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Will there be a Hormuz agreement and the Democrats win the Senate?

polymarketElections·2026-10-13·view on polymarket ↗
8%
Agent
10%
Market Price
-1.7%
Edge
60%
Confidence
50,131
Volume
0.1c
Spread
21
Days to resolution
3
Markets in event
final rationale
Mean of 2 draws (0.08, 0.08). (0) Nothing has resolved. As of Oct 12–13 no US–Iran Hormuz agreement has been announced. The June 17 MOU predates this market, which opened Oct 11, and sibling Hormuz-deal markets still trade around 12–14%, so the MOU evidently does not count. The Senate leg cannot be decided until after Nov 3. (a) About 20 days remain for the Hormuz leg (deadline Nov 2, 11:59 PM ET), and the Senate result follows the Nov 3 election. (b) Status quo is NO: the strait is effectively closed, attacks on shipping are escalating, the US blockade continues, and Iran calls the US reply 'insufficient' and demands all seven conditions first. (c) NO scenario: stalemate persists because both sides believe waiting improves their terms. Trump signals a deal could come after the midterms, and any partial arrangement is framed as Iran–Oman or hedged, so it fails the acceptance test. (d) YES scenario: Iran's pending reply narrows the gap, and Qatar or Pakistan brokers a Hormuz-only blockade-for-reopening text that both sides announce before Nov 2. Trump wants it for oil prices and has pledged no strikes before Nov 3. Democrats then win the Senate, which markets price at about 63%. On the anchor, the Hormuz-by-Nov-2 markets sit at about 13–14%, and multiplying by 0.635 gives about 8.5%. A pre-election deal might slightly help Republicans, which adds a small negative correlation. The research also shows repeated failed 'imminent deal' episodes. I therefore shade slightly below the 9.65% market price, to about 8%.
price vs. prediction
market price agent forecast at t+0
5 follow-ups
1. Planner Opus 5.5 · picks the research tools
Tools chosen: polymarket_direct resolution_source polymarket_related kalshi_related wikipedia
Planner reasoning
This is a joint market: a US-Iran Hormuz agreement by Nov 2 combined with Democrats winning the Senate. Polymarket's direct price is the anchor. Related markets on both venues for each leg separately (US-Iran deal and Senate control) let us check whether the joint price is consistent with its components. Wikipedia gives background on the Senate map and the Hormuz crisis.
2. Research parallel tool calls + 4 web research loops (Sonnet 5.5) · read raw by the forecasters
at a glance
RESEARCH DIGEST (built in code: tool summaries and each report's bottom line; the forecasters read the full tool outputs and reports) Tools - polymarket_direct: ## This Market's Polymarket Data **Will there be a Hormuz agreement and the Democrats win the Senate?** - Current price (probability): 9.65% (live; bid 10% / ask 10%) - 7-day price change: -0.20% - 30-day price change: -0.20% - Total volume: $50,131 (USD notional) - Price range: 9.65% - 9.85% - Data points: 3 days - resolution_source: already_resolved=unclear; matches_criteria=False; last_updated=2026-10-12. As of Oct 12, 2026, no new US–Iran Hormuz agreement has been announced. Iran says it accepts some US conditions but no deal until all are met, and says the strait stays closed until the US accepts its plan (Al Jazeera, Oct 4 and Oct 12). The US and Iran signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) on June 17 that included reo - polymarket_related: Polymarket search over 4 keyword(s), kept 20 matches. keyword 'Hormuz': 5 markets | keyword 'Iran agreement': 5 markets | keyword 'Senate control 2026': 5 markets | keyword 'Democrats win Senate': 5 markets - kalshi_related: 1 related markets / summaries. series CONTROLS: 0 markets (skipped 4 no-signal) | keyword 'Senate control': ok | keyword 'Iran deal': no matches | keyword 'Hormuz': no matches - wikipedia: Fetched 2 Wikipedia entries (0 missing pages). Research loops, bottom lines - current state: The two components currently look very different. The Senate leg leans Democratic, at roughly 60–65% in most models and markets. The Hormuz leg is stalled: Iran is publicly hardline, the US rejected Iran's roadmap, shipping attacks are escalating, and only indirect Qatar/Pakistan message exchanges are under way. A qualifying US–Iran agreement announced by Nov 2 would be a sharp reversal of the last two weeks. - base rate: The reference class is poor for YES. Several "deal imminent" episodes in Aug–Sept (Aug 5 Axios, Bessent's "today or tomorrow") resolved NO, the strait is still effectively closed and escalating, and Iran is publicly holding out for its full conditions. Conditional on a deal, the Senate component is roughly a 56–65% Democratic call across models and markets, though one model gives about 33%. The Senate component is therefore likely to be a modest multiplier on a low deal probability. - yes case: The best YES case is a Hormuz-only text built on a narrowing gap, with Trump's pre-election no-strike pledge and Iran's pending reply. That is paired with a Senate leg that most models favour for Democrats. It still needs a sharp reversal from Iran's current public refusal to negotiate. - no case: A NO is the default. No talks are scheduled, both sides are demanding the other move first, Trump is signalling he'd rather wait until after the midterms, and every earlier "imminent" deal slipped. Added to that are strict acceptance-statement and US–Iran-specific criteria, a hard Nov 2 cutoff, and a second Senate leg that further cuts the joint probability.
tools
toolstatustimeitemssummary
polymarket_direct OK 0.3s 1 ## This Market's Polymarket Data **Will there be a Hormuz agreement and the Democrats win the Senate?** - Current price (probability): 9.65% (live; bid 10% / ask 10%) - 7-day price change: -0.20% - 30-day price change: -0.20% - Total volume: $50,131 (USD notional) - Price range: 9.65% - 9.85% - Dat
resolution_source OK 15.3s 1 already_resolved=unclear; matches_criteria=False; last_updated=2026-10-12. As of Oct 12, 2026, no new US–Iran Hormuz agreement has been announced. Iran says it accepts some US conditions but no deal until all are met, and says the strait stays closed until the US accepts its plan (Al Jazeera, Oct 4
polymarket_related OK 0.5s 20 Polymarket search over 4 keyword(s), kept 20 matches. keyword 'Hormuz': 5 markets | keyword 'Iran agreement': 5 markets | keyword 'Senate control 2026': 5 markets | keyword 'Democrats win Senate': 5 markets
kalshi_related OK 26.8s 1 1 related markets / summaries. series CONTROLS: 0 markets (skipped 4 no-signal) | keyword 'Senate control': ok | keyword 'Iran deal': no matches | keyword 'Hormuz': no matches
wikipedia OK 0.3s 2 Fetched 2 Wikipedia entries (0 missing pages).
research loops · 4/4 ok · 16 searches · 6 page reads
dimensionstatustimesearchespage readsreport
current state OK 18s 4 2 4481 chars
base rate OK 24s 4 2 5147 chars
yes case OK 23s 4 0 5597 chars
no case OK 26s 4 2 5668 chars
report: current state
- [2026-10-13] No US–Iran Hormuz agreement has been announced as of today. I found no report of one. The contract's own resolution text was truncated, so the full "listed countries" and resolution-source clauses are unseen. https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2026/10/12/iran-sets-crosshairs-on-us-uae-oil-shuttle-out-of-strait-of-hormuz - [2026-10-12] Iran's Foreign Ministry spokesman Baghaei said Iran is still reviewing the US response to its Hormuz proposal. He said message exchanges continue via Qatar and Pakistan and that Iran's preconditions must be respected. https://today.lorientlejour.com/article/1550537/iran-still-reviewing-us-response-on-hormuz-voices-concern-over-saudi-houthi-escalation.html - [2026-10-11] Security chief Rezaei called the US response "insufficient" because it fails Iran's seven conditions. He said Hormuz stays shut and there will be no negotiations until they are met. https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/iran-news/article-911369 - [2026-10-12] Iran says it will target the US-assisted Gulf oil "shuttle" through the southern corridor, and the US naval blockade of Iranian ports remains. Windward counts at least 15 ships targeted in October. About 31 ships a day transited Hormuz in the last week of September, against 138 before the war. Crisis Group analyst Azizi reads Tehran as feeling no immediate pressure to deal. https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2026/10/12/iran-sets-crosshairs-on-us-uae-oil-shuttle-out-of-strait-of-hormuz - [2026-10-07] Trump said on Oct 5 that the war is "essentially over". On Oct 6 he said a decision is coming, "the nice way or the not-so-nice way". Pezeshkian called the talks "meaningless", Qatar says mediation continues, and Vance said any deal needs reduced Iranian enrichment. https://hormuzstraitmonitor.com/crisis-timeline/ - [2026-10-07] The US set new demands for an Iran deal. Rubio claimed Iran has lost control of the strait, yet a tanker was hit on Oct 6 and 12 crew were injured. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/10/7/us-sets-new-demands-for-iran-deal-what-are-they - [2026-09-25] Araghchi offered to reopen Hormuz within 7 days and restart nuclear talks if Iran's conditions are accepted. Trump rejected the proposal days later. https://www.cnbc.com/2026/09/25/us-iran-trump-hormuz-.html - [2026-10-04] Ghalibaf said Hormuz will not open until Iran's seven conditions, based on the Islamabad memorandum, are met. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/10/4/iran-says-strait-of-hormuz-to-remain-closed-until-us-meets-conditions - [2026-06-17] Precedent: Trump and Pezeshkian signed an MOU with a US blockade removal and 60 days of free passage. It broke down. The US bombed Iran in July and reimposed the blockade (Jul 18), and Iran has since refused direct talks. https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R45281 - [2026-08-05] Precedent: a US–Iran–Oman interim Hormuz deal was reported as "close" with a target announcement date. Iran denied direct talks. Later Iran–Oman route agreements (Aug 26) did not include the US. https://www.axios.com/2026/08/05/us-iran-strait-of-hormuz-deal-nears - [2026-10-13] Senate side: Poliwave gives Democrats a 61% chance of Senate control, with a median of 51 seats. Vote-Scope has 65% D and cites Polymarket Democratic Senate control at about 63%. Pollsmax is an outlier at 32.8% D. Polymarket's balance-of-power market on Oct 12 had "Democrats sweep" at 62%. https://www.poliwave.com/us/fed/projection - [2026-10-11] Silver Bulletin (updated Oct 11) shows Democrats leading in YouGov polls in TX, OH, KS, NE and MI. Kansas is rated a toss-up. https://www.natesilver.net/p/nate-silver-2026-midterm-election-polls-model - Scheduled: election day is 2026-11-03. The Hormuz component must be announced by 2026-11-02 11:59 PM ET. Senate control is resolved after that. I found no scheduled US–Iran talks. BOTTOM LINE: The two components currently look very different. The Senate leg leans Democratic, at roughly 60–65% in most models and markets. The Hormuz leg is stalled: Iran is publicly hardline, the US rejected Iran's roadmap, shipping attacks are escalating, and only indirect Qatar/Pakistan message exchanges are under way. A qualifying US–Iran agreement announced by Nov 2 would be a sharp reversal of the last two weeks. NOT FOUND: the full resolution-source and "listed countries" clauses (the text was truncated). Any scheduled US–Iran negotiating round before Nov 2. Any announced Hormuz agreement. Reporting after Oct 12 on Trump's "decision" deadline.
report: base rate
- [2026-10-13] A sibling Polymarket market, "Who wins the Senate pending Hormuz Agreement by Oct 23?", opened 2026-10-11. It priced No Hormuz Agreement at about 89%, Hormuz Agreement with a D Senate at about 7%, and with an R Senate at about 4.5%. This is a shorter window (to Oct 23) than the question's Nov 2 deadline, and it is not this contract's own price. https://polymarket.com/event/who-wins-the-senate-pending-hormuz-agreement - [2026-10-12] Al Jazeera reports that Iran says the US accepted some of its seven conditions, but Tehran insists a deal comes only when all of them are met. A Crisis Group analyst reads this as Tehran judging it is under no immediate pressure to settle. The US naval blockade remains in place. Iran is also attacking a US/UAE-assisted oil shuttle that moves crude out of the strait. https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2026/10/12/iran-sets-crosshairs-on-us-uae-oil-shuttle-out-of-strait-of-hormuz - [2026-10-12] A Hormuz tracker says the strait is effectively closed, with about 4 transits on Oct 4 against a pre-war baseline of 85 a day. It also says Iranian state media call the US reply to Iran's seven conditions insufficient. https://straits.live/briefs/2026-10-12 - [2026-10-08] Lloyd's List reports at least 13 tanker or gas-carrier attacks since Sep 28, the highest in seven months. The US blockade of Iranian ports continues. https://www.lloydslistintelligence.com/resources/blog/strait-of-hormuz-brief-8-october-2026 - [2026-08-17] Base-rate evidence for repeated near-misses: the June 17 US-Iran MOU called for a 60-day negotiation window. Trump declared it "over" on July 8, and the window expired in stalemate despite repeated claims that a deal was imminent. https://www.cbsnews.com/live-updates/us-iran-war-deal-expired-strait-of-hormuz/ - [2026-08-05] Axios reported the US, Iran and Oman were closing in on an interim Hormuz deal, with the US aiming for a Wednesday announcement and Iranian leadership reportedly signed off. Al Jazeera said Iran denied direct talks with the US and described the talks as being with Oman. No qualifying agreement followed. Iran-Oman framing may also complicate the "US and Iran both accept the same agreement" requirement. https://www.axios.com/2026/08/05/us-iran-strait-of-hormuz-deal-nears - [2026-08-09] On Polymarket, odds of a US-Iran Hormuz deal by Aug 31 fell to about 30%, then drifted lower. The Aug 31 deadline passed without a deal. This is an example of imminent-deal signals failing. https://vinnews.com/2026/08/09/polymarket-odds-fall-to-about-30-for-u-s-iran-strait-of-hormuz-shipping-agreement-by-aug-31/ - [2026-09-29] Polymarket's separate "Iran-Oman Hormuz Management Agreement" market was about 22% for Nov 30 and 34% for Dec 31 (undated snapshot, likely late Sept/Oct). A "Hormuz traffic normal by Nov 30" market was about 7%. Reuters (Sep 24, via Cryptonews) reported a phased deal under consideration: Iran reopens the strait in exchange for the US lifting its blockade. https://cryptonews.com/news/iran-war-polymarket-odds-blockade-end/ - [2026-10-13 (undated snapshot)] An Archyde report, undated in the results but appearing to be from the last few weeks, says Polymarket gave about 8% for a US-Iran Hormuz agreement by Sep 30. It also says Trump told the UN a deal could come after the midterms, while Pezeshkian said Iran does not want talks dragged past the elections. https://archyde.com/iran-seeks-us-peace-deal-before-midterms-despite-trump-claims - [2026-10-11] Senate control, DDHQ/The Hill model: Democrats 56%, projecting 51 seats. https://votes.decisiondeskhq.com/forecast/2026/senate - [2026-10-13] Senate control from other sources: Poliwave gives Democrats 61% (model "not historically calibrated"). Pollsmax gives Democrats 32.8% (Oct 12). Nate Silver's model had Democrats at 74.8% on Oct 8 (Newsweek). Kalshi had Democrats at about 62% and Polymarket at about 64%. https://www.poliwave.com/us/fed/projection - [2026-10-12] Polymarket's Balance of Power market gave Democrats Sweep 62% and R Senate/D House 29%. D Senate/R House was under 1%. Its Senate-only market was about 64% D. Markets have moved toward Democrats since the Iran war began (Forbes, Sep 23: Republicans were about 60% before the war). https://polymarket.com/event/balance-of-power-2026-midterms BOTTOM LINE: The reference class is poor for YES. Several "deal imminent" episodes in Aug–Sept (Aug 5 Axios, Bessent's "today or tomorrow") resolved NO, the strait is still effectively closed and escalating, and Iran is publicly holding out for its full conditions. Conditional on a deal, the Senate component is roughly a 56–65% Democratic call across models and markets, though one model gives about 33%. The Senate component is therefore likely to be a modest multiplier on a low deal probability. NOT FOUND: This contract's own price, which was excluded by instruction. Any independent expert estimate of a deal before Nov 2. A track record for the 2026 Senate models. Any evidence linking a Hormuz deal to Senate outcomes (correlation). The full text of the resolution sources and the "listed countries" clause, which was truncated in the question.
report: yes case
YES means: a US–Iran diplomatic agreement on Hormuz traffic is announced by Nov 2, 2026 (11:59 PM ET), and Democrats win control of the Senate in the Nov 3 election. **Strongest case for YES.** All of this is new relative to the colleague reports above. - [2026-10-08/09] Trump promised no US strikes on Iran before Nov 3. He cited "productive discussions", while saying the blockade stays. This came a day after Axios, NBC and The Atlantic reported Pentagon preparations for renewed strikes. A pre-election ban on force and a stated reason to want a deal both fit a short diplomatic path. https://www.breitbart.com/politics/2026/10/08/trump-rules-out-iran-strikes-before-midterms-citing-productive-talks-ongoing-blockade/ - [2026-10-09] The same CBS live blog quotes an Iranian official saying Iran is reviewing the US reaction to its seven-day plan and will "respond within a few days". He added that the negotiating process continues. The Oct 12 Baghaei statement is a later version of this. A reply from Iran is therefore due inside the window. https://www.cbsnews.com/live-updates/iran-war-nuclear-donald-trump-vance-rubio-strait-of-hormuz/ - [2026-10-11] Rezaei confirmed to Press TV that the US response accepted some of Iran's seven conditions. He called the status of the others unclear or ambiguous, not rejected. He said the US asked for Iran's proposals through three channels: Pakistan, Qatar and Iraq. The gap is narrower than "rejected" implies, and it is a gap over conditions, not over the principle of a deal. https://english.news.cn/20261012/693eff76bbb1466d8ef7fdff87cbb2c1/c.html - [2026-10-11] Iran's offer is explicitly a Hormuz-only package. It would restore normal maritime passage within seven days if its conditions are met. A narrow, Hormuz-focused text fits the "Iranian commitments aimed at restoring traffic" test better than a broad peace deal does. https://www.iranintl.com/en/202610111041 - [2026-09-29] Araghchi said talks had become more "serious" and focused solely on Hormuz. He denied the US had formally rejected the proposal. He said the final US reply would come through Qatar. That contradicts Trump's rejection claim. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/9/29/us-iran-talks-in-new-york-whats-the-latest - [2026-10-08] The National's sources (five diplomats) say channels via Qatar, Pakistan and China remain open. A Pakistani source says "negotiations are still happening". Both sides are bracing for escalation, so the deal clock is short. Iran's side is split: the IRGC opposes talks, while the foreign ministry and mediators back them. https://thenationalnews.com/news/mena/2026/10/08/attempt-to-break-us-iran-diplomatic-deadlock-up-against-growing-appetite-for-major-war - [2026-06-17 to 2026-04-08] Precedents show an agreement can be announced within hours of a Trump deadline. Examples: the April 7 two-week ceasefire conditioned on Hormuz reopening, and the June Islamabad MOU after weeks of "will they, won't they". Both were announced by the principals (Trump on Truth Social, Araghchi confirming). A short-notice text of the same kind could happen before Nov 2. https://aljazeera.com/news/2026/4/7/trump-suspends-iran-bombing-for-two-weeks-following-dire-threats - [2026-10-12] Senate leg: DDHQ/The Hill has Democrats at 56%, projecting 51 seats. Its Senate-only seat table shows Ohio 51%, Iowa 52%, Maine 54%, Texas 57%, and Kansas at 65% R-leaning in the table. https://votes.decisiondeskhq.com/forecast/2026/senate - [2026-10-08] Silver Bulletin's model had Democrats at 74.8% for the Senate, up from 56.2% on Aug 5. It also had them at 74.5% for both chambers. Momentum is toward Democrats. https://www.newsweek.com/democrat-chances-of-winning-house-senate-hit-new-high-nate-silver-forecast-12545290 - [2026-10-13] Poliwave polling averages show Democrats ahead in OH (+3.3), TX (+2.8), MI (+3.3) and IA (+1.2). Its forecast gives Democrats 61% for the Senate, with the "R House, D Senate" combination at about 1%. Cook moved Kansas to toss-up on Oct 6. https://www.poliwave.com/us/fed/projection - [2026-10-06] Cook and Crystal Ball both shifted several races toward Democrats in early October (NC and NH for Cook, AK for Crystal Ball). Ratings are still moving the same way. https://www.270towin.com/2026-senate-election-predictions/ **Most likely path to YES.** Iran replies "within a few days" with a counter that accepts the ambiguous US terms. The sequence runs roughly as follows: - Qatar or Pakistan brokers a short Hormuz-only text (a blockade-for-reopening phased swap, the seven-day plan). - Trump, who wants lower oil prices before Nov 3, and Iran both announce acceptance of the same text by Nov 2. - Democrats then win the Senate, which is the favoured outcome in most models. Prerequisites: - The US has to concede the remaining Iranian conditions (guarantees, blockade lift) or Iran has to drop them. - Iran has to publicly accept the agreement, not just reviewing it. - The announcement has to be bilateral or clearly the same agreement. The Aug Iran–Oman format would not qualify. BOTTOM LINE: The best YES case is a Hormuz-only text built on a narrowing gap, with Trump's pre-election no-strike pledge and Iran's pending reply. That is paired with a Senate leg that most models favour for Democrats. It still needs a sharp reversal from Iran's current public refusal to negotiate. NOT FOUND: Any announced agreement or any scheduled US–Iran round before Nov 2. Any post-Oct 12 report of Iran's formal reply. The full "listed countries" and resolution-source clauses. Any evidence linking a deal to Senate outcomes.
report: no case
YES means: a US–Iran Hormuz agreement is announced (and accepted by all listed countries) by Nov 2, 2026 11:59 PM ET, AND Democrats win Senate control in the Nov 3 midterm. Both legs are required. - [2026-10-13] Time left. The window is about 20 days, and no US–Iran negotiating round is scheduled. Baghaei said on Oct 12 that Iran is still reviewing the US reply and will answer via mediators. He gave no timetable and, per PakTribune, there is no jointly accepted implementation mechanism. https://paktribune.com/iran-reviews-us-response-on-hormuz-as-pakistan-and-qatar-continue-mediation/ - [2026-10-13] Iran's position is sequencing: it says it cannot guarantee security in the strait while the US blockade stays. The US told mediators on Sep 25–26 that Trump has no intention of lifting the blockade, so the two sides' first-move demands directly contradict each other. https://pakistan.shafaqna.com/EN/338795 ; https://www.breitbart.com/politics/2026/09/25/trump-rejects-iran-seven-day-hormuz-proposal-expects-renew-strikes-midterms/ - [2026-10-13] Foreign Affairs Forum (an analysis piece) reports that Rezaei on Oct 11 said Iran is no longer responding and that Washington must clarify the unresolved points. It also says no comprehensive ceasefire or unrestricted reopening has been confirmed. On Oct 10–11 the US disabled a blockade-runner (Oct 10) and tankers were hit near Sohar and in the strait (Oct 11). The Houthi attacks on Riyadh add a second front. The piece's view is that stalemate is escalating. https://faf.ae/home/2026/10/13/blockade-without-peace-how-hormuz-riyadh-and-the-open-sea-have-fused-into-one-war - [2026-09-27] Al Jazeera analysis: Trump believes waiting yields better terms. Krieg (King's College London) calls protraction the most likely outcome, because both sides think waiting improves their deal. Iran is "betting heavily on time". A leader who wants to avoid being seen lifting the blockade and releasing about $12bn before the midterms has an incentive to delay. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/9/27/better-deal-whats-behind-trumps-rejection-of-irans-truce-offer - [2026-09-26] The Hill/WSJ: Trump told aides he expects to resume strikes after the midterms. Officials said his position could change and could depend on the midterm results. Iran's September offer was close to the failed June MOU, so the template for a deal has already failed once. https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/6113000-trump-iran-proposal-ceasefire/ - [2026-09-28] Newsweek, via Waltz on Meet the Press: the US called Iran's proposal a "cynical attempt" to get sanctions relief and frozen assets up front, and said Iran wants "everything up front". The core dispute, over nuclear sequencing and who concedes first, is unresolved on both sides. https://www.newsweek.com/trump-rejects-iran-deal-reopen-strait-hormuz-12493131 - [2026-08-04/05] Resolution-criteria technicality: Iran has repeatedly said it negotiates with Oman, not the US. Iran denied direct talks in August while Axios, CNBC and Al Jazeera reported a US–Iran–Oman deal close. If a Hormuz arrangement again appears as Iran–Oman, it may fail the "US and Iran both announce acceptance of the same agreement" test. The criteria require declarative acceptance statements from every listed country. Hedged statements such as "positive talks" or "close" do not count. https://www.cnn.com/2026/08/04/world/live-news/iran-war-trump ; https://www.cnbc.com/2026/08/05/us-iran-war-trump-hormuz-bessent-iran-deal-close.html - [2026-08-05] Iran–Oman route agreements may also fail on the Iranian-obligation requirement. The Iran–Oman route plan is conditioned on a US blockade lift and return to the truce. The US rejected joint Iran–Oman management as contrary to free passage (FAF, Oct 13). A deal can therefore be announced by some parties and still not be one the US accepts. https://www.cbsnews.com/live-updates/iran-war-us-strait-of-hormuz-sanctions/ - [2026-10-12] Resolution mechanics favour NO. The market resolves "No Hormuz Agreement" immediately if nothing qualifying is announced by Nov 2. Ambiguous announcements can stay undetermined for up to 14 days after the last party's first announcement. Late announcements in Nov 3–16 would not count, since the deadline is Nov 2. https://polymarket.com/event/us-iran-hormuz-agreement-byptptpt-20260803235957575 - [2026-10-12] Even a Yes on the Hormuz leg is diluted by the Senate leg. The Senate leg leans D in markets at about 60–65%, so the joint outcome cannot be more likely than the deal alone. Any model skeptic (Pollsmax about 33% D) shrinks it further. This adds nothing beyond the colleagues' numbers. - [2026-10-13] Pattern in failed attempts. April's ceasefire and the April 17 reopening were reversed, the Islamabad talks failed, the June MOU collapsed on Jul 8, and the August "imminent deal" claims came to nothing. Each came with optimistic official signalling that proved unreliable. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2026_Strait_of_Hormuz_crisis BOTTOM LINE: A NO is the default. No talks are scheduled, both sides are demanding the other move first, Trump is signalling he'd rather wait until after the midterms, and every earlier "imminent" deal slipped. Added to that are strict acceptance-statement and US–Iran-specific criteria, a hard Nov 2 cutoff, and a second Senate leg that further cuts the joint probability. NOT FOUND: The full "listed countries" and resolution-source text. Any scheduled US–Iran or mediator round before Nov 2. Any post-Oct 12 report of a Trump deadline or Iranian reply. Confirmation of the Hill article on fetch (the page was inaccessible); its content comes from the search snippet.
3. Forecasters 2 draws · Opus 5.5 + GPT · plain mean
claude-opus-5-5 · high effort
60% conf
Yes 8%
No 92%
(0) Nothing has resolved. As of Oct 12–13 no US–Iran Hormuz agreement has been announced. The June 17 MOU predates this market, which opened Oct 11, and sibling Hormuz-deal markets still trade around 12–14%, so the MOU evidently does not count. The Senate leg cannot be decided until after Nov 3. (a) About 20 days remain for the Hormuz leg (deadline Nov 2, 11:59 PM ET), and the Senate result follows the Nov 3 election. (b) Status quo is NO: the strait is effectively closed, attacks on shipping are escalating, the US blockade continues, and Iran calls the US reply 'insufficient' and demands all seven conditions first. (c) NO scenario: stalemate persists because both sides believe waiting improves their terms. Trump signals a deal could come after the midterms, and any partial arrangement is framed as Iran–Oman or hedged, so it fails the acceptance test. (d) YES scenario: Iran's pending reply narrows the gap, and Qatar or Pakistan brokers a Hormuz-only blockade-for-reopening text that both sides announce before Nov 2. Trump wants it for oil prices and has pledged no strikes before Nov 3. Democrats then win the Senate, which markets price at about 63%. On the anchor, the Hormuz-by-Nov-2 markets sit at about 13–14%, and multiplying by 0.635 gives about 8.5%. A pre-election deal might slightly help Republicans, which adds a small negative correlation. The research also shows repeated failed 'imminent deal' episodes. I therefore shade slightly below the 9.65% market price, to about 8%.
claude-opus-5-5 · high effort
60% conf
Yes 8%
No 92%
(0) Not resolved. No qualifying US–Iran Hormuz agreement has been announced as of Oct 12–13. Iran is still reviewing the US reply, Rezaei calls it insufficient, and the strait remains effectively closed. The June 17 MOU predates this market (opened Oct 11), and the sibling markets clearly treat it as not counting. The Senate leg cannot resolve until after Nov 3. (a) About 20 days remain until the Nov 2, 11:59 PM ET Hormuz deadline; the Senate result follows the Nov 3 election. (b) Status quo is a stalemate with escalating tanker attacks, a continuing US blockade and no scheduled talks, so the market resolves No. (c) NO: Iran holds out for all seven conditions, Trump waits until after the midterms as reported (WSJ/Hill), and the deadline passes; or a deal happens but Republicans keep the Senate. (d) YES: Iran's pending reply accepts the ambiguous US terms, Qatar or Pakistan brokers a short Hormuz-only blockade-for-reopening text, both sides announce acceptance before Nov 2 as Trump seeks lower oil prices, and Democrats win the Senate as most models favour (56–75%). Polymarket prices a Hormuz deal by Nov 2 at roughly 13–14% and D Senate at about 63.5%. Multiplied, that gives about 8–9%, with perhaps a slight negative correlation since a pre-election deal could help Republicans. The repeated failure of 'imminent deal' signals also argues for the lower end. I shade slightly below the 9.65% anchor.
4. Final plain mean of 2 draws
8% (60% confidence)
Yes: 8% No: 92%
Mean of 2 draws (0.08, 0.08). (0) Nothing has resolved. As of Oct 12–13 no US–Iran Hormuz agreement has been announced. The June 17 MOU predates this market, which opened Oct 11, and sibling Hormuz-deal markets still trade around 12–14%, so the MOU evidently does not count. The Senate leg cannot be decided until after Nov 3. (a) About 20 days remain for the Hormuz leg (deadline Nov 2, 11:59 PM ET), and the Senate result follows the Nov 3 election. (b) Status quo is NO: the strait is effectively closed, attacks on shipping are escalating, the US blockade continues, and Iran calls the US reply 'insufficient' and demands all seven conditions first. (c) NO scenario: stalemate persists because both sides believe waiting improves their terms. Trump signals a deal could come after the midterms, and any partial arrangement is framed as Iran–Oman or hedged, so it fails the acceptance test. (d) YES scenario: Iran's pending reply narrows the gap, and Qatar or Pakistan brokers a Hormuz-only blockade-for-reopening text that both sides announce before Nov 2. Trump wants it for oil prices and has pledged no strikes before Nov 3. Democrats then win the Senate, which markets price at about 63%. On the anchor, the Hormuz-by-Nov-2 markets sit at about 13–14%, and multiplying by 0.635 gives about 8.5%. A pre-election deal might slightly help Republicans, which adds a small negative correlation. The research also shows repeated failed 'imminent deal' episodes. I therefore shade slightly below the 9.65% market price, to about 8%.
Pipeline Timing
Total pipeline time: 62.3s
Per-tool research timings shown in the Research section above.