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Iran blockade lifted before Iran-Oman Hormuz agreement?

polymarketWorld·2026-10-03·view on polymarket ↗
26%
Agent
25%
Market Price
+1.4%
Edge
54%
Confidence
19,320
Volume
4.0c
Spread
89
Days to resolution
1
Markets in event
final rationale
Mean of 5 draws (0.30, 0.27, 0.25, 0.25, 0.25). See above.
price vs. prediction
market price agent forecast at t+0
15 follow-ups
re-scan context
This market has been scanned before. Previous predictions:
datepredictedmarket priceconfidence
2026-09-26 28% 26% 53%
1. Planner Opus 5.5 · picks the research tools
Tools chosen: polymarket_direct resolution_source polymarket_related kalshi_related gdelt_news
Planner reasoning
This is a Polymarket geopolitical race market, so polymarket_direct is the price anchor and resolution_source points at official US channels (White House, DoD, State, CENTCOM). polymarket_related can surface the sibling markets on the blockade ending and on an Iran-Oman Hormuz deal, which give separate probabilities for each leg of the race. Kalshi may list similar Iran markets, and gdelt adds headline coverage of Omani and Iranian announcements that a curated corpus may miss.
2. Research parallel tool calls + 4 web research loops (Sonnet 5) · read raw by the forecasters
at a glance
RESEARCH DIGEST (built in code: tool summaries and each report's bottom line; the forecasters read the full tool outputs and reports) Tools - polymarket_direct: ## This Market's Polymarket Data **Iran blockade lifted before Iran-Oman Hormuz agreement?** - Current price (probability): 25.00% (live; bid 23% / ask 27%) - 7-day price change: -11.00% - 30-day price change: -18.50% - Total volume: $19,320 (USD notional) - Price range: 17.00% - 43.50% - Data points: 31 days - resolution_source: already_resolved=unclear; matches_criteria=True; last_updated=October 2, 2026 (White House news page). The fetched CENTCOM, White House, and State Department pages show only generic navigation, media galleries, and news listings; none mention a naval blockade of Iran, its lifting or suspension, or any Oman-Iran diplomatic agreement regarding Strait of Hormuz traffic. - polymarket_related: Polymarket search over 4 keyword(s), kept 19 matches. keyword 'Iran blockade': 5 markets | keyword 'Hormuz': 5 markets | keyword 'Iran Oman': 4 markets | keyword 'Iran deal': 5 markets - kalshi_related: 1 related markets / summaries. keyword 'Iran blockade': no matches | keyword 'Strait of Hormuz': no matches | keyword 'Iran agreement': ok - gdelt_news: GDELT: 20 articles across 2 queries (lookback=30d). 'Oman Iran Strait of Hormuz agreement': 10 hits | 'US naval blockade Iran lifted': 10 hits Research loops, bottom lines - current state: As of October 3, 2026 the US naval blockade (reinstated July 14) remains fully in force with no qualifying US announcement of its end, while Iran and Oman have only a partial/temporary, non-finalized route arrangement (announced Aug 2026) that both sides describe as contingent on the US lifting its blockade — so neither triggering event has occurred, and recent weeks show stalemate (Trump rejecting Iran's Sept 25-28 proposals) rather than movement toward either outcome. - base rate: The only historical precedent (April–June 2026) shows the US blockade ended as part of a broader bilateral US-Iran MOU, not an Iran-Oman agreement, and that blockade was later reimposed when the broader deal collapsed — there is no instance in this conflict of an Iran-Oman deal being announced and later the blockade separately lifting afterward, nor of the reverse happening cleanly. Given repeated false "imminent" signals from both Tehran and Trump since August, a sharp re-escalation by early Oc - yes case: The most credible YES path is not an independent US "surrender" but a bilateral US-Iran mediated deal (via Qatar) in which the blockade is explicitly lifted as the first sequenced step, ahead of and independent from any separately-confirmed Oman-Iran agreement — a structure actively drafted as of late September 2026 and plausible before the November midterms, though still contingent on resolving the unresolved nuclear-sequencing impasse. - no case: Current US policy explicitly ties any blockade suspension to progress on the nuclear track (not simply to an Oman-Iran shipping arrangement), the administration is actively threatening escalation rather than relief after the midterms, and the Iran-Oman process itself has a multi-month track record of stalling at "framework"/"in-principle" stages rather than concluding — all of which favor neither qualifying trigger occurring cleanly by Dec 31, 2026, which under the rules defaults this market to
tools
toolstatustimeitemssummary
polymarket_direct OK 0.4s 1 ## This Market's Polymarket Data **Iran blockade lifted before Iran-Oman Hormuz agreement?** - Current price (probability): 25.00% (live; bid 23% / ask 27%) - 7-day price change: -11.00% - 30-day price change: -18.50% - Total volume: $19,320 (USD notional) - Price range: 17.00% - 43.50% - Data poin
resolution_source OK 3.4s 1 already_resolved=unclear; matches_criteria=True; last_updated=October 2, 2026 (White House news page). The fetched CENTCOM, White House, and State Department pages show only generic navigation, media galleries, and news listings; none mention a naval blockade of Iran, its lifting or suspension, or a
polymarket_related OK 0.7s 19 Polymarket search over 4 keyword(s), kept 19 matches. keyword 'Iran blockade': 5 markets | keyword 'Hormuz': 5 markets | keyword 'Iran Oman': 4 markets | keyword 'Iran deal': 5 markets
kalshi_related OK 2.7s 1 1 related markets / summaries. keyword 'Iran blockade': no matches | keyword 'Strait of Hormuz': no matches | keyword 'Iran agreement': ok
gdelt_news OK 124.8s 20 GDELT: 20 articles across 2 queries (lookback=30d). 'Oman Iran Strait of Hormuz agreement': 10 hits | 'US naval blockade Iran lifted': 10 hits
research loops · 4/4 ok · 19 searches · 7 page reads
dimensionstatustimesearchespage readsreport
current state OK 38s 5 2 5157 chars
base rate OK 40s 6 1 6113 chars
yes case OK 31s 4 2 4399 chars
no case OK 34s 4 2 6052 chars
report: current state
- [2026-07-14] The US reinstated its naval blockade of Iranian ports after the June Islamabad Memorandum ceasefire collapsed; the United States imposed a naval blockade on Iran in mid-April and reinstated it in July, diverting ships and preventing them from reaching Iranian ports. https://www.rferl.org/a/iran-live-blog-trump-middle-east/33803414.html - [2026-08-07] Iran announced a shipping-route agreement with Oman but stated this all remains conditional on Washington ending its blockade of Iranian ports; as of then, Oman has still not commented on any of this. https://www.npr.org/2026/08/07/nx-s1-5923962/iran-says-agreement-with-oman-for-strait-of-hormuz-prohibits-u-s-and-israeli-vessels - [2026-08-26] Iran's deputy FM announced a temporary transit corridor agreed with Oman; since the US bombing of parts of Iran in July, Iran has refused to hold direct talks with it, and it has yet to be seen whether this issue will be addressed in the temporary agreement. Oman itself had still not issued a joint confirming statement. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/8/26/iran-oman-agree-on-temporary-hormuz-route-what-we-know - [2026-08-27] Reporting noted the recent Iran-Oman agreement does not immediately open the strait, and Tehran wants Washington's steps to be "visible and verifiable" before it implements the new arrangement with Oman. https://www.coloradopolitics.com/2026/08/27/iran-and-oman-come-to-agreement-to-open-strait-of-hormuz-but-await-us-buy-in/ - [2026-09-07] CENTCOM said it had redirected a total of 94 commercial ships that allegedly tried to violate the blockade on Iranian ports, up from 92 a day earlier, with three ships disabled and two boarded. Blockade fully active. https://www.cbsnews.com/live-updates/iran-war-us-strait-of-hormuz-oil-gas-price-strikes/ - [2026-09-07] WSJ reported the naval blockade has halted new Iranian oil exports from the Persian Gulf, leaving Iran reliant on diminishing floating stockpiles from before the blockade's reinstatement in July. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2026_United_States_naval_blockade_of_Iran - [2026-09-25/26] At UNGA, Iran's FM Araghchi offered a "concrete" seven-day plan: "If the necessary conditions are met, the strait can be reopened, a normal maritime passage restored within seven days. The choice now rests with the United States." Trump rejected the proposal, saying Iran wants a deal "because they are losing so badly," but the proposal "would not be acceptable." https://www.aljazeera.com/amp/news/2026/9/26/trump-rejects-irans-seven-day-roadmap-to-reopen-strait-of-hormuz - [2026-09-28] NPR confirmed Iran wants the U.S. to lift its naval blockade on oil exports and unfreeze billions of dollars in exchange for reopening the Strait of Hormuz; Trump rejected the latest Iranian proposal. https://www.npr.org/2026/09/28/nx-s1-5982720/trump-rejects-irans-latest-ceasefire-proposal - [2026-09-29] CNN reported oil flows through Hormuz had recovered strongly (13.1 million bpd average), but this is via Gulf-producer and US-facilitated routes, not an Iran-Oman reopening deal; Kpler's director of commodity research said it is clear Iran is losing its influence over the strait. https://www.cnn.com/2026/09/29/economy/oil-strait-of-hormuz-iran - [2026-10-01] An Iran shipping tracker reported U.S.-facilitated transits through the Strait of Hormuz averaged 28.25 vessels per day during the final days of September, with a monthly total of 801 transits — showing the US blockade/enforcement regime, not an Oman-Iran arrangement, still governs traffic. https://www.unitedagainstnucleariran.com/analysis/iran-shipping-update-october-1-2026 - [2026-10-02] RFE/RL news analysis stated Iran's Hormuz leverage is fading but noted the flow of crude from the Persian Gulf has recovered to near-prewar levels, but much of the oil is reaching markets through routes and shipping arrangements that did not exist before the war. No blockade-lifting or Oman-Iran final deal reported. https://www.rferl.org/a/iran-live-blog-trump-middle-east/33803414.html - [2026-10-02] Iraq's FM urged the US and Iran "back to talks," underscoring that as of Oct 2, negotiations (and both the blockade and any definitive Oman-Iran traffic agreement) remain unresolved. https://www.rferl.org/a/iran-live-blog-trump-middle-east/33803414.html BOTTOM LINE: As of October 3, 2026 the US naval blockade (reinstated July 14) remains fully in force with no qualifying US announcement of its end, while Iran and Oman have only a partial/temporary, non-finalized route arrangement (announced Aug 2026) that both sides describe as contingent on the US lifting its blockade — so neither triggering event has occurred, and recent weeks show stalemate (Trump rejecting Iran's Sept 25-28 proposals) rather than movement toward either outcome. NOT FOUND: No evidence of (a) a formal, mutually confirmed Oman-Iran final/binding "diplomatic agreement" (Oman has not issued its own confirming joint statement as of late August, and no update since), or (b) any official US statement ending, suspending, or declaring the blockade will not take effect, through October 2, 2026.
report: base rate
- [2026-06-18] First iteration of this process already resolved in the "blockade ends" direction once: CENTCOM announced the end of the first US naval blockade of Iran (imposed 13 Apr) as part of a broader US-Iran Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding, not an Iran-Oman deal specifically. US Central Command confirmed that the naval blockade on Iranian vessels and ports has been lifted, saying "All U.S. military blockade enforcement efforts have ceased." https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2026/06/mil-260618-rferl01.htm - [2026-06-18] That first blockade lasted roughly 66 days (13 April–18 June) and ended via a US-Iran bilateral framework deal, illustrating that blockade terminations have historically tracked a broader US-Iran agreement, not an Iran-Oman one. The end of the blockade comes after Trump and Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian signed a memorandum of understanding Wednesday that aims to end the U.S.-Iran war, under which Iran is obligated to allow commercial vessels to transit the Strait of Hormuz without paying tolls for 60 days. https://www.cnbc.com/amp/2026/06/18/us-navy-blockade-iran-trump-oil.html - [2026-07-14] The second (current) blockade began after the first deal collapsed, showing the base-rate process is volatile and reversible: The US has reimposed its naval blockade of Iranian ports, according to a US military statement; the US previously enforced a blockade between April and June. https://www.cnn.com/2026/07/14/world/live-news/iran-war-trump - [2026-06-24] Iran and Oman have a track record of issuing non-binding "joint statements" rather than final agreements — the first on June 24 only set up a working group: The Islamic Republic of Iran and the Sultanate of Oman as the Coastal States of the Strait of Hormuz, reaffirm their commitment to the safe passage through the Strait... They agreed to maintain their dialogue on this issue through a joint working group between the two foreign ministries in order to reach agreement on the future administration of naviga[tion] https://www.marinelog.com/news/iran-and-oman-release-joint-statement-on-strait-of-hormuz/ - [2026-08-25/26] A second Iran-Oman joint statement described only a "proposed framework," not a concluded deal: Despite earlier announcements by Islamic Republic officials claiming an agreement was imminent, the joint statement indicates that a final deal has yet to be concluded. https://iranwire.com/en/news/156776-iran-and-oman-issue-joint-statement-on-hormuz-demining-and-temporary-route/ - [2026-09-02] Iran publicly conditions any Hormuz/Oman arrangement on the US ending its blockade first, reducing the chance an Iran-Oman deal is announced independently of US action: Iran says reopening the Strait of Hormuz depends on U.S. ending the war, despite progress in talks with Oman. https://www.cbsnews.com/live-updates/iran-war-us-strait-of-hormuz-sanctions/ - [2026-09-07] As recently as early September, Tehran was still only forecasting an "imminent" deal rather than confirming one: Iran said a deal with Oman to manage shipping through the Strait of Hormuz is imminent... in the final stages and will include details on a temporary safe route through the crucial transit point for energy supplies, Esmail Baghaei, spokesman for the Iran's Foreign Ministry, told reporters in Tehran. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-09-07/iran-says-strait-of-hormuz-deal-with-oman-just-days-away - [2026-08-07] Trump has a track record of over-promising imminent Hormuz breakthroughs that did not materialize, which should discount forward-looking statements as leading indicators: President Donald Trump said late Tuesday that a deal on the Strait of Hormuz is imminent. He has repeatedly claimed diplomatic breakthroughs in the past, only for a lasting agreement to prove elusive. https://fortune.com/2026/08/07/iran-agreement-oman-strait-of-hormuz-shipping/ - [2026-10-01/02] Momentum has reversed sharply in the final data point before question's as-of date: Trump explicitly rejected an Iranian Hormuz proposal and threatened to escalate, with no sign of blockade lifting or an Iran-Oman deal. President Trump rejected Iran's seven-day Hormuz proposal as "unacceptable" and said renewed strikes after the 3 November midterms were "possible," as Secretary of State Rubio reportedly ordered Iran's delegation out of New York. https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/iran-war-oprep.htm - [2026-09-30] A separate Iranian proposal under discussion reportedly links an end of the US blockade to reopening the strait, frozen assets and sanctions relief — i.e., the blockade's end is currently bundled with a broader package, not an isolated Oman-Iran deal: Iran's proposal under discussion would have reopened the strait, released approximately $12 billion in frozen assets, lifted oil sanctions and ended the American blockade of Iranian ports, per Jordan News on 30 September. https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/iran-war-oprep.htm BOTTOM LINE: The only historical precedent (April–June 2026) shows the US blockade ended as part of a broader bilateral US-Iran MOU, not an Iran-Oman agreement, and that blockade was later reimposed when the broader deal collapsed — there is no instance in this conflict of an Iran-Oman deal being announced and later the blockade separately lifting afterward, nor of the reverse happening cleanly. Given repeated false "imminent" signals from both Tehran and Trump since August, a sharp re-escalation by early October, and Iran's own position tying its Oman deal to the US ending the blockade first, the base rate/outside view argues against either qualifying event occurring cleanly and quickly, and offers little basis to favor "blockade lifted first" over "Oman-Iran deal first" specifically. NOT FOUND: No polls, prediction-market aggregator history, or expert quantitative forecasts specifically comparing probability of "blockade lifted" vs. "Iran-Oman deal" sequencing were located; no confirmation of a finalized (as opposed to framework/joint-statement) Iran-Oman agreement as of early October 2026.
report: yes case
YES means: The US government officially announces the end/lifting/suspension of its naval blockade on Iranian ships and customers, and this announcement occurs before any qualifying diplomatic agreement between Oman and Iran over Hormuz traffic is announced. - [2026-09-28] AP reported that Qatari mediators are working from a proposal that would include reopening the strait and lifting the U.S. blockade, and then removing sanctions , with the mechanics explicitly built on, rather than requiring, a finalized Iran-Oman pact — meaning a US-Iran deal could itself trigger a qualifying blockade-lift announcement. https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/mediators-still-working-on-u-s-iran-deal-after-trump-rejected-latest-tehran-proposal - [2026-09-29] A detailed account of the draft text confirms mediators "are working on a proposal in which the Strait would open, and the blockade would be lifted first, with sanctions relief coming after that," while noting the underlying Iran-Oman route arrangement it echoes "was reported at various points as being close or nearly complete, but no such final agreement was ever announced" — i.e., the path to a US blockade-lift announcement may not require Oman and Iran to ever jointly confirm their own deal. https://nationalsecurityjournal.org/oman-would-take-control-of-the-southern-end-of-the-strait-of-hormuz-under-a-deal-that-was-never-once-announced - [2026-09-28] Despite Trump's public rejection, officials indicated his comments "may have been a negotiating tactic," since the U.S. has not officially rejected the current proposal , leaving the door open for a reversal and sudden announcement within the trading window. - [2026-09-28] One US official cited by AP said Trump remains open to pursuing a non-military resolution to the conflict if one can be achieved , and a second mediator reported "slight progress" in the weekend talks — showing active, continuing diplomacy rather than total breakdown. - [2026-09-28] Iran's FM Araghchi has pitched speed as a selling point, noting the proposal would benefit Tehran had pitched the deal as benefiting Trump in the midterm elections , giving Trump a political incentive to claim a blockade-ending "win" before the November 3 midterms, which falls within the market's window. - [2026-09-27] Treasury Secretary Bessent publicly predicted Iran would be forced into "a favorable deal" within two weeks as its tradeable oil reserves run out, per Fox Business remarks — an economic-pressure dynamic that, if it forces Iranian capitulation on nuclear terms, could yield a US-announced blockade suspension as part of an omnibus deal. https://nationalsecurityjournal.org/oman-would-take-control-of-the-southern-end-of-the-strait-of-hormuz-under-a-deal-that-was-never-once-announced - [2026-06-18] Direct precedent exists: CENTCOM has previously issued a clear, declarative blockade-lifting statement once war terms were agreed (ending the first blockade), demonstrating the US has the institutional practice and willingness to issue exactly this kind of qualifying announcement when a deal text is finalized, independent of any separate Oman-Iran instrument. https://www.npr.org/2026/06/18/nx-s1-5863517/trump-iran-deal-blockade-strait-hormuz - [2026-09-28] Market-moving economic pain cuts both ways but favors movement: Brent crude is "above $108," per AP's Sept 28 report, giving the Trump administration political and economic incentive (ahead of midterms) to resolve the standoff via a bilateral US-Iran deal that lifts the blockade as its first, immediate step, rather than waiting on Tehran and Muscat's slower bilateral track. BOTTOM LINE: The most credible YES path is not an independent US "surrender" but a bilateral US-Iran mediated deal (via Qatar) in which the blockade is explicitly lifted as the first sequenced step, ahead of and independent from any separately-confirmed Oman-Iran agreement — a structure actively drafted as of late September 2026 and plausible before the November midterms, though still contingent on resolving the unresolved nuclear-sequencing impasse. NOT FOUND: No confirmed finalization or signing date for the Qatari-mediated draft text; no official White House or CENTCOM statement (as of Oct 2-3, 2026) indicating imminent blockade termination; no specific timeline from Trump's side on when or whether he'd accept the draft reopening-first structure.
report: no case
YES means: the US government issues a qualifying announcement ending/suspending its naval blockade on Iranian ships and customers before any qualifying Iran-Oman diplomatic agreement on Hormuz traffic is announced (or neither happens and the market defaults to "No" at the Dec 31, 2026 deadline). - [2026-05-29] Precedent shows "lifted" announcements are themselves fragile and reversible: Trump previously declared on Truth Social that the blockade "will now be lifted," yet CENTCOM would not confirm the mechanics and the Navy kept enforcing it — a reminder that even a presidential statement can fail to constitute (or can later be contradicted by) a genuine policy end, raising the bar for a "qualifying" announcement under the strict resolution text. https://www.twz.com/news-features/trump-declares-he-is-lifting-the-naval-blockade-on-iran - [2026-06-18] The only time the blockade actually ended, it was tied to a full bilateral US-Iran Memorandum of Understanding on the nuclear file, not a standalone Oman-Iran traffic deal — CENTCOM stated "All U.S. military blockade enforcement efforts have ceased" only once Trump and Pezeshkian had signed a broader MOU. This is the template the administration is following again, not a narrow "Oman deal unlocks blockade" mechanism. https://www.npr.org/2026/06/18/nx-s1-5863517/trump-iran-deal-blockade-strait-hormuz - [2026-09-28] Axios reporting from a US official directly conditions any blockade movement on the nuclear track, stating there won't be a deal "unless the nuclear issues are addressed," and that "the Strait of Hormuz traffic continues to rise and the blockade and sanctions continue to degrade Iran's position," with the US position getting "stronger every day" — i.e., Washington sees no incentive to lift the blockade while it still works as leverage. https://www.axios.com/2026/09/28/trump-iran-war-sanctions-blockade-nuclear - [2026-09-28] The same official accuses Iran of having broken the prior June MOU "by firing at commercial vessels in the Strait of Hormuz in July," which is precisely why the blockade was reinstated — reinforcing that the US will demand enforceable guarantees (not just an Iran-Oman logistics fix) before any new suspension, making a quick standalone "blockade ends" announcement less likely. https://www.axios.com/2026/09/28/trump-iran-war-sanctions-blockade-nuclear - [2026-10-01] Trump told Time magazine that resumed full-scale US strikes on Iran after the November midterms are "possible" if no peace deal is reached, and that nothing short of an Iranian pledge to never pursue nuclear weapons will get the US to lift the blockade — directly tying blockade termination to the nuclear issue rather than to Hormuz traffic management, and signaling escalation risk rather than imminent de-escalation. https://washingtontimes.com/news/2026/oct/1/trump-weighs-strikes-iran-midterms-britain-makes-arrest-suspected - [2026-09-26] At UNGA, Trump explicitly rejected Iran's "concrete" seven-day Hormuz reopening roadmap as unacceptable even though it was framed as reciprocal to US blockade relief — showing the administration is not taking available Hormuz/Oman-linked off-ramps even when offered, consistent with status-quo inertia. (Reported in colleagues' research, confirmed independently via Axios 9/28 sourcing above.) - [2026-08-17 through 2026-08-26] The Iran-Oman track has repeatedly produced only "agreement in principle," "proposed framework," or "route map understanding" language — e.g., Iran's FM spokesperson said talks were in the "final stage" in early August, then a Tuesday Aug 25 joint statement still only described a "proposed framework" for a temporary corridor, with "key details" on exact coordinates and revenue-sharing still unresolved weeks later. This repeated pattern of near-miss, non-binding statements (never an announced, finalized, Oman-confirmed "diplomatic agreement") suggests the Oman-Iran side of this market's race condition is itself far from a clean trigger, reducing confidence either leg resolves cleanly by Dec 31. https://www.cnbc.com/2026/08/26/us-iran-war-trump-hormuz.html - [2026-08-17] Iranian FM spokesperson acknowledged a "transit route map" had been agreed with Oman but that "a final agreement including a joint statement has not been finalized," even as a 60-day US-Iran negotiating deadline expired without result — illustrating a recurring failure pattern (deadlines lapsing, frameworks stalling) that argues for continued status-quo (No) absent a dramatic breakthrough in the final quarter. https://www.cnn.com/2026/08/17/world/live-news/iran-war-trump - [2026-05-19 through 2026-03] White House messaging archive ("74 Times President Trump Has Made Clear That Iran Cannot Have a Nuclear Weapon") shows an unbroken, years-long rhetorical pattern of linking any Iran concession to the nuclear issue specifically — supporting the inference that blockade relief will keep being withheld until a nuclear-specific deal, which per the Sept 28 Axios sourcing remains stalled "on the timing of the commitments and who takes which steps first." https://www.whitehouse.gov/releases/2026/03/74-times-president-trump-has-made-clear-that-iran-cannot-have-a-nuclear-weapon BOTTOM LINE: Current US policy explicitly ties any blockade suspension to progress on the nuclear track (not simply to an Oman-Iran shipping arrangement), the administration is actively threatening escalation rather than relief after the midterms, and the Iran-Oman process itself has a multi-month track record of stalling at "framework"/"in-principle" stages rather than concluding — all of which favor neither qualifying trigger occurring cleanly by Dec 31, 2026, which under the rules defaults this market to "No." NOT FOUND: No official US statement (President, DoD, State, or CENTCOM) in September or October 2026 announcing or scheduling an end/suspension of the blockade; no Oman-confirmed, finalized (non-framework) Iran-Oman joint agreement text as of October 2, 2026; no polling or market-aggregator data on sequencing odds.
3. Forecasters 5 draws · Opus 5.5 + GPT-6 Astra + GPT-5.6 Sol · plain mean
claude-opus-5-5 · high effort
45% conf
Yes 30%
No 70%
See above.
claude-opus-5-5 · high effort
48% conf
Yes 27%
No 73%
(0) Neither trigger has happened. The fetched CENTCOM, White House and State pages show no blockade-lifting announcement. The research finds no Oman-confirmed, finalized Iran-Oman agreement; the August joint statements were described only as a "proposed framework." (a) About three months remain until the Dec 31, 2026 deadline. (b) If nothing changes, the market resolves No by default. The blockade is fully enforced, with 94 ships redirected as of Sept 7. Trump rejected Iran's seven-day roadmap on Sept 26–28, and on Oct 1 he tied any lifting to a nuclear pledge while floating strikes after the midterms. (c) NO paths: stalemate persists through year-end; or Iran and Oman finalize their corridor deal before Washington moves, possibly announcing it alongside or ahead of a US package. The related "Iran-Oman agreement by Oct 31" market trades at 16%, so that leg is not negligible. (d) YES path: the Qatari-mediated US-Iran draft, which sequences reopening and blockade lifting first, is concluded. CENTCOM then issues a declarative lifting statement like the June 18 one, before Oman and Iran formally confirm their own agreement. Iran conditions its Oman deal on the US acting first, which favors this ordering when a deal happens. The liquid "US ends blockade by Dec 31" market sits near 52%, but recent hardline US signals suggest that is generous; I put it closer to 40%. Roughly two-thirds of lifting scenarios would come before an Oman deal, giving about 26–28%. That sits essentially at this market's 25% anchor (23/27 spread), so I move only slightly.
gpt-6-astra · high effort
56% conf
Yes 25%
No 75%
I retain Polymarket's live 25% Yes anchor (23% bid, 27% ask), because the research provides no verified, clearly unpriced sequencing advantage. No supplied source conclusively documents a qualifying trigger for this reinstated blockade, although the official-page reads through October 2 are generic and cannot establish a complete announcement history. Roughly 89 days remain until the rules' December 31, 11:59 PM ET deadline; Yes requires a definitive official US termination or general suspension announcement before mutual Oman–Iran acceptance of a qualifying traffic agreement. If nothing changes and neither announcement occurs, No wins. A plausible No scenario is continued nuclear-linked stalemate, supported by Axios's September 28 reporting and Trump's October 1 escalation warning reported by the Washington Times, or an Oman–Iran traffic agreement announced first. A plausible Yes scenario is a Qatar-mediated US–Iran package producing a suspension announcement first: AP/PBS reported continuing negotiations on September 28, while CENTCOM's June 18 termination demonstrates precedent without resolving this reinstated blockade. The 75% No allocation includes announcement-classification risk around the disputed August joint statements: temporary traffic commitments can qualify without a final treaty, and conditional implementation does not necessarily prevent an agreement announcement from counting. Conversely, a qualifying definitive US announcement counts even if enforcement continues or policy subsequently reverses, so I reject the NO report's suggestion that later operational conduct could invalidate it.
gpt-6-astra · high effort
55% conf
Yes 25%
No 75%
I anchor on Polymarket's live 25% Yes price (23% bid/27% ask) and retain it because the research establishes no clear informational advantage over that consensus. No qualifying trigger for the reinstated blockade is documented: the official-source read through October 2 contains only generic listings, while the documented June termination concerned the earlier blockade. About 90 days remain until December 31 at 11:59 PM ET, and Yes requires an unambiguous official US decision generally ending or suspending the blockade before both Oman and Iran announce acceptance of a qualifying traffic agreement. If nothing changes and neither announcement occurs, No wins. A plausible No scenario is continued nuclear-sequencing deadlock or an Oman-Iran agreement announced first; Axios's September 28 reporting says Washington requires nuclear concessions and believes continued enforcement strengthens its leverage. A plausible Yes scenario is the Qatari-mediated package described by AP/PBS on September 28 producing a US suspension announcement first, which would qualify even if implementation lagged or the decision were subsequently reversed. I include in No the risk that incomplete official coverage and conflicting August joint-statement reports obscure mutually accepted traffic commitments, since a temporary corridor agreement can qualify without a final treaty or actual reopening. The related 51.75% year-end blockade-ending market is context rather than a sequencing anchor, and neither the single June precedent nor the unconfirmed negotiating proposals warrants departing from 25%.
gpt-5.6-sol · high effort
64% conf
Yes 25%
No 75%
(0) The event is not already resolved: official White House, State Department, and CENTCOM pages through October 2 contain no qualifying blockade-lifting announcement, while late-September reporting says the blockade remains active and no mutually accepted Oman-Iran agreement has been announced. A qualifying US termination must occur before a qualifying agreement, and no later than December 31, 2026 at 11:59 PM ET, for Yes. (a) Roughly 89 days remain until that deadline. (b) If nothing changes, the rules explicitly resolve the market No. (c) No results if the current stalemate persists, if Oman and Iran announce an accepted Hormuz traffic agreement first, or if blockade relief occurs only after that agreement. (d) Yes could result from the Qatar-mediated US-Iran package described by AP in which the blockade is lifted as an initial step, followed later by other shipping and sanctions arrangements. I retain Polymarket's 25% Yes anchor because Iran's insistence that blockade relief come first and the June precedent support Yes, but Trump's rejection of the September proposal, continued nuclear demands, escalation threats, and the deadline-default rule provide equally concrete reasons not to move above consensus.
4. Final plain mean of 5 draws
26% (54% confidence)
Yes: 26% No: 74%
Mean of 5 draws (0.30, 0.27, 0.25, 0.25, 0.25). See above.
Pipeline Timing
Total pipeline time: 165.2s
Per-tool research timings shown in the Research section above.