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Will quarterly GDP be above 5% in any quarter in Q1 2025 to Q4 2028?

KXGDPUSMAX-28-5 · Economics · 2026-05-11
48%
Agent
52%
Market Price
-4.0%
Edge
45%
Confidence
Volume: 158,015
Spread: 1.6c
Days to resolution: 991
Markets in event: 1
Final Rationale
My independent forecast confirmed Q1-Q4 2025 all came in below 5% (peak Q3 at 4.4%), leaving 11 quarters of opportunity with a post-1990 base rate of ~5.7% per quarter, mechanically yielding ~49% under independence. I ACCEPT the critique's math correction — my 43.7% under-weighted the disjunctive structure by conflating central-tendency drags (CBO 2.2%, rising unemployment) with tail quarterly outcomes, when a single 5%+ quarter is consistent with 2% annual averages. I PARTIALLY ACCEPT the elevated post-COVID volatility point but don't fully extrapolate it. Moving to 0.48 reflects the corrected combination minus a modest downward tilt for genuine structural headwinds (tariffs, no sharp contraction yet to fuel a rebound). The market at 0.52 is within 4 points and the convergence after correction reinforces this range; thin/declining market volume doesn't warrant fully matching it.
Price vs. prediction
How the market moved after the agent's call. Solid blue line is the actual market price; dashed line is the agent's static forecast at $t{=}0$.
$n = 58$ follow-ups
Re-scan Context
This market has been scanned before. Previous predictions:
DatePredictedMarket PriceConfidence
2026-05-04 52% 56% 42%
2026-04-05 50% 59% 40%
1. Planner Opus · Fermi decomposition + tool plan
Tools chosen: kalshi_data fred_data article_search web_search wikipedia_lookup code_execution
Sub-questions (Fermi decomposition)
  1. Has any quarter from Q1 2025 through Q1 2026 already recorded annualized GDP growth above 5%? (w=0.25)
  2. Will any quarter from Q2 2026 through Q4 2027 record annualized GDP growth above 5%? (w=0.40)
  3. Will any quarter in 2028 record annualized GDP growth above 5%? (w=0.20)
  4. Is there a realistic economic shock such as a post-recession rebound or fiscal stimulus surge between now and Q4 2028 that could produce a single quarter of above 5% annualized GDP growth? (w=0.15)
Planner reasoning
This question asks whether ANY single quarter in a 16-quarter window (Q1 2025 to Q4 2028) will record annualized real GDP growth above 5%. The key feature is that this is a maximum-over-window question, so even moderate per-quarter probabilities compound significantly over 16 quarters. Reference class: post-1990 US quarterly GDP data shows roughly 5-8 quarters out of ~140 exceeded 5% annualized growth, giving a per-quarter base rate around 4-6%. Over 16 quarters, the cumulative probability of at least one exceeding 5% is roughly 50-60% at baseline. However, current conditions matter heavily: the 2025-2026 environment features trade war headwinds, tariff uncertainty, and potential recessionary pressures that suppress near-term odds. The rebound scenario is critical: if a recession occurs in 2025-2026, a sharp recovery bounce in 2026-2027 could easily produce a 5%+ quarter, as seen after the 2020 Q2 contraction (Q3 2020 was +33%). The temporal sequence: Q1-Q4 2025 data is either already released or nearly so; Q2 2026 through Q4 2028 represents the key window. The primary causal mechanisms are: (1) post-recession rebound bounce, (2) fiscal stimulus surge, (3) productivity shock from AI. The question is different from average growth questions because it only requires one outlier quarter, making it more sensitive to tail events and volatility.
2. Research Parallel tool calls · legacy v2
ToolStatusTimeItemsSummary
kalshi_data OK 1.5s -
fred_data OK 21.9s -
article_search OK 0.7s -
web_search OK 35.6s -
wikipedia_lookup OK 1.5s -
code_execution OK 0.0s -
3. Evidence Synthesis Sonnet · 26 items · legacy v2
#StrengthCredibilityDirectionSourceClaimPriced In
1 STRONG 95 ↓ DOWN web_search Q1 2025 real GDP decreased at an annualized rate of 0.5% (final BEA estimate), well below the 5% threshold. Yes
2 STRONG 95 ↓ DOWN web_search Q2 2025 real GDP grew at an annualized rate of 3.8% (final BEA estimate), below the 5% threshold. Yes
3 STRONG 95 ↓ DOWN web_search Q3 2025 real GDP grew at an annualized rate of 4.4% (final BEA estimate), the highest quarter in the window so far but still below 5%. Yes
4 STRONG 95 ↓ DOWN web_search Q4 2025 real GDP grew at an annualized rate of only 0.5% (final BEA estimate), heavily suppressed by the 43-day government shutdown. Yes
5 WEAK 40 NEUTRAL article_search Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick predicted Q1 2026 GDP would exceed 5% growth, speaking in January 2026; mainstream economists were skeptical of this claim. Yes
6 STRONG 90 ↓ DOWN fred_data Real GDP (GDPC1) stood at $24,174.5 billion as of Q1 2026, with a year-over-year increase of ~$1,594 billion, consistent with roughly 2% annual growth — far below 5% pace. Yes
7 MODERATE 90 ↓ DOWN fred_data Unemployment rate was 4.3% as of April 2026, up 0.1pp year-over-year, indicating a modest labor market softening rather than a booming economy. Yes
8 MODERATE 70 NEUTRAL article_search Q1 2026 GDP data does not appear to have been released yet as of the article dates (latest GDP article is from Feb 2026 covering Q4 2025); Q1 2026 outcome is still unknown. Yes
9 STRONG 88 ↓ DOWN web_search CBO February 2026 baseline projects real GDP growth of 2.2% for full-year 2026, with higher tariffs weighing on growth — far below the 5% threshold on an annual basis. Yes
10 MODERATE 65 ↓ DOWN article_search Article from Feb 2026 notes AI spending may have been overstated as a growth driver, with prominent forecasters revising down AI-related GDP contributions, reducing one upside scenario. Yes
11 MODERATE 75 ↓ DOWN article_search The Supreme Court struck down many of Trump's tariffs in February 2026, but other tariffs remain and new ones are being introduced, creating continued trade uncertainty that weighs on growth forecasts. Yes
12 WEAK 55 ↓ DOWN article_search Middle East war (U.S. and Israel vs. Iran) introduced new external complexity per China's Two Sessions address in March 2026, representing a geopolitical risk factor for global growth. No
13 MODERATE 72 ↑ UP code_execution Post-1990 historical base rate for any single quarter exceeding 5% annualized GDP growth is approximately 5.7%; over 11 remaining quarters (sq2 + sq3 window), the base probability of at least one exceeding 5% is ~47%. Yes
14 WEAK 35 NEUTRAL article_search Commerce Secretary Lutnick predicted 6% growth for the US by end of 2026; mainstream economists were deeply skeptical and no major forecaster endorsed this view. Yes
15 MODERATE 88 ↓ DOWN fred_data Unemployment at 4.3% (April 2026) with modest year-over-year increase; no sharp recession shock has materialized yet that would set up a massive rebound quarter in 2026-2027. Yes
16 WEAK 55 ↓ DOWN web_search No institutional forecasts (CBO, Fed) extend specific quarterly projections to 2028 with sufficient granularity; long-range annual forecasts do not anticipate 5%+ growth. Yes
17 MODERATE 65 NEUTRAL code_execution Base rate for at least one of four 2028 quarters exceeding 5% annualized GDP is approximately 20% (4 quarters × ~5.7% per quarter base rate, compounded). Yes
18 WEAK 45 ↑ UP article_search 2028 is a US presidential election year — historically, election-year fiscal stimulus and spending sometimes boosts growth, though rarely to 5%+ in the modern era. Yes
19 MODERATE 75 ↑ UP article_search A 43-day government shutdown in Q4 2025 artificially suppressed GDP by an estimated ~1.9 percentage points; this creates a statistical base effect that could boost Q1 2026 rebound growth. Yes
20 WEAK 50 NEUTRAL article_search Middle East war (U.S./Israel vs. Iran) mentioned in March 2026 article creates geopolitical uncertainty that could either disrupt or, in resolution scenarios, lead to demand rebounds. No
21 MODERATE 78 ↑ UP article_search Fed rate cuts occurred in 2025 (three cuts), creating monetary easing that could support accelerated growth in 2026-2027 if combined with other tailwinds. Yes
22 MODERATE 80 ↑ UP article_search 2025 reconciliation act (tax cuts) expected by CBO to spur additional economic activity in 2026, a modest positive fiscal stimulus. Yes
23 MODERATE 68 ↓ DOWN article_search AI investment boom was cited as a major growth engine in 2025, but a Feb 2026 analysis argues AI's contribution to GDP was likely overstated, reducing the AI productivity shock scenario. No
24 MODERATE 80 ↓ DOWN web_search Post-pandemic Q3 2020 rebound showed GDP can spike to 33%+ annualized in a single quarter after a sharp contraction; Q1 2025 contraction (-0.5%) is far too mild to trigger a comparable rebound. Yes
25 MODERATE 72 ↓ DOWN article_search Tariff uncertainty and ongoing trade war headwinds (even after Supreme Court struck down some tariffs) create a structural drag that makes sustained 5%+ growth unlikely without an offsetting shock. Yes
26 MODERATE 65 NEUTRAL kalshi_data Kalshi market KXGDPUSMAX-28-5 prices the probability of ANY quarter in Q1 2025–Q4 2028 exceeding 5% at 52%, down 7pp over 30 days, suggesting declining market confidence. Yes
Information Gaps
  • Q1 2026 GDP data has not yet been released (advance estimate typically released late April 2026); this is the most critical near-term data point missing.
  • No specific quarterly GDP forecasts for Q2–Q4 2026 and 2027 from major institutions (Fed, CBO) found in research data — only annual averages.
  • No data on current recession probability forecasts from major banks or the Fed as of Q2 2026, which is critical for assessing the rebound scenario.
  • No information on the 2025 reconciliation act's specific magnitude of fiscal stimulus, which affects the odds of a demand surge.
  • No data on Q1 2026 GDP estimate or early indicators (e.g., GDPNow, Blue Chip consensus) for the current quarter.
  • Missing details on the U.S.-Israel-Iran war's economic impact on oil prices and supply chains, which could materially affect 2026-2027 growth.
  • No 2027-2028 GDP projections from any source in the research data.
  • Unclear whether tariff resolution scenarios (e.g., U.S.-China trade deal) are being priced into forecasts.
Key Uncertainties
  • Whether Q1 2026 GDP shows a rebound from Q4 2025's shutdown-suppressed 0.5% — even a 3-4% bounce would not resolve YES but would signal momentum.
  • Whether a U.S. recession materializes in 2026, which could set up a 2026-2027 rebound quarter exceeding 5% (the key YES scenario).
  • The ultimate resolution of U.S. tariff policy — whether tariffs are substantially reduced via court rulings or trade deals, which could release pent-up demand.
  • AI productivity realization: whether AI transitions from investment phase to genuine productivity gains that could lift potential GDP growth rate.
  • Middle East war (U.S./Israel vs. Iran) trajectory — escalation could suppress global growth, while resolution could provide demand stimulus.
  • Whether fiscal stimulus from the 2025 reconciliation act and any additional spending measures is large enough to create a demand surge in any single quarter.
  • Fed rate cut path in 2026-2027 — aggressive cuts could stimulate growth but would typically only arrive in response to weakness.
Market Context
Price: 0.52 · 7d: -0.046 · 30d: -0.07
Volume: LOW-MODERATE — 279 contracts average daily volume is thin for a multi-year question · Depth: UNKNOWN — no orderbook depth data provided
Reliability: MEDIUM-LOW — moderate volume with a declining trend over 30 days from 72% to 52% suggests significant re-pricing as economic data disappointed; thin volume limits reliability as a precise probability signal
4. Independent Forecaster Opus · No market price · legacy v2 Did NOT see market price
Independent estimate: 44% (47% confidence)
base rate
45%
45% conf
evidence driven
46%
45% conf
contrarian
40%
50% conf
Spread
6pp
Low disagreement
sq1: Has any quarter from Q1 2025 through Q1 2026 already recorded annualized GDP growth above 5%?
5%
Q1 2025: -0.5%, Q2 2025: 3.8%, Q3 2025: 4.4%, Q4 2025: 0.5% — all confirmed below 5%. Only Q1 2026 remains unknown. With Q4 2025 shutdown drag, a Q1 2026 rebound is plausible but unemployment is rising, CBO projects ~2.2% for 2026, and FRED data implies ~2% YoY growth through Q1 2026. Lutnick's 5%+ prediction is dismissed by economists. Probability Q1 2026 exceeds 5%: ~5-7%, lowered slightly because consensus points to moderate rebound (2-3%).
sq2: Will any quarter from Q2 2026 through Q4 2027 record annualized GDP growth above 5%?
32%
Base rate: 7 quarters × ~5.7% per-quarter base rate gives ~34% chance of at least one >5% quarter. Adjustments: tariff headwinds, CBO 2.2% projection, softening labor market, AI overhang push DOWN by ~8%. Offsets: Fed cuts, reconciliation act stimulus, possible recession-rebound dynamics (mild contraction risk in 2026) push UP by ~6%. Net estimate ~32%.
sq3: Will any quarter in 2028 record annualized GDP growth above 5%?
21%
Base rate: 4 quarters × 5.7% ≈ 21% probability at least one exceeds 5%. Election-year stimulus slightly UP, but no specific shock evidence. Conditional on no recession occurring earlier (lowering rebound odds in 2028), roughly base rate. Estimate 21%.
sq4: Is there a realistic economic shock that could produce a single 5%+ quarter through Q4 2028?
40%
Multiple plausible scenarios exist: (1) shutdown-bounce in Q1 2026, (2) recession-rebound if 2026 downturn materializes, (3) tariff resolution unleashing pent-up demand, (4) AI productivity surge, (5) fiscal stimulus surge. None individually likely but cumulatively the probability that at least one materializes meaningfully is moderate. Historical precedent: most 5%+ quarters since 1990 came from rebounds (2020 Q3, 2021 Q2, post-2008 quarters). Mild Q1 2025 contraction insufficient for big bounce on its own. Estimate 40%.
Show full reasoning trace
base rate: Post-1990 quarterly base rate of 5%+ annualized GDP growth is ~5.7% per quarter. With 5 confirmed sub-5% quarters (Q1 2025-Q4 2025 plus near-certain Q1 2026), 11 quarters remain with base probability ~47% of at least one >5%.
evidence updates: DOWN: CBO 2.2% 2026 projection, ongoing tariff headwinds, AI contribution revised down, rising unemployment, no sharp contraction to trigger massive rebound (-10% from base). UP: Fed cuts, reconciliation stimulus, shutdown rebound base effects, potential 2026 recession setting up 2027 rebound (+5%).
combination method: Treated sq1-sq3 as disjoint window maximums combined via independence: 1-product(1-p_i), then adjusted for positive correlation between sq2 and sq3 since persistent structural drags affect both.
final: Combined estimate ~45%. The window is long enough that base rates favor a moderate probability, but current conditions (tariffs, mild slowdown without sharp contraction, downgraded AI thesis) suppress the most common path to 5%+ (sharp rebound). Confidence moderate given uncertainty about whether 2026 enters recession.
ensemble: {'ensemble_count': 3, 'perspectives': {'base_rate': {'p_yes': 0.45, 'confidence': 0.45}, 'evidence_driven': {'p_yes': 0.46, 'confidence': 0.45}, 'contrarian': {'p_yes': 0.4, 'confidence': 0.5}}, 'spread': 0.06, 'individual_p_yes': {'base_rate': 0.45, 'evidence_driven': 0.46, 'contrarian': 0.4}}
5. Devil's Advocate Sonnet · legacy v2 Market price revealed
Asymmetric Evidence Math Error Reasoning Flaw
Challenges
  1. Math check on sq2: 7 quarters at 5.7% per-quarter base rate gives 1-(0.943)^7 ≈ 34%, which is correct. But sq3 uses 4 quarters × 5.7% ≈ 21% (also correct as 1-(0.943)^4 ≈ 20.7%). However, the combination method in the trace is inconsistent: sq1 (~5%), sq2 (32%), sq3 (21%) combined via independence gives 1-(0.95)(0.68)(0.79) = 1-0.510 = 49%, not 43.7%. The stated 'positive correlation adjustment' downward isn't clearly quantified — the forecaster should show this math explicitly. The combined number appears to under-weight the disjunctive structure.
  2. Asymmetric evidence weighting: The forecaster lists 15 DOWN vs 5 UP evidence items and lets this drag the estimate below the mechanical base-rate combination (~49%). But many DOWN items (CBO 2.2% for 2026, unemployment 4.3%, AI overhang) are about CENTRAL TENDENCY / annual averages, not about tail quarterly outcomes. A 5%+ single quarter is a tail event that can occur even when annual growth averages 2.2% (e.g., one quarter at 5.5% and three at ~1% averages ~2.2%). The forecaster conflates 'central forecast is low' with 'tail probability is low'.
  3. The sq4 'shock' sub-question appears to double-count with sq1-sq3 rather than provide independent information. It's unclear whether sq4 was used in the final combination or just as a sanity check — the methodology should be explicit.
  4. Historical base rate of 5.7% per quarter post-1990 may itself be understated for the current regime. Post-COVID, quarterly GDP volatility has been elevated (multiple 5%+ quarters in 2020-2021, plus Q3 2025 at 4.4% just barely missed). The base rate may be 7-9% in current high-volatility regime, which would push the combined probability up.
  5. Time-awareness: 991 days to resolution with 11 quarters remaining means substantial uncertainty — confidence of 0.467 may be appropriately moderate, but the point estimate should reflect the heavy right-tail risk from possible recession-rebound dynamics that the forecaster acknowledges but only weights at +5-6%.
Suggested adjustment: +5pp
The mechanical combination of the sub-forecasts (sq1=5%, sq2=32%, sq3=21%) under independence yields ~49%, not 43.7%. The downward adjustment for correlation is under-justified, and the forecaster appears to let directional evidence count (15 DOWN vs 5 UP) drag down a tail-event probability when most of that evidence concerns central tendency rather than tail outcomes. A modest upward adjustment to ~0.49 better reflects the disjunctive math and the tail-vs-mean distinction. This is not a market-conformity adjustment (though it happens to move toward the market).
Market comparison: Forecaster: 43.7%, Market: 52%. The 8-point divergence is partially explained by a reasoning flaw in combination math and asymmetric weighting of central-tendency evidence against a tail-event question. After correcting these, the gap narrows to ~3 points, which is within reasonable disagreement given thin market volume.
6. Aggregator Opus · final calibrated forecast
48% (45% confidence)
My independent forecast confirmed Q1-Q4 2025 all came in below 5% (peak Q3 at 4.4%), leaving 11 quarters of opportunity with a post-1990 base rate of ~5.7% per quarter, mechanically yielding ~49% under independence. I ACCEPT the critique's math correction — my 43.7% under-weighted the disjunctive structure by conflating central-tendency drags (CBO 2.2%, rising unemployment) with tail quarterly outcomes, when a single 5%+ quarter is consistent with 2% annual averages. I PARTIALLY ACCEPT the elevated post-COVID volatility point but don't fully extrapolate it. Moving to 0.48 reflects the corrected combination minus a modest downward tilt for genuine structural headwinds (tariffs, no sharp contraction yet to fuel a rebound). The market at 0.52 is within 4 points and the convergence after correction reinforces this range; thin/declining market volume doesn't warrant fully matching it.