Scan: Will Trump be impeached and removed from office?

← Back to scans

Will Trump be impeached and removed from office? — Before his term ends

KXTRUMPREMOVE · Politics · 2026-04-06

Agent

27%

Market Price

-22.0%

Edge

55%

Confidence

Final Rationale

No U.S. president has ever been removed via impeachment (0/47 base rate), and the 2/3 Senate supermajority requirement remains a nearly insurmountable structural barrier in today's polarized environment. I adjusted upward from my initial 1.5% to 5% after accepting critiques about severe information gaps (no data on 15 months of Trump's second term), mathematical underweighting of tail/dramatic-change scenarios, and the possibility that Democrats' proven willingness to impeach Trump could yield higher impeachment probability if they retake the House. The market at 27% appears significantly inflated — critically, the actual yes_bid is only $0.07 with a $0.51 spread, suggesting the displayed price is unreliable and informed money prices this much lower. My 22-point divergence from the displayed market price is justified by the zero historical base rate for removal, the structural impossibility of getting 17+ Republican senators to convict, and the wide bid-ask spread undermining the market signal.

Price vs. prediction

How the market moved after the agent's call. Solid blue line is the actual market price; dashed line is the agent's static forecast at $t{=}0$.

$n = 52$ follow-ups

1. Planner Opus · Fermi decomposition + tool plan

Tools chosen: kalshi_data kalshi_orderbook article_search wikipedia_lookup code_execution

Sub-questions (Fermi decomposition)

Will the House of Representatives vote to impeach Trump during his second term (before Jan 20, 2029)? (w=0.40)
If Trump is impeached by the House, will the Senate convict him with a 2/3 supermajority? (w=0.40)
Will political conditions change dramatically enough (e.g., major scandal, Republican defection wave) to make impeachment and removal plausible before 2029? (w=0.20)

Planner reasoning

This question requires assessing a two-step conditional probability: (1) the House impeaches Trump, AND (2) the Senate convicts by 2/3 supermajority. The critical structural constraint is that Republicans control both chambers as of 2025-2026. For impeachment to happen, Democrats would need to retake the House (likely not before 2027 midterms at earliest) AND have enough votes. For Senate conviction, a supermajority (~67 votes) is required, meaning ~14 Republican senators would need to defect — something that has never happened in U.S. history. The reference class shows 0 presidents have ever been removed via impeachment in 47 presidencies. Trump's two prior impeachments (both failed Senate conviction) are directly relevant — Republicans held firm both times even when his behavior was arguably more egregious. The relevant causal mechanism for any change would require a catastrophic scandal causing mass Republican defection, which has not materialized. The prediction market price should reflect near-zero probability (1-3%).

2. Research Parallel tool calls · legacy v2

Tool	Status	Time	Items
kalshi_data	OK	2.5s	-
kalshi_orderbook	OK	0.1s	-
article_search	OK	9.4s	-
wikipedia_lookup	OK	1.7s	-
code_execution	OK	0.0s	-

3. Evidence Synthesis Sonnet · 12 items · legacy v2

#	Strength	Credibility	Direction	Source	Claim	Priced In
1	STRONG	-	↓ DOWN	code_execution	Historical base rate of presidential impeachment is ~8.5% across 47 presidencies; no president has ever been removed via impeachment (0% removal rate). Republicans currently control both chambers.	Yes
2	MODERATE	-	↑ UP	kalshi_data	Kalshi market 'Will Trump be impeached during his term?' (KXIMPEACH-29-JAN20) is priced at 68%, up 4% in 7 days and 1% in 30 days, with moderate volume (~670 contracts/day).	Yes
3	MODERATE	-	NEUTRAL	kalshi_data	The impeachment market (68%) is dramatically higher than what one would expect from structural base rates, suggesting significant speculative or sentiment-driven pricing rather than grounded political analysis.	Yes
4	STRONG	-	↓ DOWN	wikipedia_lookup	The House can impeach with a simple majority. Trump was impeached twice (2019, 2021) but never convicted. Both times Republicans held firm in the Senate.	Yes
5	WEAK	-	↓ DOWN	article_search	No news articles were found for the period Oct 2025 – Apr 2026 related to impeachment proceedings or House votes.	No
6	STRONG	-	↓ DOWN	code_execution	Senate conviction requires ~67 votes (2/3 supermajority). With Republicans holding ~53 seats, roughly 14 Republican senators would need to defect — something that has never occurred in U.S. history across 3 prior presidential impeachment trials.	Yes
7	STRONG	-	↓ DOWN	wikipedia_lookup	In Trump's first impeachment (2020), the Republican-controlled Senate voted to acquit on both articles. In the second impeachment (2021), only 7 Republican senators voted to convict — far short of the required ~17 defections needed at that time.	Yes
8	MODERATE	-	↑ UP	kalshi_data	The primary KXTRUMPREMOVE market (impeached AND removed) is priced at 27%, implying the conditional probability of Senate conviction given impeachment is ~27%/68% ≈ 40% — extremely high compared to historical precedent and structural math.	Yes
9	MODERATE	-	↓ DOWN	kalshi_orderbook	The KXTRUMPREMOVE orderbook shows yes_bid at $0.07 and no_bid at $0.42, with a very wide spread of $0.51 despite high depth (60,541 contracts), suggesting significant disagreement or illiquidity at top of book.	Yes
10	MODERATE	-	↑ UP	kalshi_data	The KXTRUMPREMOVE market has risen from a range low of 15% to 27% over the data period (178 days), with a +4% move in both the last 7 and 30 days, suggesting recent upward drift in perceived political instability.	No
11	WEAK	-	NEUTRAL	article_search	No news articles were found for the Oct 2025 – Apr 2026 window on political conditions, scandals, or Republican defections relevant to impeachment.	No
12	STRONG	-	↓ DOWN	wikipedia_lookup	All three presidential impeachment trials in U.S. history (Johnson, Clinton, Trump x2) ended in acquittal; no mass partisan defection wave has ever produced a conviction, even under significant political pressure.	Yes

Information Gaps

No current news articles were returned for the Oct 2025 – Apr 2026 period — unclear if this reflects a data retrieval failure or genuinely no relevant news, which is itself informative but unverified
No data on current House composition post-2026 midterms (if they have occurred), which would be critical for assessing Democratic ability to impeach
No information on specific scandals, investigations, or political events in 2025-2026 that might be driving the recent 4% upward move in Kalshi markets
No data on current Republican Senate cohesion or any defection signals from GOP senators
No information on whether Democrats have formally introduced or threatened impeachment articles in the current Congress
The wide orderbook spread (yes_bid $0.07 vs market price $0.27) requires explanation — possible market microstructure issue or strong directional disagreement

Key Uncertainties

Whether the 2026 midterms result in Democrats retaking the House — the most plausible pathway to a House impeachment vote
Whether any catastrophic scandal or constitutional crisis emerges that causes unprecedented Republican defection in the Senate
The reliability of the Kalshi impeachment market (68%) as a signal — it may reflect speculative/entertainment trading rather than well-calibrated political forecasting
Whether the wide spread in the orderbook (yes_bid $0.07 vs displayed price $0.27) indicates a stale market price or genuine disagreement among sophisticated traders
Whether Trump's term ends early through mechanisms other than impeachment (25th Amendment, resignation, death), which would resolve related markets differently
Structural question of why KXTRUMPREMOVE (27%) implies ~40% conditional conviction probability given impeachment, which contradicts all historical precedent

Market Context

Price: 0.27 · 7d: +0.04 · 30d: +0.04
Volume: MODERATE — 1,289 contracts/day average for KXTRUMPREMOVE; 670/day for impeachment-only market · Depth: HIGH depth (60,541 contracts) but very wide spread ($0.51) with yes_bid only $0.07 vs displayed price of $0.27 — significant internal tension
Reliability: LOW-MEDIUM — High nominal depth but the extreme spread between yes_bid ($0.07) and the displayed market price ($0.27) raises serious questions about price reliability. The implied conditional conviction probability (~40%) is wildly inconsistent with structural/historical constraints, suggesting possible sentiment-driven or speculative pricing. The related impeachment-only market at 68% also appears elevated relative to base rates.

4. Independent Forecaster Opus · No market price · legacy v2 Did NOT see market price

Independent estimate: 2% (88% confidence)

sq1: Will the House of Representatives vote to impeach Trump during his second term (before Jan 20, 2029)?

12%

Base rate: ~8.5% of presidents have been impeached (4 out of ~47, counting Trump twice). However, Trump has already been impeached twice, making him uniquely impeachment-prone. Republicans currently control the House, so impeachment before Jan 2027 is essentially impossible (~1%). The key question is whether Democrats retake the House in the 2026 midterms. Historical base rate for the president's party losing the House in midterms is ~70-75%. If Democrats retake the House, the probability of them impeaching Trump is moderate — they did it twice before, and Trump's behavior in office tends to generate impeachable controversies. I'd estimate P(Dems win House in 2026) ≈ 0.55-0.65, and P(impeachment | Dem House) ≈ 0.15-0.25 (lower than his first term because the political calculus has changed — two failed impeachments may create fatigue, but new controversies could emerge). So: P ≈ 0.01 (before midterms) + 0.60 * 0.18 ≈ 0.12. The absence of current impeachment news pushes this down slightly. Final: 12%.

sq2: If Trump is impeached by the House, will the Senate convict him with a 2/3 supermajority?

Base rate: 0 out of 4 presidential impeachment trials have resulted in conviction (0%). Even in the most favorable case (Trump's second impeachment in 2021), only 7 Republican senators voted to convict — far short of the ~17 needed. For conviction before 2029, even after the 2026 midterms, Democrats are unlikely to have more than ~52-53 Senate seats (the 2026 map is actually somewhat favorable for Democrats but getting to 67 is structurally impossible through elections alone). This means ~14-15 Republican senators would need to defect. The only scenario where this happens is a truly catastrophic, Nixon-level scandal with incontrovertible evidence that makes Trump's position untenable even among Republicans. Nixon resigned before conviction but the writing was on the wall — Republican leaders told him he'd lose. The partisan polarization is far more extreme now than in 1974. Even with a massive scandal, I'd estimate only ~5% chance of 14+ Republican defections given modern partisan dynamics. The strong structural constraint of the 2/3 requirement makes this extremely unlikely. Final: 4%.

sq3: Will political conditions change dramatically enough to make impeachment and removal plausible before 2029?

Base rate for 'dramatic political conditions change leading to removal': 0% historically completed, though Nixon came close (~1 case in 47 presidencies ≈ 2%). Current conditions: no evidence of major scandals or Republican defection waves in the Oct 2025–Apr 2026 window. Trump's behavior in his second term has been aggressive on executive power (tariffs, DOGE, etc.) but has not yet produced the kind of bipartisan crisis that would threaten removal. The partisan media ecosystem insulates Trump from the kind of cross-party accountability that threatened Nixon. However, there are ~3 years remaining, and black swan events (major corruption revelation, constitutional crisis, economic catastrophe blamed on Trump) could shift conditions. I estimate maybe 6% chance that conditions change enough to make removal genuinely plausible (not that it actually happens, but that the political environment shifts to where it becomes a serious possibility).

Show full reasoning trace

base rate: 0 out of 47 presidents have been removed via impeachment (0%). Nixon came closest but resigned. The structural barrier — 2/3 Senate supermajority — has never been met. Trump himself survived two impeachments with Republican senators largely holding firm.

evidence updates: No current news of impeachment proceedings pushes probability down slightly. Republicans control both chambers currently, making near-term impeachment impossible. The 2026 midterms could give Democrats the House (~55-65% probability), enabling impeachment but not removal. Modern partisan polarization is significantly more extreme than during Watergate, making mass Republican defection less likely than the historical near-miss would suggest.

combination method: Conditional: P(removed) = P(impeached) * P(convicted|impeached), with an adjustment for the small probability of dramatic political change that would simultaneously increase both probabilities.

final: The probability of Trump being impeached AND removed before January 20, 2029 is approximately 1.5%. The primary barriers are: (1) Republican House control through at least Jan 2027, (2) the 2/3 Senate supermajority requirement making conviction nearly impossible in a polarized environment, and (3) the complete absence of historical precedent for presidential removal via impeachment. Even accounting for unknown future scandals and the remaining ~3 years of the term, the structural constraints make this an extremely low-probability event.

5. Devil's Advocate Sonnet · legacy v2 Market price revealed

Missing Info Overconfidence Time Awareness Issue Reasoning Flaw Math Error

Challenges

The forecaster notes the Kalshi KXTRUMPREMOVE market at 27% and the impeachment-only market at 68% but dismisses both as sentiment-driven or speculative without adequately investigating what information might be driving these prices. With 1,289 contracts/day and moderate volume, this isn't a dead market. The forecaster should more seriously consider what the market participants might know that isn't captured in the analysis — especially given the acknowledged information gap about events in 2025-2026.
The information gaps are severe and inadequately weighted. The forecaster acknowledges having NO news articles from Oct 2025 – Apr 2026 but treats this as 'itself informative' rather than as a major source of uncertainty. We are already in April 2026, meaning nearly 15 months of Trump's second term have elapsed with zero information about what has actually happened. The forecaster's confidence of 0.88 is far too high given these gaps.
The 2026 midterm analysis may be stale or wrong. The forecaster says 'Republicans currently control the House' and estimates P(Dems win House in 2026) ≈ 0.55-0.65, but it's April 2026 — the midterms are only 7 months away. There should be much more concrete information available about the political landscape, polling, and Trump's approval ratings. The forecaster is reasoning as if it's early 2025 rather than April 2026.
The P(impeachment | Dem House) estimate of 15-25% may be too low given historical precedent. Democrats impeached Trump TWICE in his first term — once with a much thinner political case (Ukraine call) and once after Jan 6. If Democrats retake the House in a political environment where impeachment markets are at 68%, the political incentive to impeach could be very high. The 'impeachment fatigue' argument cuts both ways — it also means the procedural barriers and political taboo have been thoroughly broken.
The forecaster's conditional probability P(conviction | impeachment) = 4% may underweight tail scenarios adequately. While 0/4 historical convictions is the base rate, the forecaster's own analysis acknowledges ~3 years remain and black swan events are possible. A 4% conviction rate given impeachment means the forecaster is almost entirely ruling out a Nixon-like scenario, but Nixon's situation developed relatively quickly once the tapes emerged. The question is whether such evidence could emerge in the next ~2.7 years.
The combination method has an internal inconsistency. The forecaster estimates P(dramatic political change) at 6% in sq3, but this probability should feed more strongly into the conditional estimates. If there's a 6% chance conditions change dramatically enough to make removal 'genuinely plausible,' then P(conviction | impeachment, dramatic change) should be much higher than 4% — perhaps 30-50%. The correct calculation would be something like: P(removal) = P(impeached) × [P(convicted | impeached, normal) × P(normal) + P(convicted | impeached, dramatic) × P(dramatic)], which would yield a higher number than 1.5%.
The wide orderbook spread (yes_bid $0.07 vs displayed price $0.27) actually provides some useful information the forecaster partially dismisses. The yes_bid at $0.07 is much closer to the forecaster's 1.5% estimate, but the fact that someone is willing to sell at $0.58 (no_bid $0.42) suggests there's genuine disagreement. The midpoint of actual bids ($0.07-$0.58) is ~$0.325, and the displayed price of $0.27 falls within this range. The market may be unreliable as a point estimate but the range of $0.07-$0.58 suggests significant uncertainty.

Suggested adjustment: +4pp

The forecaster's confidence is too high given massive information gaps (no news data for 15 months of Trump's term). The combination method underweights tail scenarios — the 6% dramatic political change probability should feed through to a higher conditional conviction probability in those scenarios, mathematically yielding a higher combined estimate. The P(impeachment | Dem House) may also be underestimated given Democrats' proven willingness to impeach Trump. However, the structural constraint of the 2/3 Senate requirement remains genuinely formidable, so the adjustment should be moderate. Moving from 1.5% to ~5% better accounts for the information gaps and mathematical inconsistency while still respecting the strong structural barriers.

Market comparison: Forecaster: 1.5%, Market: 27%. The market price appears significantly elevated, likely driven by speculative sentiment and the wide bid-ask spread ($0.07-$0.58) suggests the true informed estimate is much lower than 27%. However, the forecaster's 1.5% may be too low given severe information gaps about what has actually happened during Trump's second term and a mathematical underweighting of tail scenarios. The true probability likely falls somewhere in the 3-8% range — closer to the forecaster than the market, but not as extreme as 1.5%.

6. Aggregator Opus · final calibrated forecast

5% (55% confidence)

7. Entry Decision Opus Trader

Side

Position Size

$1500

Contracts

2055

Trader Confidence

55%

Trade Rationale

The edge here is massive at -22%. No president has ever been removed via impeachment in U.S. history, and the structural requirement of a 2/3 Senate supermajority makes this extraordinarily unlikely in today's polarized environment. The sub-question decomposition confirms this: even if impeachment happens (12%), Senate conviction is only 4%, giving a joint probability well under 1%. The market at 27% appears wildly inflated, likely due to thin orderbook dynamics — the forecaster notes the actual yes_bid is only $0.07 with a $0.51 spread. Even accepting the Devil's Advocate's +4% adjustment, the edge remains ~18%, which is very large. The forecaster confidence at 0.55 is moderate, reflecting genuine uncertainty about unknown future events over 1000+ days, but the structural barriers to removal are so high that even accounting for tail risks, 27% is far too high.

Allocation Logic

The edge is very large (22%) but forecaster confidence is moderate (0.55), and the time horizon is long (1020 days), which introduces capital lockup risk. I'm sizing at $1500 — above baseline but below maximum — to reflect the strong edge tempered by the long duration and the Devil's Advocate flags about missing information from 15 months of Trump's second term.

Entry price: $0.73

Current: $0.82

Status: OPEN

P&L: $184.93