Scan: Will the President be impeached before Jan 20, 2029?

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Will the President be impeached before Jan 20, 2029?

KXIMPEACH-29-JAN20 · Politics · 2026-05-11

48%

Agent

64%

Market Price

-16.0%

Edge

40%

Confidence

Volume: 324,863

Spread: 3.0c

Days to resolution: 985

Markets in event: 1

Final Rationale

My structural decomposition (P(Dem House)×P(impeach|Dem) + P(GOP House)×P(impeach|GOP)) yielded ~38-41%, but I ACCEPT the critique that sq3 underweights Trump's personal 2/2 impeachment base rate when opposition controls the House, combined with the pre-built infrastructure (articles already filed, 85+ Dems calling for it, 55% public support) — this pushes sq3 closer to 65-70%. I PARTIALLY ACCEPT the positive correlation argument (same conditions driving Dem House also raise impeachment willingness) and the tail-risk floor for sq4 over 985 days. The market at 62% with declining trend and an anomalous bid-ask spread deserves moderate but not full deference; I land at 48% — meaningfully above my independent estimate due to genuine reasoning flaws, but below the market because I think recent salience (Iran war, Epstein) is somewhat overpriced and Jeffries' explicit caution is real evidence the market may under-weight.

Price vs. prediction

How the market moved after the agent's call. Solid blue line is the actual market price; dashed line is the agent's static forecast at $t{=}0$.

$n = 58$ follow-ups

Re-scan Context

This market has been scanned before. Previous predictions:

Date	Predicted	Market Price	Confidence
2026-04-07	50%	68%	40%

1. Planner Opus · Fermi decomposition + tool plan

Tools chosen: kalshi_data kalshi_orderbook article_search web_search wikipedia_lookup code_execution

Sub-questions (Fermi decomposition)

Will Republicans maintain control of the House of Representatives through the 2026 midterm elections? (w=0.25)
Will Democrats gain control of the House of Representatives after the 2026 midterm elections? (w=0.25)
If Democrats control the House, will they have sufficient political will and majority to pass articles of impeachment against the President? (w=0.30)
Even with a Republican-controlled House, will enough Republican members defect to impeach the President due to a major scandal or crisis? (w=0.20)

Planner reasoning

This question asks whether President Trump (currently in his second non-consecutive term, starting Jan 2025) will be impeached before Jan 20, 2029. The critical causal chain is: (1) House composition determines feasibility — impeachment requires only a simple majority in the House; (2) Republicans currently control the House, making near-term impeachment virtually impossible without massive intraparty revolt; (3) The 2026 midterms (November 2026) are the pivotal event — if Democrats flip the House, impeachment becomes plausible; (4) Even with a Democratic House, there needs to be political will and a triggering scandal/event. Reference class: Only 4 presidential impeachments in US history (Johnson, Clinton, Trump x2). Trump being the only president impeached twice raises his personal base rate but doesn't change the institutional dynamics. In the modern era (post-WWII), ~3 impeachment votes out of ~14 presidential terms, but most occurred in polarized political environments similar to today. Temporal analysis: Today is May 2026. The midterm elections are ~6 months away (November 2026). If Democrats win the House, the new Congress is seated January 2027, leaving ~24 months until resolution for impeachment proceedings. This is ample time if the political will exists. If Republicans retain the House, the probability drops to near-zero (cross-party impeachment is historically unprecedented at scale). Key differentiating factors: (1) Trump has already survived two impeachments, suggesting Republican resistance to removing him; (2) Historical pattern of opposition party winning House in midterms (~70% of the time) increases Democratic odds; (3) Even Democratic-controlled houses may prioritize governing over impeachment if margins are thin; (4) A major constitutional crisis, foreign policy disaster, or criminal conviction could accelerate Republican defections. The market price from Kalshi will be a key anchor.

2. Research Parallel tool calls · legacy v2

Tool	Status	Time	Items
kalshi_data	OK	2.1s	-
kalshi_orderbook	OK	0.1s	-
article_search	OK	0.7s	-
web_search	OK	54.5s	-
wikipedia_lookup	OK	2.4s	-
code_execution	OK	0.0s	-

3. Evidence Synthesis Sonnet · 22 items · legacy v2

#	Strength	Credibility	Direction	Source	Claim	Priced In
1	MODERATE	72	↓ DOWN	article_search	Democrats swept November 2025 off-year elections and have been overperforming in special elections since Trump took office, suggesting a strong anti-Trump wave is building that could cost Republicans the House in 2026.	Yes
2	STRONG	82	↓ DOWN	article_search	A Democrat won a special election in a Florida district including Mar-a-Lago that Republicans had won by 19 points in 2024, described as part of a broader trend of Democratic overperformance.	Yes
3	MODERATE	70	↓ DOWN	article_search	The unpopular war with Iran and affordability issues have given Democrats cause to be hopeful about flipping key seats; CBS polling found more voters prefer Democratic control of Congress.	Yes
4	MODERATE	75	↓ DOWN	article_search	Trump's political shadow has driven unusually high opposition-party voting in every election since 2018, with voters disapproving of Trump voting for the other party at rates exceeding any other recent president.	Yes
5	WEAK	60	↑ UP	article_search	Supreme Court is weighing mail ballot rules that could affect vote counting in 14 states ahead of November 2026 midterms, introducing electoral uncertainty that could advantage Republicans.	Yes
6	MODERATE	68	↑ UP	article_search	House Democrats are charting an aggressive post-midterm strategy including subpoenas and investigations, suggesting they believe and are planning for a Democratic House majority after November 2026.	Yes
7	MODERATE	68	↑ UP	article_search	Democrats have a plausible path to recapturing the Senate in 2026 according to candidate recruiting successes, though the path for Senate is challenging due to white working-class voters in key battleground states.	Yes
8	MODERATE	70	↑ UP	article_search	The Iran war and affordability issues are driving Democratic optimism about House and Senate flips, with CBS polling showing majority preference for Democratic congressional control.	Yes
9	MODERATE	68	↓ DOWN	article_search	Democrats face structural headwinds in recapturing the Senate, needing to overcome blue-collar barricades in states like Maine, Ohio, Michigan, and Minnesota — same dynamics may apply to House races in competitive districts.	Yes
10	STRONG	78	↑ UP	web_search	As of April 24, 2026, a cohort of House Democrats is actively building a 'Day 1' impeachment case, with Rep. Ansari (D-AZ) stating 'the push for impeachment is going to be overwhelming' if Democrats retake the House.	No
11	MODERATE	65	↑ UP	web_search	A Strength In Numbers/Verasight poll found 55% of U.S. adults support House impeachment of Trump, with net +18 support putting it at Watergate-era levels; over 85 House and Senate Democrats have called for impeachment or 25th Amendment removal.	No
12	MODERATE	60	↑ UP	web_search	A Lake Research Partners poll (April 6, 2026) found 52% of likely 2026 voters support impeaching Trump, with majority support among independents, indicating broad electoral mandate for impeachment if Democrats win.	No
13	STRONG	80	↓ DOWN	article_search	Democratic leadership under Minority Leader Hakeem Jeffries has not committed to impeachment, with a leadership aide saying Jeffries has given no indication of backing a proactive impeachment effort; party is cautious about making impeachment a central campaign issue.	Yes
14	MODERATE	75	↓ DOWN	article_search	House Democrats as of January 2026 were 'not eager to impeach Trump' even with a list of alleged impeachable offenses, fearing it would distract from midterm messaging; article noted 'calculus could change if Democrats regain the House majority.'	Yes
15	MODERATE	70	↑ UP	article_search	Democrats are already planning post-midterm investigations including subpoenas for Trump on Epstein, and impeachment proceedings against DHS Secretary Noem, showing a pipeline of accountability actions short of presidential impeachment.	Yes
16	MODERATE	72	↑ UP	web_search	Rep. John B. Larson (CT-01) filed articles of impeachment as of April 7, 2026, indicating at least one formal impeachment resolution exists even in the minority, priming the process for majority consideration.	No
17	STRONG	85	↓ DOWN	article_search	Trump has survived two prior impeachments with near-unanimous Republican Senate votes to acquit, indicating deeply entrenched Republican resistance to cross-party impeachment; no evidence of significant Republican defection sentiment in current Congress.	Yes
18	MODERATE	75	↓ DOWN	article_search	The U.S. attack on Iran was called unconstitutional by Democrats and opponents, but even following this major event, Republicans did not signal any willingness to join impeachment efforts — no GOP defection toward impeachment reported.	Yes
19	MODERATE	72	↓ DOWN	article_search	Epstein-related revelations including photos showing Trump at Epstein's estate and emails referencing Trump have created political pressure, but no Republican members of Congress have publicly called for impeachment over these disclosures.	Yes
20	WEAK	55	↓ DOWN	article_search	An apparent assassination attempt on Trump (referenced in April 2026 Norah O'Donnell interview) could rally Republican support around the president and further reduce any chance of GOP defections on impeachment.	No
21	MODERATE	74	NEUTRAL	kalshi_data	The Kalshi impeachment market prices the overall probability at 62%, down 6% in 7 days and 8% in 30 days, suggesting recent events have modestly reduced the market's assessed impeachment probability.	Yes
22	WEAK	55	NEUTRAL	kalshi_orderbook	The Kalshi impeachment market has very high liquidity (depth 25,955 contracts, yes_bid $0.31 vs current price $0.62), suggesting the orderbook has significant depth though the spread is unusually wide at $0.58.	Yes

Information Gaps

No specific Kalshi or prediction market data on the probability of Democrats winning the House in 2026 midterms specifically (as opposed to the overall impeachment market)
No current generic congressional ballot polling data showing exact Democratic vs Republican margins heading into November 2026
No data on current Republican House majority size and how many seats Democrats need to flip
No information on potential 2026 House district map, gerrymandering effects, or redistricting changes that could affect Democratic flip potential
No evidence on whether any specific impeachable articles or high-profile scandals beyond Iran war and Epstein have emerged that could accelerate Republican defections (sq4)
No data on Trump's current approval ratings, which would be the single most predictive variable for midterm outcomes
Unclear what the margin of a potential Democratic House majority would be — a thin majority might be more cautious about impeachment than a large one
No information about whether Democratic leadership (Jeffries) has shifted position on impeachment since January 2026 reporting
No data on whether the assassination attempt referenced in the April 2026 interview changed political dynamics significantly
No Kalshi or Polymarket data specifically on 2026 House control outcome

Key Uncertainties

Whether Democrats will actually win the House in November 2026 — this is the single biggest swing factor for the entire impeachment question
Whether Democratic leadership (Jeffries) will endorse impeachment if they win the House, or whether they'll prioritize governing and electoral positioning for 2028
Whether any new major scandal or crisis will emerge between now and January 2027 that either triggers Republican defections or dramatically shifts the political will for impeachment
The size of a potential Democratic House majority — a thin majority makes impeachment riskier politically than a large one
Impact of the Iran war on midterm voting — it's been a major driver of anti-Republican sentiment but could also rally 'rally-around-the-flag' sentiment
Whether the Epstein revelations will deepen or fade, and whether they could implicate Trump more directly in a legally actionable way
Whether the Supreme Court ruling on mail ballot deadlines could materially affect Democratic vote totals in key House races
Whether there will be additional triggering events (constitutional crises, criminal actions, foreign policy disasters) between now and the end of Trump's term that could change the political calculus
The wide and unusual orderbook spread on Kalshi ($0.58) may indicate significant uncertainty or thin true liquidity despite high nominal depth

Market Context

Price: 0.62 · 7d: -0.06 · 30d: -0.08
Volume: MODERATE · Depth: HIGH
Reliability: MEDIUM-HIGH — 858 average daily contracts, 175 days of data, high nominal depth (25,955), but the wide $0.58 spread between yes_bid ($0.31) and current price ($0.62) is anomalous and may suggest the orderbook data includes stale or limit orders far from the current market price; the current price of 62% should be treated as a reasonable but uncertain market consensus. The 30-day decline from ~70% to 62% suggests the market has been revising down impeachment probability recently.

4. Independent Forecaster Opus · No market price · legacy v2 Did NOT see market price

Independent estimate: 41% (43% confidence)

base rate

38%

45% conf

evidence driven

43%

45% conf

contrarian

42%

40% conf

Spread

5pp

Low disagreement

sq1: Will Republicans maintain control of the House through 2026 midterms?

30%

Base rate: President's party loses House in ~70% of midterms since WWII (especially under unpopular presidents). Trump's first midterm (2018) saw Democrats flip 41 seats. Current evidence: Democrats swept 2025 off-year elections, won an R+19 Florida district, polling favors Democratic congressional control, Iran war and affordability driving anti-Trump sentiment. These all push down. Slight up factor: Republican gerrymandering and SCOTUS mail ballot ruling. Estimate: 30% Republicans hold.

sq2: Will Democrats gain control of the House after 2026 midterms?

68%

Roughly the complement of sq1, minus small probability of tied/contested outcomes. Strong evidence of Democratic overperformance, favorable polling, historical midterm pattern. Estimate: 68%.

sq3: Conditional on Democratic House, will they pass articles of impeachment?

55%

Base rate: When opposition party controls House with Trump as president, impeachment occurred (2019, 2021) — 2/2 for Trump specifically. Strong pro-impeachment evidence: 85+ Democrats already calling for impeachment, 55% public support, 'Day 1' impeachment case being built, articles already filed. Pushing down: Jeffries' caution, party prioritizing governance, thin potential majority. Trump's personal base rate of being impeached when opposition controls House is 100% (2/2). However, Jeffries' explicit reluctance is a meaningful counterweight, and a thin majority could constrain action. Estimate: 55%.

sq4: With Republican House, will defections lead to impeachment?

Base rate: Cross-party House impeachment is essentially unprecedented. Two prior Trump impeachments had near-zero Republican House support (10 in 2021 post-Jan 6 was the maximum). Even with Iran war and Epstein revelations, zero Republican defections reported. Assassination attempt likely consolidates GOP support. Estimate: 3%.

Show full reasoning trace

base rate: Only 4 presidential impeachments in US history; Trump personally has been impeached 2/2 times when opposition controlled House. Modern base rate under polarized conditions with opposition House control is roughly 50-70% for Trump specifically. Midterm loss rate for incumbent party ~70%.

evidence updates: Strong evidence Democrats are favored to win House (+): off-year sweeps, R+19 district flip, polling. Strong evidence of pre-built impeachment infrastructure (+): 85+ Dems calling for it, articles already filed, 55% public support. Moderate evidence against (-): Jeffries' caution, party messaging concerns. Near-zero probability of GOP-controlled impeachment.

combination method: Used structural conditional calculation rather than naive weighted average, since sq1 and sq2 are near-complements and sq3/sq4 are conditional on those outcomes. P = P(Dem House) * P(impeach|Dem) + P(GOP House) * P(impeach|GOP).

final: Final estimate ~38%. Main uncertainty is whether Jeffries-led Democrats actually pull the trigger if they win — historical Trump base rate says yes, but explicit leadership caution and 2024 election lessons suggest restraint is possible. Confidence medium given clear structural framework but real uncertainty on both House outcome and Democratic willingness.

ensemble: {'ensemble_count': 3, 'perspectives': {'base_rate': {'p_yes': 0.38, 'confidence': 0.45}, 'evidence_driven': {'p_yes': 0.43, 'confidence': 0.45}, 'contrarian': {'p_yes': 0.42, 'confidence': 0.4}}, 'spread': 0.05, 'individual_p_yes': {'base_rate': 0.38, 'evidence_driven': 0.43, 'contrarian': 0.42}}

5. Devil's Advocate Sonnet · legacy v2 Market price revealed

Math Error Reasoning Flaw Asymmetric Evidence

Challenges

The combination math may understate the probability. P(Dem House) × P(impeach|Dem) + P(GOP House) × P(impeach|GOP) = 0.68 × 0.55 + 0.30 × 0.03 = 0.374 + 0.009 = 0.383, not 0.41. The stated 'final ~38%' matches this, but the reported combined p_yes is 0.41 — there's an inconsistency between the structural calculation and the final number. Clarify which is correct.
sq3 may be too low given Trump's personal base rate of 2/2 impeachments when opposition controls House, combined with pre-built 'Day 1' impeachment infrastructure, 85+ Democrats already calling for it, articles already filed, and 55% public support. Jeffries' caution as of January 2026 is real but historically leadership reluctance has bent to caucus pressure (e.g., Pelosi resisted impeachment in 2019 until Ukraine). 55% seems to over-weight one piece of soft evidence against multiple hard structural factors.
sq4 at 3% may be slightly underweighted given an 985-day window with potential for major scandals, health events, or constitutional crises. Three years is a long time for tail events; even cross-party impeachment, while unprecedented, isn't impossible given Iran war constitutionality questions and Epstein revelations. A floor of 5-7% might better capture tail risk over a 2.7-year window.
The forecast doesn't fully account for the conditional dependency that the SAME conditions favoring Dem House takeover (Trump unpopularity, Iran war, scandals) also raise P(impeach|Dem House). These should be positively correlated, which raises the joint probability beyond independent multiplication.
Market has been trending DOWN from 70% to 62% over 30 days, which is informational — sophisticated traders with access to the same evidence are converging somewhere meaningfully above the forecaster's 41%. While not dispositive, the persistent 20-point gap with a liquid market warrants asking what the market knows about sq3 willingness or House control odds that the forecaster may be underweighting.

Suggested adjustment: +7pp

Two genuine reasoning issues warrant a modest upward adjustment: (1) sq3 likely underweights Trump's personal 2/2 base rate plus the unusually mature pre-built impeachment infrastructure relative to Jeffries' soft caution; (2) sq1/sq3 conditions are positively correlated (same factors driving both), so independent multiplication understates joint probability. Adjustment is for reasoning flaws, not market conformity — though it happens to narrow the gap somewhat.

Market comparison: Forecaster: 41%, Market: 62%. The 21-point divergence is substantial. The market has been declining (70%→62%), suggesting it's still processing evidence, but at high liquidity. The forecaster's structural decomposition is sound but likely underweights (a) Trump's personal impeachment base rate, (b) positive correlation between Dem House and impeachment willingness, and (c) tail risk over 985 days. Some divergence may be justified (market could be over-weighting recent salience), but a forecast in the 45-50% range would better reflect the evidence.

6. Aggregator Opus · final calibrated forecast

48% (40% confidence)