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Will Kuomintang (KMT) win the most head of local government elections in the 2026 Taiwan local elections?

polymarketElections·2026-10-06·view on polymarket ↗
89%
Agent
90%
Market Price
-0.8%
Edge
61%
Confidence
79,884
Volume
1.0c
Spread
54
Days to resolution
30
Markets in event
final rationale
Mean of 5 draws (0.88, 0.88, 0.90, 0.90, 0.89). (0) The condition is not yet met. Voting is on Nov 28, 2026, and the CEC results page could not be accessed, though no results could exist yet. (a) About 7.5 weeks remain until the election and the Nov 29 close. (b) Status quo: the KMT holds 16 of 22 seats, and Templeman's Aug 28 seat ratings give it about 12 (safe, likely and leans) against about 7 for the DPP, with New Taipei and Penghu as toss-ups and Hsinchu City held by an independent. That is a clear KMT plurality. (c) NO: the DPP holds its leaners and likelies (7), wins both toss-ups, and flips Taipei or two lean-KMT seats such as Hualien or Hsinchu County, helped by scandal fallout and the TPP split in Zhubei. Even a tie would go to the DPP, because ties resolve alphabetically and 'Democratic Progressive Party' precedes 'Kuomintang'. That is a real tail risk, since the DPP needs only to draw level, not to pass. (d) YES: Taipei (Chiang led by 15 in TPOC's Sept 20 poll, though one Sept 22 poll had him up only 1.2), Taichung (+12.6) and the offshore strongholds hold, giving the KMT about 11-13 seats against the DPP's 7-9. The Polymarket anchor of 89.5% (DPP contract at 11.35%) fits this structure. The KMT defending 10 open seats, Lai's roughly even approval and the weak New Taipei candidate justify a slight trim but not a big move.
price vs. prediction
market price agent forecast at t+0
13 follow-ups
re-scan context
This market has been scanned before. Previous predictions:
datepredictedmarket priceconfidence
2026-09-02 90% 92% 64%
2026-08-25 93% 92% 71%
2026-08-17 92% 92% 70%
1. Planner Opus 5.5 · picks the research tools
Tools chosen: polymarket_direct resolution_source wikipedia polymarket_related kalshi_related
Planner reasoning
This is a Polymarket election question, so polymarket_direct is the price anchor and resolution_source should point at the CEC database. Wikipedia covers the reference class: 2022 results (KMT won 13 of 22) and the current nomination landscape. polymarket_related surfaces sibling markets for individual races and parties as cross-checks, and kalshi_related checks whether the other venue prices anything comparable.
2. Research parallel tool calls + 4 web research loops (Sonnet 5) · read raw by the forecasters
at a glance
RESEARCH DIGEST (built in code: tool summaries and each report's bottom line; the forecasters read the full tool outputs and reports) Tools - polymarket_direct: ## This Market's Polymarket Data **Will Kuomintang (KMT) win the most head of local government elections in the 2026 Taiwan local elections?** - Current price (probability): 89.50% (live; bid 89% / ask 90%) - 7-day price change: -1.00% - 30-day price change: -2.50% - Total volume: $79,884 (USD notional) - Price range: 84.50% - 92.50% - Data points: 90 days - resolution_source (failed): https://db.cec.gov.tw/: ConnectError: [SSL: CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED] certificate verify failed: Missing Subject Key Identifier (_ssl.c:1081) - wikipedia: Fetched 2 Wikipedia entries (0 missing pages). - polymarket_related: Polymarket search over 4 keyword(s), kept 20 matches. keyword 'Taiwan local elections': 5 markets | keyword 'Taipei mayor': 5 markets | keyword 'KMT': 5 markets | keyword 'DPP': 5 markets - kalshi_related: 1 related markets / summaries. keyword 'Taiwan election': ok | keyword 'Kuomintang': no matches Research loops, bottom lines - current state: As of early October 2026, the KMT enters the Nov. 28 vote defending 16 of 22 seats (versus DPP's 5 and one independent), and even under an expert projection that assumes a modest DPP recovery to roughly 12-7, the KMT would still finish with the most head-of-government wins; the race remains competitive mainly in New Taipei and a handful of leans/toss-ups rather than threatening KMT's overall plurality. - base rate: The reference class of three consolidated "nine-in-one" cycles (2014, 2018, 2022) shows the opposition party to the presidency winning the most localities in 2 of 3 cycles, which combined with the KMT's current 16-of-22 incumbency base and still-intact KMT-TPP coordination gives it a strong structural edge; however, expert handicapping as of late August 2026 (Templeman) projects a DPP net gain reducing KMT's edge to roughly 12-7 rather than a blowout, and recency reporting shows unexpected DPP c - yes case: The single most likely path to YES is simple continuity: KMT defends most of its 16 incumbent-held localities (several, like Taipei, Taichung, and Kinmen, showing double-digit or even 15+ point leads in fresh post-registration polling) while losing only a handful of competitive seats such as New Taipei, Yilan, or Changhua — a outcome consistent with the most rigorous available seat-by-seat projection (12-7 KMT) and requiring no historically unprecedented swing, unlike the DPP's 2014-style sweep - no case: The NO case is not that KMT is projected to lose its plurality — no current poll or expert model shows that — but that late-cycle scandal exposure (vote-buying arrests, Fu Kun-chi's Hualien baggage), a visibly underperforming New Taipei candidate, and surprising DPP competitiveness even in Taipei together represent real downside tail risk to KMT's margin; for YES to materialize, several of these simultaneously-trending-DPP races (Taipei, New Taipei, Hualien, plus a Changhua-adjacent swing) would
tools
toolstatustimeitemssummary
polymarket_direct OK 0.8s 1 ## This Market's Polymarket Data **Will Kuomintang (KMT) win the most head of local government elections in the 2026 Taiwan local elections?** - Current price (probability): 89.50% (live; bid 89% / ask 90%) - 7-day price change: -1.00% - 30-day price change: -2.50% - Total volume: $79,884 (USD noti
resolution_source FAILED 1.0s 1 https://db.cec.gov.tw/: ConnectError: [SSL: CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED] certificate verify failed: Missing Subject Key Identifier (_ssl.c:1081)
wikipedia OK 1.0s 2 Fetched 2 Wikipedia entries (0 missing pages).
polymarket_related OK 1.1s 20 Polymarket search over 4 keyword(s), kept 20 matches. keyword 'Taiwan local elections': 5 markets | keyword 'Taipei mayor': 5 markets | keyword 'KMT': 5 markets | keyword 'DPP': 5 markets
kalshi_related OK 3.3s 1 1 related markets / summaries. keyword 'Taiwan election': ok | keyword 'Kuomintang': no matches
research loops · 4/4 ok · 15 searches · 7 page reads
dimensionstatustimesearchespage readsreport
current state OK 31s 3 3 4667 chars
base rate OK 26s 3 1 4647 chars
yes case OK 37s 5 1 4345 chars
no case OK 36s 4 2 5904 chars
report: current state
- [2026-09-05] Candidate registration for the Nov. 28 nine-in-one elections closed, with the DPP and KMT each formally registering 19 official candidates for the 22 city/county head races. https://www.secretchina.com/news/b5/2026/09/05/1104417.html - [2026-08-20] Taiwan's Central Election Commission confirmed the election date (Nov. 28, 2026) and finalized the electorate of roughly 19.65 million voters, with candidate registration running Aug. 31–Sept. 4, 2026. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2026_Taiwanese_local_elections - [2026-08-28] Going into the cycle, the KMT held the KMT holds 16 of 22 localities, the DPP holds 5 (Tainan, Kaohsiung, Chiayi County, Pingtung, and Penghu), and there is one independent (Kao Hung-an in Hsinchu City) , giving KMT a large defending majority. - [2026-08-28] An expert seat-by-seat rating as of late August classified the 22 executive races as Safe KMT (3): Nantou, Kinmen, Lienchiang; Likely KMT (3): Taipei, Taoyuan, Miaoli; Leans KMT (5): Taichung, Keelung, Hsinchu County, Yunlin, Hualien, Taitung; Toss-up (2): New Taipei, Penghu; Leans DPP (4): Yilan, Changhua, Chiayi City, Pingtung; Likely DPP (3): Tainan, Kaohsiung, Chiayi County — if all leaners/likelies are assigned, the projected outcome is roughly 12-7 KMT, with New Taipei, Penghu and Hsinchu City (independent) undetermined. https://www.kharistempleman.com/blog/taiwan-2026-local-elections-preview-5-wrap-up - [2026-08-28] Analysis notes the KMT faces structural headwinds this cycle: it is defending a lot of open seats; 10, to be exact, in New Taipei, Taichung, Hsinchu County, Yilan, Changhua, Yunlin, Chiayi City, Hualien, Taitung, and Kinmen. By contrast, the DPP is defending only three: Tainan, Kaohsiung, and Chiayi County , reducing the incumbency advantage KMT enjoyed in 2022. - [2026-08-28] KMT-TPP cooperation has largely held: in nearly all 22 races the KMT is the joint pan-blue nominee, with the TPP yielding everywhere except one city council race, though the TPP ended its partnership with KMT for Hsinchu County's Zhubei mayoral race in Sept. 2026. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2026_Taiwanese_local_elections - [2026-08-28] National polling cited shows President Lai Ching-te's approval roughly even (46% positive, 44% negative in an August MyFormosa poll), a much stronger position than the KMT's sweep of 2025 recall votes, while DPP: 41.2% like, 44.5% dislike... KMT: 27.2% like, 53.7% dislike... TPP: 23.0% like, 57.4% dislike . https://www.kharistempleman.com/blog/taiwan-2026-local-elections-preview-5-wrap-up - [2026-09-02] New Taipei is viewed as the marquee toss-up race, with DPP's Su Chiao-hui facing KMT/TPP joint nominee Lee Shu-chuan; a DPP win there combined with holding its current seats and 3-4 flips (e.g., Yilan, Changhua, Chiayi City) would be a strong result for DPP. https://www.kharistempleman.com/blog/taiwan-2026-local-elections-preview-5-wrap-up - [2026-10-03] Local campaigns intensified over the Oct. 3-4 weekend, with high-profile rallies for DPP's Lai Jui-lung (Kaohsiung) and KMT's Ko Chih-en (Kaohsiung), and KMT's Johnny Chiang in Taichung facing DPP's Ho Hsin-chun. https://focustaiwan.tw/politics/202610030016 - [2026-10-03] A detailed candidate roster confirms the full head-to-head matchups across all 22 jurisdictions are now set, including KMT-TPP joint tickets in New Taipei (Lee Shu-chuan) and several three/four-way races with minor-party or independent candidates (e.g., Taipei, Kaohsiung, Tainan). https://www.gvm.com.tw/article/132851 - [2026-10-03] Commentary notes the race is viewed domestically as more about local performance, candidate quality and factional ties than cross-strait or US relations, and that a weak KMT showing could pressure KMT chair Cheng Li-wun's position ahead of the 2028 presidential cycle. https://thediplomat.com/2026/10/taiwans-local-elections-are-not-about-china-president-lai-or-the-united-states/ BOTTOM LINE: As of early October 2026, the KMT enters the Nov. 28 vote defending 16 of 22 seats (versus DPP's 5 and one independent), and even under an expert projection that assumes a modest DPP recovery to roughly 12-7, the KMT would still finish with the most head-of-government wins; the race remains competitive mainly in New Taipei and a handful of leans/toss-ups rather than threatening KMT's overall plurality. NOT FOUND: No official post-registration seat-by-seat poll aggregator or betting-market-independent forecast newer than the Aug. 28, 2026 Templeman analysis was found; no results yet exist since voting has not occurred (election is Nov. 28, 2026); could not access a working Diplomat full-text page (only search snippet was available).
report: base rate
- [2014-11-29] In the 2014 "nine-in-one" local elections, the pattern was reversed from recent cycles: in 2014, DPP won 13 seats and the KMT got 6 and the independent candidate secured 3 seats , reflecting a national anti-incumbent wave against then-President Ma Ying-jeou (KMT). https://www.vifindia.org/print/5657 - [2018-11-24] In 2018, the pattern flipped again: the elections resulted in a substantial defeat for the DPP, which previously held 13 of 22 municipalities and counties but won only 6 , while the KMT retained seats in 15 of Taiwan's 22 cities or counties . https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2018_Taiwanese_local_elections - [2022-11-26] In 2022, KMT again dominated: the opposition Kuomintang (KMT) won 13 out of the 21 mayor and county magistrate seats, while the incumbent Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) secured only five seats , with the remaining seats split between TPP and independents. https://www.asiapacific.ca/publication/taiwans-ruling-party-suffers-defeat-local-elections - [2022-11-26] Commentary at the time noted the DPP only won five of 22 municipalities, which is the party's worst showing in 36 years, and down from winning six in 2018 . https://thediplomat.com/2022/11/once-again-kmt-scores-big-in-taiwans-local-elections/ - Base rate across three cycles since consolidation (2014, 2018, 2022): KMT won the most seats in 2 of 3 (2018, 2022), DPP won the most in 1 of 3 (2014) — a roughly 2:1 historical tilt toward the incumbent-opposition party winning local elections, consistent with a "midterm penalty" pattern for whichever party holds the presidency. - [2026-08-28] Political scientist Kharis Templeman's structural breakdown of the 22 races as of late August 2026 found: the KMT holds 16 of 22 localities, the DPP holds 5... If we assign all the leaners and likely races into their respective camps, the DPP would have a net gain, and the KMT a net loss, of two, for a breakdown of 12-7, with one independent (Hsinchu City) and New Taipei and Penghu to be determined by coin flips . https://www.kharistempleman.com/blog/taiwan-2026-local-elections-preview-5-wrap-up - [2026-08-28] Templeman explains why the base-rate "midterm penalty" logic does not clearly favor KMT this cycle: the conventional wisdom has been that on aggregate they will turn out a lot like midterm elections in the United States: the party of the president loses seats... In 2026, the KMT is defending a lot of open seats; 10, to be exact... By contrast, the DPP is defending only three . https://www.kharistempleman.com/blog/taiwan-2026-local-elections-preview-5-wrap-up - [2026-08-28] On national mood, the same analysis notes: this is a sneaky hard election cycle for the KMT... So the DPP is well-positioned to improve a little on 2022 , with President Lai's approval roughly even rather than deeply underwater (unlike Ma in 2014 or Tsai in 2018). https://www.kharistempleman.com/blog/taiwan-2026-local-elections-preview-5-wrap-up - [2026-04-02] A secondary market-commentary source (Lines) reported the Polymarket KMT-winner contract had been priced in the 80s (percent) earlier in 2026 but noted a declining trend, framing the KMT as "favorite" but with "growing market doubt" amid DPP strength in Taipei and New Taipei polling. https://www.lines.com/prediction-markets/elections/2026-taiwanese-local-elections-party-winner - [2026-10-06] A current race-specific report highlights unexpected DPP strength even in the KMT's traditional stronghold: with incumbent Mayor Chiang Wan-an of the Kuomintang (KMT) facing off against Puma Shen of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), polling shows Shen doing unusually well for a city that is traditionally seen as a KMT stronghold . https://thediplomat.com/2026/10/the-surprising-drama-in-taipeis-2026-mayor-race/ BOTTOM LINE: The reference class of three consolidated "nine-in-one" cycles (2014, 2018, 2022) shows the opposition party to the presidency winning the most localities in 2 of 3 cycles, which combined with the KMT's current 16-of-22 incumbency base and still-intact KMT-TPP coordination gives it a strong structural edge; however, expert handicapping as of late August 2026 (Templeman) projects a DPP net gain reducing KMT's edge to roughly 12-7 rather than a blowout, and recency reporting shows unexpected DPP competitiveness even in Taipei, so the outside view supports KMT as likely but not overwhelming favorite. NOT FOUND: No official or near-final 2026 polling aggregator or seat-by-seat betting-market consensus (beyond the Polymarket contract itself, which is excluded) was found; no results yet exist since the election has not occurred.
report: yes case
YES means: KMT's official candidates win the most head-of-government races (mayor/magistrate) among the 22 Taiwan localities on Nov. 28, 2026, becoming mathematically assured of a plurality over DPP (and any other party), per the Polymarket resolution rules. - [2026-10-05] In the marquee Taipei race, a TVBS-style one-day tracking poll (壹蘋) shows volatility but the KMT incumbent Chiang Wan-an has swung from trailing to leading DPP's Puma Shen by double digits in the most recent reading after a dip weeks earlier, illustrating KMT's capacity to hold its strongest traditional stronghold even amid earlier DPP scares. https://news.nextapple.com/politics/20261005/74295DBC7FB788C5ECA1A8AA26724832 - [2026-09-20] A TPOC poll in Taipei had Mayor 蔣萬安以48.4%領先沈伯洋33.0% , a roughly 15-point KMT lead, reinforcing that KMT's flagship incumbent remains comfortably ahead by most (though not all) pollsters. - [2026-09-14] In Taichung — one of Templeman's "leans KMT" seats — the first poll taken after official registration, commissioned via the KMT city-council caucus but conducted by TVBS, found KMT's Johnny Chiang leading DPP's Ho Hsin-chun 國民黨參選人江啟臣支持度45.1%,民進黨參選人何欣純32.5%,差距12.6個百分點 , with 江啟臣支持度突破五成看好度 electability ratings over 50%. - [2026-10-05] In Kinmen (a Templeman "Safe KMT" seat), a KMT-commissioned poll from mid-September showed incumbent Chen Yu-jen at 45.4%支持度居首,無黨籍參選人李文良10.7%居次,兩人相差34.7個百分點 , confirming KMT's offshore-island strongholds remain essentially uncontested. - [2026-10-02] A late-breaking GVM roundup of multiple September polls finds the pan-blue camp still ahead of the TPP in party identification, with 民眾黨的支持度在2025年9月時最高,來到17.6%,但到了2026年8月只剩下6.3%,跟國民黨的19.3%支持度,兩者相差13個百分點 , indicating continued TPP decline is funneling pan-blue voters toward KMT candidates rather than fragmenting the opposition vote. - [2026-08-28] Templeman's structural count — the most detailed public seat-by-seat projection available — classifies three seats as "Safe KMT" and three more as "Likely KMT," and even after assigning all "leans" races to their favored side, projects KMT finishing with roughly 12 of 22 seats versus DPP's 7, a clear plurality under the question's resolution rule. https://www.kharistempleman.com/blog/taiwan-2026-local-elections-preview-5-wrap-up - [2026-10-06] KMT enters the race defending 16 of 22 incumbencies against DPP's 5 and one independent, meaning DPP would need to roughly triple its current seat count in a single cycle to overtake KMT — a swing not seen in any of the three "nine-in-one" cycles since 2014 consolidation (DPP's biggest historical total was 13 seats in 2014, achieved against a deeply unpopular incumbent president, a condition not matched by Lai's roughly even approval rating this cycle). https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2026_Taiwanese_local_elections - [2026-10-03] Nationwide candidate-matchup confirmation (GVM) shows the KMT-TPP joint ticket structure holding in nearly every contested seat, including New Taipei (Lee Shu-chuan) and Yilan (Wu Zong-hsien jointly backed), preserving the consolidated anti-DPP vote share that underpinned KMT's 2018 and 2022 sweeps. https://www.gvm.com.tw/article/132851 - [2026-10-03] On-the-ground reporting from Kaohsiung and Taichung confirms TPP founder Ko Wen-je is actively campaigning for KMT candidates (e.g., Ko Chih-en in Kaohsiung), signaling the pan-blue coalition is functioning as a unified electoral bloc rather than splitting votes in DPP-leaning cities, which could help KMT even make gains in "Likely DPP" categories. https://focustaiwan.tw/politics/202610030016 BOTTOM LINE: The single most likely path to YES is simple continuity: KMT defends most of its 16 incumbent-held localities (several, like Taipei, Taichung, and Kinmen, showing double-digit or even 15+ point leads in fresh post-registration polling) while losing only a handful of competitive seats such as New Taipei, Yilan, or Changhua — a outcome consistent with the most rigorous available seat-by-seat projection (12-7 KMT) and requiring no historically unprecedented swing, unlike the DPP's 2014-style sweep that would be needed for NO. NOT FOUND: No comprehensive post-October-1 poll aggregator covering all 22 races simultaneously; no verified, non-KMT-commissioned poll for Kinmen or other "Safe KMT" seats to cross-check the KMT-sourced polling.
report: no case
YES means: the KMT's official candidates fail to win the most head-of-government races (mayor/magistrate) among the 22 listed jurisdictions on Nov. 28, 2026 — i.e., the DPP (or in a rare scenario, a tie resolving to a non-KMT alphabetical winner) ends up with as many or more wins than the KMT once all races are mathematically decided. - [2026-10-05] In Taipei — a traditional KMT stronghold the party cannot afford to lose without denting its national plurality — polling shows Shen doing unusually well for a city that is traditionally seen as a KMT stronghold , with the Sept. 22 Taipei Trust in Democracy poll showing Chiang leading Shen by just 1.2 points, within the margin of error (Taipei Times, Sept. 22). - [2026-10-05] The Diplomat's own analysis frames New Taipei — not Taipei — as the single most consequential race, noting "New Taipei City, traditionally a KMT stronghold, and arguably the most important race this cycle... His replacement should have an easy race, but the KMT candidate, Lee Shu-chuan, is struggling." - [2026-10-05] The same report attributes KMT's New Taipei weakness to candidate quality, stating Lee Shu-chuan "is struggling. Although he has a history of being a strong bureaucrat, Lee has run a lackluster campaign and lacks charisma. So far, his campaign has been bland." - [2026-10-05] Su Chiao-hui's DPP campaign is framed as unusually strong because "his DPP opponent, Su Chiao-hui, is performing strongly for a DPP candidate in New Taipei," being "the daughter of DPP heavyweight and former New Taipei mayor Su Tseng-chang, she is both a family legacy and a demonstration of long commitment to the city." - [2026-10-05] Even in Taipei, KMT's own position has weakened versus its historical baseline, per the same analysis: "Chiang, meanwhile, has faced more scandals this campaign than in the rest of his tenure, and has so far run a particularly lackluster campaign." - [2026-09-23] A pattern of KMT-linked local corruption scandals has surfaced across multiple counties in the campaign's final stretch: a Taipei Times editorial reports the Sept. 18 arrest of Changhua County Council Speaker Hsieh Dien-lin over alleged vote-buying and embezzlement, the Sept. 9 arrest of KMT Sioulin Township Mayor Wang Mei-kuei in Hualien on vote-buying/recall-act charges, and the Sept. 10 detention of KMT Yilan township candidate Chang Chia-hao for alleged vote-buying — concluding that "local self-government has long since degenerated into a predatory production line that turns public funds into private gains" within KMT factions. - [2026-09-13] A separate investigative piece documents that "New Taipei City Councilor Yang Chun-mei of the KMT has become the first politician to fall afoul of laws against vote buying, over accusations that she distributed laundry detergent and other household goods to voters," signaling vote-buying enforcement risk concentrated on KMT-aligned figures this cycle, which could taint down-ballot KMT branding in contested mayoral races. - [2026-10-06] In Hualien, the magistracy is an open seat (KMT incumbent Hsu Chen-wei term-limited) being contested amid lingering public anger over the 2025 barrier-lake flood disaster response tied to KMT power-broker Fu Kun-chi's network, with Wikidata confirming KMT nominee Yu Shu-chen (as "Wei Chia-hsien" ballot listing) faces competitive independent challengers including Chang Chun, a local figure who publicly clashed with Fu over disaster-meeting exclusion in Oct. 2025 — an unresolved reputational liability in a seat KMT must defend among its 10 open-seat jurisdictions. - [2026-10-03] Macau Business opinion commentary from earlier in 2026 flagged that "recent political developments in Taiwan are defined by significant scandals involving the primary opposition parties, the Kuomintang (KMT) and the Taiwan People's Party," raising doubts about "the opposition's ability to form a united front," with "the family feud within the KMT" seen as "perhaps lethal to the image and popularity of the party in the upcoming county and township elections in November 2026." - [2026-09-?] The TPP's September 2026 rupture with KMT specifically in Zhubei (Hsinchu County), confirmed on Wikipedia, shows the KMT-TPP coordination that underpins its 19-candidate slate is not fully intact everywhere, creating at least one three-way pan-blue split that could cost KMT a seat it would otherwise be "leans KMT" favored to win. - [2026-10-06] No post-registration (post-Sept. 4) independent poll aggregator shows KMT below its current 16-of-22 floor in any scenario; even the most DPP-favorable published scenario (Templeman, Aug. 28, cited by colleagues) nets KMT a 12-7 plurality, meaning the strongest NO case rests on compounding multiple simultaneous upset losses (Taipei, New Taipei, Hualien, plus others) beyond what any current poll or forecast projects. BOTTOM LINE: The NO case is not that KMT is projected to lose its plurality — no current poll or expert model shows that — but that late-cycle scandal exposure (vote-buying arrests, Fu Kun-chi's Hualien baggage), a visibly underperforming New Taipei candidate, and surprising DPP competitiveness even in Taipei together represent real downside tail risk to KMT's margin; for YES to materialize, several of these simultaneously-trending-DPP races (Taipei, New Taipei, Hualien, plus a Changhua-adjacent swing) would all need to break DPP's way at once, a scenario none of the available sources currently forecast as the base case. NOT FOUND: No poll or forecast published after Sept. 23, 2026 specifically modeling the cumulative seat count under a "KMT scandal cascade" scenario; no confirmation of KMT candidate status/withdrawal in Hualien or Changhua County races following the arrests noted above; could not access a full, unparsed version of the Oct. 5 Diplomat Taipei-race article beyond the cached search snippet.
3. Forecasters 5 draws · Opus 5.5 + GPT-6 Astra + GPT-5.6 Sol · plain mean
claude-opus-5-5 · high effort
60% conf
Yes 88%
No 12%
(0) The condition is not yet met. Voting is on Nov 28, 2026, and the CEC results page could not be accessed, though no results could exist yet. (a) About 7.5 weeks remain until the election and the Nov 29 close. (b) Status quo: the KMT holds 16 of 22 seats, and Templeman's Aug 28 seat ratings give it about 12 (safe, likely and leans) against about 7 for the DPP, with New Taipei and Penghu as toss-ups and Hsinchu City held by an independent. That is a clear KMT plurality. (c) NO: the DPP holds its leaners and likelies (7), wins both toss-ups, and flips Taipei or two lean-KMT seats such as Hualien or Hsinchu County, helped by scandal fallout and the TPP split in Zhubei. Even a tie would go to the DPP, because ties resolve alphabetically and 'Democratic Progressive Party' precedes 'Kuomintang'. That is a real tail risk, since the DPP needs only to draw level, not to pass. (d) YES: Taipei (Chiang led by 15 in TPOC's Sept 20 poll, though one Sept 22 poll had him up only 1.2), Taichung (+12.6) and the offshore strongholds hold, giving the KMT about 11-13 seats against the DPP's 7-9. The Polymarket anchor of 89.5% (DPP contract at 11.35%) fits this structure. The KMT defending 10 open seats, Lai's roughly even approval and the weak New Taipei candidate justify a slight trim but not a big move.
claude-opus-5-5 · high effort
60% conf
Yes 88%
No 12%
(0) Nothing is resolved yet. The election is November 28, 2026, and the CEC resolution source could not be read, so no result exists. (a) About 7.5 weeks remain until election day and close. (b) Status quo strongly favours YES. The KMT holds 16 of 22 seats and registered 19 candidates. Templeman's late-August seat ratings project roughly 12-7 KMT, with New Taipei and Penghu as toss-ups and Hsinchu City held by an independent. Post-registration polls show KMT double-digit leads in Taichung (45-32) and mostly in Taipei (TPOC 48-33, a recent tracking poll), with Kinmen safe. (c) NO path: a correlated DPP wave flips New Taipei, Penghu and several KMT-lean open seats (Hualien, Taitung, Hsinchu County, Keelung, Yunlin). Scandal drag from vote-buying arrests, a weak Lee Shu-chuan campaign and a tighter Taipei race could drive it. Importantly, a tie resolves to the DPP because it comes first alphabetically, so the DPP only needs to equal the KMT, at roughly 10-10 or 11-11. (d) YES path: the KMT holds most leans and likelies as current polling suggests and finishes around 11-13 seats against the DPP's 7-9. I anchor on the Polymarket price of 89.5%, which has drifted down 2.5 points over 30 days. I shade slightly lower for three reasons: the KMT is defending 10 open seats, Lai's approval is roughly even, and the tie-break works against the KMT. These are partly priced in, so the adjustment is small.
gpt-6-astra · high effort
58% conf
Yes 90%
No 10%
No source shows the condition already met or impossible: voting remains ahead, and the failed CEC database fetch provides no verified official results. There are 53 days until the November 28 election; November 29 is the trading close, but the rules permit outstanding results through June 30, 2027 at 11:59 PM ET. If the reported race balance persists, YES is the status-quo forecast: Templeman's August 28 assessment projects roughly 12 KMT wins versus seven DPP wins before unresolved contests, consistent with KMT's plurality victories in 2018 and 2022. A YES scenario is KMT retaining enough favored northern, central and island jurisdictions to reach 12 official-party wins, with September Taipei and Taichung polling providing some support. A NO scenario is a correlated DPP surge across KMT's ten open seats and competitive northern races producing an 11–10 DPP lead with one independent; a DPP–KMT tie also resolves against KMT alphabetically. Conflicting Taipei polls, partly partisan surveys, inconsistent research seat arithmetic and the absence of a fresh independent seat forecast limit conviction, while the cited Zhubei township dispute is outside the eligible races. Only officially nominated, party-registered winners count, so pan-blue independent victories cannot automatically be credited to KMT; incomplete registration verification leaves classification risk, although delayed certification alone need not change the winner. I retain Polymarket's live 89.5% YES anchor (89% bid/90% ask), because the research supports a substantial KMT advantage without establishing sufficiently reliable, unpriced information to justify a departure.
gpt-6-astra · high effort
58% conf
Yes 90%
No 10%
No source shows the resolving condition already met or impossible: voting has not occurred, and the CEC database retrieval failed, leaving official records unverified. The election is 53 days away on November 28; the rules allow delayed results beyond the November 29 trading close, with a final cutoff of June 30, 2027 at 11:59 PM ET. I retain Polymarket's live 89.5% YES anchor because the research provides no sufficiently reliable, demonstrably unpriced information to justify moving it. If the current electoral balance persists, KMT wins the most offices: Templeman's August 28 assessment assigns approximately 12 races to KMT and seven to DPP, with two toss-ups and one independent, although this is a dated assessment rather than a verified October forecast. A straightforward YES scenario is KMT retaining its stronger localities and enough competitive seats to finish with 12 wins despite several DPP gains. A NO scenario is DPP retaining its five reported holdings and flipping six KMT localities, producing an 11–10 advantage with one independent; an equal KMT–DPP tally also resolves against KMT under the alphabetical tiebreaker. Conflicting September–October Taipei polls, KMT commissioning of some favorable polling, ten KMT open seats, and reported scandals support correlated downside, while October 3 Focus Taiwan reporting supports continued KMT–TPP cooperation. The 10.5% NO allocation preserves electoral and official-affiliation/reporting uncertainty: pan-blue independents cannot count as KMT winners, and the reported Zhubei township coordination rupture concerns an election outside the 22 counted jurisdictions.
gpt-5.6-sol · high effort
70% conf
Yes 89%
No 11%
(0) The condition has not been met or made impossible: voting is scheduled for November 28, no results exist, and the official CEC site could not be accessed, so KMT must still secure a plurality of the 22 listed races once results become official. (a) There are 53 days from October 6 until election day, leaving meaningful but limited time for campaign shocks; unresolved results can be considered through June 30, 2027. (b) If the present race structure holds, KMT wins: it currently controls 16 localities, and Templeman's latest comprehensive seat-by-seat assessment projects roughly 12 KMT wins versus 7 DPP wins, with three races undetermined. (c) NO requires a broad DPP wave in which it wins New Taipei, converts several KMT open seats such as Yilan, Changhua, Hualien, or Hsinchu County, and possibly upsets Taipei; a KMT-DPP tie would also disadvantage KMT because Democratic Progressive Party comes first alphabetically. (d) YES results if KMT retains its safe and likely seats, converts most of its leaners, and limits losses among its ten open-seat defenses, a path supported by recent double-digit KMT polling leads in Taipei and Taichung and continued KMT-TPP coordination. I anchor closely to Polymarket's 89.5% YES price and reduce it only slightly to 89% because the available polling is incomplete and sometimes party-commissioned, while the late scandal and open-seat risks are real but no published forecast currently shows KMT losing the plurality.
4. Final plain mean of 5 draws
89% (61% confidence)
Yes: 89% No: 11%
Mean of 5 draws (0.88, 0.88, 0.90, 0.90, 0.89). (0) The condition is not yet met. Voting is on Nov 28, 2026, and the CEC results page could not be accessed, though no results could exist yet. (a) About 7.5 weeks remain until the election and the Nov 29 close. (b) Status quo: the KMT holds 16 of 22 seats, and Templeman's Aug 28 seat ratings give it about 12 (safe, likely and leans) against about 7 for the DPP, with New Taipei and Penghu as toss-ups and Hsinchu City held by an independent. That is a clear KMT plurality. (c) NO: the DPP holds its leaners and likelies (7), wins both toss-ups, and flips Taipei or two lean-KMT seats such as Hualien or Hsinchu County, helped by scandal fallout and the TPP split in Zhubei. Even a tie would go to the DPP, because ties resolve alphabetically and 'Democratic Progressive Party' precedes 'Kuomintang'. That is a real tail risk, since the DPP needs only to draw level, not to pass. (d) YES: Taipei (Chiang led by 15 in TPOC's Sept 20 poll, though one Sept 22 poll had him up only 1.2), Taichung (+12.6) and the offshore strongholds hold, giving the KMT about 11-13 seats against the DPP's 7-9. The Polymarket anchor of 89.5% (DPP contract at 11.35%) fits this structure. The KMT defending 10 open seats, Lai's roughly even approval and the weak New Taipei candidate justify a slight trim but not a big move.
Pipeline Timing
Total pipeline time: 113.9s
Per-tool research timings shown in the Research section above.