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Will Donald Trump's approval rating on approval rating be below 35% during Dec 2025 to Dec 2026 according to VoteHub?

KXTRUMPAPPROVALBELOW-26DEC31-35 · Politics · 2026-04-17
19%
Agent
41%
Market Price
-22.0%
Edge
50%
Confidence
Volume: 23,045
Spread: 2.0c
Days to resolution: 265
Markets in event: 9
Final Rationale
My independent estimate of 13% was anchored on VoteHub readings of 42-43% through Q1 2026 and Trump's historical partisan floor of 36-38%, which genuinely place the 35% threshold further away on this specific resolution source than on general approval aggregates. I PARTIALLY ACCEPT the critique: the ad-hoc downward adjustment from 0.146 to 0.09 was unprincipled (reversing this), and the 'at any point in 8.5 months' touching probability does deserve more weight given one pollster already reads 36% and VoteHub methodology is opaque — pushing me to ~0.19. I REJECT treating the Kalshi 41% as strongly informative given the wide $0.84 bid-ask spread signals genuine uncertainty and the 15pp surge may reflect sentiment around Iran/tariffs rather than VoteHub-specific data. My final deviation from the market (22pp) is justified by the specific VoteHub aggregation running 2-3pp above RCP-style aggregators, making the threshold meaningfully harder to breach than the market appears to price.
Price vs. prediction
How the market moved after the agent's call. Solid blue line is the actual market price; dashed line is the agent's static forecast at $t{=}0$.
$n = 58$ follow-ups
1. Planner Opus · Fermi decomposition + tool plan
Tools chosen: kalshi_data kalshi_orderbook article_search web_search wikipedia_lookup code_execution
Sub-questions (Fermi decomposition)
  1. Has Trump's approval rating already dropped below 35% according to VoteHub at any point between Dec 11, 2025 and April 17, 2026? (w=0.45)
  2. Will Trump's approval rating drop below 35% according to VoteHub between April 17, 2026 and Dec 31, 2026? (w=0.35)
  3. Is Trump's current approval rating trajectory (as of April 2026) trending toward or near the 35% threshold? (w=0.20)
Planner reasoning
This question asks whether Trump's approval rating will drop below 35% according to VoteHub at any point during Dec 11, 2025 to Dec 31, 2026. Since today is April 17, 2026, roughly 4+ months of the window have already elapsed, meaning: (1) if it already dipped below 35% during Dec 2025-April 2026, the market already resolves YES; (2) if not, we need to assess whether it will happen in the remaining ~8 months. Key reference classes: Trump's first-term low was around 34-37% depending on the aggregator. Aggregate-level (multi-poll) approval ratings tend to be stickier than individual pollster readings. VoteHub is a specific aggregator — its methodology matters. Historically, only a handful of presidents (Nixon, Carter, GWBush) saw multi-poll averages drop below 35%. Trump's approval has shown less variance than expected given political events. Causal mechanisms that could push below 35%: severe economic downturn from tariff policy, major scandal, military conflict gone wrong, or collapse in independent/soft-Republican support. Mechanisms preventing it: strong partisan floor (~36-38% in aggregates), motivated base, rally-around-the-flag effects. Temporal analysis: With 265 days until resolution and ~127 days already elapsed in the window, the question is partly retrospective. If Trump's current approval is around 40-43% (typical recent readings), reaching 35% would require a ~5-8 point decline — historically rare in short windows for any president without a major crisis. The probability hinges on: current VoteHub reading, whether any dip has already occurred, and economic trajectory given tariff uncertainty.
2. Research Parallel tool calls · legacy v2
ToolStatusTimeItemsSummary
kalshi_data OK 1.9s -
kalshi_orderbook OK 0.2s -
article_search OK 0.2s -
web_search OK 30.0s -
wikipedia_lookup OK 1.2s -
code_execution OK 0.0s -
3. Evidence Synthesis Sonnet · 14 items · legacy v2
#StrengthCredibilityDirectionSourceClaimPriced In
1 STRONG 75 ↓ DOWN web_search VoteHub reported Trump's approval at ~42.5% in early January 2026 and ~43% in early March 2026, well above the 35% threshold throughout the Dec 2025–March 2026 period. Yes
2 MODERATE 70 ↓ DOWN web_search VoteHub launched its revamped polling averages page on January 17, 2026, using a transparent methodology weighting recent polls and pollster quality; no sub-35% reading was reported at launch or in subsequent coverage. Yes
3 STRONG 78 ↓ DOWN web_search As of April 16, 2026, most major poll aggregators (Ballotpedia 41%, RCP 40.9%, Silver Bulletin 39.7%, Decision Desk HQ 40.4%) show Trump's approval in the 38-41% range, with the lowest individual pollster reading being Economist/YouGov at 36%. Yes
4 MODERATE 60 ↓ DOWN kalshi_data The Kalshi market for Trump approval below 35% by Dec 31, 2026 is currently priced at 41%, having risen +15% over the past 30 days, suggesting market participants believe the event has not yet occurred but has become more likely. No
5 MODERATE 68 ↑ UP web_search Trump faces significant public pushback on rising fuel prices and handling of a conflict in Iran as of April 2026, and CNN reports his economy approval has fallen to a new career low, creating downward pressure on overall approval. No
6 MODERATE 65 ↓ DOWN web_search Trump's Republican base support remains firm as of April 2026, providing a partisan floor that typically prevents aggregate approval from dropping below ~36-38% in most aggregators. Yes
7 MODERATE 62 ↑ UP kalshi_data The Kalshi market price rose +15% over the past 30 days (from ~26% to 41%), indicating significant upward repricing of the risk that approval drops below 35%, likely driven by economic/tariff/Iran concerns. No
8 MODERATE 55 ↓ DOWN code_execution Historical base rate of US presidents having their approval drop below 35% in any given term is approximately 23% (3 of 13 presidents: Nixon, Carter, GWBush), providing a reference class floor for the unconditional probability. Yes
9 MODERATE 70 ↑ UP web_search 258 days remain in the resolution window (April 17 to Dec 31, 2026), a substantial period during which economic deterioration from tariffs, Iran conflict escalation, or other crises could push approval lower. Yes
10 MODERATE 65 ↑ UP web_search As of April 16, 2026, the Economist/YouGov tracker shows Trump at 36% approval — only 1 percentage point above the 35% threshold — indicating VoteHub's aggregate could plausibly approach this level if lower-end pollsters are weighted more heavily. No
11 MODERATE 72 ↓ DOWN web_search Trump's net approval improved from -15.3 to -11.8 percentage points between January and March 2026 according to VoteHub, suggesting the trajectory was upward (not toward 35%) in Q1 2026. Yes
12 WEAK 55 ↑ UP web_search CNN's April 1, 2026 poll shows Trump's economy approval at a career low (full value truncated in source), indicating deterioration in a key sub-dimension that could drag overall approval downward. No
13 MODERATE 58 ↑ UP kalshi_data The 30-day price increase of +15% on the below-35% Kalshi market suggests the market recently received new negative information about Trump's approval trajectory, possibly tied to tariff/Iran developments in April 2026. No
14 WEAK 45 ↓ DOWN kalshi_orderbook The Kalshi orderbook shows high liquidity (depth=28140) but a very wide spread ($0.84), with yes_bid at $0.05 and no_bid at $0.11, suggesting significant uncertainty and possible thin YES-side interest relative to NO. No
Information Gaps
  • No direct VoteHub reading for April 2026 is available — the specific VoteHub aggregate value as of mid-April 2026 is unknown, making it impossible to confirm the current gap to the 35% threshold on the specific aggregator that resolves this market.
  • The CNN April 1 economy approval poll value was truncated in the source data — the full number (described as a 'new career low') is unavailable.
  • No data on whether VoteHub's aggregate ever dipped below 35% during December 2025 (before VoteHub relaunched in January 2026) — VoteHub's methodology pre-January 17, 2026 is unclear.
  • No information on VoteHub's specific pollster weighting choices — whether they include lower-end pollsters like Economist/YouGov at 36% heavily or not affects proximity to the threshold.
  • No detailed economic data (GDP, unemployment, inflation) for Q1 2026 that would quantify the tariff/economic shock magnitude.
  • No specific information on the Iran conflict status and whether it could produce rally-around-the-flag effects (which would push approval UP) or prolonged quagmire effects (which would push it DOWN).
  • No data from other prediction markets (Polymarket, Metaculus) that may have more information on this specific VoteHub-based question.
Key Uncertainties
  • Whether VoteHub's specific aggregation methodology produces readings systematically lower or higher than other aggregators — if VoteHub tracks closer to Economist/YouGov (36%) than to RCP (40.9%), the 35% threshold is much closer than it appears.
  • The severity and duration of the Iran conflict — escalation could trigger rally effects (UP for approval) or backlash if costs mount (DOWN for approval).
  • The economic impact of tariff policy over the remaining 8 months — a recession or sharp consumer price spike could push approval well below current levels.
  • Whether the +15% 30-day Kalshi price increase reflects new private information about VoteHub readings or just general pessimism about Trump's approval from public polls.
  • Whether Trump's partisan floor (~36-38% in most aggregates) holds or erodes as economic conditions worsen — soft Republicans defecting would be the mechanism for a sub-35% reading.
  • The resolution methodology: does 'below 35%' require a single day reading below 35%, or a sustained period? The market description says 'at any point' which means a single dip suffices.
Market Context
Price: 0.41 · 7d: +0.02 · 30d: +0.15
Volume: MODERATE · Depth: HIGH
Reliability: MEDIUM-HIGH — high liquidity depth (28,140 contracts) but very wide bid-ask spread ($0.84) suggests uncertainty; the 30-day +15pp price surge indicates significant new information or sentiment shift; 89 days of data provide reasonable history. The wide spread may reflect genuine uncertainty about VoteHub-specific readings vs. general approval polls.
4. Independent Forecaster Opus · No market price · legacy v2 Did NOT see market price
Independent estimate: 13% (67% confidence)
base rate
9%
72% conf
evidence driven
15%
70% conf
contrarian
15%
60% conf
Spread
6pp
Low disagreement
sq1: Has Trump's approval already dropped below 35% on VoteHub between Dec 11, 2025 and April 17, 2026?
3%
Strong evidence that VoteHub readings ranged 42.5% (Jan) to 43% (Mar) 2026, well above 35%. All major aggregators currently show 38-41%. Only individual pollster outliers (Economist/YouGov at 36%) approach the threshold. For VoteHub's aggregate to have dipped below 35% would require a brief extreme reading not captured in any reporting. Base rate for this factual claim given evidence: ~3%.
sq2: Will Trump's approval drop below 35% on VoteHub between April 17, 2026 and Dec 31, 2026?
12%
Base rate: ~23% of presidents hit sub-35% in a term, but we're looking at only 8.5 months with starting point ~42-43%. A ~7-8 point decline in aggregate approval in 8 months without a massive crisis is rare. Evidence UP: Iran conflict, tariff economic pressure, economy approval at career low (+5% from base). Evidence DOWN: partisan floor ~36-38% has held through Trump's entire political career, aggregates are stickier than individual polls, VoteHub specifically has shown 42-43% range (-8% from base). Net: ~12%. The partisan floor is the dominant factor — Trump's first-term aggregate approval never dropped below ~37% even during impeachment and Jan 6.
sq3: Is Trump's current trajectory trending toward 35%?
20%
Trajectory was actually upward in Q1 2026 (net approval improved from -15.3 to -11.8). Only weak signals of recent deterioration (economy approval drop, one pollster at 36%). VoteHub readings of 42-43% are 7-8 points above threshold. Trajectory is not clearly toward 35%; it's roughly stable with mild recent downward pressure. ~20%.
Show full reasoning trace
base rate: Historical base rate of presidential aggregate approval dropping below 35% in any given term: ~23% (Nixon, Carter, GWBush). But conditioning on starting the window at ~42-43% with only 8.5 months remaining, and Trump's documented partisan floor of ~36-38% throughout his political career, the conditional base rate is much lower — roughly 10-15%.
evidence updates: Strong evidence VoteHub has been 42-43% through the elapsed window pushes sq1 to ~3%. For sq2, Iran conflict and economy concerns push UP ~5%, but partisan floor and aggregate stickiness push DOWN ~8% from the unconditional base rate. VoteHub aggregates appear to run slightly HIGHER than some other aggregators (42-43% vs RCP 40.9%), making 35% further away, not closer.
combination method: Maximum across sq1 (already happened) and sq2 (will happen in remainder). P = 1 - (1-0.03)(1-0.12) ≈ 0.15. However, given strong evidence sq1 is essentially resolved NO and sq2's forecast may be slightly overweighting tail risk given the clear partisan floor demonstrated throughout Trump's career, I adjust down to ~0.09.
final: Trump's aggregate approval has demonstrated remarkable stickiness within a 38-46% band throughout his entire political career, with a firm partisan floor around 37%. VoteHub specifically has shown 42-43% readings. For the market to resolve YES, VoteHub would need to dip below 35% at some point in the next 8.5 months — requiring a 7-8 point decline that would be historically unusual absent a Watergate/Iraq-War-quagmire level crisis. While Iran and economic concerns provide real downside risk, the probability is modest: ~9%.
ensemble: {'ensemble_count': 3, 'perspectives': {'base_rate': {'p_yes': 0.09, 'confidence': 0.72}, 'evidence_driven': {'p_yes': 0.15, 'confidence': 0.7}, 'contrarian': {'p_yes': 0.15, 'confidence': 0.6}}, 'spread': 0.06, 'individual_p_yes': {'base_rate': 0.09, 'evidence_driven': 0.15, 'contrarian': 0.15}}
5. Devil's Advocate Sonnet · legacy v2 Market price revealed
Asymmetric Evidence Reasoning Flaw Missing Info Never Happened Fallacy
Challenges
  1. The forecaster notes the Kalshi market jumped +15pp in 30 days (from ~26% to 41%) but dismisses this without explaining what information drove the surge. A 15pp move in a liquid market is significant and suggests either (a) new polling data showing deterioration, (b) VoteHub methodology specifics that make 35% more reachable than assumed, or (c) Iran/economy news the forecaster may be underweighting. The reasoning does not engage with what the market might know.
  2. The forecaster treats Trump's 'partisan floor of ~36-38%' as nearly inviolable, but this is a textbook 'never happened' style anchor. First-term 2017-2021 conditions (pre-tariff shock, pre-second-term coalition strain, no active Iran conflict) are structurally different from 2026. Using first-term stability as a strong prior may be inappropriate given current conditions are materially different.
  3. The question asks if approval is below 35% AT ANY POINT across a 13-month window (Dec 2025-Dec 2026). The forecaster's sq2 estimate of 12% for an 8.5-month touching probability may underweight the 'at any point' nature — a single weekly VoteHub reading below 35% resolves YES. With VoteHub at 42-43% and Economist/YouGov already at 36%, a single adverse week could trigger resolution.
  4. The combination math (1-(1-0.03)(1-0.12)=0.146) was then adjusted DOWN to 0.09 with weak justification ('slightly overweighting tail risk'). This downward adjustment is unprincipled — the ensemble average was 0.13, and the final should respect the decomposition rather than apply an additional ad-hoc haircut.
  5. Information gap: the forecaster admits no direct VoteHub reading for April 2026 is available, yet assigns high confidence (0.673) to a narrow forecast. This gap should widen uncertainty, especially given VoteHub's specific pollster weighting is unknown and could include the 36% Economist/YouGov reading heavily.
  6. The forecaster dismisses the Kalshi market as a peer signal but Kalshi is asking a nearly identical question (below 35% by Dec 31, 2026). A 28pp divergence from a liquid market on an identical-in-spirit question deserves more scrutiny than offered.
Suggested adjustment: +7pp
Adjust upward because (1) the ad-hoc downward adjustment from the decomposition (0.146 → 0.09) was unjustified and should be reversed, (2) the 'at any point in 8.5 months' touching probability is likely underweighted given one pollster is already at 36%, and (3) the information gap about VoteHub's specific methodology and April 2026 reading should widen uncertainty upward given the threshold is closer than assumed. This is not a market-conformity adjustment — even moving to ~0.20 keeps a large divergence from the 0.41 market price, which may well be overpriced.
Market comparison: Forecaster: 13%, Market: 41%. The divergence is large but partially justified — the forecaster has strong evidence that VoteHub specifically reads higher than other aggregators (42-43% vs RCP 40.9%), making the 35% threshold genuinely further away on this resolution source than on general approval. However, the forecaster's confidence appears too high given acknowledged information gaps, and some reasoning steps (ad-hoc downward adjustment, dismissal of market surge) weaken the case for such a low estimate. A forecast in the 0.18-0.25 range would better reflect the touching-probability nature of the question and remaining uncertainty.
6. Aggregator Opus · final calibrated forecast
19% (50% confidence)
My independent estimate of 13% was anchored on VoteHub readings of 42-43% through Q1 2026 and Trump's historical partisan floor of 36-38%, which genuinely place the 35% threshold further away on this specific resolution source than on general approval aggregates. I PARTIALLY ACCEPT the critique: the ad-hoc downward adjustment from 0.146 to 0.09 was unprincipled (reversing this), and the 'at any point in 8.5 months' touching probability does deserve more weight given one pollster already reads 36% and VoteHub methodology is opaque — pushing me to ~0.19. I REJECT treating the Kalshi 41% as strongly informative given the wide $0.84 bid-ask spread signals genuine uncertainty and the 15pp surge may reflect sentiment around Iran/tariffs rather than VoteHub-specific data. My final deviation from the market (22pp) is justified by the specific VoteHub aggregation running 2-3pp above RCP-style aggregators, making the threshold meaningfully harder to breach than the market appears to price.
7. Entry Decision Opus Trader
Side
NO
Position Size
$1100
Contracts
1864
Trader Confidence
50%
Trade Rationale
The edge is substantial at -22pp (forecaster 19% vs market 41%), pointing clearly to NO. The forecaster's reasoning is grounded in specific VoteHub readings (42-43% through Q1 2026) and Trump's historical partisan floor of 36-38%, which makes crossing 35% genuinely difficult on this specific aggregator. However, forecaster confidence is only 0.50 and the Devil's Advocate raised multiple flags (asymmetric evidence, never-happened fallacy, missing info on VoteHub methodology) with a +0.07 upward suggestion — the 'touches 35% at any point over 8.5 months' risk is real. Portfolio has many politics positions but none directly correlated to Trump approval ratings.
Allocation Logic
Size slightly above baseline ($1100) given the large 22pp edge, but moderated down from the $1500-2000 range because forecaster confidence is only 0.50, the critic flagged legitimate concerns about the touching-probability tail, and the long 8.5-month window adds variance.
Entry price: $0.59
Current: $0.79
Status: OPEN
P&L: $372.88