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Will the 25th Amendment be used during Trump's Presidency? — Before 2029

KXAMEND25-29 · Politics · 2026-04-11
4%
Agent
30%
Market Price
-26.0%
Edge
75%
Confidence
Volume: 96,497
Spread: 1.0c
Days to resolution: 1015
Markets in event: 1
Final Rationale
The question explicitly specifies Section IV of the 25th Amendment (involuntary removal), which has never been invoked in 59 years across 12 presidents. The Devil's Advocate's strongest critique — that Section 3 voluntary transfers should count — is invalid because the question description specifically requires VP and Cabinet transmission under Section IV. Trump's age (79-82 over remaining term) creates ~8% risk of severe incapacitation, but even then, a loyal hand-picked Cabinet and a VP with strong incentives against appearing disloyal make invocation extremely unlikely (conditional probability ~5-10% even given clear incapacitation). I deviate substantially from the 33% market price because the 0% historical base rate for Section IV, combined with the structural barriers to Cabinet revolt against a sitting president of their own party, provides overwhelming evidence against a 1-in-3 probability. The orderbook asymmetry (yes_bid $0.08 vs no_bid $0.32) itself suggests informed participants view this as overpriced.
Price vs. prediction
How the market moved after the agent's call. Solid blue line is the actual market price; dashed line is the agent's static forecast at $t{=}0$.
$n = 56$ follow-ups
1. Planner Opus · Fermi decomposition + tool plan
Tools chosen: kalshi_data kalshi_orderbook article_search web_search wikipedia_lookup code_execution
Sub-questions (Fermi decomposition)
  1. Will Trump experience a significant health event (serious illness, incapacitation, or cognitive decline) before January 20, 2029 that would make him unable to discharge presidential duties? (w=0.35)
  2. If Trump is incapacitated, will VP Vance and a majority of the Cabinet be willing to invoke Section IV of the 25th Amendment against Trump's wishes? (w=0.35)
  3. Has there been any concrete movement, discussion, or organizing within the Trump administration about invoking the 25th Amendment? (w=0.30)
Planner reasoning
This question asks about Section IV of the 25th Amendment being invoked against Trump before January 2029 — roughly 1,015 days away. The key insight is that Section IV has NEVER been invoked in U.S. history since the 25th Amendment was ratified in 1967, despite multiple presidents experiencing health crises (Reagan's Alzheimer's in later term, Bush's colonoscopies where Section III was used voluntarily, Biden's age concerns). This creates a near-zero base rate. Two independent conditions must BOTH be true for YES to occur: 1. **Health/incapacitation event**: Trump is 79 years old, making a serious health event more plausible than for younger presidents. However, he survived COVID in his first term and has shown no public signs of acute incapacitation. 2. **Political will**: VP Vance and a majority of the Cabinet would need to act against Trump's wishes. Given that Trump's cabinet is composed of loyal allies, this is extraordinarily unlikely. Even in cases where a president was genuinely incapacitated, Section IV has never been used — the political cost is enormous and the incentive for any Trump loyalist to be seen as 'betraying' him is essentially nil. The temporal analysis matters: for YES to occur in 1,015 days, Trump would need to suffer incapacitation + Vance would need to organize Cabinet support + they'd need to transmit the written declaration. The speed required and political alignment required make this extremely rare even in the worst-case health scenario. Reference class: Section IV of the 25th Amendment has been considered but never invoked across 12 presidents over 59 years. The closest came during discussions in Trump's first term (John Kelly era), but nothing materialized. Even with elevated age risk, the political discount factor dominates the probability calculation. Market consensus on similar questions typically places this below 3%.
2. Research Parallel tool calls · legacy v2
ToolStatusTimeItemsSummary
kalshi_data OK 2.1s -
kalshi_orderbook OK 0.1s -
article_search OK 0.8s -
web_search OK 58.8s -
wikipedia_lookup OK 2.1s -
code_execution OK 0.0s -
3. Evidence Synthesis Sonnet · 17 items · legacy v2
#StrengthCredibilityDirectionSourceClaimPriced In
1 MODERATE 72 ↑ UP article_search In December 2025, Trump appeared to doze off during a Cabinet meeting, and a NYT story detailed how the 79-year-old president has 'slowed down' during his second term, prompting widespread scrutiny of his health and stamina. Yes
2 MODERATE 70 NEUTRAL article_search In January 2026, Trump disclosed bruising on his hands (attributed to high-dose aspirin) and claimed he passed his 'third straight' cognitive test, but disclosures failed to quell health scrutiny per CNN reporting. Yes
3 MODERATE 75 ↓ DOWN article_search Trump sat for multiple lengthy interviews (NYT marathon 2+ hours, 60 Minutes ~90 minutes, NBC interview) in late 2025–early 2026, demonstrating functional capacity to engage in extended public appearances despite age-related concerns. Yes
4 MODERATE 78 ↓ DOWN article_search Trump attended Supreme Court oral arguments on birthright citizenship in April 2026 for roughly 75 minutes, indicating continued physical mobility and public functioning. Yes
5 MODERATE 60 ↑ UP web_search The NAACP issued an unprecedented call in April 2026 to invoke the 25th Amendment citing 'alarming signs of President Trump's deteriorating health and increasingly delusional behavior,' marking the first time the NAACP has made such a demand. No
6 MODERATE 58 ↑ UP web_search Trump reportedly jointly bombed Iran on Feb. 28, 2026, described as surprising even internal advisors; an Easter Sunday Truth Social post triggered calls from 70+ lawmakers about his mental fitness. No
7 WEAK 40 NEUTRAL code_execution Actuarial/base-rate modeling estimates the age-adjusted probability of a serious incapacitating health event sufficient to trigger 25th Amendment consideration at roughly 1.67% per remaining year, totaling ~4.5% over the remaining term before political discount. No
8 STRONG 80 ↓ DOWN web_search VP Vance, whom Trump is reportedly considering endorsing for 2028, has strong political incentives NOT to invoke the 25th Amendment; the White House called Democratic invocation calls 'pathetic,' signaling no internal support. Yes
9 STRONG 95 ↓ DOWN wikipedia_lookup Section IV of the 25th Amendment has never been invoked since ratification in 1967, across 12 presidents over nearly 60 years, establishing a near-zero historical base rate even when presidents experienced genuine incapacitation. Yes
10 STRONG 82 ↓ DOWN web_search Calls to invoke the 25th Amendment in April 2026 came exclusively from Democrats and opposition figures (70+ lawmakers, NAACP, Rep. Larson's impeachment articles) — not from within the Cabinet or VP's office, where the mechanism must originate. No
11 WEAK 45 NEUTRAL web_search Even figures like Marjorie Taylor Greene and Alex Jones called for action against Trump, suggesting some MAGA-adjacent voices are dissatisfied, but these are not Cabinet members with authority under Section IV. No
12 WEAK 38 ↓ DOWN code_execution After applying a political discount factor (~95% reduction) to reflect the near-impossibility of Vance and loyal Cabinet members acting against Trump, the modeled probability of invocation drops to approximately 0.23% over the remaining term. No
13 STRONG 82 ↓ DOWN web_search As of April 2026, all documented calls to invoke the 25th Amendment originate from external Democratic lawmakers and advocacy groups — there is zero reported internal Cabinet discussion, organizing, or movement toward invocation from within the Trump administration. No
14 MODERATE 65 ↑ UP web_search Prediction market prices on the 25th Amendment invocation rose from ~28.6% to ~35.1% over the past month (April 2026), reaching the second highest level since the start of the second term, driven by the Iran bombing and Easter post controversy. No
15 MODERATE 72 ↓ DOWN article_search During Trump's first term, Chief of Staff John Kelly era saw internal discussions about the 25th Amendment among staff, but nothing ever materialized — establishing a precedent that internal discussions do not translate to action. Yes
16 MODERATE 62 NEUTRAL kalshi_data Kalshi market KXAMEND25-29 shows current probability at 33%, with moderate 7-day decline (-1%) but slight 30-day increase (+1%), suggesting market participants see elevated but not dramatically rising probability of 25th Amendment invocation. Yes
17 MODERATE 68 ↓ DOWN kalshi_orderbook The orderbook shows a significant asymmetry: yes_bid at $0.08 vs no_bid at $0.32, with high liquidity depth of 24,717 contracts, suggesting the market may be overpriced on the YES side relative to where informed participants are actually willing to buy. Yes
Information Gaps
  • No access to Trump's actual medical records or physician assessments — all health evidence is observational (behavioral reports, self-reported cognitive tests)
  • No reporting on private Cabinet dynamics or whether any Cabinet member has privately expressed willingness to act under Section IV
  • No independent confirmation of the Iran bombing claim from the web search summary — this is a significant event that would need verification from primary sources
  • No data on Trump's current cognitive testing results from independent medical professionals
  • Unclear what 'deteriorating health' claims from NAACP are based on — no specific medical evidence cited
  • No reporting on Vance's private views on Trump's fitness for office or any scenario planning within the VP's office
  • The web search results appear to contain some potentially speculative or low-credibility claims (e.g., Iran bombing details) that would need primary source verification
Key Uncertainties
  • Whether the reported Iran military action in February 2026 reflects a genuine break from rational decision-making or normal presidential authority — this is the single biggest recent event affecting probability
  • Whether Trump's observable behavioral changes (dozing off, memory lapses in NYT interview) represent normal aging or progressive cognitive decline that could accelerate
  • Whether Vance's 2028 ambitions create any scenario where he might calculate that invoking the 25th Amendment is politically advantageous rather than suicidal
  • Whether an extreme crisis scenario (e.g., nuclear escalation, sudden severe incapacitation) could rapidly shift Cabinet loyalties in ways not currently observable
  • The accuracy and completeness of the web search summary — the Iran bombing claim is presented without corroboration and would represent an extraordinary event if true
  • Whether the Kalshi market at 33% reflects genuine informational wisdom or is inflated by retail sentiment following dramatic news events (Iran, Easter post)
Market Context
Price: 0.33 · 7d: -0.01 · 30d: +0.01
Volume: MODERATE · Depth: HIGH
Reliability: LOW-MEDIUM — The 33% market price appears dramatically inconsistent with both the historical base rate (Section IV never invoked) and the analytical estimate (~1-3% range). The orderbook asymmetry (yes_bid $0.08 vs no_bid $0.32) suggests informed sellers are not willing to buy YES at current prices, implying the market may be driven by retail sentiment and dramatic news cycles rather than calibrated probability assessment. High liquidity depth (24,717 contracts) adds some reliability to price discovery, but the structural gap between the 33% market price and the ~2-5% analytical base rate warrants significant skepticism about market accuracy here.
4. Independent Forecaster Opus · No market price · legacy v2 Did NOT see market price
Independent estimate: 2% (79% confidence)
base rate
2%
78% conf
evidence driven
2%
78% conf
contrarian
2%
82% conf
Spread
0pp
Low disagreement
sq1: Will Trump experience a significant health event (serious illness, incapacitation, or cognitive decline) before January 20, 2029 that would make him unable to discharge presidential duties?
8%
Base rate: For a 79-year-old male, the annual mortality rate is roughly 5-6%, and severe incapacitating events (stroke, severe cardiac event, advanced dementia) that would render someone truly unable to function are a subset of that — perhaps 2-3% per year for full incapacitation. Over ~2.75 remaining years, that's roughly 6-8% cumulative probability of a genuinely incapacitating event. Evidence pushing UP: Trump is showing signs of slowing down (dozing at Cabinet meetings, age-related scrutiny), and the NAACP's unprecedented call suggests observable behavioral changes. The Easter post controversy and Iran bombing decisions raise questions. These push up by ~2%. Evidence pushing DOWN: Trump continues to do lengthy interviews (2+ hours), attend court proceedings, and function publicly. He passed self-reported cognitive tests. His first-term COVID survival suggests resilience. These push down by ~1-2%. Key distinction: the question is about being UNABLE to discharge duties, not just showing age. Presidents have governed with significant health issues (Wilson, FDR, Reagan) without being formally incapacitated. True incapacitation (coma, severe stroke, etc.) is the relevant threshold. Final estimate: ~8%.
sq2: If Trump is incapacitated, will VP Vance and a majority of the Cabinet be willing to invoke Section IV of the 25th Amendment against Trump's wishes?
6%
Base rate: Section IV has NEVER been invoked in 59 years across 12 presidents. Even when Reagan was shot and temporarily incapacitated, Section IV was not used. Even when there were active internal discussions (John Kelly era), nothing happened. This establishes a base rate effectively at 0%. Evidence pushing UP: If Trump were TRULY incapacitated (e.g., in a coma, clearly unable to function), even loyal Cabinet members might feel compelled to act for national security reasons — this is the scenario where invocation becomes plausible. The Iran bombing and erratic behavior create a thin thread of possibility. Push up by ~5-6% from near-zero. Evidence pushing DOWN: Vance has strong political incentives not to act — he's positioning for 2028 with Trump's endorsement. The Cabinet is composed of Trump loyalists. All current 25th Amendment calls come from Democrats and opposition groups, not from within the administration. The White House dismissed calls as 'pathetic.' Push down keeps this very low. Key uncertainty: The conditional here is critical — IF Trump is truly incapacitated (coma, severe stroke), the calculus changes dramatically compared to gradual cognitive decline. For true incapacitation, I'd estimate ~25-30% chance the Cabinet acts. For cognitive decline short of full incapacitation, essentially 0%. Weighting these scenarios: most incapacitation events would be of the gradual/partial type where Section IV wouldn't be invoked. Final conditional estimate: ~6%.
sq3: Has there been any concrete movement, discussion, or organizing within the Trump administration about invoking the 25th Amendment?
2%
Base rate: Internal 25th Amendment discussions have been reported only once in recent history (John Kelly era, first Trump term), and even those didn't lead to action. Currently, zero reporting of any internal Cabinet discussion or organizing. Evidence: All calls come exclusively from external opponents (Democrats, NAACP). The White House has dismissed these. Prediction market prices have risen to ~33-35%, but this appears driven by external political events rather than internal administration dynamics. The Kelly-era precedent shows that even when internal discussions happen, they don't translate to action. The prediction market movement is notable but prediction markets on dramatic political events are often inflated by retail sentiment. No insider reporting, no leaks, no Cabinet member statements suggest any internal movement. Final estimate: ~2%.
Show full reasoning trace
base rate: Section IV of the 25th Amendment has never been invoked in 59 years across 12 presidents, establishing a near-zero base rate. Even in cases of genuine presidential incapacitation (Reagan shooting, Wilson's stroke predating the amendment), formal removal mechanisms were not used. The structural barriers — requiring VP and majority of Cabinet to act against a sitting president's wishes — are enormous.
evidence updates: Trump's age (79) creates elevated health risk (~6-8% chance of genuinely incapacitating event over remaining term), pushing probability up from near-zero. Observable signs of aging (dozing, slowing) push up slightly. However, continued functional capacity (long interviews, public appearances) pushes back down. The Iran bombing and Easter post are the strongest recent evidence of concerning behavior, but their significance is uncertain and they haven't generated any internal administration movement. All 25th Amendment calls come from external opponents, not from within the Cabinet or VP's office, which is where the mechanism must originate. Vance's 2028 ambitions create strong incentives against action. Rising prediction market prices (~33%) appear significantly inflated relative to fundamentals.
combination method: Conditional probability: P(incapacitating event) × P(Cabinet invokes Section IV | incapacitation). Decomposed into severe vs. partial incapacitation scenarios with different conditional probabilities of Cabinet action. Reality-checked against sq3 (no internal movement).
final: The probability is very low — approximately 1.5%. The main scenario where this could happen is a sudden, severe, undeniable incapacitation (e.g., major stroke leaving Trump in a coma) that would force even loyal Cabinet members to act for national security. Gradual cognitive decline, even if significant, is extremely unlikely to trigger Section IV given Cabinet loyalty and political incentives. The prediction market price of ~33% appears substantially inflated, likely driven by dramatic news events and retail sentiment rather than genuine probability assessment.
ensemble: {'ensemble_count': 3, 'perspectives': {'base_rate': {'p_yes': 0.015, 'confidence': 0.78}, 'evidence_driven': {'p_yes': 0.015, 'confidence': 0.78}, 'contrarian': {'p_yes': 0.02, 'confidence': 0.82}}, 'spread': 0.005, 'individual_p_yes': {'base_rate': 0.015, 'evidence_driven': 0.015, 'contrarian': 0.02}}
5. Devil's Advocate Sonnet · legacy v2 Market price revealed
Reasoning Flaw Missing Info Asymmetric Evidence
Challenges
  1. The forecaster's interpretation of the question may be too narrow. The question asks 'Will the 25th Amendment be used' — this could include VOLUNTARY transfers under Section 3 (e.g., for a medical procedure under anesthesia), not just the hostile Section 4 invocation. Section 3 was used by Bush twice (colonoscopies) and by Biden once. If Trump undergoes any procedure requiring anesthesia over ~2.75 years, a voluntary temporary transfer is plausible. This pathway is completely ignored in the analysis.
  2. The conditional probability structure (P(incapacitation) × P(Cabinet acts | incapacitation)) is sound for Section 4 but misses the Section 3 voluntary transfer pathway entirely. If the question resolves YES for ANY use of the 25th Amendment (including voluntary temporary transfers), the probability should be substantially higher.
  3. The forecaster notes 'Even figures like Marjorie Taylor Greene and Alex Jones called for action against Trump' as weak/neutral evidence, but this is potentially very significant — it suggests erosion of support from Trump's own base, which could affect Cabinet member calculations. This evidence deserves more weight.
  4. The Iran bombing claim is flagged as needing verification in the information gaps section, yet it's used as moderate evidence in the reasoning. If this event actually happened and 'surprised even internal advisors,' it represents a more significant data point about decision-making capacity than the forecaster credits.
  5. The 95% 'political discount factor' applied to Vance's willingness to act is presented as if it's analytically derived, but it's essentially an arbitrary number. The forecaster should acknowledge more uncertainty here — Vance's incentives could shift dramatically in scenarios not yet imagined (e.g., a constitutional crisis, a national security emergency where inaction becomes politically untenable).
  6. The forecaster dismisses the prediction market price as 'substantially inflated' and 'driven by retail sentiment,' but the orderbook shows HIGH liquidity (24,717 contracts). Markets with this level of liquidity typically have informed participants. The forecaster's own reliability assessment acknowledges 'high liquidity depth adds some reliability to price discovery' while simultaneously dismissing the signal. This is somewhat contradictory.
  7. The 1015 days remaining (nearly 3 years) is substantial. The forecaster's health risk estimate of 6-8% for incapacitation seems reasonable for known risks, but doesn't adequately account for tail risks and unknown unknowns over a nearly 3-year period — assassination attempts, novel health crises, drug interactions, falls, etc. The uncertainty band should be wider.
  8. The ensemble shows virtually no spread (0.005), which suggests the forecaster is not genuinely considering alternative perspectives but rather confirming the same estimate three times. A true ensemble should show meaningful disagreement.
Suggested adjustment: +4pp
The most significant reasoning flaw is the apparent failure to consider Section 3 (voluntary transfer) as a resolution pathway. If the question resolves YES for ANY use of the 25th Amendment — including a routine voluntary transfer for a medical procedure — the probability increases substantially. For a 79-82 year old president over ~2.75 years, the probability of needing a procedure requiring anesthesia is meaningful (perhaps 10-15%), and the probability of using Section 3 in such cases has recent precedent (Bush, Biden). This alone could add 3-5% to the estimate. Additionally, the near-zero ensemble spread suggests insufficient consideration of uncertainty, and the tail risk over 1015 days is somewhat underweighted. Adjusting upward from 1.7% to approximately 6% to account for the Section 3 pathway and wider uncertainty, while still remaining far below the likely inflated market price.
Market comparison: Forecaster: 1.7%, Market: 33%. The divergence is very large (31.3%). The forecaster's core reasoning about Section 4 being extremely unlikely is sound — the historical base rate is zero, Cabinet loyalty is strong, and Vance has clear incentives against action. However, the forecaster may be answering a narrower question (hostile Section 4 invocation only) than what's being asked (any use of the 25th Amendment). Even accounting for the Section 3 pathway and wider uncertainty, a probability around 5-6% seems more defensible than 33%. The market price likely reflects some combination of: (1) broader question interpretation including Section 3, (2) retail sentiment driven by dramatic news, (3) genuine uncertainty about Trump's health over 3 years, and (4) possible mispricing in a politically charged market. The forecaster is likely closer to correct than the market, but not as close to zero as estimated.
6. Aggregator Opus · final calibrated forecast
4% (75% confidence)
The question explicitly specifies Section IV of the 25th Amendment (involuntary removal), which has never been invoked in 59 years across 12 presidents. The Devil's Advocate's strongest critique — that Section 3 voluntary transfers should count — is invalid because the question description specifically requires VP and Cabinet transmission under Section IV. Trump's age (79-82 over remaining term) creates ~8% risk of severe incapacitation, but even then, a loyal hand-picked Cabinet and a VP with strong incentives against appearing disloyal make invocation extremely unlikely (conditional probability ~5-10% even given clear incapacitation). I deviate substantially from the 33% market price because the 0% historical base rate for Section IV, combined with the structural barriers to Cabinet revolt against a sitting president of their own party, provides overwhelming evidence against a 1-in-3 probability. The orderbook asymmetry (yes_bid $0.08 vs no_bid $0.32) itself suggests informed participants view this as overpriced.
7. Entry Decision Opus Trader
Side
NO
Position Size
$1800
Contracts
2571
Trader Confidence
75%
Trade Rationale
The forecaster estimates only 4% probability of the 25th Amendment Section IV being invoked, versus a market price of 30%. This represents a massive 26% edge. The reasoning is extremely sound: Section IV has never been used in 59 years, Trump's Cabinet is hand-picked and loyal, VP Vance has no incentive to appear disloyal, and even conditional on incapacitation the probability of actual invocation is very low. The sub-question decomposition (8% health event × ~6% Cabinet willingness) mathematically supports a very low probability. The Devil's Advocate flags are weak — the critic's main point about Section 3 voluntary transfers is explicitly excluded by the question description. Forecaster confidence is 0.75, which is appropriate given the long time horizon but strong structural reasoning.
Allocation Logic
Sizing at $1800 (near maximum) due to the enormous 26% edge combined with 0.75 forecaster confidence and rock-solid reasoning. I'd go higher but the 1015-day horizon and existing heavy portfolio exposure to Trump-related political NO positions (I count ~10+ correlated Trump-era bets) warrants slight restraint from the $2000 max.
Entry price: $0.70
Current: $0.73
Status: OPEN
P&L: $77.14