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Israeli airspace closed by October 31, 2026?
7%
Agent
8%
Market Price
-0.2%
Edge
62%
Confidence
154,838
Volume
1.0c
Spread
24
Days to resolution
3
Markets in event
final rationale
Mean of 5 draws (0.07, 0.07, 0.07, 0.07, 0.07). (0) Resolution check: nothing shows the condition met. Safe Airspace/OPSGROUP (Oct 7) says the Tel Aviv FIR is open, and NOTAM trackers show only routine LLBG maintenance notices. The only recent incident was the Sept 30 flydubai hijack attempt, which led to a security-vetting directive, not a closure. (a) About 24 days remain until the Oct 31, 11:59 PM ET deadline. (b) Status quo is NO: the airspace is open, EASA has only a caution-level Information Note valid to Nov 16, and many foreign carriers have scheduled resumptions for late October. (c) NO scenario: tensions over the Hormuz tanker war and uranium enrichment persist, but no US or Israeli strike on Iran comes before the Nov 3 midterms. Any Iranian or proxy fire is absorbed with short ground stops, in line with Israel's mid-2026 policy of keeping Ben Gurion open during alerts, and those stops do not qualify. (d) YES scenario: a US or Israeli strike on Iran, perhaps linked to the flydubai attack or the third carrier group arriving, or a large Iranian barrage, prompts an immediate FIR closure NOTAM, as in June 2025 and February 2026. The escalation signals (carrier buildup, IDF strike planning, Iran under economic pressure) are real. However, reporting says a pre-midterm strike is less likely, and Israel now prefers to avoid full closures. I anchor on the 7.5% market price, consistent with the 6.5% Oct 15–31 sibling market and 19% for Dec 31, and shade slightly down for the policy shift and the airline schedules.
price vs. prediction
market price
agent forecast at t+0
11 follow-ups
re-scan context
This market has been scanned before. Previous predictions:
| date | predicted | market price | confidence |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-09-30 | 13% | 12% | 62% |
| 2026-09-18 | 14% | 12% | 57% |
1. Planner Opus 5.5 · picks the research tools
Tools chosen:
polymarket_direct
resolution_source
polymarket_related
kalshi_related
wikipedia
gdelt_news
Planner reasoning
Polymarket is the venue, so polymarket_direct gives the price anchor and resolution_source covers the Israeli CAA/IAA. Related markets on both venues (Iran strike, Israeli airspace at other dates) give cross-market signal on escalation risk. Wikipedia on past airspace closures (April 2024, June 2025) gives a base rate, and GDELT covers recent Israel–Iran escalation headlines.
2. Research parallel tool calls + 4 web research loops (Sonnet 5) · read raw by the forecasters
at a glance
RESEARCH DIGEST (built in code: tool summaries and each report's bottom line; the forecasters read the full tool outputs and reports)
Tools
- polymarket_direct: ## This Market's Polymarket Data **Israeli airspace closed by October 31, 2026?** - Current price (probability): 7.50% (live; bid 7% / ask 8%) - 7-day price change: -3.00% - 30-day price change: -3.00% - Total volume: $154,838 (USD notional) - Price range: 4.50% - 12.50% - Data points: 23 days
- resolution_source: already_resolved=unclear; matches_criteria=True; last_updated=unknown. The fetched page is the Israel Airports Authority homepage showing general navigation, airport info, and a notice about Terminal 1 reopening for aviation activity on June 28, 2026; it contains no information about any airspace closure or NOTAM affecting the Tel Aviv FIR.
- polymarket_related: Polymarket search over 3 keyword(s), kept 4 matches. keyword 'Israeli airspace': 3 markets | keyword 'Israel Iran strike': 0 markets | keyword 'Iran attack Israel': 1 markets
- kalshi_related: 2 related markets / summaries. keyword 'Israel airspace': ok | keyword 'Israel Iran': ok
- wikipedia: Fetched 3 Wikipedia entries (0 missing pages).
- gdelt_news: GDELT: 20 articles across 2 queries (lookback=14d). 'Israel airspace closed NOTAM': 10 hits | 'Iran Israel escalation missile': 10 hits
Research loops, bottom lines
- current state: As of October 7, 2026, Israeli airspace (Tel Aviv FIR/LLLL) is open and operating, with the only recent disruption being a foiled hijacking attempt on a flydubai flight (Sept 30) that triggered new security-vetting procedures and political controversy, not a NOTAM-based closure; EASA and other states maintain only caution advisories, not prohibitions. Absent a major new Iran/Houthi/Hezbollah escalation, current conditions point toward continued openness through October 31, 2026.
- base rate: Historically, qualifying full closures of the Tel Aviv FIR are rare outside acute war escalations but have happened multiple times in the 2024–2026 Iran conflict cycle (June 2025, Feb-Mar 2026, apparently again around September 2026), each lasting days-to-weeks and each tied to a specific triggering strike; absent such a fresh trigger, Israeli authorities have shown an increasing policy preference (since mid-2026) for keeping airspace open with only brief ground stops, making a new qualifying cl
- yes case: The strongest YES path is a fresh Israeli or US strike on Iran (or a major Iranian/Houthi retaliatory barrage) triggered by the accelerating Hormuz tanker war, the uranium-enrichment dispute, and the flydubai-attack fallout — all of which were actively escalating in the first week of October 2026, with a third US carrier strike group explicitly positioned to be in-region by late October, inside the contract's window.
- no case: Every current primary-source indicator — EASA's downgraded, extended-to-mid-November Israel advisory, dozens of airline resumption dates scheduled for mid-to-late October, new route launches targeting the exact contract window, and the absence of any Israeli NOTAM or CAA order approaching a closure — points to continued open status through Oct 31; a qualifying closure would require a fresh, acute Iran/Hezbollah/Houthi strike on Israel that has not materialized as of Oct 7.
tools
| tool | status | time | items | summary |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| polymarket_direct | OK | 0.4s | 1 | ## This Market's Polymarket Data **Israeli airspace closed by October 31, 2026?** - Current price (probability): 7.50% (live; bid 7% / ask 8%) - 7-day price change: -3.00% - 30-day price change: -3.00% - Total volume: $154,838 (USD notional) - Price range: 4.50% - 12.50% - Data points: 23 days |
| resolution_source | OK | 3.1s | 1 | already_resolved=unclear; matches_criteria=True; last_updated=unknown. The fetched page is the Israel Airports Authority homepage showing general navigation, airport info, and a notice about Terminal 1 reopening for aviation activity on June 28, 2026; it contains no information about any airspace cl |
| polymarket_related | OK | 0.6s | 4 | Polymarket search over 3 keyword(s), kept 4 matches. keyword 'Israeli airspace': 3 markets | keyword 'Israel Iran strike': 0 markets | keyword 'Iran attack Israel': 1 markets |
| kalshi_related | OK | 3.3s | 2 | 2 related markets / summaries. keyword 'Israel airspace': ok | keyword 'Israel Iran': ok |
| wikipedia | OK | 0.3s | 3 | Fetched 3 Wikipedia entries (0 missing pages). |
| gdelt_news | OK | 64.5s | 20 | GDELT: 20 articles across 2 queries (lookback=14d). 'Israel airspace closed NOTAM': 10 hits | 'Iran Israel escalation missile': 10 hits |
research loops
·
4/4 ok ·
17 searches ·
7 page reads
| dimension | status | time | searches | page reads | report |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| current state | OK | 31s | 4 | 2 | 5475 chars |
| base rate | OK | 52s | 5 | 2 | 5998 chars |
| yes case | OK | 39s | 5 | 2 | 5434 chars |
| no case | OK | 33s | 3 | 1 | 4833 chars |
report: current state
- [2026-09-30] A flydubai Boeing 737 attempted hijacking/terror attack occurred near Ben Gurion Airport (Omani copilot tried to crash the plane); the flight landed safely and airspace remained open throughout.
A flydubai Boeing 737 MAX 8 aircraft prepares for landing at Israel's Ben Gurion Airport in Lod on September 30, 2026.
Source: timesofisrael.com/liveblog-october-5-2026/
- [2026-10-04] In response to the attack, Netanyahu ordered a security review and the Transportation Ministry issued a new "Security Directive 2026" for foreign airlines flying into Israel, requiring enhanced crew-vetting; this is a security/procedural measure, not an airspace closure.
The letter, headed "Security Directive 2026: Security Measures for Foreign Flights Entering the Israeli FIR," is signed by Avri Cohen... It warns the operators that the ministry will be conducting recurring assessments to ensure that they are implementing the necessary programs, measures, and procedures to address the threats and risks associated with flights to Israel.
Source: timesofisrael.com/liveblog-october-5-2026/
- [2026-10-05] Political fallout continued, with calls for Transportation Minister Regev's removal over the security lapse, and US officials disagreeing over whether Iran was behind the attack
US Vice President JD Vance said earlier today that he had not seen conclusive evidence tying Iran to the attack.
Source: timesofisrael.com/liveblog-october-5-2026/
- [2026-09-30] EASA's current Information Note on Israeli airspace risk, which only advises caution rather than prohibiting flights, was issued and
Issued: 30-Sep-26, valid until: 16 Nov 2026... Information Note on the threat and risk situation in the airspace of Israel (FIR Tel Aviv - LLLL)
. Source: safeairspace.net/israel/
- [2026-10-07, as of today] Safe Airspace/OPSGROUP's current assessment states
Despite that, Israeli airspace (the LLLL/Tel Aviv FIR) is open again, but the security situation remains volatile and many international airlines have not returned to LLBG/Tel Aviv since the start of the conflict.
Source: safeairspace.net/israel/
- [2026-07 dated, still current] The primary ongoing risk cited is
missile and drone attacks linked to the ongoing conflict with Iran and regional militant groups, including Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Houthis in Yemen
, not an active closure order. Source: safeairspace.net/israel/
- [2026-09-01/09-29] Foreign-state advisories remain only cautionary: Italy's NOTAM (issued 2026-09-01, valid to 2026-11-29) and Russia's night-flight restriction (expired 2026-07-16) are examples of operator-specific caution, not Israeli closure orders.
Source: Italy Reference: Notam LIRR E2223/26 Issued: 01-Sep-26, valid until: 29 Nov 2026 Plain English: Italian operators should exercise caution in the airspace of Israel.
Source: safeairspace.net/israel/
- [2026-04-09] Ben Gurion Airport fully reopened after the 2026 Iran war ceasefire, a baseline reference point:
Ben Gurion Airport fully reopened on April 9, 2026, following the ceasefire between Israel and Iran. All terminals, duty-free shops, and passenger services are operating normally.
Source: israelwelcome.com
- [2026-10-06] Israeli-Palestinian conflict tracker shows continued low-level Gaza/West Bank violence (strikes, arrests) but no mention of any airspace or NOTAM closure action:
Israeli forces killed three Palestinians during strikes in Gaza City and Khan Younis (Al Jazeera).
Source: cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/israeli-palestinian-conflict
- [2026-10-05] NOTAM tracking site (ctrltwr.com) shows only routine, non-security NOTAMs for LLBG (runway/ILS maintenance, crane notices) around early-mid September/October 2026, with no general airspace closure NOTAM for LLLL in its current feed. Source: ctrltwr.com
- [2026-10-06] Related Polymarket sibling contract "Israeli airspace closed between Oct. 15 and Oct. 31?" market context notes
Recent developments in the US-Iran conflict and associated regional tensions have left Israeli airspace (Tel Aviv FIR) open following multiple temporary closures earlier in 2026 tied to missile and drone exchanges. As of mid-September, authorities report restricted but operational commercial flights at Ben Gurion Airport, with several foreign carriers scheduling gradual resumptions through October and November under heightened security protocols.
Source: polymarket.com/event/israeli-airspace-closed-between-octpt-15-and-octpt-31
- [2026-10-07] No Israeli Civil Aviation Authority, Ministry of Transport, or Israel Airports Authority statement found announcing any general closure of the Tel Aviv FIR as of this writing; airport is described as open with security-focused procedural changes only.
BOTTOM LINE: As of October 7, 2026, Israeli airspace (Tel Aviv FIR/LLLL) is open and operating, with the only recent disruption being a foiled hijacking attempt on a flydubai flight (Sept 30) that triggered new security-vetting procedures and political controversy, not a NOTAM-based closure; EASA and other states maintain only caution advisories, not prohibitions. Absent a major new Iran/Houthi/Hezbollah escalation, current conditions point toward continued openness through October 31, 2026.
NOT FOUND: No official Israeli Ministry of Transport, CAA, or Israel Airports Authority NOTAM/press release announcing an airspace closure in the past 30 days; no scheduled/announced closure events for the remainder of October 2026.
report: base rate
- [2024-04-13] Jordan and several neighbors briefly closed airspace during Iran's mass drone/missile attack on Israel; Israel's own airspace was not confirmed closed in this episode (closures were mainly in neighboring states). Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/April_2024_Iranian_strikes_on_Israel
- [2025-06-13] Israel closed the Tel Aviv FIR (NOTAM A0572/25, "ISRAEL FIR CLSD TO ALL FLT EXC INTL FLT DEP WB/NB ONLY OR PPR FLT") at the start of "Operation Rising Lion," a clear-cut qualifying full closure lasting roughly 12 days with phased reopening.
A0572/25 NOTAMR A0569/25 Q) LLLL/QAELP/IV/NBO/E /000/999/3124N03520E121 A) LLLL B) 2506131413 C) 2506151700 E) ISRAEL FIR CLSD TO ALL FLT EXC INTL FLT DEP WB/NB ONLY OR PPR FLT
https://www.flightradar24.com/blog/flight-tracking-news/airspace-closures-following-israeli-strikes-on-iran/
- [2025-06-22] After direct US strikes on Iran, Israel re-closed its airspace entirely;
the direct US involvement caused a renewed total closure of the airspace, reopening on June 22 at 1400L only to flights preapproved by the Israeli civil aviation authority
, showing closures recur quickly once triggered and reopen gradually/conditionally. https://www.ch-aviation.com/news/155232-israeli-carriers-resume-rescue-flights-amid-airspace-closure
- [2026-02-28] A "Second Iran War" began around Feb 28, 2026 with US/Israel strikes on Iran;
Israel closed its airspace until at least Monday as Iran responded with missiles and drones, making travel through Ben Gurion impossible
. https://www.timesofisrael.com/iran-conflict-strands-tens-of-thousands-of-israelis-abroad/
- [2026-02-01 to 2026-07-31] Reference-class base rate from the safeairspace/OPSGROUP tracker:
Feb-Jul 2026: Israeli airspace closed and reopened several times during the Iran conflict following US and Israeli strikes on Iran and subsequent Iranian missile and drone retaliation
— i.e., several distinct qualifying closures within a 5-month window during active war, each lasting days to roughly two weeks.
- [2026-06-07] Even mid-conflict, Israel sometimes chose NOT to close airspace despite missile fire —
Transportation Minister Miri Regev said Israel's airspace remains open and flights continue as scheduled, following a situation assessment
, showing authorities have grown reluctant to trigger full closures. https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/israels-airspace-remaining-open-flights-continuing-as-scheduled-regev-says/
- [2026-06-08] This policy shift is explicit:
the decision to keep Ben Gurion Airport operating despite Iranian missile attacks reflects an effort to break the pattern under which missile launches toward Israel were routinely followed by closure of Israeli airspace
. https://www.calcalistech.com/ctechnews/article/hjrlkk4bgx
- [2026-06-07] Israeli officials' own guidance states
even in the event of launches toward central Israel, this would not necessarily mean a prolonged closure of Ben Gurion Airport; the more likely scenario is a temporary halt to takeoffs and landings during alerts, followed by a return to operations
— i.e., short, non-qualifying ground stops rather than full FIR closures have become the norm since mid-2026.
- [2026-09-30/10-07] Current baseline:
Israeli airspace (the LLLL/Tel Aviv FIR) is open again, though security remains volatile and many international airlines have not returned; several states continue airspace warnings and EASA's Information Note advises caution rather than avoidance
. https://safeairspace.net/summary/
- [2026-09-08] Sibling-market reporting shows markets priced near-certain closure ahead of a Sept 30 deadline amid a Hormuz tanker-war flare-up:
a Polymarket contract asking whether Israel will close its airspace by September 30 jumped to a 96% implied probability of "Yes" as of September 08, 2026, a move of roughly 21 points in a single day
, implying the reference class saw an actual qualifying closure event around that time, distinct from the current Oct 31 question's window.
- [2026-09-16/10-07] For the narrower "Oct 15–Oct 31" sibling contract (closer analog to the remaining question period),
Israeli airspace (Tel Aviv FIR) has been open following multiple temporary closures earlier in 2026, with authorities reporting restricted but operational commercial flights at Ben Gurion as of mid-September
, and that contract's public commentary described de-escalation signals (Qatari-mediated talks, a "fragile truce framework") reducing near-term closure odds.
- [2024–2026 pattern] Across the full 2024–2026 reference class, qualifying full-FIR closures of Israel occurred roughly 3–4 distinct times (Oct 2024 regional tensions with no confirmed Israel-FIR closure, June 2025 twice, Feb–Mar 2026, and a further Sept 2026 episode implied by sibling-market pricing), each clustered tightly around an acute Israeli/US strike on Iran or large-scale Iranian retaliation, and each resolved (reopened) within roughly 1–3 weeks.
BOTTOM LINE: Historically, qualifying full closures of the Tel Aviv FIR are rare outside acute war escalations but have happened multiple times in the 2024–2026 Iran conflict cycle (June 2025, Feb-Mar 2026, apparently again around September 2026), each lasting days-to-weeks and each tied to a specific triggering strike; absent such a fresh trigger, Israeli authorities have shown an increasing policy preference (since mid-2026) for keeping airspace open with only brief ground stops, making a new qualifying closure by Oct 31 contingent on a fresh acute escalation rather than a steady background rate.
NOT FOUND: An authoritative, dated list of every historical Tel Aviv FIR NOTAM closure (official statistic on number/days closed per year) was not available; could not confirm whether the implied "Sept 2026" closure referenced in sibling-market commentary was an officially documented NOTAM closure versus market-trader rumor, nor find a track record of accuracy specifically for these Polymarket "airspace closed by" contract series.
report: yes case
YES means: Israel's Ministry of Transport/Civil Aviation Authority issues a NOTAM or official order that generally cancels/suspends commercial aviation across the Tel Aviv FIR (LLLL) at some point between Sept 15 and Oct 31, 2026, satisfying the contract's qualifying-closure test (default prohibition, not merely advisories, ground stops, or sectoral/altitude restrictions).
- [2026-10-04] The U.S. military is
U.S. forces relocated twelve B-1 bombers from RAF Fairford to their home bases in the United States following new warnings of a suspected Iran-backed plot against the British airbase
, confirming active, credible Iran-linked plotting against Western military assets concurrent with the question window. Source: cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/confrontation-between-united-states-and-iran
- [2026-10-03]
The UK Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) Center reported that an unknown projectile struck an oil tanker transiting the Strait of Hormuz
, and independent reporting the same week counted
ships still being hit in the Strait of Hormuz, with five struck in a 72-hour stretch late this week, including a supertanker that caught fire off Oman
— the exact kind of maritime/energy-chokepoint escalation that has historically preceded FIR closures. Source: cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker; andmagazine.substack.com/p/in-the-news-3-october-2026
- [2026-10-01]
U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Mike Waltz accused Iran of enriching uranium to 60 percent
, and separately
The United States is sending a third carrier strike group and second Marine expeditionary unit to the Middle East
, with reporting noting this could
put three carriers there by the end of October
— a major pre-strike posture buildup inside the Oct 31 window.
- [2026-10-04] Walla/Jerusalem Post sourcing describes active Israeli war-planning:
The military's main focus is on the operations it would need to carry out if forced to launch extensive strikes against Iran, including identifying targets that would affect the extremist regime in Tehran
, with
additional troops and aircraft are expected to arrive in the coming weeks as part of preparations for an escalation in the Middle East
. Source: jpost.com/middle-east/article-910572
- [2026-10-05] Israel Hayom reporting frames the near-term risk explicitly around U.S. politics: while a pre-midterm strike is seen as less likely, officials stress Iranian actions needn't follow Washington's calendar, and Jerusalem is preparing "both proactive strike options and defensive postures should Tehran initiate hostilities to break its economic isolation" — any such Israeli or Iranian first move has historically triggered an immediate full FIR closure (per the June 2025 and Feb 2026 precedents in the base-rate file). Source: israelhayom.com/2026/10/05/israel-iran-strike-timeline-us-midterms-idf-strategy/
- [2026-01-27/09-27] Trump has repeatedly kept open the possibility of military action against Iran before the midterms while declining to rule it out — on Sept 27
Asked by Fox News about strikes before the midterm elections, Trump said, "I don't want to say that"
— preserving a live path to a strike-triggered closure inside the window rather than only after Nov 3 midterms. Source: washingtonexaminer.com/op-eds/4750803/trump-iran-strike-midterm-elections
- [2026-10-04] Iran's economic desperation under blockade is acute: reporting states Tehran is
roughly two weeks from having nothing left to trade
on oil exports, a pressure point that in the Feb-2026 cycle (per colleagues' base-rate file) directly preceded Iranian missile/drone retaliation and an Israeli FIR closure; a similarly cornered Iran raises the odds of a desperation strike before Oct 31.
- [2026-10-04] Trump's rhetoric remains escalatory and personal: he said
Trump says Iran will be hit 'very hard' if it is behind copilot who tried to crash flight to Israel
, directly tying the Sept 30 flydubai hijacking attempt (documented by colleagues) to a potential US/Israeli strike trigger — a mechanism that, if acted on, would almost certainly prompt an immediate precautionary Israeli FIR closure akin to June 2025/Feb 2026.
- [2026-09-19] Historical mechanism confirmed: Israel's own June 2025 NOTAM precedent (cited by colleagues) shows closures are typically imposed within hours of a first strike and reopen only in phases — meaning any single Israeli or US strike on Iran before Oct 31, even if brief, plausibly produces a qualifying multi-day closure, not just a short ground stop.
- [2026-10-06] NOTAM tracker (ctrltwr.com) as of this week shows only routine maintenance/crane NOTAMs for LLBG with no active closure order, confirming the YES path is not yet realized but remains open given the live carrier buildup and tanker-war intensification described above. Source: ctrltwr.com
BOTTOM LINE: The strongest YES path is a fresh Israeli or US strike on Iran (or a major Iranian/Houthi retaliatory barrage) triggered by the accelerating Hormuz tanker war, the uranium-enrichment dispute, and the flydubai-attack fallout — all of which were actively escalating in the first week of October 2026, with a third US carrier strike group explicitly positioned to be in-region by late October, inside the contract's window.
NOT FOUND: No confirmed date or explicit decision for an imminent Israeli/US strike on Iran before Oct 31; no official Israeli NOTAM/closure order as of Oct 7, 2026.
report: no case
YES means: Israeli authorities (Ministry of Transport/CAA/Israel Airports Authority) issue a NOTAM or official order that generally bars commercial flights from transiting, arriving in, or departing the Tel Aviv FIR (LLLL) at some point between market creation (2026-09-15) and 2026-10-31, 11:59 PM ET — i.e., the title asks whether a qualifying closure occurs, so "NO" is the status-quo outcome of continued open airspace.
- [2026-10-07] EASA's live Conflict Zone Information Bulletin feed shows Israel is no longer in a "do-not-operate" category at all: the only active Israel-specific EASA instrument is an Information Note (not a CZIB prohibition) telling operators to merely "Exercise caution in Israel," while the harder "Not operate" language in EASA's export is reserved for Iran, Iraq and Lebanon FIRs, confirming Israel sits one tier below any closure-equivalent advisory. Source: https://www.easa.europa.eu/en/domains/air-operations/czibs/export?page=&_format=csv
- [2026-09-30] That Israel Information Note was itself extended/reissued with validity running to 16 Nov 2026, meaning the EU's own risk authority expects the current "open but cautious" status to persist past the Oct 31 deadline rather than escalate to a prohibition. Source: https://safeairspace.net/israel/
- [2026-10-04/05] Dozens of foreign carriers have published firm resumption dates at Ben Gurion clustered in the back half of October — Brussels Airlines and Air Canada (Montreal/Toronto) resuming Oct 24, Porto–TLV on Oct 25, British Airways cancellations only "until October 24" — scheduling decisions airlines would not make if they expected Israel to re-close its own FIR before month-end. Source: https://www.touristisrael.com/flights-to-ben-gurion-airport/12331/
- [2026-10] Israir's long-haul New York–Tel Aviv launch, cleared by the FAA in August 2026 and targeted for Oct 19 (possibly earlier), is a new scheduled-expansion data point underscoring industry confidence that LLLL stays open through the contract window. Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Israir
- [2026-07-25] Air Haifa's plan to add up to 10 daily Ben Gurion–Ramon domestic flights "from late October" is a further concrete commercial commitment premised on uninterrupted FIR access in the exact Oct 15-31 corridor relevant to this market. Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Air_Haifa
- [2026-10-03] The CFR Iran conflict tracker's most recent entry is a projectile hitting a tanker in the Strait of Hormuz, not an attack on Israeli territory or airspace — the live escalation ladder's newest rung is a Gulf shipping incident, a step removed from the kind of direct Iran-Israel missile exchange that has historically triggered Israeli FIR closures. Source: https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/confrontation-between-united-states-and-iran
- [2026-10-05] Reporting on the flydubai hijacking aftermath shows Israel's policy response was confined to a new foreign-carrier security-vetting regime ("Security Directive 2026"), not any airspace action, and US officials (VP Vance) publicly disputed Iranian responsibility, reducing the odds this incident escalates into a state-level trigger for closure. Source: timesofisrael.com/liveblog-october-5-2026/ (per prior research)
- [Mechanism] Under the contract's own exclusions, foreign-state cautionary NOTAMs (Italy's valid to Nov 29, per earlier research) and EASA's non-binding Information Note do not count, since resolution requires an Israeli authority's order generally barring commercial flights by default — the strongest NO case rests on the fact that no such Israeli-origin order currently exists and none is foreshadowed in official channels.
- [Precedent/inertia] Israel's own June–July 2026 policy shift toward keeping Ben Gurion open through missile alerts (cited in prior "BASE RATE" research) remains the operative doctrine as of Oct 7 with no reversal signaled, and the CAA's historical practice (seen in the April 2026 NOTAM extension episode) has been to extend technical notices without closing the FIR absent an acute strike event.
BOTTOM LINE: Every current primary-source indicator — EASA's downgraded, extended-to-mid-November Israel advisory, dozens of airline resumption dates scheduled for mid-to-late October, new route launches targeting the exact contract window, and the absence of any Israeli NOTAM or CAA order approaching a closure — points to continued open status through Oct 31; a qualifying closure would require a fresh, acute Iran/Hezbollah/Houthi strike on Israel that has not materialized as of Oct 7.
NOT FOUND: No official Israeli CAA/Ministry of Transport NOTAM text for the current period could be retrieved directly (only secondary trackers); no evidence of any Israeli government warning or contingency statement anticipating closure before Oct 31.
3. Forecasters 5 draws · Opus 5.5 + GPT-6 Astra + GPT-5.6 Sol · plain mean
claude-opus-5-5 · high effort
60% conf
| Yes | 7% |
| No | 93% |
(0) Resolution check: nothing shows the condition met. Safe Airspace/OPSGROUP (Oct 7) says the Tel Aviv FIR is open, and NOTAM trackers show only routine LLBG maintenance notices. The only recent incident was the Sept 30 flydubai hijack attempt, which led to a security-vetting directive, not a closure. (a) About 24 days remain until the Oct 31, 11:59 PM ET deadline. (b) Status quo is NO: the airspace is open, EASA has only a caution-level Information Note valid to Nov 16, and many foreign carriers have scheduled resumptions for late October. (c) NO scenario: tensions over the Hormuz tanker war and uranium enrichment persist, but no US or Israeli strike on Iran comes before the Nov 3 midterms. Any Iranian or proxy fire is absorbed with short ground stops, in line with Israel's mid-2026 policy of keeping Ben Gurion open during alerts, and those stops do not qualify. (d) YES scenario: a US or Israeli strike on Iran, perhaps linked to the flydubai attack or the third carrier group arriving, or a large Iranian barrage, prompts an immediate FIR closure NOTAM, as in June 2025 and February 2026. The escalation signals (carrier buildup, IDF strike planning, Iran under economic pressure) are real. However, reporting says a pre-midterm strike is less likely, and Israel now prefers to avoid full closures. I anchor on the 7.5% market price, consistent with the 6.5% Oct 15–31 sibling market and 19% for Dec 31, and shade slightly down for the policy shift and the airline schedules.
claude-opus-5-5 · high effort
66% conf
| Yes | 7% |
| No | 93% |
(0) Resolution check: none of the sources show a qualifying Israeli NOTAM or official order closing the Tel Aviv FIR since market creation on Sept 15. Safe Airspace/OPSGROUP (Oct 7) says LLLL is open, and NOTAM trackers list only routine LLBG maintenance notices. The Sept 30 flydubai attack produced a security directive, not a closure. The September episode implied by the sibling market fell before this market was created. (a) About 24 days remain, to Oct 31 11:59 PM ET. (b) If nothing changes, the airspace stays open and the market resolves No. Every structural indicator supports that: EASA's Israel note is caution-only and runs to Nov 16, many airlines resume flights Oct 19–25, and Israel has had an explicit policy since mid-2026 of keeping Ben Gurion open through missile alerts. That policy means short ground stops, which do not qualify, are more likely than full FIR closures. (c) NO scenario: Hormuz tanker incidents and rhetoric keep simmering, and the US avoids a pre-midterm (Nov 3) strike. Any Iranian provocation stays in Gulf shipping, and Israel keeps its airspace open. (d) YES scenario: a US/Israeli strike on Iran, perhaps tied to the flydubai attribution, the 60% enrichment dispute or the third carrier group arriving late October. Alternatively, a cornered Iran launches a missile barrage, and Israel issues a full FIR closure NOTAM as it did in June 2025 and Feb 2026. The escalation signals are real but already priced. The market sits at 7.5% (bid 7, ask 8), with the Oct 15–31 sibling at 6.5% and the December market at 19%. I see no unpriced information, and the policy reluctance to close slightly offsets the military buildup, so I stay near the anchor at 7%.
gpt-6-astra · high effort
59% conf
| Yes | 8% |
| No | 92% |
No supplied source documents a qualifying closure since the September 15 opening: Safe Airspace's October 7 assessment describes LLLL as open, while the alleged September closure is inferred from another market's price rather than documented. The generic IAA homepage and failed CAA retrieval leave a small missed-closure or classification risk within this forecast; current airport operations cannot rule out an earlier brief qualifying closure. Roughly 24–25 days remain until October 31 at 11:59 PM ET, during which an Israeli-authorized, non-excluded order generally prohibiting commercial transit, arrivals and departures must take effect for a new closure to qualify. I retain Polymarket's live 7.5% YES anchor, with its 7–8% spread, because the research provides no sufficiently verified, unpriced information warranting a departure. If nothing changes, No wins; it also wins if further incidents produce only enhanced security screening, airport ground stops, or foreign-government advisories. The strongest YES scenario is a major Israeli/US strike on Iran or Iranian retaliation prompting an immediate FIR-wide commercial prohibition, following the documented June 2025 closure precedent. CFR's October 3 tanker-strike report and the Jerusalem Post's October 4 military-planning report sustain that escalation risk, but June 7–8 reporting about keeping aviation operating during missile attacks weakens the assumption that escalation automatically produces a qualifying closure. EASA's caution-only guidance and planned October airline resumptions support continued openness, although advisory expiry dates and reversible airline schedules are not guarantees against a sudden closure.
gpt-6-astra · high effort
59% conf
| Yes | 8% |
| No | 92% |
No supplied source documents a qualifying closure since the September 15 opening; the base-rate report's inference from a September sibling-market price is not evidence that this contract has already resolved. The IAA homepage is generic and direct CAA access failed, leaving a small risk of an overlooked temporary official closure that current flight operations cannot exclude. Roughly 24 days remain until October 31 at 11:59 PM ET, during which an Israeli-authority order generally prohibiting commercial transit, arrivals, and departures across LLLL must take effect. The status quo is No: Safe Airspace reports the FIR open as of October 7, and the October 5 Times of Israel reporting describes enhanced security vetting rather than closure following the flydubai incident. A No scenario is continued regional tension managed through security procedures and temporary ground stops, consistent with the June 7–8 reporting on Israel's preference to maintain aviation operations; those measures do not satisfy the contract. A Yes scenario is a fresh major strike or retaliation prompting a general Israeli closure order, with CFR's October 3 tanker incident and the Jerusalem Post's October 4 contingency-planning report identifying plausible escalation pathways but no confirmed strike timetable. Airline resumption schedules and EASA's caution notice support continued operations, but neither guarantees openness through the deadline. I retain Polymarket's 7.5% YES anchor, within its 7–8% spread, because the research supplies no sufficiently verified, demonstrably unpriced trigger warranting a departure, while preserving a tail for sudden escalation and incomplete official-source coverage.
gpt-5.6-sol · high effort
68% conf
| Yes | 8% |
| No | 92% |
(0) The resolving condition is not documented as already met: the Israel Airports Authority page contains no closure announcement, and the October 5-7 NOTAM and news checks found only routine notices and security procedures, though inability to retrieve the CAA directly leaves a small verification gap. A qualifying Israeli order closing the Tel Aviv FIR generally to commercial aviation would still need to take effect by October 31 at 11:59 PM ET, approximately 24 days from today. (b) If conditions remain unchanged, the airspace stays open and the market resolves No. (c) The No scenario is continued regional tension without a direct major attack, with Israel relying on enhanced vetting and brief ground stops under its mid-2026 policy of keeping Ben Gurion operating. (d) The Yes scenario is a fresh Israeli or US strike on Iran, or a major Iranian or proxy barrage, prompting an official full-FIR closure like those imposed in June 2025 and February 2026. I retain Polymarket's 7.5% Yes anchor because the carrier buildup and Hormuz incidents sustain tail risk, but EASA's caution-only posture, planned late-October airline resumptions, and Israel's greater reluctance to close the FIR provide no clear unpriced reason to depart from the liquid market consensus.
4. Final plain mean of 5 draws
7%
(62% confidence)
Yes: 7%
No: 93%
Mean of 5 draws (0.07, 0.07, 0.07, 0.07, 0.07). (0) Resolution check: nothing shows the condition met. Safe Airspace/OPSGROUP (Oct 7) says the Tel Aviv FIR is open, and NOTAM trackers show only routine LLBG maintenance notices. The only recent incident was the Sept 30 flydubai hijack attempt, which led to a security-vetting directive, not a closure. (a) About 24 days remain until the Oct 31, 11:59 PM ET deadline. (b) Status quo is NO: the airspace is open, EASA has only a caution-level Information Note valid to Nov 16, and many foreign carriers have scheduled resumptions for late October. (c) NO scenario: tensions over the Hormuz tanker war and uranium enrichment persist, but no US or Israeli strike on Iran comes before the Nov 3 midterms. Any Iranian or proxy fire is absorbed with short ground stops, in line with Israel's mid-2026 policy of keeping Ben Gurion open during alerts, and those stops do not qualify. (d) YES scenario: a US or Israeli strike on Iran, perhaps linked to the flydubai attack or the third carrier group arriving, or a large Iranian barrage, prompts an immediate FIR closure NOTAM, as in June 2025 and February 2026. The escalation signals (carrier buildup, IDF strike planning, Iran under economic pressure) are real. However, reporting says a pre-midterm strike is less likely, and Israel now prefers to avoid full closures. I anchor on the 7.5% market price, consistent with the 6.5% Oct 15–31 sibling market and 19% for Dec 31, and shade slightly down for the policy shift and the airline schedules.
Pipeline Timing
Total pipeline time: 134.4s
Per-tool research timings shown in the Research section above.