Strait of Hormuz traffic returns to normal by December 31?

- [2026-02-28] Shipping traffic through the Strait of Hormuz has been largely blocked since this date, when the US and Israel launched military operations against Iran and Iran responded with attacks on shipping, sea mines, and transit warnings. Beginning 28 February 2026, traffic through the strait was largely blocked after the U.S. and Israel launched military operations against Iran and Iran responded with attacks on shipping, sea mines, and warnings against transit. (en.wikipedia.org/randforecastinginitiative.org) - [2026-09-01 to 2026-09-06] IMF PortWatch data showed commercial ship transits through the Strait of Hormuz averaging 3.17 a day over the first six days of September 2026, against an average of 85.5 a day across 2025 , a 96% decline from normal (globalmilitary.net). - [2026-09-27] The most recent IMF PortWatch-reported value cited by multiple trackers: IMF PortWatch recorded 1 vessel transiting on 2026-09-27, against a pre-crisis baseline of 85 per day. (straits.live) - [2026-09-28 to 2026-10-04] A secondary analysis of the official IMF ArcGIS table reports its latest seven observations, from 28 September through 4 October, were 4, 1, 4, 0, 4, 2 and 4 calls , summing to 19 calls, giving a moving average of 2.71, against the contract's required 60, equivalent to 420 counted calls across a week (noah-news.com). - [2026-10-04] On Oct 4, IMF PortWatch's most recent published day, commercial transit through the Strait reached 5% of the pre-crisis vessel count: 4 vessels against a typical 85 per day. (straits.live) - [2026-10-04] Reuters reports that Hormuz traffic has fallen to its lowest level in over two months following recent attacks. (straits.live, citing Reuters) - [2026-10-05] Diplomatic standoff continues: Ghalibaf says the Strait of Hormuz stays closed until Iran's seven conditions are met, while thenationalnews.com reports Iraq arranging a tanker to move oil through the strait. (straits.live) - [2026-10-01] IRGC claims via Fars news agency reported that its navy targeted at least seven tankers in the strait over five days , indicating ongoing attacks on shipping (straits.live). - [2026-10-05] Middle East oil exports have climbed back above levels seen before the US-Israel war on Iran began in February, despite Tehran's attempts to blockade the Strait of Hormuz and attack vessels , but this reflects crude volume rerouted or loaded differently, not PortWatch's vessel-call count (aljazeera.com). - [2026-10-08] Independent AIS trackers (hormuz.now) report a 10.7/day 7-day average; 75 crossings in 7 days by their own counting method — still far below 60, and PortWatch's own figures for the equivalent days remain in single digits per day, much lower than third-party AIS counts due to stricter vessel-qualification criteria (hormuz.now). - [2026-10-08] Independent tracker Windward reports 5 inbound (all AIS) and 3 outbound on 8 Oct, down from 18 on 7 Oct , confirming continued suppressed and volatile traffic (insights.windward.ai). - [2026-10-09] As of today, trackers describe the strait as effectively closed to commercial shipping; it is closed to commercial shipping as of 9 October 2026, with 4 ships transited on October 4 vs ~85/day normal (straits.live). BOTTOM LINE: As of early October 2026, IMF PortWatch's own 7-day moving average of Strait of Hormuz transit calls sits around 2–11 (depending on source/day), roughly 2–18% of the required 60 threshold, with no sign of imminent recovery amid continued attacks on shipping and an unresolved US-Iran standoff; reaching a 60 average by December 31, 2026 would require an extraordinarily rapid and sustained de-escalation not currently indicated by any diplomatic or military development. NOT FOUND: An official IMF PortWatch chart/CSV figure beyond early October 2026 (the primary portwatch.imf.org page could not be fetched in full detail — only metadata was retrievable); any confirmed ceasefire or de-escalation agreement that would restore normal shipping before year-end.

- [2026-09-12] Historical baseline context: PortWatch's full series shows pre-war annual daily averages were far above the 60 threshold every year since 2019 — the annual daily average rose from 69.1 in 2019 to 73.6 in 2020 and 80.8 in 2021, then held in the low 90s: 93.5 in 2022, 92.3 in 2023 and 91.1 in 2024, before easing to 85.5 in 2025, meaning in the reference class of "normal" (pre-crisis) periods the 60-threshold was cleared essentially every single day. https://www.globalmilitary.net/news/hormuz-transits-three-a-day-september-2026-gmn-data/ - [2026-09-12] Within the current crisis window (the only relevant reference class now), the 7DMA has never come close to 60: March averaged 3.19 transits a day. April recovered to 7.13, May fell back to 3.94, June reached 12.93 and July 10.19, before August dropped to 4.71 , and the first six days of September averaged 3.17, with a low of 2 transits and a high of 6 on any single day . https://www.globalmilitary.net/news/hormuz-transits-three-a-day-september-2026-gmn-data/ - [2026-09-12] Across the entire seven-month war period the average is far below the resolution threshold: across the whole war period, 1 March to 6 September, the series averages about 6.9 transits a day . https://www.globalmilitary.net/news/hormuz-transits-three-a-day-september-2026-gmn-data/ - [2026-10-09] Most recent readings remain in single digits, far below 60: a tracker citing PortWatch reports as of 2026-10-01, about 3 commercial ships per day are transiting the Strait of Hormuz (IMF PortWatch 7-day average) — about 3% of the pre-crisis norm of roughly 74 transits per day . https://straitofhormuz.report/today - [2026-09-27] A separate PortWatch-based tracker similarly shows 1 commercial vessel transited the Strait of Hormuz on SEP 27. That is 1% of the ~85/day pre-crisis typical, per IMF PortWatch (chokepoint6 dataset) . https://straits.live/today - [2026-05-04] At market creation time for the sibling series, prediction-market traders were already pricing the 60-threshold as a slow, uncertain process: traders think there's a 59% chance traffic returns to normal by September 1. Odds that happens by August are hovering around 50% , and this was itself a downgrade from a week earlier. https://www.cnbc.com/2026/05/04/strait-of-hormuz-traffic-disrupted-until-september-kalshi-traders-say.html - [circa 2026-05] A RAND Forecasting Initiative crowd poll on the highest 7DMA reached by year-end gave only modest weight to a full return near/above 60, with initial probabilities of Less than 25: 3%; 25–50: 12%; 50–75: 20%; 75–100: 35%; ≥100: 30% — an optimistic early-stage forecast that has not been borne out by subsequent data. https://www.randforecastinginitiative.org/question_queue/questions/1767-what-will-be-the-highest-7-day-moving-average-of-daily-transit-calls-arrivals-of-ships-at-the-strait-of-hormuz-as-reported-by-imf-portwatch-for-any-date-between-8-may-2026-and-31-december-2026 - [2026-10-01, retrospective] That same RAND write-up noted the actual trajectory: the Strait of Hormuz 7DMA averaged 93.7 across 2025, reached 107.3 on 24 February 2026 just before the disruption, fell to a low of 2.7 in late March 2026 , confirming the magnitude of the collapse relative to the 60 bar. https://www.randforecastinginitiative.org/question_queue/questions/1767-what-will-be-the-highest-7-day-moving-average-of-daily-transit-calls-arrivals-of-ships-at-the-strait-of-hormuz-as-reported-by-imf-portwatch-for-any-date-between-8-may-2026-and-31-december-2026 - [~2026-07-29] A sibling Polymarket contract for "by July 7" was analyzed as effectively near-zero because of the moving-average mechanic: the bar is a sustained 7-day moving average of Hormuz transit calls returning to "normal," and the average is the enemy of any late jump... even with a reopening, observed traffic hasn't approached the normal range, and a trailing 7-day average from a re-closed ~12/day base physically can't climb to a "normal" reading within the ~11 days left , yielding an outside estimate of ~9% Yes for that earlier, shorter-dated contract. https://manifold.markets/BillClintonBubba/strait-of-hormuz-traffic-returns-to-h8dyOt6Nq9 - [~2026-07-02] A sibling "by August 31" Polymarket contract was trading at only about 3.8% implied chance on an aggregator snapshot, consistent with the trend of falling odds across successive deadline contracts (July 15, Aug 15, Aug 31, Sep 1) as the conflict persisted. https://terminal.vectorialdata.com/events/strait-of-hormuz-traffic-returns-to-normal-by-august-31-20260702154212320 - [2026-09-29] A Good Judgment Open question tracking the 7DMA as of 30 September 2026 noted that ship traffic through the Strait of Hormuz was back to a trickle as of late July 2026 as the stalemate between the US and Iran continued , and that as of question launch the IMF reported the 7-day Moving Average for 1 July 2026 was 32.285714285714285 — already well below 60 and since fallen further toward single digits by September/October. https://www.gjopen.com/questions/5609-as-of-30-september-2026-what-will-be-the-7-day-average-number-of-ships-passing-through-the-strait-of-hormuz-according-to-the-imf - [2026-10-09] No ceasefire or reopening deal has materialized despite months of on/off talks: UAE press reports describe an Iranian seven-day reopening plan still "under review," with no new ceasefire or peace deal yet as of today, and Iran's leadership stating days earlier that "the Strait of Hormuz will not open until our seven conditions based on the Islamabad memorandum are met" . https://gulfnews.com/uae/usiran-standoff-what-uae-residents-need-to-know-today-oct-9-2026-1.500703686 ; https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/10/4/iran-says-strait-of-hormuz-to-remain-closed-until-us-meets-conditions BOTTOM LINE: Outside the current crisis, the 60-threshold was essentially always satisfied (pre-2026 annual averages ran 69–93/day), but within the only relevant reference class — the ongoing 2026 Hormuz disruption (28 Feb 2026–present) — the 7-day moving average has never exceeded roughly 13 even during ceasefire windows, has trended toward single digits by September–October, and every successive shorter-dated sibling prediction market (July 7, Aug 15, Aug 31, Sep 1) saw its implied "return to normal" probability collapse toward single digits as deadlines approached without a breakthrough; this base-rate trajectory argues strongly against a jump to ≥60 before December 31 absent a sudden, durable, and swift reopening agreement. NOT FOUND: An explicit, continuously-updated public track record of how often "return to normal" threshold questions of this exact type have historically resolved Yes across many different chokepoints/crises (no broader meta-analysis of such binary markets was located); the current live price of this specific December 31 Polymarket contract (intentionally not reported per instructions).

YES means: IMF PortWatch publishes, on at least one date between now and December 31, 2026, a 7-day moving average of Strait of Hormuz transit calls (Arrivals of Ships) of 60 or higher — i.e., a near-full normalization of shipping traffic, not merely a partial rebound. - [2026-10-05] Iran's formally submitted "seven-day plan" explicitly states that if the US accepts, "Day 6: the Strait of Hormuz reopens and normal commercial shipping resumes," with final talks beginning day 7 — giving a concrete, publicly documented mechanism by which a deal could trigger a fast reopening rather than a slow drift. https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/530767/What-is-Iran-s-7-Day-plan-to-reopen-the-Hormuz - [2026-10-07] Despite Trump's initial rejection of the proposal, backchannel diplomacy through Qatari intermediaries remained active and "several meetings and messages have been exchanged," with efforts "focused on building common ground," indicating the negotiating track has not collapsed entirely. https://www.arabnews.com/middle-east/iran-threatens-new-strikes-as-it-awaits-us-response-to-hormuz-plan-3003671 - [2026-10-04] A senior Iranian official described the dispute as centered on "the sequencing of the steps rather than the components of the plan," implying the substantive gap between the two sides' positions may be narrower than public rhetoric suggests. https://www.thenationalnews.com/news/gulf/2026/10/04/iran-says-strait-of-hormuz-will-not-reopen-until-its-conditions-are-met/ - [2026-10-04] Iran has signaled some flexibility by offering "to dilute its 60 per cent enriched uranium stockpile and transfer it to a third party under IAEA-recognised mechanisms," a concession on the thorniest nuclear issue that could unlock broader sequencing compromises. https://www.thenationalnews.com/news/gulf/2026/10/04/iran-says-strait-of-hormuz-will-not-reopen-until-its-conditions-are-met/ - [2026-07-26, retrospective] There is direct historical precedent for a rapid traffic jump following a diplomatic breakthrough: after the June 14 MoU, Vortexa's tracking showed tanker traffic "responded almost immediately," rebounding from near-zero within days of the agreement being signed. https://www.vortexa.com/insights/hormuz-after-the-mou - [2026-06-20, retrospective] During that post-MoU window, independent trackers recorded a real acceleration — "a jump from 32 vessels (Jun 12–14) to 93 (Jun 19–21)" by one count — showing traffic can swing by multiples of its base within roughly a week once attacks stop and mine-clearance/escort arrangements are in place. https://manifold.markets/HillaryClinton/strait-of-hormuz-traffic-returns-to-P2ZghLz5Q8 - [2026-06-25, retrospective] AXSMarine data showed dry bulk tanker traffic reaching its 2025 baseline level for the first time since March 1, and overall recovery reached roughly 50% of pre-crisis peacetime levels at the June rebound's peak, demonstrating that partial-to-majority normalization is achievable quickly once a ceasefire holds. https://discoveryalert.com/strait-hormuz-traffic-recovery-vessel-backlog-mine-clearance/ - [2026-10-09] With nearly three months remaining until the December 31 deadline, there is materially more runway than in the failed shorter-dated sibling contracts (July 7, July 15, August 31) that resolved No after only weeks of post-MoU recovery time; a durable deal reached even in November could still leave 5-6 weeks for traffic to build toward 60, which is closer to (though still below) the ~32-40 peak 7DMA reached during the best prior window. - [2026-10-04] Iraq's move to route oil around Hormuz for the first time in decades, combined with Al Jazeera's October 5 report that Middle East oil exports have climbed back above pre-war levels via rerouting, shows regional actors and markets are actively adapting and capital is flowing again — a precondition that, paired with a reopening deal, could support a fast volume ramp-up once ships resume using the strait itself. https://www.thenationalnews.com/news/gulf/2026/10/04/iran-says-strait-of-hormuz-will-not-reopen-until-its-conditions-are-met/ BOTTOM LINE: The single most plausible path to YES is a near-term US acceptance of Iran's seven-day reopening plan (or an equivalent deal), which per Iran's own published timeline would mean normal commercial shipping resumes within about a week of acceptance — and historical precedent (the June MoU) shows traffic can rebound by an order of magnitude within days of such a deal; however, even that best historical rebound only pushed the 7DMA into the 30s-40s, well short of 60, so YES still requires not just a swift deal but an unusually complete and sustained reopening sustained for a full week, something that has not yet been achieved in this crisis. NOT FOUND: Any public reporting that the US has accepted or is close to accepting Iran's seven-day plan as of the search date; any projection from Kpler, Vortexa, or similar firms specifically modeling a path to a 60+ 7DMA (as opposed to partial recovery) before December 31, 2026.

YES means: IMF PortWatch publishes a 7-day moving average of Strait of Hormuz "Arrivals of Ships" transit calls reaching 60 or higher on any date between market creation (2026-05-11/06) and December 31, 2026. - [2026-09-26] The U.S. side rejected Iran's own reopening offer: President Donald Trump said Saturday that he has rejected an Iranian proposal to reopen the Strait of Hormuz, after Iranian officials indicated that shipping through the critical waterway could resume within days if a deal was sealed, telling reporters "I rejected their deal." This shows the most concrete recent reopening offer was explicitly killed by Washington, not just stalled. - [2026-10-04] Iran's own position hardened rather than softened post-rejection: the Strait of Hormuz is going to remain closed until the United States accepts Tehran's seven-day plan to reopen the waterway, Iran's top negotiator and parliament speaker has said. - [2026-10-07/08] Even the one tangible step forward (Iran-Oman safe-corridor coordinates) is explicitly non-dispositive: Iran and Oman have agreed on the geographical coordinates of designated "safe" transit routes for ships entering and leaving the Strait of Hormuz, but the agreement does not by itself mean Hormuz is fully open or that commercial vessels have an unconditional guarantee of safe passage. - [2026-10-07] Iran is simultaneously threatening the very alternative route traffic has been using: a senior IRGC adviser stated that transit routes in the Strait of Hormuz deemed "illegal" by Tehran would soon be blocked, explicitly referencing the alternative southern shipping pathway flanking Oman's coast. This undercuts even the limited workaround traffic PortWatch might otherwise capture. - [2026-10-05] Fresh kinetic damage to shipping as recently as this week undercuts any "quiet stabilization" narrative: Lloyd's List reported the Liberia-flagged tanker Lipsi suffered engine-room damage after being hit near Oman, with Tehran continuing to tie reopening to its seven conditions (per Noah Intelligence's synthesis of Lloyd's List reporting). - [2026-10-03/07] Mechanical/publication-lag technicality favors NO: independent trackers confirm PortWatch publishes weekly on Tuesdays on a ~2-day lag, and the next update lands the same day a market closes — so the complete month's print isn't public yet , and more broadly IMF PortWatch publishes weekly, on Tuesdays, on about a two-day lag, so the newest Hormuz day is typically about two to nine days old — meaning any late-December surge would need to be reported before year-end to count, and the 14-day grace period only pulls data forward, it cannot manufacture a qualifying high reading. - [2026-10-07] A quantitative third-party forecast converges on a low probability: Noah puts the probability that IMF PortWatch publishes a Strait of Hormuz seven-day transit-call average of at least 60 by 31 December at 14%, with a 6–28% uncertainty interval , explicitly noting IMF PortWatch recorded only 19 qualifying ship calls in the latest seven available days, a moving average of 2.71, against a contract requirement of 60, or 420 counted calls across a week . - [2026-10-06] The World Bank's own baseline economic assumption treats sustained normalization as a 2027 event, not a 2026 one: per The National's report on the World Bank's MENAAP Economic Update, the Bank's growth projections work on the assumption that the Strait of Hormuz will only gradually reopen starting December 31, 2026 — i.e., even the optimistic institutional baseline places the start of reopening at the very last day of the resolution window, leaving no time for a sustained 7-day≥60 average to be published and confirmed before the deadline. - [2026-10-05] Regional escalation is spreading rather than cooling: Yemeni-aligned forces claimed control of the Bab Al Mandeb strait and Mokha amid a major Houthi-linked offensive, with Saudi-coalition jets responding — a widening-conflict signal inconsistent with the de-escalation needed to restore Hormuz traffic (thenationalnews.com, Oct 5 2026). - [2026-10-07] Noah's own explicit decision rule underscores the NO case's structural strength: if the seven-day average is still below 10 after 1 December, the probability should move below 5% absent an implemented deal — and as of the report's writing the average was 2.71, nowhere near that threshold with under three months left. - [2026-10-09] Sibling Kalshi contracts corroborate the same deadline-arithmetic skepticism: a live tracker shows the "before November 1, 2026" Hormuz-60 contract priced at just 3%, confirming near-zero near-term probability consistent with the trajectory needed to reach 60 by year-end (straits.live). BOTTOM LINE: Every concrete recent development — Trump's rejection of Iran's seven-day plan, Iran's hardened closure stance, IRGC threats against the one working alternative corridor, a fresh tanker strike, and a widening Yemen/Bab-al-Mandeb front — points to continued single-digit PortWatch readings, while the World Bank's own baseline assumes reopening only begins on December 31 itself, leaving no feasible window for a qualifying 7-day≥60 average to be published before the deadline. NOT FOUND: Any confirmed implemented security/reopening agreement with an operating date; any PortWatch reading above the low-teens at any point in the crisis to date; an official IMF PortWatch chart reading beyond October 4-8, 2026.