Will Iran withdraw from the NPT before 2027?

- [2026-02-28] The US and Israel began a new round of strikes on Iran. Parliament has met only irregularly since then, per ACA's May report. https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2026-05/news/iran-threatens-withdraw-npt - [2026-03-28] MP Malek Shariati introduced the "Support for the Nuclear Rights of the Iranian Nation" bill. It would withdraw Iran from the NPT and repeal the JCPOA law. It was to be fast-tracked. A passed bill would still need Guardian Council review. Article X requires 3 months' notice to the UN Security Council and the other parties, with a statement of the extraordinary events. https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2026-05/news/iran-threatens-withdraw-npt - [2026-03-30] Foreign Ministry spokesman Baghaei said Iran is reviewing a withdrawal but will abide by the treaty while it remains a party. https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2026/03/30/iran-revives-threat-to-withdraw-from-nuclear-non-proliferation-treaty/ - [2026-09-09] The IAEA Board voted 23-3 to report Iran to the UN Security Council for safeguards non-compliance. Russia and China opposed it. Iran says it will allow verification only as part of a wider deal. Diplomacy is stalled. https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2026-10/news/iaea-reports-iran-un-security-council - [2026-09-17] Iran International reports a split in Tehran. Hardliners want to leave. Conservative Khorasan and reformists argue that withdrawal would end a useful "grey zone": the IAEA has lost access, but Iran keeps NPT legal protection and Russian and Chinese support. Pezeshkian said Iran is not seeking nuclear weapons. SNSC secretary Mohsen Rezaei hinted that IAEA actions could push states to leave the treaty. https://www.iranintl.com/en/202609165573 - [2026-09-20] Lawmakers submitted a "triple urgency" withdrawal bill to the Presiding Board. It needs Speaker Ghalibaf's approval before it can be debated in open session. https://www.presstv.co.uk/Detail/2026/09/20/776678/Iran-lawmakers-NPT-withdrawal - [2026-09-28] First Deputy Speaker Nikzad said the bill is under review and would be taken up the day it is announced. The same day, current and former officials called for withdrawal "as soon as possible". https://www.iranintl.com/en/202609283557 - [2026-09-28] Committee member Shahriari said the measure may get no more than 70 votes. He said leaving during wartime would amount to pursuing a nuclear weapon. This was reported via Iran International and secondary outlets. https://www.naturalnews.com/2026-09-30-iran-parliament-fast-tracks-bill-withdrawal-npt.html - [2026-09-27] Araghchi said 60% enrichment is peaceful and consistent with the NPT. He said Iran is ready to discuss a deal on that material if trust is restored. https://tass.com/world/2193651 - [2026-10-04] Presiding-board member Salimi said withdrawal "remains on the table" and would be examined. As of 5 Oct there was no open-session vote, no government or SNSC decision, and no formal notice. https://defconwarningsystem.com/2026/10/05/iran-npt-withdrawal-kaliningrad-nuclear-warning/ - [2026-10-01] ACA (Oct 2026 issue): Iran does not appear to be excavating its bombed nuclear material or restarting activity that would indicate weaponization. Factions still call for withdrawal. https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2026-10/news/iaea-reports-iran-un-security-council - [2026-09-16] Context: Hormuz tensions and tanker attacks continue. Iran International's most-viewed list showed escalation. https://www.iranintl.com/en/202609165573 BOTTOM LINE: As of 2026-10-15 Iran remains an NPT member. The withdrawal bill is pending but has not had an open-session vote, and no Article X notice has been sent. The government, the foreign ministry and a share of conservatives resist withdrawal. The threat functions mainly as leverage, but war and the IAEA referral keep tail risk live. NOT FOUND: Any news from 2026-10-06 to 10-15 on the bill's progress. Any statement from the Supreme Leader or the SNSC endorsing withdrawal. Any scheduled parliamentary vote date. Any UN or depositary record of a notice.

- [2026-10-09] Iran has not given Article X notice as of today. A bill for withdrawal under "triple urgency" was filed on Sept 20. It needs Speaker Ghalibaf's approval before it can reach the floor. One lawmaker said senior officials decided "for now, we are not leaving the NPT." Committee member Shahriari said it would get "perhaps 70 votes at most." https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2026/10/09/iran_doesnt_need_to_leave_the_treaty_it_has_already_left_the_inspectors_1210757.html - [2026-10-01] The IAEA Board found Iran non-compliant in June 2026. It referred Iran to the UN Security Council on Sept 9 by 23-3. Russia and China oppose, so Council action is unlikely. Arms Control Association (ACA) says Iran shows no sign of excavating bombed material or weaponizing. Factions keep calling for exit. Pezeshkian told Fox "Not at all" when asked about wanting nuclear weapons. https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2026-10/news/iaea-reports-iran-un-security-council - [2026-09-16] Iran International reports a split in Iran's elite. SNSC secretary Mohsen Rezaei hinted at withdrawal, while Pezeshkian said Iran is not seeking nuclear weapons. The Khorasan daily argues that Iran already has a "grey zone" (IAEA access cut, NPT legal cover and Russian/Chinese support kept) and that formal withdrawal would destroy it. https://www.iranintl.com/en/202609165573 - [2026-09-28] First Deputy Speaker Nikzad said the withdrawal bill is "under consideration" and would be debated the same day it is introduced. Serving and former officials issued a public call to withdraw. Iran International notes the bill is unlikely to pass. https://www.iranintl.com/en/202609283557 - [2026-05 / 2026-03-28] Base rate of the threat: the March 28, 2026 bill was introduced after US-Israeli strikes began Feb 28. Parliament had not met in person and the bill's fate was unclear. FDD notes Iran "has threatened to quit the NPT on several occasions since 2004." Spokesman Baghaei said Iran would abide by the treaty while it remains a signatory. https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2026-05/news/iran-threatens-withdraw-npt ; https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2026/03/30/iran-revives-threat-to-withdraw-from-nuclear-non-proliferation-treaty/ - [2025-2026 history] Iran's threats have recurred and gone unexecuted. Examples: 2019 (considered, then dropped, per AEOI), January 2020 (Zarif conditional threat), the June 2025 draft bill, and the 2025 snapback. Each time Iran stayed in, including after the 2025 and 2026 strikes and snapback. https://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/iran/2019/iran-190907-sputnik02.htm ; https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/1/20/iran-to-quit-npt-if-its-nuclear-programme-referred-to-un-zarif - [Reference class] Only one state, North Korea, has ever invoked Article X. It announced withdrawal on Jan 10, 2003, after the IAEA board report of Feb 2003 and the collapse of the Agreed Framework. It first notified in 1993, then suspended that notice. No other state has withdrawn in more than 55 years, so the formal-notice base rate is about 1 in 190 states. https://nonproliferation.org/north-koreas-withdrawal-from-the-npt-a-reality-check/ ; https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/us-north-korean-agreed-framework-glance - [Resolution mechanics] Article X requires a written notice with a statement of the "extraordinary events," sent to the UN Security Council and all parties, plus a three-month wait. Resolution here needs only the notice, not effectiveness. A Majlis vote alone would not qualify. The SNSC and Supreme Leader would also need to decide, and the government would have to send the notice. https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2026-05/news/iran-threatens-withdraw-npt - [2025-07-21] Albright: Iran might announce it has left, but under international law the withdrawal "wouldn't be recognized" and the prohibition on nuclear weapons would still apply. Iranian leaders weigh this alongside the risk that withdrawal invites strikes. https://www.iranintl.com/en/202507219398 - [2026-10-01] Context: US-Iran diplomacy is stalled. Trump rejected Iran's Hormuz/talks offer on Sept 26 and has called more strikes "possible." That is a possible trigger for escalation, but hardliners' main argument is that there is little left to lose. https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2026-10/news/iaea-reports-iran-un-security-council BOTTOM LINE: The outside view is strongly NO. In 55 years there has been one Article X notice (North Korea), and Iran has repeatedly threatened but not acted. That includes the periods after two rounds of US-Israeli strikes and snapback. Tail risk is elevated by a pending withdrawal bill, a stalled diplomatic track and the risk of renewed strikes. Even so, the Majlis would probably lack the votes, and senior officials say "for now" Iran is staying. NOT FOUND: Any existing forecasts, expert probability estimates or betting odds for an Iranian NPT withdrawal (I did not look for this contract's own price, as instructed). Also not found: any confirmation of a formal Article X notice by Iran, and any update after Oct 9 on whether Ghalibaf has scheduled a vote.

YES means: Iran formally sends the UN a written Article X notice of withdrawal from the NPT, stating its intent and the "extraordinary events", by 31 Dec 2026, 11:59 PM ET. A Majlis vote or a threat alone does not count. **Most likely path to YES.** Four things would have to happen in order: 1. Washington breaks off or fails the post-midterm talks, or strikes Iran again. Trump said he expects a deal after the Nov 3 US midterms. 2. Ghalibaf lets the triple-urgency bill reach the floor, and it passes. A passed bill would still need Guardian Council review. 3. The SNSC, led by Rezaei, and Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei decide to withdraw. 4. The Foreign Ministry sends the Article X letter to the UN Security Council and the treaty parties. Of these, the SNSC decision is the binding constraint. A new law would not force the executive's hand. - [2026-10-08] Responsible Statecraft's analysis says Rezaei's warning is new. No earlier SNSC secretary has threatened withdrawal, so the author says it "must necessarily be taken more seriously". The same piece says the SNSC has not reached consensus. Reformists and centrists have also shifted since 2025; some now back leaving or even building a weapon. https://responsiblestatecraft.org/iran-non-proliferation-treaty/ - [2026-10-02] Rezaei (via The Cradle) said that after the US abandoned the post-war "Islamabad Memorandum", the leadership concluded it must "change course". He said withdrawal "totally depends on Washington's behavior". So the SNSC secretary has made exit a conditional, US-contingent decision. That makes any renewed US-Israeli strike a plausible trigger. https://english.10mehr.com/irans-npt-debate-moves-beyond-parliament/ - [2026-10-02] The Cradle reports the parliamentary pressure is broad. Haji-Deligani says the bill has been with the presidium for months and the delay is Ghalibaf's. Ghazanfari is blaming the presidium for holding it back. Sani, a national-security committee member, says the NPT "no longer has any meaning". Even the Khorasan daily, which opposes leaving now, does not rule out exit after a bomb test. The dispute is "when", not "whether". https://english.10mehr.com/irans-npt-debate-moves-beyond-parliament/ - [2026-09-28] Responsible Statecraft reports 32 prominent conservatives, including ex-officials, published an open letter. It asked Pezeshkian, the Majlis and the SNSC to halt IAEA cooperation and start withdrawal. https://responsiblestatecraft.org/iran-non-proliferation-treaty/ - [2026-09] Tehran Times, a regime-aligned outlet, reported 130 lawmakers signed a statement calling for the legal withdrawal process to begin. It argued that continuing attacks and failed international guarantees amount to Article X "extraordinary events". That is the legal basis the notice would cite. Their number is well above the roughly 70 votes Shahriari predicted for the bill. https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/530066/130-Iranian-lawmakers-call-for-legal-process-to-withdraw-from - [2026-10-10] Iran International reports ex-conservative MP Nezamoddin Mousavi, who has IRGC ties, said "nuclear ambiguity did not prevent war". He raised revisiting both the nuclear doctrine and NPT membership, in an interview with a pro-Pezeshkian outlet. This suggests the argument is spreading beyond the ultraconservatives. https://www.iranintl.com/en/202610106118 - [2026-10-04] 56 countries signed a joint statement backing the restored UN restrictions on Iran. The IAEA referral to the Security Council came on Sept 9. These add to the "no benefit left" argument made by Haji-Deligani. https://www.ncr-iran.org/en/news/iran-news-in-brief-october-4-2026/ - [2026-10-14] Day 229 of the war per GlobalSecurity. A tanker was struck in Hormuz and Brent is near $106. No US or Israeli strike on Iranian territory was reported on Oct 13-14. VP Vance said on Oct 6 that Iran must make a "meaningful" cut in enrichment capacity. The war and the demand are still unresolved. https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/iran-war-oprep.htm - [2025-09-23] Precedent for overstatement: MP Hajideligani claimed then that "all decision-making bodies" agreed on exit, and no notice followed. That is a caution on this path. https://iranwire.com/en/news/145018-iranian-lawmaker-says-npt-withdrawal-bill-ready-for-parliament-vote/ - [2026-09-27] Shahriari said the Supreme Leader, whom he named as Mojtaba Khamenei, "stressed" Iran should refrain from nuclear weapons, and that the SNSC and Ali Khamenei had opposed leaving. Shahriari did not say the Supreme Leader opposed withdrawal itself. https://www.iranintl.com/en/202609274971 BOTTOM LINE: The strongest YES case is conditional escalation. The SNSC secretary has tied exit to US conduct, 130 MPs and 32 ex-officials back it, and the IAEA referral and renewed-strike risk are live. Even so, every step still requires Ghalibaf, the SNSC and the Supreme Leader to agree. None has publicly endorsed withdrawal. NOT FOUND: Any Oct 10-15 news on the bill reaching the floor. Any public endorsement from the Supreme Leader or SNSC. Any scheduled vote. Any UN or depositary record of an Article X notice by Iran. The omitted middle section of the Responsible Statecraft article, which could not be read.

YES means: Iran formally sends the UN a written Article X notice of withdrawal from the NPT by 2026-12-31, 11:59 PM ET. A Majlis vote, threats or statements alone do not count. - [2026-10-08] Ghalibaf is the gatekeeper and is also Iran's chief negotiator with the US. A bill needs his approval for the floor, and even a passed law would not bind the executive. The SNSC decides nuclear-security questions, as it did when it suspended the hijab law in 2024. So the chain is: Speaker, floor vote, Guardian Council, SNSC/Leader, and a Foreign Ministry letter. Responsible Statecraft says the lack of consensus has so far prevented withdrawal despite war, sanctions and snapback. https://responsiblestatecraft.org/iran-non-proliferation-treaty/ - [2026-09-28] The 32-signatory open letter was from outside the executive, and it asked the SNSC to start the process. Nothing shows the SNSC has done so. The SNSC secretary has said only that a decision has "not yet" been made and "depends on US behavior" (Sept 19). He also reaffirmed the fatwa and was reported to prefer diplomacy. https://www.presstv.co.uk/Detail/2026/09/19/776619/Iran-Rezaei-SNSC-nuclear-doctrine-NPT ; https://inkstickmedia.com/will-iran-ditch-the-non-proliferation-treaty/ - [2026-10-08] Precedent of an unfulfilled threat: Rouhani, as SNSC secretary in 2005, threatened to leave if the IAEA referred Iran to the Security Council. Iran did not leave when the referral came in Feb 2006. The Sept 9, 2026 referral fits the same pattern. https://responsiblestatecraft.org/iran-non-proliferation-treaty/ - [2025-09-28] Precedent of the Speaker blocking the bill: an MP said Ghalibaf blocked an NPT-withdrawal proposal in a closed session. Lawmakers said then that the SNSC must decide first. The 2025 draft "has yet to move forward" (Oct 8, 2026). The current motion has sat with the presidium for months, per The Cradle (Oct 2). https://www.iranintl.com/en/202509284755 ; https://thecradle.co/articles/irans-npt-debate-moves-beyond-parliament - [2026-10-06] The Foreign Ministry line, even in a pro-withdrawal RT op-ed, is that Iran remains committed to NPT membership. Baghaei says the possibility is "considered", not decided. Tehran's own legal case against the strikes rests on its treaty status; a 2025 German analyst said exit would "undermine this line entirely". https://www.rt.com/news/646817-bombed-and-sanctioned-npt-iran/ ; https://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/iran/2025/iran-250616-rferl01.htm - [2026-10-06] Elite infighting over even indirect US contact, with an impeachment motion against Araghchi, shows a fragmented system. It is hard to coordinate a rare, unanimous, irreversible move. It also means the Foreign Ministry, which would send the notice, is under pressure and still engaged with Oman and the US. https://www.thenationalnews.com/news/gulf/2026/10/06/iran-politician-files-impeachment-motion-against-araghchi-over-us-contacts/ - [2026-10-14] Short-term triggers are dampened. Trump pledged on Oct 8 not to strike before Nov 3, and Iran was still reviewing the US response on Oct 12. The Omani channel is open, and the track is described as "stalled but not closed." Araghchi reportedly offered inspector access for sanctions relief (Oct 2). Both signals point to bargaining, not exit. https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/iran-war-oprep.htm ; https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/iran-news/article-910387 - [2026-10-08] Iranian analysts argue withdrawal should come only after acquiring a weapon, otherwise Iran is punished for nothing. Russia and China are cited as "essential" in keeping Iran in. Staying keeps the "grey zone" of no inspections but treaty cover. This gives Tehran a reason to hold off. https://responsiblestatecraft.org/iran-non-proliferation-treaty/ - [2026-10-09] Wording technicality: the contract needs an "official written notice" explicitly invoking Article X, delivered to the UN. Likely substitutes would not count: a parliament vote, a "suspension" of NPT obligations, ending IAEA cooperation, a declaration that Iran "has left", or a law. A notice sent only to the depositaries and not to the UN Security Council is a further ambiguity. North Korea's 1993 notice was later suspended, which shows how rarely a notice survives. https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2026-05/news/iran-threatens-withdraw-npt - [2026-10-15] Deadline arithmetic: about 11 weeks remain, with no scheduled vote, no Guardian Council review, and no SNSC decision as of Oct 14. Iran's own sequence would need Majlis, Guardian Council, SNSC and Leader sign-off. That is feasible in days only if the leadership has already decided, and no source shows it has. Resolution needs only the notice, not the three months' wait, so the timing is not a bar if Tehran chooses to act. This is the main residual risk. https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2026/10/09/iran_doesnt_need_to_leave_the_treaty_it_has_already_left_the_inspectors_1210757.html BOTTOM LINE: Status quo and the chain of required approvals point to NO. Every earlier trigger (2006 referral, 2019–20, 2025 war and snapback, the Feb 2026 strikes) ended in threats, and the Speaker and Foreign Ministry are still holding the bill back. The residual risk is a leadership decision after renewed strikes, since the pledge of no strikes expires Nov 3. NOT FOUND: Any news after Oct 9 on the bill's progress; any scheduled floor vote; any SNSC or Mojtaba Khamenei statement endorsing exit; any UN record of an Article X notice; any current expert probability estimates.