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Will Trump be impeached and removed from office? — Before his term ends

KXTRUMPREMOVE · Politics · 2026-05-11
3%
Agent
21%
Market Price
-18.0%
Edge
72%
Confidence
Volume: 451,881
Spread: 1.0c
Days to resolution: 985
Markets in event: 1
Final Rationale
My independent estimate of 2.2% reflects the structural near-impossibility of Senate conviction (0/4 historically, 67-vote threshold, demonstrated GOP cohesion through Iran war, Venezuela strike, and Epstein revelations in 2025-2026 without a single Republican co-sponsoring Raskin's 25th Amendment bill). I partially accept the Devil's Advocate's tail-risk argument — over 985 days with a 79-year-old president who has already survived an assassination attempt, black-swan health/scandal scenarios warrant nudging to 3%. I reject deference to the 21% market midpoint because the $0.03 yes_bid vs $0.57 no_bid spread means the true tradeable price is closer to 5-10%, and the apparent inconsistency with the 63% impeachment market implies a P(convict|impeach) of ~33% that contradicts the historical 0% base rate and current GOP behavior. The market signal here is unreliable due to illiquidity, not informationally superior to my structural analysis.
Price vs. prediction
How the market moved after the agent's call. Solid blue line is the actual market price; dashed line is the agent's static forecast at $t{=}0$.
$n = 58$ follow-ups
Re-scan Context
This market has been scanned before. Previous predictions:
DatePredictedMarket PriceConfidence
2026-04-06 5% 27% 55%
1. Planner Opus · Fermi decomposition + tool plan
Tools chosen: kalshi_data kalshi_orderbook article_search wikipedia_lookup code_execution web_search
Sub-questions (Fermi decomposition)
  1. Will the House of Representatives vote to impeach Trump during his second term (2025-2029)? (w=0.45)
  2. If Trump is impeached by the House, will the Senate vote to convict and remove him from office? (w=0.35)
  3. Will a triggering political crisis (scandal, legal crisis, or health emergency) emerge before Jan 2029 severe enough to fracture Republican support for Trump? (w=0.20)
Planner reasoning
This question asks whether Trump will be both impeached (by the House) AND convicted/removed (by the Senate) before Jan 20, 2029 — roughly 985 days away. These are two sequential hurdles. **Historical base rates**: No U.S. president has ever been removed via the Senate conviction process. Trump was impeached twice (2019, 2021) but acquitted both times. The Senate has never convicted a president in 230+ years of constitutional history. **Current political structure**: Republicans control both chambers. For House impeachment, Democrats would need to flip the House (possible in 2026 midterms) and then have the political will to impeach. For Senate conviction, 67 votes are needed — meaning roughly 14-20 Republican senators would need to defect even in an adverse scenario. This is historically unprecedented for a sitting same-party president. **Timeline mechanics**: - 2026 midterms (Nov 2026) could flip the House to Democrat control — a necessary but insufficient condition for impeachment - Even if Democrats win the House, they'd need to pass articles of impeachment (politically costly) - Senate conviction remains near-impossible given current dynamics - Any crisis severe enough to cause 14+ Republican senators to abandon Trump would be extraordinary **Key causal factors**: Republican party unity, absence of any defection-triggering scandal, Trump's control of GOP base, and the structural 2/3 Senate threshold all make removal extraordinarily unlikely. The reference class for Senate conviction = 0/4 attempts in history. **What would need to happen for YES**: (1) Some major crisis or scandal emerging by late 2026; (2) Democrats retaking House in Nov 2026; (3) Impeachment vote passing; (4) Unprecedented collapse of Republican Senate support (14+ defections). This chain has a very low probability at each step, compounding to near-zero overall.
2. Research Parallel tool calls · legacy v2
ToolStatusTimeItemsSummary
kalshi_data OK 2.5s -
kalshi_orderbook OK 0.1s -
article_search OK 0.9s -
wikipedia_lookup OK 2.1s -
code_execution OK 0.0s -
web_search OK 62.5s -
3. Evidence Synthesis Sonnet · 22 items · legacy v2
#StrengthCredibilityDirectionSourceClaimPriced In
1 MODERATE 62 ↑ UP kalshi_data The Kalshi impeachment market (KXIMPEACH-29-JAN20) prices House impeachment of Trump at 63%, down 8% in the past 7 days and down 6% in 30 days. Yes
2 STRONG 80 ↓ DOWN web_search Multiple impeachment resolutions have been introduced in 2025-2026 (Thanedar, Green, H.Res.939), but Democratic leadership (Jeffries) has voted 'present' or tabled them, steering the caucus away from impeachment until after the midterms. Yes
3 STRONG 82 ↓ DOWN article_search As of January 2026, House Democrats are not eager to impeach Trump before the midterms, fearing distraction from affordability messaging and potential backlash; the calculus could change only if Democrats retake the House in November 2026. Yes
4 MODERATE 68 ↑ UP web_search A cohort of resistance-minded House Democrats is building a case for a 'Day 1 impeachment vote' if they retake the House, and more than 85 House and Senate Democrats called for impeachment or 25th Amendment removal during the Iran war. Yes
5 MODERATE 72 ↑ UP article_search Democrats see Senate control within reach for the 2026 midterms due to Trump's crumbling approval ratings and the Iran war's economic impact, but still need to win five Trump-carried states — big hurdles remain. Yes
6 MODERATE 75 NEUTRAL code_execution Historical base rate for House impeachment per president is approximately 8.89% (4 out of 45 unique presidents), providing a weak base rate anchor; Trump has already been impeached twice, raising his personal rate significantly above average. Yes
7 MODERATE 70 ↑ UP article_search The Iran war (ongoing as of March 2026), soaring oil prices, inflation, and deportation crackdown have cratered Trump's approval ratings, with even MAGA influencers abandoning him — this materially raises the prospect of a Democratic House takeover in 2026. No
8 MODERATE 72 ↑ UP article_search November 2025 Democratic election victories showed Trump's disapproval driving voters to Democrats at historically high rates, suggesting a favorable midterm environment for Democrats retaking the House. Yes
9 WEAK 60 NEUTRAL article_search Republicans have shown rare but real pockets of dissent — 20 House GOP members broke with Trump on union rights, and 4 joined Democrats on Epstein files — but these remain small and issue-specific, not threatening Trump's overall House control. Yes
10 MODERATE 60 ↓ DOWN kalshi_data The Kalshi removal market (KXTRUMPREMOVE) prices Trump being impeached AND convicted at 21%, down 3% in 7 days and 5% in 30 days, implying the market sees Senate conviction as relatively unlikely even conditional on impeachment. Yes
11 STRONG 65 ↓ DOWN kalshi_orderbook The KXTRUMPREMOVE orderbook shows very deep liquidity (depth=52,955, HIGH), yes_bid at $0.03 vs. no_bid at $0.57, with a very wide spread — suggesting strong market consensus against removal, with limited buying pressure on the YES side. Yes
12 STRONG 90 ↓ DOWN code_execution Historical base rate for Senate conviction given House impeachment is 0 out of 4 attempts (0%), requiring 20 of 53 Republican senators (37.7% of the caucus) to defect — an historically unprecedented level of intra-party defection. Yes
13 STRONG 95 ↓ DOWN wikipedia_lookup The U.S. Senate has never convicted a president in 230+ years of constitutional history; even the Johnson impeachment (1868) and both Trump impeachments (2020, 2021) ended in acquittal. Yes
14 MODERATE 72 ↓ DOWN article_search Democrats see Senate control within reach in 2026 but face big hurdles needing to flip five Trump states; even with a Democratic Senate majority, they would need additional Republican crossover votes to reach the 67-vote conviction threshold. Yes
15 MODERATE 68 ↓ DOWN web_search With fewer elected Democrats willing to commit to impeachment even if they retake the House (given Republican Senate control and voter backlash risk), political will for the full removal process appears limited even in a Democratic-controlled scenario. Yes
16 STRONG 78 ↑ UP article_search The U.S.-Iran war (beginning ~March 2026) has caused soaring oil prices, inflation, and cratering approval ratings — constituting a significant political crisis that has fractured Trump's non-MAGA base support but not his Republican congressional caucus. No
17 MODERATE 70 ↑ UP web_search After Trump's threatening Truth Social posts during the Iran war (including 'a whole civilization will die tonight'), 85+ Democrats called for impeachment or 25th Amendment removal, and Rep. Raskin introduced a 25th Amendment commission bill — but it has no Republican co-sponsors. No
18 MODERATE 65 NEUTRAL article_search An apparent assassination attempt on Trump occurred (referenced in an April 2026 interview with Norah O'Donnell), suggesting an extremely volatile political environment that could further destabilize the presidency. No
19 WEAK 55 NEUTRAL article_search Epstein-related documents and emails mentioning Trump continue to emerge and generate political controversy, but have not produced evidence severe enough to fracture Republican congressional support. Yes
20 MODERATE 70 ↓ DOWN article_search Despite crumbling approval ratings and the Iran war crisis, Trump retains his MAGA core base, and MAGA elite abandonment has not translated into Republican congressional defections sufficient to threaten his position. Yes
21 MODERATE 72 ↑ UP article_search Trump's approval ratings are at their lowest since returning to office (as of November 2025), with economic dissatisfaction and the Epstein controversy contributing — but this has not triggered Republican Senate defection. Yes
22 WEAK 58 ↓ DOWN article_search The U.S. military assault on Venezuela and capture of its head of state (referenced January 2026) was cited by Democrats as an impeachable offense, but caused no Republican fracture. Yes
Information Gaps
  • No data on actual 2026 midterm election results — the most critical variable for House impeachment probability
  • No polling data on Republican senator-specific approval or willingness to convict Trump
  • Unclear what the Iran war's full economic and political impact will be by November 2026
  • No data on whether any Republican senators have publicly distanced themselves from Trump on removal
  • No information on whether Epstein documents have produced evidence specifically implicating Trump in criminal conduct
  • No current Trump approval rating polling data (only qualitative references to 'lowest since returning to office')
  • No data on the specific makeup of the 2026 Senate map — which specific seats Democrats are contesting
  • The scope and resolution of the Iran war is unknown — escalation or de-escalation would materially affect the political environment
  • Unclear whether any Republicans joined the 25th Amendment commission bill introduced by Raskin
  • No data on health status of Trump that would trigger a 25th Amendment pathway
Key Uncertainties
  • 2026 midterm outcome: whether Democrats retake the House is the single most critical gating factor for impeachment
  • Whether the Iran war and economic deterioration will be severe enough to flip enough swing districts for a Democratic House majority
  • Whether Democratic leadership will pursue impeachment even if they retake the House, given strategic concerns about Senate acquittal and voter backlash
  • Whether any additional major scandal (Epstein, Iran war conduct, etc.) will materialize and be severe enough to fracture Republican Senate support
  • Whether Democrats can win the Senate — even so, they would need ~14-20 Republican senators to vote for conviction, which has never occurred in U.S. history
  • Trump's physical health and capacity to serve — an incapacitation scenario could alter the political calculus
  • Whether the Iran war de-escalates before November 2026, potentially stabilizing Trump's political position
  • The implied conditional probability of Senate conviction given impeachment: the market implies ~33% (21%/63%), which appears very high given zero historical precedent
Market Context
Price: 0.21 · 7d: -0.03 · 30d: -0.05
Volume: MODERATE — 1,206 average daily contracts on removal market; 627 on impeachment-only market · Depth: HIGH — depth of 52,955, with very wide spread (yes_bid $0.03 vs no_bid $0.57)
Reliability: MEDIUM-LOW — While volume is moderate and depth is high, the wide bid-ask spread and the apparent mispricing between the removal market (21%) and the impeachment market (63%) suggests limited arbitrage efficiency; the implied conditional probability of Senate conviction (~33%) appears inconsistent with historical base rates of 0%, suggesting possible market irrationality or the market pricing in highly asymmetric tail scenarios
4. Independent Forecaster Opus · No market price · legacy v2 Did NOT see market price
Independent estimate: 2% (79% confidence)
base rate
2%
78% conf
evidence driven
2%
82% conf
contrarian
2%
78% conf
Spread
0pp
Low disagreement
sq1: Will the House vote to impeach Trump during his second term?
28%
Base rate: ~9% historically per president, but Trump has been impeached twice already (personal rate ~67%). Key gating factor is 2026 midterms — Democrats need to retake House (~55-60% likely given Trump's cratering approval, Iran war, economic deterioration, and Nov 2025 Dem overperformance). If Dems take House, probability of actually voting articles is maybe 45-50% (leadership cautious, fear of Senate acquittal backlash, but pressure from base is strong and Trump's conduct has been provocative). 0.57 * 0.47 ≈ 0.27. Slight upward adjustment for possibility of even a GOP-controlled House impeaching in extreme scenario (very low). Final: 28%.
sq2: If impeached, will Senate convict and remove?
4%
Base rate: 0/4 historically (0%). Requires 67 votes — even in best-case Democratic Senate majority scenario, need 14-20 Republican defections, which has never happened. Trump retains MAGA base and Republican senators have shown remarkable cohesion through two prior impeachments, Jan 6, Iran war, etc. The conditional case for impeachment passing the House would itself signal a significant crisis, slightly raising P(conviction | impeachment) above pure 0% historical. Cap at ~4% to reflect possibility of extreme black-swan scenario (massive scandal, health crisis, or geopolitical catastrophe creating GOP exodus). Final: 4%.
sq3: Will a triggering crisis fracture Republican support?
12%
Crisis-level events have already occurred (Iran war, Venezuela strike, Epstein documents, low approval) without producing Republican congressional fracture. This demonstrates remarkable GOP cohesion. For a crisis severe enough to fracture support (e.g., direct criminal evidence, severe health incident, military catastrophe), base rate of such events causing party fracture is very low. Note: this sub-question is partially captured in sq2's conditional. Final: 12%.
Show full reasoning trace
base rate: 0/47 presidents removed via impeachment. 0/4 Senate convictions. Trump personally 0/2 in prior attempts despite serious charges. The 67-vote threshold combined with party polarization makes this structurally near-impossible.
evidence updates: Iran war and economic crisis raise impeachment probability (Dems more likely to retake House) but barely move Senate conviction probability since GOP senators have shown extreme cohesion through multiple crises already. The fact that no Republican has co-sponsored Raskin's 25th Amendment bill despite the Iran war is highly diagnostic of unfracturable GOP support.
combination method: Conditional: P(impeach) ≈ 28%, P(convict | impeach) ≈ 4%, joint ≈ 1.1%. Adjusted slightly upward to 2% for tail risks (health crisis, catastrophic scandal not yet visible, resignation-like dynamics).
final: 2% reflects strong historical priors against Senate conviction, combined with observed GOP cohesion through significant 2025-2026 crises. The market likely overprices this due to political salience bias.
ensemble: {'ensemble_count': 3, 'perspectives': {'base_rate': {'p_yes': 0.02, 'confidence': 0.78}, 'evidence_driven': {'p_yes': 0.02, 'confidence': 0.82}, 'contrarian': {'p_yes': 0.025, 'confidence': 0.78}}, 'spread': 0.005, 'individual_p_yes': {'base_rate': 0.02, 'evidence_driven': 0.02, 'contrarian': 0.025}}
5. Devil's Advocate Sonnet · legacy v2 Market price revealed
Reasoning Flaw Asymmetric Evidence
Challenges
  1. The market structure is highly informative here: the impeachment-only market is at 63% but the removal market is at 21%, implying P(convict|impeach) ≈ 33%. Your forecast implies P(convict|impeach) = 4%. Even if you think the market is irrational on conviction, the impeachment market at 63% vs your 28% is a massive divergence worth examining more carefully. Why is the Kalshi impeachment market pricing 63% if Democrats are 'not eager to impeach'? You may be underweighting the strong UP evidence (Iran war, cratering approval, Nov 2025 Dem overperformance, Day 1 impeachment cohort).
  2. The orderbook signal is misleading you. yes_bid $0.03 vs no_bid $0.57 means a ~$0.40 wide spread — this is NOT a real 21% market price; it's an illiquid midpoint. The 'true' market price could easily be 5-10%, much closer to your forecast. Don't treat 21% as a confident market signal when the spread is this wide.
  3. Sub-question 3 (crisis fracturing GOP) appears to be double-counted or unused — you note it's 'partially captured in sq2' but don't show how it integrates. Either drop it or explicitly use it. As written it's decorative.
  4. Your tail-risk adjustment from 1.1% to 2% is reasonable but you could justify it more rigorously: over 985 days, the probability of a black-swan health/criminal/military event is non-trivial. Trump is 79+, an assassination attempt already occurred, and resignation-under-pressure dynamics aren't captured in pure impeachment math (though note the question requires impeachment AND removal, not resignation).
  5. Confirm the resolution criteria: does 'impeached and removed' include 25th Amendment removal, or only Senate conviction? If 25th Amendment counts, your estimate should be slightly higher given health/age factors over 985 days.
Suggested adjustment: +1pp
Minor upward adjustment (to ~3%) to account for: (1) 985-day window includes meaningful tail risk of health crisis or extreme scandal, (2) the Kalshi impeachment market at 63% suggests you may be underweighting P(House impeaches) given current crisis conditions, even if Senate conviction remains near-impossible. The market's 21% is not a strong anchor due to the very wide bid-ask spread, so no large adjustment toward it is warranted.
Market comparison: Forecaster: 2.2%, Market midpoint: 21% but with $0.03/$0.57 spread making the true market price ambiguous (likely 5-15% on the bid side). The divergence is largely an artifact of illiquid orderbook midpoint. Forecaster's reasoning on Senate conviction structural impossibility is sound; the historical 0/4 base rate plus observed GOP cohesion through multiple 2025-2026 crises strongly supports a low estimate. Minor upward adjustment for tail risk over a 985-day horizon is warranted.
6. Aggregator Opus · final calibrated forecast
3% (72% confidence)
My independent estimate of 2.2% reflects the structural near-impossibility of Senate conviction (0/4 historically, 67-vote threshold, demonstrated GOP cohesion through Iran war, Venezuela strike, and Epstein revelations in 2025-2026 without a single Republican co-sponsoring Raskin's 25th Amendment bill). I partially accept the Devil's Advocate's tail-risk argument — over 985 days with a 79-year-old president who has already survived an assassination attempt, black-swan health/scandal scenarios warrant nudging to 3%. I reject deference to the 21% market midpoint because the $0.03 yes_bid vs $0.57 no_bid spread means the true tradeable price is closer to 5-10%, and the apparent inconsistency with the 63% impeachment market implies a P(convict|impeach) of ~33% that contradicts the historical 0% base rate and current GOP behavior. The market signal here is unreliable due to illiquidity, not informationally superior to my structural analysis.