Will Iran target Iraq by September 30, 2026?

- [2026-09-01] Iran launched coordinated missile/drone attacks on US positions in Bahrain, Jordan and Iraq in retaliation for US strikes that killed 11 people; Al Jazeera reported Kuwait also reports confronting Iranian attacks, as Tehran responds to US attacks that killed 11 people, including 5 at a wedding party. This explicit Iranian claim on Iraq (Erbil) predates the market's Sept 8 creation date. (https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/9/1/us-military-says-launching-new-attacks-on-iran) - [2026-09-02] IRGC Ground Forces explicitly claimed a combined missile/drone strike on a US base in Erbil, Iraq: TEHRAN, Sep. 02 (MNA) – The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps said its ground forces launched a combined missile and drone attack on US bases in Erbil, destroying a repair centre, equipment warehouses and a spy balloon guidance system... destroying equipment and setting fuel tanks ablaze. This also predates market creation (Sept 8). (https://en.mehrnews.com/news/247400/IRGC-strikes-US-facilities-in-Iraq-s-Erbil) - [2026-09-18/20] A "fire pause" began shortly after market creation: by Day 203-205 (Sept 18-20), trackers noted The fire pause enters a ninth day with no Iranian ballistic missile or drone attack on any host state reported through the 0500 ET cutoff , indicating the pause began roughly Sept 9-10, just after market open. (https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/iran-war-update.htm) - [2026-09-30] A Shafaq News report described an unattributed drone strike on a KDPI opposition camp in Erbil: The Kurdistan Region Security Agency said on Wednesday that Azadi Camp in Koya district came under a drone attack, confirming that no casualties were reported. Origin was not explicitly claimed by Iran in this report. (https://shafaq.com/en/Kurdistan/Drone-strikes-Iranian-Kurdish-opposition-camp-in-Erbil) - [2026-09-30] Critical Threats/ISW's Iran Update for Sept 30 devoted its Iraq section entirely to militia disarmament politics (Asaib Ahl al-Haq splinter, Kataib Hezbollah threats) with no mention of any new Iranian strike on Iraq; the "Iranian Strike Campaign" section for that day contained no new strike entry. (https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-september-30-2026) - [2026-09-30] US-led coalition forces completed withdrawal from Iraq on this date, reducing the US target set inside Iraq that had driven earlier Iranian/militia strikes: 1,000 drone and ballistic missile attacks since the US-Israeli war on Iran began on February 28 had been recorded cumulatively, but Military equipment, including crucial air defence systems, is also being withdrawn as forces left. (https://aljazeera.com/news/2026/9/30/how-does-iraqs-security-change-after-us-forces-withdraw) - [2026-10-01] An IRGC official made an unverified claim of a long-range ballistic strike on moving targets (location/target unclear, not specified as Iraq): An IRGC official claimed on 1 October that Iran achieved a first long-range ballistic hit on moving targets, per CBS News; the claim was not verified. (https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/iran-war-oprep.htm) - [2026-10-02] Iraq's ambassador to Iran said normal civil ties were resuming rather than military friction: Iraq's ambassador to Iran, Yasser Abdul Zahra al-Hajjaj, said flights between Iran and Iraq would resume despite U.S. sanctions restricting international companies and countries from providing services to Iranian airlines. (https://jinsa.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/Iran-War-Update-10.2.26.pdf) - [2026-10-03] The most current tracker (Day 218) confirms the pause has held region-wide for over three weeks: No Iranian attack on a host state was reported for a twenty-fourth consecutive day, and no coalition strike on Iranian territory ashore was reported for a twenty-sixth consecutive operational period. (https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/iran-war-oprep.htm) - [2026-10-03] The same update notes no resumption of hostilities is scheduled yet, but risk is rising: the American naval buildup: EA WorldView reported that the Theodore Roosevelt group would join the George H.W. Bush and George Washington carriers... with the amphibious group of the Boxer, and that the carrier Abraham Lincoln had been deployed more than 260 days and President Trump said Iran is "ready to fold up" and that the United States would win "right after the election," adding "maybe before the election." CBS News reported that he suggested American military action could resume after the 3 November midterms if negotiations fail. (https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/iran-war-oprep.htm) - [2026-10-01/02] Militia-level tension persists inside Iraq even without direct Iranian strikes: Kataib Hezbollah "claimed the militia has proof that the United States is still operating in Iraqi airspace" and threatened to shoot down "hostile aircraft," while a Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba front group "stated on September 29 its refusal to disarm... and threatened to attack any 'foreign presence' in Iraq." These are proxy, not Iranian-state, actions and would not qualify under the market's rules. (https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-september-30-2026) BOTTOM LINE: Explicitly Iran-claimed strikes on Iraq (Erbil) did occur on Sept 1-2, 2026, but that was before the Sept 8 market creation date; since then a region-wide "fire pause" has held through at least Oct 3, 2026 (24 consecutive days with no Iranian attack on any host state, per the most current tracker), and the only Iraq-related incident in that window (a Sept 30 drone strike on a KDPI camp) is unattributed rather than Iran-claimed/confirmed. Elevated war-resumption risk exists (Trump reportedly planning renewed strikes after the Nov 3 US midterms, Iran warning of a broader response), but as of today no qualifying Iranian strike on Iraq is confirmed within the market's open window. NOT FOUND: No official Iranian government/IRGC statement explicitly claiming a strike on Iraqi territory between Sept 8 and Oct 5, 2026; no Iraqi government confirmation of an Iranian-origin strike in that window; no resolution-source (per the market's own criteria) statement on this specific contract.

- [2026-02-28] A new war phase began when the Islamic Republic of Iran and Iraqi Iran-aligned Shi'ite militias, primarily operating under the Popular Mobilization Forces, launched a series of ballistic missile and drone attacks against the Kurdistan Region, Iraq , with around 200 attacks in Iraq as of 11 March 2026 . https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2026_Iranian_strikes_on_the_Kurdistan_Region - [2026-03-01/03] In the opening days, Erbil alone was targeted by more than 70 missiles and drones in the first three days, though US and British air defense systems intercepted most of them, resulting in little to no damage. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2026_Iranian_strikes_on_the_Kurdistan_Region - [2026-03-28] Escalation continued with a drone attack targeting the residence of Kurdistan Region President Nechirvan Barzani in Dohuk, and a drone intercepted near former president Masoud Barzani's residence the next day, both seen as crossing a "red line." - [2026-03-31] By late March, the Kurdistan Region had been struck by "more than 450 drones and missiles" since late February, indicating an extremely high historical strike cadence once Iran-Iraq hostilities are "hot." https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2026_Iranian_strikes_on_the_Kurdistan_Region - [2026-04-07 to 2026-06] Despite a ceasefire with the US/Israel, strikes on Iraqi Kurdistan persisted: a civilian couple was killed by a drone the Counter Terrorism Department said was "launched from Iran," and on 8 June the IRGC launched strikes on Kurdish opposition headquarters in the region , showing Iran continued targeting Iraq intermittently even post-ceasefire with other parties. - [2026-09-02] Most recent confirmed direct Iran-Iraq incident before market creation: the IRGC announced it had carried out missile and drone operations against American positions and bases in Jordan, Bahrain, and Iraq in response to US attacks , described as one of the most extensive military responses by Tehran since the ceasefire began . https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2026_Iranian_strikes_on_Arab_countries - [2026-09-03] Ambiguity in attribution is common in this reference class: the Iraqi Kurdistan Counter Terrorism Service reported that coalition forces intercepted 10 drones launched over Erbil on September 3, which were not targeting the US Consulate or US bases, and no actor had claimed responsibility as of that reporting — illustrating why Polymarket-style rules require explicit Iranian claim or confirmed Iranian origin. - [2026-09-27] Since early September a "fire pause" has held: no Iranian drone attack on a host state was reported for a twenty-second consecutive day; no Iranian missile or drone was reported fired into Iraq in the window , and Iranian drone launches were down 83 percent from Day 1 levels per the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/iran-war-20260927.htm - [2026-09-18/19] This pause is independently corroborated: "the fire pause enters a tenth day with no Iranian ballistic missile or drone attack on any host state reported through the 0500 ET cutoff" , dating the pause's start to roughly September 9, just after market creation (Sept 8). https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/iran-war-update.htm - [Historical reference class, pre-2026] Direct Iranian cross-border strikes on Iraq (Kurdistan) have occurred repeatedly but episodically over 2018–2025: first in September 2018, then March 2022 (12 missiles), September–October 2022 (~70 missiles/drones), and January 2024 (11 missiles, 4 killed) — roughly one major overt Iranian state-attributed episode every 1–2 years prior to 2026's near-daily war-time tempo. https://www.newarab.com/analysis/what-was-behind-irans-missile-attack-iraqi-kurdistan - [Market-reference pattern] Analogous Polymarket "Will Iran strike/target X by [date]" series (e.g., "Iran strike a U.S. facility," "US strikes Iran by [date]") have historically resolved Yes with high frequency once active war conditions existed, with "every daily contract from February 28 through early March resolved to 'yes' after the strikes began" , showing such binaries swing sharply from low to near-certain once a war is "hot," and can remain near-zero during genuine pauses. https://www.mexc.com/news/826214 BOTTOM LINE: The reference class shows Iran has struck Iraq (overwhelmingly via Kurdistan-region targets) with very high frequency — hundreds of times — during the active "hot war" phase from late February through roughly early September 2026, but a documented ~3-4 week fire pause with zero Iranian strikes on Iraq has held since approximately September 9, 2026, continuing through the September 27 update, right as this market's window opened; the base rate therefore depends heavily on whether the current lull (which historically has been repeatedly broken by renewed Iranian strikes on Iraq within the same war) holds through September 30, 2026. NOT FOUND: No specific Iran-targets-Iraq incident confirmed between 2026-09-09 and the 2026-10-05 "today" date; no dedicated expert/analyst numeric probability estimate or poll on this specific binary question; no track record data for this exact Polymarket contract's historical resolution (it is a new market).

YES means: Iran (explicitly via IRGC/Iranian state claim, or confirmed Iranian-origin munitions) conducts an air strike or surface-to-surface missile/drone strike landing on Iraqi territory (including Iraqi Kurdistan) at any point between the Sept 8, 2026 market creation and the Sept 30, 2026 deadline (with up to 3 additional calendar days allowed for attribution to firm up). - [2026-09-02] The IRGC claimed on September 2 that it conducted combined missile and drone attacks targeting US bases in Kuwait, Jordan, Bahrain, and Iraq , with the Guards saying they "carried out a coordinated missile and drone attack on US bases in Erbil" that destroyed a maintenance centre, warehouses and the guidance system of a US surveillance aerostat . This is just 6 days before market creation and establishes very recent, explicit Iranian willingness and capability to strike Iraq directly. https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-september-2-2026 - [2026-09-08/09] A confirmed IRGC strike landed in the region right at market creation: the most recent confirmed host-state strike tracked is "the 20 missiles at Muwaffaq Salti on 8-9 September remaining the most recent confirmed event at a state" (Jordan) — showing Iran's missile campaign against host states, including the pattern that had just hit Iraq days earlier, was still firing exactly as the market opened, before the pause set in. https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/iran-war-20260922.htm - [2026-03-03, 2026-04-30, pattern through 2026] Azadi Camp in Koya, Erbil governorate is a recurring, historically Iran-attributed target: in the March 3 strike, the PDKI commander told AFP "drones and missiles attacked the camp", blaming the attack on Iran , and where sources identified the belligerent, all sources attributed the drone strike to the Iranian military . This establishes a clear, repeated precedent of Iran-attributed strikes on this exact site. https://airwars.org/incidents/irirq260303a-march-3-2026 - [2026-09-30] The most recent incident inside the market window hit the same historically Iran-attributed target: the Kurdistan Region Security Agency said Azadi Camp in Koya district came under a drone attack, confirming no casualties, and a KDPI official told Shafaq News that a drone struck a camp of the party in Erbil . Given the site's unbroken history of Iranian attribution, this strike is the single most likely path to a YES resolution if credible reporting or KDPI/Kurdish officials subsequently attribute it explicitly to Iran within the rules' 3-day adjudication window. https://shafaq.com/en/Kurdistan/Drone-strikes-Iranian-Kurdish-opposition-camp-in-Erbil - [2026-10-01] Separately, an IRGC official claimed on 1 October that Iran achieved a first long-range ballistic hit on moving targets per earlier reporting, an unverified claim whose target was unspecified — if Iraq-based US assets were later confirmed as the target, it would independently qualify. - [2026-10-03] Despite the multi-week fire pause, escalation risk is explicitly rising on the US side: naval buildup continues and conditional escalation threats continue to be issued into the Iranian fire pause , with Iranian officials (Khatam al-Anbiya) warning of unrestricted strikes on American bases and complicit host states (which include Iraq) if the US resumes action — a credible trigger mechanism that could produce a qualifying Iraq strike before any final resolution cutoff. BOTTOM LINE: The strongest documented YES path is the Sept 30 Azadi Camp drone strike, which hit a site with an unbroken record of Iran-attributed strikes throughout 2026; if credible reporting or KDPI/Iraqi officials formally attribute it to Iran within the rules' 3-day adjudication window, this single incident — occurring on the last day of the window — could flip the market to YES even though the broader "fire pause" otherwise holds. NOT FOUND: No official IRGC or Iranian-government statement explicitly claiming the Sept 30 Azadi Camp strike as of Oct 5; no Iraqi or Kurdistan Regional Government statement formally attributing that strike to Iran (as opposed to unspecified "drone attack"); no other Iraq-directed incident confirmed as Iranian-claimed between Sept 8 and Sept 30, 2026.

YES means: Iran's armed forces (IRGC or other Iranian state forces) execute an air strike or surface-to-surface missile/drone strike explicitly claimed by Iran or confirmed as Iranian-origin, landing on Iraqi territory, at any point between market creation (Sept 8, 2026) and the stated deadline — with proxy strikes (Kataib Hezbollah, PMF, etc.) explicitly excluded. - [2026-09-27/28] Open-source trackers reported a possible IRGC strike on Koya and Erbil with missiles and drones; SOF.News's weekly brief stated plainly: "The latest attack on Sunday, September 27, 2026, were on the town of Koya and the city of Erbil... The Iranians are continuing to target Kurds in northern Iraq... Missiles and drones were used in the attack." This falls inside the market's window and, if confirmed as Iranian-claimed, would be strike-qualifying. (https://sof.news/update/20260928/) - [2026-09-30] Critically, however, the two most rigorous, purpose-built Iran-war trackers do not corroborate this Sept 27 claim: Critical Threats/ISW's Sept 30 "Iranian Strike Campaign" section for Iraq contains no new strike entry and simply says "See topline section," which itself discusses only militia disarmament politics — no mention whatsoever of any Sept 27/28 Erbil or Koya strike. (https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-september-30-2026) - [2026-09-28] The Koya/Azadi Camp drone incident that did generate reporting is explicitly unattributed by at least one outlet: a Kurdish-affiliated source noted the strike was reported as IRGC-carried-out by Roj News, but a separate aggregator stated plainly "the party responsible for carrying out the attack has not been independently confirmed." (https://hawarnews.com/en/azadi-camp-in-south-kurdistan-targeted-by-drone-attack) - [2026-09-28] A parallel real-time feed (sh1n.org) logged the same Koya incident only as "Three Drones Strike Azadi Camp" and a separate claim that "U.S. Air Force combat air patrols downed multiple unmanned aerial vehicles over the Kurdistan Region of Iraq," without attributing the launch to Iran by name. (https://sh1n.org/tweets/three-drones-struck-azadi-camp-in-koya-last-night-erbil-province-iraq-2104448238275162249) - [2026-09-28] A separate Kurdistan-focused digest covering September, published the same day as the alleged Koya/Erbil strike, discusses Iranian strikes only up to the explicit Sept 2 IRGC claim and notes "The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) separately claimed attacks against US facilities in Erbil, although Kurdish and American authorities did not confirm the damage and casualties claimed by Tehran," with no mention of a late-September repeat strike. (https://dckurd.org/2026/09/28/kurdistan-digest-september-2026/) - [2026-10-03] The most current operational tracker (Day 218) still frames the overall campaign as a 24-26 day fire pause with no Iranian attack on any host state reported, which is inconsistent with an unrebutted Sept 27 Iranian strike on Iraq — suggesting the incident, if real, was either folded into militia/unclear-origin reporting or was never confirmed as Iranian rather than proxy/unknown. (https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/iran-war-oprep.htm) - [2026-10-01] No IRGC or Iranian government statement explicitly claiming an Erbil/Koya strike for Sept 27-28 surfaced in any search; the only confirmed IRGC claim on Iraqi soil in the broader war remains the Sept 2 Erbil statement, which predates market creation. (https://en.mehrnews.com/news/247400/IRGC-strikes-US-facilities-in-Iraq-s-Erbil) - [2026-09-30] Iraqi federal forces completed their US-coalition withdrawal on this date, removing the principal US target set that had driven the Sept 1-2 Iranian retaliation, reducing Iran's stated rationale (ending "US military presence" and "hostile operations") for further strikes on Iraqi soil specifically. (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2026_United_States%E2%80%93Israeli_strikes_on_Iraq) - [2026-10-02] Iraq's ambassador to Iran publicly emphasized normalization — resuming Iran-Iraq civil flights — rather than describing any military friction, consistent with a de-escalatory diplomatic posture between the two governments even as US-Iran tensions remain high. (https://jinsa.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/Iran-War-Update-10.2.26.pdf) - [2026-10-01] Kataib Hezbollah's call for Iraqi militias to halt all military operations (except against "hostile aircraft") until Iraq secures its own air-defense systems signals an internal Iran-aligned preference for restraint inside Iraq at this time, reducing the odds Tehran would simultaneously order a direct overt strike on the same territory. (https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-september-30-2026) - [2026-10-01] Per the WSJ, Trump has told advisors he plans to resume strikes on Iran in November — after the market's Sept 30 deadline — meaning the most-cited trigger for renewed Iranian retaliation (a new US strike) was not reported to have occurred before the deadline. (https://jinsa.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/Iran-War-Update-10.2.26.pdf) BOTTOM LINE: The only concrete, explicitly IRGC-claimed strike on Iraqi territory in the entire war record remains the Sept 1-2 Erbil attack, which predates market creation; the sole post-Sept 8 incident with any Iranian-attribution claim (the Sept 27-28 Koya/Erbil reports) is contradicted or ignored by the two most authoritative purpose-built trackers (Critical Threats/ISW and GlobalSecurity's day-by-day campaign log), leaving attribution unconfirmed under the market's "explicit Iranian claim or confirmed Iranian origin" standard — precisely the kind of conflicting, unresolved reporting the rules' adjudication clause treats skeptically absent consensus. NOT FOUND: No official IRGC/Iranian government statement explicitly claiming any strike on Iraq between Sept 8 and the Sept 30 deadline; no Iraqi government or Kurdistan Regional Government statement attributing the Sept 27-28 Koya/Erbil incident to Iran; no resolution-source consensus confirming Iranian origin for any Iraq-directed strike within the market window.