Will another country leave OPEC in 2026?

- [2026-04-28] The UAE officially announced its withdrawal from OPEC and OPEC+, effective May 1, 2026, ending membership that had contributed to the organisation since 1967 ; this is the baseline event the market resolves against, not the "another country" trigger. - [2026-04-29] The United Arab Emirates' shock decision to leave OPEC is reverberating across global energy markets, exposing fractures in the powerful oil cartel as production quotas risk prompting other members to follow suit , with analysts flagging Kazakhstan, Nigeria and Venezuela as possible "flight risks." - [2026-06-25] Iraq publicly floated leaving OPEC over a quota dispute, but Iraq's oil ministry said reports suggesting Baghdad could end its membership "did not reflect the Iraqi government's official position," while still pressing for a higher quota baseline. - [2026-06-25] Reuters reported that though Iraq had considered leaving OPEC, the current plan is to remain a member of the group while seeking a higher output quota. No Iraqi exit has been announced since. - [2026-08-27/28] Bloomberg reported (sourced to unnamed people familiar with the matter) that Venezuela is considering leaving OPEC, a move that could further weaken the oil cartel's influence over global crude markets... the idea has been discussed with U.S. officials, although no final decision has been made , amid deepening US-Venezuela oil ties. - [2026-08-28] Analysts noted the scale of a potential Venezuelan exit: if Venezuela followed the UAE out of OPEC, the two departures would remove more than 5 MMbpd of production capacity from the organization, equivalent to roughly 17% of the capacity held by core members at the beginning of 2026 . - [2026-09-07] Kpler's senior analyst assessed that Venezuela's exit from the OPEC group is 'structurally likely' but not for now , and "an eventual exit has a real probability, OPEC is unlikely to push for quotas on Venezuela in the near term given its still-modest output, a dynamic that removes urgency." - [2026-09-07] The same analysis notes Venezuela's recovering output is "only back to around 1.3 million barrels per day and guided toward ~1.4 million barrels per day by late-2027," reducing pressure for an imminent formal break. - [2026-10-04] OPEC's official press release on the 68th JMMC meeting (comprising Saudi Arabia, Russia, Iraq, Kuwait, Kazakhstan, Nigeria, Algeria and Venezuela) shows Venezuela still listed and participating as a member in good standing, with overall conformity for OPEC and non-OPEC countries participating in the Declaration of Cooperation noted for July-August 2026 — no indication of an impending exit. - [2026-10-04] The OPEC/non-OPEC group, via a separate seven-country subset (not including Venezuela, which remains quota-exempt), kept November output targets unchanged, with the decision taken by seven countries: Saudi Arabia, Russia, Iraq, Kuwait, Kazakhstan, Algeria and Oman. Venezuela is an OPEC member but is exempt from production quotas, together with Iran and Libya . - [2026-10-04] Per the official OPEC press release, the next JMMC meeting is scheduled for 29 November 2026, and OPEC's own member-country roster page (fetched today) still lists Algeria, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela as current members — i.e., no member besides the UAE has left as of this date. - [Ongoing] No official government announcement of a second OPEC exit (Venezuela, Iraq, or any other member) has been found as of 2026-10-11; all reporting remains sourced to "people familiar with the matter" or walked-back ministerial statements, which the market's resolution criteria explicitly exclude ("informal announcements, statements from unnamed sources, or leaks will not qualify"). BOTTOM LINE: As of October 11, 2026, no OPEC member besides the UAE has officially announced withdrawal; Venezuela is the most credible candidate (actively "weighing" an exit per Bloomberg/Kpler reporting through September 2026) while Iraq raised and then walked back exit threats in June, but OPEC's own October 4, 2026 communications show Venezuela still a fully listed member with no public exit notice — resolution would require moving from "considering" to a formal government announcement before Dec 31, 2026. NOT FOUND: Any primary-source (government or OPEC) announcement of a second withdrawal; any news from the last 7 days (Oct 4–11, 2026) specifically updating Venezuela's or Iraq's exit deliberations beyond the Oct 4 OPEC+ and JMMC statements.

- [2026-04-28] The UAE's withdrawal was the sixth departure/suspension episode in OPEC's history (Gabon 1995, Indonesia 2009 & 2016, Qatar 2019, Ecuador 2020, Angola 2024, UAE 2026), i.e. roughly one exit event every 5-6 years since 1995, though several of these were the same two or three "serial" leavers (Indonesia, Ecuador) rather than distinct new countries. The Southeast Asian country of Indonesia withdrew not once, but twice from the organisation, first in 2008 and again in 2016 after rejoining. - [2024-01-01] The most recent precedent before UAE: the last country to withdraw from OPEC before the UAE was Angola, having done so in 2024, after a six-year OPEC membership, following a dispute over output quotas. This shows the base-rate "trigger" is almost always a quota/capacity dispute, not a one-off geopolitical shock like UAE's. - [2026-06-25] A second-dimension precedent already occurred within this very market window: Iraq warned that otherwise a decision would have to be made regarding whether to remain in or withdraw from OPEC, two months after the UAE formally left the oil cartel. However, a separate Bloomberg report said Iraq walked back its threat, with Iraq's Oil Ministry stating that reports it was considering ending its OPEC membership "do not reflect the official position of the Iraqi Government," and that neither the Prime Minister nor the Government had proposed withdrawing. This is a clear example of "informal/threatened" exit talk that explicitly would NOT satisfy this market's resolution criteria (which excludes unofficial statements). - [2026-08-27/28] The most serious live candidate is Venezuela: OPEC's decades-long hold over global oil markets is fraying again as founder member Venezuela becomes the second nation in a matter of months to consider an exit, with Caracas's deliberations on whether to leave the organization it helped create more than six decades ago. Nothing is decided — Bloomberg's report described deliberations, not a decision, and every source in the report was anonymous, with no final decision announced. - [2026-09-07] Expert assessment frames Venezuela's exit as likely eventually but not imminent: Venezuela's exit from the OPEC group is "structurally likely" but not for now, according to Kpler Senior Commodity Analyst Homayoun Falakshahi, who noted Venezuela is reportedly in internal deliberations over leaving OPEC, months after the UAE's withdrawal. - [2026-10-04] As of the most recent OPEC+ meeting, Venezuela remains a nominal member: Venezuela is an OPEC member but is exempt from production quotas, together with Iran and Libya, and was not among the seven countries setting November output targets. No official Venezuelan withdrawal announcement has been reported. - [2026-04-29] Analysts named other "flight risk" candidates immediately after the UAE exit: Matt Smith, lead oil analyst at Kpler, flagged Kazakhstan as a key candidate given persistent overproduction, adding that Nigeria could also be one to watch because it is becoming more self-sufficient by redirecting domestic crude to the Dangote refinery, and Venezuela is another possible contender, said market watchers. (Note: Kazakhstan is an OPEC+ partner, not an OPEC member, so it is irrelevant to this specific market.) - [2026-06] A specialist energy-analytics outlet speculated further: longer term, only Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Iran, and Kuwait retain real market power, and Venezuela may follow the UAE out as its production recovers, especially given the change in Venezuela's relationship with the United States following the removal of President Maduro in January 2026. - [2026-06] The regional think-tank consensus is that OPEC is weakening structurally but gradually, not collapsing suddenly: the most likely long-term trajectory is not the collapse of OPEC+, but rather its gradual transformation into a weaker and more decentralized institution. - Historical base rate: across ~65 years of OPEC's existence there have been roughly 6-7 discrete exit/suspension events (Gabon 1995, Indonesia 2009, Qatar 2019, Indonesia again 2016, Ecuador 2020, Angola 2024, UAE 2026), implying an unconditional annual probability of a member leaving of roughly 8-10%. However, the current environment (post-UAE shock, active Venezuela deliberations, Iraq quota friction) is a cluster period, elevating the conditional rate well above the long-run average for 2026 specifically. - No betting markets, polls, or formal forecaster track records on this specific question (other than the Polymarket contract itself) were found; coverage is dominated by oil-market analysts (Kpler, Rystad, Capital Economics, Eurasia Group) offering qualitative "likely eventually" framing rather than numeric probabilities. NOT FOUND: No evidence of any country having made a formal/official withdrawal announcement since the UAE (April 2026) through early October 2026; no Polymarket-external prediction-market or bookmaker odds specific to "next OPEC country to leave in 2026"; no official OPEC Secretariat statement responding to the Venezuela reports. BOTTOM LINE: Historically OPEC exits are rare (roughly one new departure every 5-8 years) and nearly always follow lengthy, visible quota disputes rather than snap decisions, but 2026 is an atypical cluster year — Iraq's quota threat (later walked back, thus not qualifying) and Venezuela's unresolved, still-unofficial exit deliberations show elevated but not yet realized risk; the base rate plus current "considering but undecided" status of the leading candidate (Venezuela) suggest a meaningfully above-average but still sub-50% chance of an official second withdrawal being announced before 2026-12-31.

YES means: at least one current OPEC member (other than the UAE, which already left on April 28, 2026) issues an official government announcement of withdrawal from OPEC between April 28, 2026 and December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM GST. - [2026-10-02] Reuters reported that OPEC+'s review to help determine members' 2027 oil output quotas has been delayed after the US-Israeli war on Iran disrupted projects to expand capacity across the Middle East, with the capacity review originally due by end of September 2026 , and the deadline has slipped to mid-November, according to sources . This pushes the single biggest quota flashpoint—exactly the dispute Iraq cited in its June threat—into a window (mid-to-late November) still inside the market's Dec 31 deadline, creating a concrete trigger date for escalation rather than vague "deliberation." - [2026-10-02] The capacity assessment is being done by independent firm DeGolyer and MacNaughton, and it is evaluating participating countries except Russia, Iran, and Venezuela, which are under US sanctions, with findings expected to reach OPEC ahead of the alliance's next group-wide meeting later in November (the Nov 29 JMMC per colleagues' Oct 4 finding) — giving Iraq a defined decision point under 2 months before market close. - [2026-10-02] Analysts explicitly flagged the downside risk for Baghdad: the uncertainty complicates a politically sensitive exercise for OPEC+, with production capacity estimates likely to influence how much individual members are allowed to pump; countries whose assessed capacity is lower could face pressure for lower quotas while producers that have expanded capacity might seek higher allocations — a disappointing outcome for Iraq (which is pushing hard for recognition of its capacity) could reignite the exit threat it raised and then shelved in June. - [2026-06/2026-08] A specialist analysis lays out the escalation path explicitly: if the MSC review delivers a modest increase that falls short of Iraq's ambition, "the tail-risk scenario remains formally off the table according to Iraq's Oil Ministry," but "the combination of fiscal pressure, the UAE exit precedent, and the structural gap between Iraq's capacity and its current ceiling creates a set of conditions that, if the MSC review disappoints materially, could shift the probability calculus in ways that crude markets may not be fully pricing today." - [2026-10-04] Iraq's underlying financial motive for an exit threat remains acute: Reuters-sourced reporting from the Oct 4 OPEC+ meeting notes the group met "as Gulf states work to boost exports following months of turmoil caused by the US war against Iran; however, most producers are still pumping much below their goal quotas." Persistently depressed Iraqi export revenue versus its 5.5 MMbpd aspirational capacity keeps the fiscal pressure that originally drove the June threat fully intact. - [2026-09/2026-08] On the Venezuela track, the mechanism for a YES is now explicitly tied to US policy: Bloomberg reporting shows "some American officials envision an oil powerhouse built from an alliance between the US and Venezuela that would greatly diminish OPEC's influence, one of the people said," while "Caracas isn't subject to any OPEC production limits now given the scale of its slump in recent years, and another person said that freeing the country from any potential quotas would help it maximize production over the longer-term and thus lower prices... Washington would be able to pursue its plans for the country's oil sector unfettered by obligations to another group." If the US-Venezuela oilfield-lease negotiations (up to 100-year terms per Aug 27 Bloomberg reporting) close, formalizing an exit becomes a low-cost, symbolic move Washington has incentive to push for. - [2026-09-07] Kpler's analyst quantifies why an eventual Venezuela exit is "structurally likely": a Venezuela exit "would strip out roughly six million barrels per day of OPEC capacity, or about 20 percent of total production capacity" — a scale significant enough that US officials pushing the realignment have clear strategic motive to formalize it rather than leave Venezuela as a quota-exempt member in limbo. - [2026-10-04] Separately, the delayed capacity review also sets up a parallel Kazakhstan-style overproduction/quota fight: a US consultancy-based review covering all OPEC+ members except Russia, Iran and Venezuela (sanctioned) reporting ahead of the Nov 29 JMMC means any member unhappy with its allotted baseline has a natural, dated occasion in which to escalate a threat to a formal announcement before year-end. - [2026-06-25] The pattern already established in this exact market window shows how fast rhetoric can turn: within two months of the UAE's exit, Iraq's spokesperson stated outright that the cartel "has to raise Iraq's production quota. Otherwise, a decision will have to be made about whether to stay or leave the organization." The same ingredients (fiscal strain, unresolved quota gap, upcoming capacity-review decision point) recur in November, so a repeat — this time potentially crossing into a formal announcement rather than a walked-back threat — is plausible. BOTTOM LINE: The most likely YES path is Iraq re-escalating its quota grievance into a formal withdrawal announcement around the now-delayed MSC capacity review (expected mid-November) and the Nov 29 OPEC+/JMMC meeting, or Venezuela converting its ongoing, US-encouraged "deliberations" into an official notice as US-Venezuela oil-lease deals progress; both have concrete, dated triggers falling inside the Oct 11–Dec 31, 2026 window, which the April-June precedent shows can move from threat to crisis within weeks. NOT FOUND: No official government statement from Iraq, Venezuela, or any other OPEC member post-dating the Oct 4, 2026 JMMC communique indicating a change from "considering" to a decided withdrawal; no confirmed date for conclusion of US-Venezuela oilfield lease talks; no outcome yet of the delayed MSC capacity review (due mid-November) or its effect on Iraq's quota demand.

YES means: at least one current OPEC member (other than the UAE) issues an official government announcement of withdrawal from OPEC between April 28, 2026 and December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM GST — informal statements, anonymous-sourced reports, or walked-back threats do not count per the resolution criteria. - [2026-10-05] Venezuela's Hydrocarbons Minister Paula Henao publicly "ratificó su respaldo inquebrantable a la estabilidad del mercado energético mundial" at the 68th JMMC meeting, explicitly reaffirming "la plena vigencia de la Declaración de Cooperación" (OPEC+'s cooperation framework) — the opposite of exit signaling, and the most recent dated statement from Caracas on the matter. https://ultimasnoticias.com.ve/economia/venezuela-ratifica-en-la-opep-su-compromiso-con-la-estabilidad-del-mercado-energetico-global - [2026-09-09] Rather than moving toward exit, Iraq instead formally submitted a request to OPEC+ to raise its production baseline to 6 million bpd from 4.431 million bpd, explicitly "dismissing alliance exit rumors," showing its energy is now channeled into the quota negotiation track, not departure. https://www.iraqinews.com/iraq/iraq-demands-opec-quota-increase-6-million-bpd-reconstruction-2026/ - [2026-09-09] Iraq's quota review timeline shows the external consultant's capacity assessment is due to be completed only at the end of September 2026 and ratified by oil ministers at the late-November meeting — meaning any genuine Iraqi grievance has an institutional outlet (the Nov 29 JMMC) rather than an immediate trigger for exit before year-end. https://www.rigzone.com/news/wire/iraq_asks_opec_to_raise_quota-09-sep-2026-184569-article/ - [2026-08-28] Even in the most bullish "exit" coverage, reporters note a structural reason exit lacks urgency: Venezuela "is currently exempt from OPEC production quotas," meaning a formal withdrawal "would free no barrels" and yields no immediate practical benefit, reducing the incentive to take the symbolic step now. https://www.worldoil.com/news/2026/8/28/venezuela-weighs-opec-exit-as-producer-group-faces-growing-fragmentation/ - [2026-08-28] Bloomberg's own sourcing on the Venezuela story remains entirely anonymous ("according to people familiar with the matter... no final decision has been made"), and as of six weeks later no on-the-record confirmation, government statement, or official has materialized — exactly the category the market explicitly excludes. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-08-28/opec-s-future-darkens-with-venezuela-latest-nation-to-mull-exit - [2026-08-29] Analysts explicitly noted that unlike the UAE's abrupt move, a Venezuelan exit is still just talk: "the idea has been discussed with U.S. officials, although no final decision has been made," and the piece frames this as only "gaining traction" rather than decided. https://www.rigzone.com/news/wire/venezuela_weighs_opec_exit-29-aug-2026-184484-article/ - [2026-10-04] OPEC+'s seven-country production-target rollover for a second consecutive month (September and October both unchanged) signals a period of institutional calm and consensus rather than crisis bargaining that typically precedes an exit announcement. https://energynews.pro/en/seven-opec-countries-keep-production-targets-unchanged-for-november-2026 - [2026-06] Historical precedent within the current cluster itself shows the "threat-then-retreat" pattern: Iraq's oil ministry spokesperson stated on the record that Iraq "has no intention of withdrawing from the organization and remains committed to its mechanisms," despite earlier warning a decision on membership "will have to be made" if quotas aren't raised — illustrating how quickly such threats are walked back under the market's exclusion of informal statements. https://english.aawsat.com/business/5288490-baghdad-urges-opec-raise-iraqs-production-quota - [2015/2026 analogy] A similar pattern previously played out with the UAE itself: a prior (pre-2026) WSJ report of UAE "internal discussions" about exiting OPEC was followed by UAE officials denying any exit plans, showing that even serious-sounding leaks about this exact country have failed to convert into formal announcements until they finally did in April 2026 — underscoring how high the bar is for leak-to-announcement conversion and how long it can take. - [2026-09] A regional energy-analytics outlet's framing that OPEC "could die in 2027 as a result of events" in Venezuela implicitly places the expected resolution of any Venezuelan exit beyond the 2026 trading-close deadline, not within it. https://www.agbi.com/opinion/oil-and-gas/2026/08/latam-gushers-and-possible-venezuela-exit-a-nightmare-for-opec/ BOTTOM LINE: Every live "exit candidate" (Iraq, Venezuela) has, as of the most recent dated statements (Oct 5 Venezuela JMMC reaffirmation, Sept 9 Iraq quota petition), moved toward working within OPEC's institutional channels rather than toward formal withdrawal, and all Venezuela exit reporting remains anonymously sourced — exactly the category the resolution criteria exclude — leaving no qualifying official announcement on record with under three months of the window remaining. NOT FOUND: Any on-the-record government statement (Venezuelan, Iraqi, or other OPEC member) confirming an actual decision to leave; any OPEC Secretariat communication acknowledging receipt of a second withdrawal notice; any news from the last five days (Oct 6–11, 2026) beyond the Oct 4–5 JMMC coverage already cited.