Scan: Will there be a year with zero wild polio cases before 2030?

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Will there be a year with zero wild polio cases before 2030?

KXPOLIOELIM-30 · Health · 2026-05-13

Agent

10%

Market Price

-2.9%

Edge

70%

Confidence

Volume: 37,765

Spread: 0.1c

Days to resolution: 1328

Markets in event: 1

Final Rationale

My independent estimate of 5.3% was based on confirmed non-zero years for 2024 (18 cases) and 2025 (51 cases), with 2026 already at 6 cases by May and an active Pakistan-Afghanistan conflict disrupting campaigns. I PARTIALLY ACCEPT the Devil's Advocate's math critique — a proper union of my sub-forecasts implies ~8-9%, and my evidence ledger was asymmetric (the 2026 YTD pace of 6 cases through May is actually below the 2025 trend of ~4/month, and the $1.9B pledge and ceasefire talks are genuine mixed signals). I REJECT the framing that zero-from-six is highly plausible — the tail jump from a positive environmental reservoir to zero detected cases is structurally hard, not just stochastic. Adjusting upward to 7.5% addresses the math inconsistency and asymmetric coding; the remaining 2.5% gap to the market's 10% is acceptable given LOW-MEDIUM market liquidity and shallow orderbook depth, and the directional convergence supports my revised number.

Price vs. prediction

How the market moved after the agent's call. Solid blue line is the actual market price; dashed line is the agent's static forecast at $t{=}0$.

$n = 58$ follow-ups

Re-scan Context

This market has been scanned before. Previous predictions:

Date	Predicted	Market Price	Confidence
2026-05-06	50%	7%	20%
2026-04-29	4%	4%	72%
2026-04-03	4%	3%	50%

1. Planner Opus · Fermi decomposition + tool plan

Tools chosen: kalshi_data article_search web_search wikipedia_lookup code_execution

Sub-questions (Fermi decomposition)

Will wild poliovirus 1 cases reach zero in 2024 or 2025 (retrospectively confirmed)? (w=0.15)
Will wild poliovirus 1 cases reach zero in 2026 or 2027? (w=0.35)
Will wild poliovirus 1 cases reach zero in 2028 or 2029? (w=0.35)
Will the current endemic reservoirs (Pakistan, Afghanistan) be sufficiently controlled to allow a zero-case year before 2030? (w=0.15)

Planner reasoning

This question asks whether any single calendar year from 2024-2029 will record zero wild poliovirus type 1 (WPV1) cases globally. The key reference class is historical WPV1 eradication progress. Wild polio has never reached zero in any year since global tracking began — the minimum was 6 cases in 2021. Endemic transmission persists in Pakistan and Afghanistan, which represent the last two reservoirs. The trajectory is non-linear: cases spiked to 1,226 in 2020, then crashed to 6 in 2021, then rebounded. This volatility makes near-zero years possible but sustained zero elusive. The causal mechanism requires: (1) vaccine coverage reaching critical thresholds in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa/FATA and southern Afghanistan, (2) no importation to new areas, (3) functional surveillance confirming absence. Key obstacles include ongoing conflict in Afghanistan limiting vaccination access, vaccine hesitancy and security incidents in Pakistan, and the 12-month certification lag (a zero year in 2026 might only be confirmed in 2027). For temporal analysis: 2024 data is likely already available and non-zero; 2025 data will be complete by mid-2026. For 2026-2029, each year represents an independent chance given the highly uncertain trajectory. The main differentiator from standard disease elimination questions is the extreme geographic concentration (2 countries) and the history of near-misses — this is genuinely close but has repeatedly disappointed. The overall probability must account for the fact that resolution requires ANY one of 6 years (2024-2029) to hit zero, which is a union probability.

2. Research Parallel tool calls · legacy v2

Tool	Status	Time	Items
kalshi_data	OK	0.9s	-
article_search	OK	0.6s	-
web_search	OK	50.4s	-
wikipedia_lookup	OK	1.8s	-
code_execution	OK	0.0s	-

3. Evidence Synthesis Sonnet · 18 items · legacy v2

#	Strength	Credibility	Direction	Source	Claim	Priced In
1	STRONG	90	↓ DOWN	code_execution	Historical WPV1 data shows the minimum annual case count was 6 in 2021; no year has ever recorded zero cases. 2024 recorded 18 cases.	Yes
2	STRONG	88	↓ DOWN	web_search	2025 final WPV1 case count was 51 (31 Pakistan, ~20 Afghanistan), a significant increase from 2024's 18 cases, definitively ruling out zero for 2025.	Yes
3	STRONG	93	↓ DOWN	web_search	WHO retained poliovirus as a Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC) as of April 9, 2025, indicating ongoing endemic transmission with no near-term zero-case prospect.	Yes
4	STRONG	85	↓ DOWN	web_search	As of May 2026, six WPV1 cases have been reported for 2026 year-to-date, indicating active transmission continues into 2026 and zero cases for the full year 2026 is very unlikely.	No
5	STRONG	88	↓ DOWN	article_search	Pakistan declared 'open war' with Afghanistan in February 2026, with ongoing military strikes and border closures since October 2025, severely disrupting any vaccination campaigns in affected border regions.	No
6	MODERATE	82	↓ DOWN	article_search	Pakistan-Afghanistan border closures have been in place since mid-October 2025, paralyzing cross-border movement and likely disrupting coordinated vaccination efforts between the two endemic countries.	Yes
7	MODERATE	87	↓ DOWN	article_search	CDC issued a Level 2 global polio travel notice in March 2026 covering 30 destinations where poliovirus has been found in the past 13 months, indicating broad ongoing circulation.	No
8	MODERATE	88	↓ DOWN	web_search	WPV1 was detected in an environmental sample from Hamburg, Germany in October 2025, linked to Kandahar, Afghanistan, demonstrating continued international spread risk.	Yes
9	MODERATE	85	↓ DOWN	article_search	Pakistan and Afghanistan agreed to a ceasefire mediated by Qatar and Turkey in October 2025, but fighting resumed by February 2026, showing instability in the conflict that disrupts polio campaigns.	No
10	MODERATE	85	↓ DOWN	article_search	$1.9 billion was pledged in December 2025 for polio eradication through 2029, but a $440 million funding gap remains after high-income country foreign aid cuts, potentially limiting campaign effectiveness in 2028-2029.	Yes
11	MODERATE	78	↓ DOWN	article_search	GPEI aims for eradication by 2029, but the ongoing Pakistan-Afghanistan conflict and USAID/foreign aid cuts create a significant funding and operational gap that reduces probability of zero cases before 2030.	No
12	STRONG	88	↓ DOWN	code_execution	Historical WPV1 case counts show extreme volatility (6 in 2021, 1226 in 2020, 30 in 2022), suggesting even if a near-zero year occurs it could easily rebound, and the trend for 2025 (51 cases) moved in the wrong direction.	Yes
13	STRONG	87	↓ DOWN	web_search	673 WPV1-positive environmental samples in 2025 (608 from Pakistan alone) suggest vast under-detection and deep environmental reservoir, making a zero-case year in 2028-2029 extremely challenging.	No
14	STRONG	90	↓ DOWN	article_search	Active Pakistan-Afghanistan military conflict since late 2025 with airstrikes on cities including Kabul has severely disrupted the operational environment for vaccination campaigns in both endemic reservoir countries.	No
15	STRONG	88	↓ DOWN	web_search	Southern Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) accounted for 17 of Pakistan's 31 WPV1 cases in 2025, in an area with known security challenges and militant activity that has historically blocked vaccination teams.	Yes
16	MODERATE	82	↓ DOWN	article_search	Taliban-controlled Afghanistan has severely limited access for international health workers; peace talks in China as of April 2026 are ongoing but no ceasefire is confirmed, suggesting continued disruption through at least mid-2026.	No
17	MODERATE	83	↓ DOWN	article_search	USAID and high-income country foreign aid cuts have created a $440M GPEI funding gap through 2029, reducing capacity for vaccination campaigns and surveillance in Pakistan and Afghanistan.	Yes
18	MODERATE	65	↓ DOWN	kalshi_data	Kalshi prediction market prices this question at 10.40% probability (up from ~6% 30 days ago and ~7% 7 days ago), reflecting recent modest upward revision but overall low confidence in zero-case year before 2030.	Yes

Information Gaps

Exact 2026 year-to-date WPV1 case count breakdown by month is truncated — we know 6 cases as of May 2026 but not the exact date cutoff or whether this is accelerating or slowing
No specific data on whether vaccination campaigns in KPK and southern Afghanistan have been suspended or continued during the Pakistan-Afghanistan conflict
No data on current US CDC or USAID funding levels for GPEI operations in Pakistan and Afghanistan following foreign aid cuts
No information on whether Taliban has agreed to any vaccination protocols for 2026 given the war with Pakistan
No data on 2024 final confirmed case count breakdown by month to assess seasonality patterns
No expert epidemiological projections for 2027-2029 case trajectories under current conflict scenario
Unknown whether Pakistan-Afghanistan ceasefire (April 2026 talks) will lead to border reopening that could allow coordinated vaccination

Key Uncertainties

Duration and intensity of the Pakistan-Afghanistan military conflict — a prolonged war could cause cases to spike dramatically and push zero far beyond 2030
Whether Taliban will allow international vaccination teams access to southern and eastern Afghanistan during active conflict with Pakistan
The $440M GPEI funding gap — which donors will fill it and on what timeline, affecting campaign coverage through 2029
Non-linear case dynamics: 2025 showed a rebound from 2024's 18 to 51, suggesting the trajectory is worsening not improving
Whether environmental surveillance (608 Pakistan positive samples in 2025) reflects true transmission intensity that would make zero reported paralytic cases statistically near-impossible even in a good year
Whether any ceasefire between Pakistan and Afghanistan leads to sufficient operational normalization for effective vaccination by 2027-2028
Historical pattern of near-misses (6 cases in 2021 but never zero) suggests a structural floor that may reflect surveillance sensitivity rather than true transmission

Market Context

Price: 0.104 · 7d: +0.034 · 30d: +0.044
Volume: LOW-MODERATE · Depth: SHALLOW
Reliability: LOW-MEDIUM — modest volume of 238 contracts/day, price range of 3-12% over 158 days suggests thin liquidity; recent upward drift may reflect news flow about 2026 case counts being relatively low so far (6 cases), but market still prices this as unlikely

4. Independent Forecaster Opus · No market price · legacy v2 Did NOT see market price

Independent estimate: 5% (74% confidence)

base rate

75% conf

evidence driven

78% conf

contrarian

70% conf

Spread

1pp

Low disagreement

sq1: Will WPV1 cases reach zero in 2024 or 2025?

Definitively ruled out: 2024 had 18 confirmed cases, 2025 had 51 cases (31 Pakistan, ~20 Afghanistan). Both years are retrospectively known to be non-zero. Probability near floor.

sq2: Will WPV1 cases reach zero in 2026 or 2027?

Base rate: zero year has never occurred. 2026 already has 6 cases by May, ruling out 2026 essentially (P~0.01). For 2027, would require dramatic reversal from 51 cases in 2025 plus 608 positive environmental samples in Pakistan. Pakistan-Afghanistan conflict actively disrupting campaigns. Union of 2026 (~0.01) and 2027 (~0.02) gives ~0.03.

sq3: Will WPV1 cases reach zero in 2028 or 2029?

More time for conflict resolution and vaccination recovery, but starting from a worsening trajectory (51 cases 2025, environmental reservoir vast, $440M funding gap). Historical minimum was 6 cases (2021) — even the best year ever wasn't zero. Each year ~3-4%, union ~6%.

sq4: Will endemic reservoirs be sufficiently controlled?

Active war between the two endemic countries, Taliban restrictions, funding gaps, security challenges in KPK. Structural conditions are worse than 2021 when 6 cases were achieved. Low probability of sufficient control.

Show full reasoning trace

base rate: Zero WPV1 cases has never occurred in any year of global surveillance. Minimum was 6 cases in 2021. Historical base rate of any single year being zero: ~0% empirically, but 2021 demonstrated near-misses are possible.

evidence updates: 2024 (18 cases) and 2025 (51 cases) confirmed non-zero, eliminating 2 of 6 years. 2026 already at 6 cases by May. Pakistan-Afghanistan war severely disrupts campaigns. 608 Pakistan environmental positives in 2025 indicate deep reservoir. Trajectory worsening, not improving. All evidence pushes DOWN from any optimistic prior.

combination method: Union probability across 6 years, with first 2 essentially ruled out and 2026 nearly ruled out. Remaining hope is 2027-2029 (~3 effective chances each ~2-3%).

final: Combined probability ~5%. Aligns with prior forecasts of 3-4% but slightly higher to account for 3+ years of remaining opportunity and possibility of rapid post-conflict vaccination surge.

ensemble: {'ensemble_count': 3, 'perspectives': {'base_rate': {'p_yes': 0.05, 'confidence': 0.75}, 'evidence_driven': {'p_yes': 0.05, 'confidence': 0.78}, 'contrarian': {'p_yes': 0.06, 'confidence': 0.7}}, 'spread': 0.01, 'individual_p_yes': {'base_rate': 0.05, 'evidence_driven': 0.05, 'contrarian': 0.06}}

5. Devil's Advocate Sonnet · legacy v2 Market price revealed

Math Error Asymmetric Evidence Reasoning Flaw

Challenges

The sub-question decomposition treats years as roughly independent in a union, but they are highly correlated (same endemic reservoirs, same conflict, same funding). However, the bigger issue is the combination math: if sq2 (2026 OR 2027) = 0.03 and sq3 (2028 OR 2029) = 0.06, a naive union gives ~0.089, not 0.053. The forecaster's final number is BELOW the implied union of their own sub-forecasts, suggesting either an unjustified downward adjustment or a math inconsistency.
The forecaster notes 2026 has 'only 6 cases by May' which is actually comparable to the 2021 record-low full-year total of 6. This is arguably a mildly UP-pointing signal for 2026 specifically (cases may be running lower than 2025's pace) that gets coded as DOWN. The evidence balance of 18 DOWN / 0 UP suggests confirmation bias — no positive signals were credited (e.g., $1.9B pledge, April 2026 ceasefire talks, low 2026 YTD count, GPEI 2029 target).
The 'historical minimum was 6, never zero' framing slightly commits the never-happened fallacy. The gap from 6 to 0 in a single year is plausible given stochastic tail behavior; 2021 demonstrated the system can get very close. With ~3.5 more years of opportunity and known volatility, the floor probability should arguably be higher than 5%.
Information gap on 2026 YTD trajectory is material — if 6 cases through May represents a slowdown vs 2025's pace (51/year ≈ 4-5/month, so 6 by May is well below trend), this is meaningful evidence the forecaster did not incorporate. Widening uncertainty here is warranted.

Suggested adjustment: +2pp

Two genuine reasoning issues warrant a modest upward adjustment: (1) the sub-question union math implies ~8-9% if sub-forecasts are taken at face value, not 5.3%; (2) the evidence ledger is 18-0 DOWN, which reflects asymmetric coding rather than truly one-sided evidence (the $1.9B pledge, ceasefire talks, and low 2026 YTD pace are at minimum mixed signals). Adjusting to ~7-8% reflects these flaws, not market conformity. This happens to move toward the market but is justified independently.

6. Aggregator Opus · final calibrated forecast

8% (70% confidence)