Strait of Hormuz traffic returns to normal by November 30?

- [2026-09-27] The most recent IMF PortWatch daily data point available (published with ~1 week lag) shows **1 transit call** on 2026-09-27, with the mirrored dataset reporting a **7-day moving average of 3.14** transit calls, far below the 60-call threshold. Daily Transit Calls 2026-09-27 was 1.00, and the Daily Transit Calls 7-Day Moving Avg for 2026-09-27 was 3.14. https://en.macromicro.me/collections/27263/usiran-war/148236/supply-chain-imf-strait-of-hormuz-daily-transit-calls-transit-trade-volume - [2026-09-20] An independent tracker citing IMF PortWatch for an earlier date also shows near-zero flow: IMF PortWatch recorded 1 transit on 2026-09-20, against a pre-crisis baseline of 85 per day. https://straits.live/briefs/2026-09-28 - [2026-02-28] IMF PortWatch's own event page confirms the disruption is classified as ongoing: "Strait of Hormuz | 28 February, 2026 — Ongoing... Event name and type: Trade disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz due to attacks on commercial ships, Event date: Reduced traffic since February 28, 2026 — Ongoing." https://portwatch.imf.org/pages/cc317ba850e34c4dadbead6f7b336fb1 - [2026-09-26] Diplomatically, Iran proposed reopening the strait within seven days of a ceasefire, but Trump rejected the plan: "They want to make a deal where they open the strait immediately because they're losing so badly," Trump added. Araghchi had said "If the necessary conditions are met, the strait can be reopened and normal maritime passage restored within seven days... The choice now rests with the United States." https://www.npr.org/2026/09/26/nx-s1-5981990/trump-rejects-iranian-deal-strait-of-hormuz - [2026-09-29] Despite rejection of the formal reopening plan, indirect US-Iran talks continued, per a tracker citing wire reports: "84 events have been indexed in the past day, the most recent being a reported negotiation: 'US, Iran Hold Indirect Talks After Hormuz Proposal Rejection; Tehran Awaits Reply'." https://straits.live/briefs/2026-09-29 - [2026-09-30] Non-IMF AIS trackers (Windward) report a very different, much higher traffic picture than IMF PortWatch: "16 vessels transited Hormuz on 30 September (6 inbound, 10 outbound), against 17 the previous day; 6 were dark, four of them outbound, and all 6 dark vessels used the southern corridor." This is a tiny fraction of the ~85/day pre-crisis baseline and well short of the 60 7-day-average threshold even under this more generous count. https://insights.windward.ai/ - [2026-09-29] Violence against shipping continued inside the strait: "Three attacks were reported on Tuesday while oil volumes appear to be increasing," with two Liberian-flagged crude tankers managed by ADNOC and a smaller shuttle tanker struck while transiting dark. https://maritime-executive.com/article/three-vessels-struck-in-strait-of-hormuz-as-iran-s-grip-loosens - [2026-09-29] Reuters-sourced reporting (via OilPrice) confirms the strikes and notes the affected vessels were running dark: "Three Liberia-flagged tankers with their transponders switched off were transiting the Strait on Tuesday and Wednesday when they were hit by projectiles, shipping intelligence firm Marisks says, as carried by Reuters on Thursday." https://oilprice.com/Latest-Energy-News/World-News/Three-Tankers-Struck-by-Unknown-Projectiles-in-Strait-of-Hormuz.html - [2026-09-29] Separately, press coverage using Kpler oil-flow data (not IMF PortWatch vessel-count methodology) claims a large rebound: "An average of 10 million barrels of oil have passed through the strait daily, according to data from maritime tracking agency Kpler." This metric tracks oil volume, not the "Arrivals of Ships" transit-call count IMF PortWatch publishes, and so is not directly comparable to the resolution criterion. https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2026/sep/29/hormuz-traffic-nears-prewar-levels-iran-war-simmers/ - [2026-10-01] An aggregator summarizing the live IMF PortWatch feed as of October 1 states flatly: "Effectively no, it is closed to commercial shipping as of 1 October 2026. 1 ship transited on September 27 vs ~85/day normal." https://straits.live/ - [2026-10-01] The same tracker notes a sibling Kalshi contract on the identical IMF PortWatch 60-threshold metric, but with a later deadline, trading around 17%: "Will the 7-day moving average of transit calls through the Strait of Hormuz as reported by the IMF PortWatch be above 60 before January 1, 2027?... closes 1 Jan 2027, 17% market price." (Different venue and later date than the Polymarket Nov 30 question covered here.) https://straits.live/ - [2026-09-30] IMF PortWatch itself continues to caveat the reliability of its figures given wartime conditions: "Due to the ongoing conflict in the region, there are reports of GPS jamming, AIS spoofing, and vessels going dark. Please use the data with care." https://portwatch.imf.org/pages/cc317ba850e34c4dadbead6f7b336fb1 BOTTOM LINE: As of the latest IMF PortWatch publication (2026-09-27), the 7-day moving average of transit calls is roughly 3, over 19x below the 60-threshold needed for "Yes," and the strait remains under attack (three tankers struck 2026-09-29) with no reopening deal in place after Trump's rejection of Iran's seven-day roadmap on 2026-09-26; even optimistic non-IMF AIS counts (Windward) show only ~16-17 daily transits, still far short of 60. NOT FOUND: A direct, fully rendered pull of the live IMF PortWatch chart/CSV for dates after 2026-09-27 (the official site is JavaScript-rendered and did not return data on fetch); any confirmed ceasefire or reopening agreement dated after 2026-09-30; official IMF PortWatch commentary reconciling its low AIS-based counts with higher Kpler/Windward volume estimates.

- [2026-02-28] The Strait of Hormuz crisis began when the US and Israel launched an air war against Iran; Iran retaliated by warning against passage, attacking merchant ships, and laying mines, triggering a near-total shipping shutdown — shipping traffic through the Strait of Hormuz has been largely blocked by Iran since 28 February 2026, when the United States and Israel launched an air war against Iran, with the IRGC boarding and attacking merchant ships and laying sea mines. (en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2026_Strait_of_Hormuz_crisis) - [2026-06-17] A US–Iran memorandum of understanding (Islamabad MoU) raised hopes of reopening, but analysts warned recovery would be slow: Kpler analysts estimated the backlog could take 10 to 15 days to clear, but warned this would not amount to a full recovery, calling the initial boost "purely mechanical." (cnbc.com) - [2026-04-22] Pentagon officials told Congress that it could take six months to fully clear the Strait of Hormuz of mines deployed by the Iranian military, and any such operation is unlikely to be carried out until the U.S. war with Iran ends , an estimate later echoed by Kpler's "more conservative six months for a comprehensive sweep" (washingtonpost.com, investinglive.com). - [2026-08-27] As of the crisis's six-month mark, CENTCOM claimed mines were cleared, but some US allies reportedly dispute that the strait has been fully demined, per Bloomberg, while the IMO separately verified at least 70 attacks on international shipping since February 28, with 19 seafarers killed and roughly 6,000 sailors still stranded in the Gulf. Iran and Oman subsequently announced a "phased framework" for a joint demining/shipping-corridor plan (hormuzstraitmonitor.com). - [2026-10-01/02] Independent live tracking shows traffic still far below the 60-threshold needed for this market: about 3 commercial ships per day are transiting the Strait of Hormuz (IMF PortWatch 7-day average) — about 3% of the pre-crisis norm of roughly 74 transits per day… including 0 loaded oil tankers observed transiting eastbound. This is described as roughly day 216 of the disruption (straitofhormuz.report). - [2026-09-27] IMF PortWatch's own published series confirms the stagnation: daily transit calls were 1.00 and the Daily Transit Calls (7-Day Moving Avg) 2026-09-27 3.14 (macromicro.me, mirroring PortWatch). - [Base rate, sibling Polymarket "returns to normal" contracts]: Every earlier dated version of this identical ≥60 7-day-average threshold has resolved or been priced at essentially 0% "Yes" so far in 2026 — April 30 (" Trader consensus on Polymarket has locked in a 100% implied probability for "No" on Strait of Hormuz traffic normalizing by April 30, 2026 "), May 15 (<1%), May 31 (0%), June 30 (0%), and September 30 (<1%, with daily commercial passages averaging just 3 vessels versus historical levels of 70–130, according to IMF PortWatch and AIS data as of September 24 ). None of the roughly seven sibling "by [date]" contracts run since February has resolved Yes. - [2026-04-28 forecast] Maritime-insurance experts argued full normalization requires not just demining but insurer confidence: if there is any risk of mines remaining, this will deter insurers and halt traffic... "War-risk insurers are not looking for a risk-free environment; they are looking for a risk they can quantify, price, and spread across enough capacity" — a bar not yet met as of late September. - [Historical analogue cited by trackers]: the strait has never been fully closed for a sustained period in the modern era, despite repeated threats. The closest precedent is the 1980–1988 Tanker War, when hundreds of vessels were attacked during the Iran–Iraq conflict yet traffic continued at reduced volume under naval escort. That precedent featured gradual, partial recovery rather than a sudden snap-back to pre-crisis levels, reinforcing that the 7-day-average metric used by this market (which punishes any slow ramp) is a high, slow-moving bar. - [Forecaster consensus, RAND Forecasting Initiative, ~2026-06]: A related RAND question on the *highest* 7DMA reached by year-end 2026 shows forecasters pricing only a 20% chance of reaching 50-75 and 30% chance of reaching ≥100, after the Strait of Hormuz 7DMA averaged 93.7 across 2025, reached 107.3 on 24 February 2026 just before the disruption, fell to a low of 2.7 in late March 2026, and stood at 12.0 on 19 April 2026 — indicating experts see a path back above 60 as plausible eventually but highly uncertain in timing. - [Mine-clearance timeline convergence]: Multiple independent estimates (Pentagon ~6 months from April, Kpler ~6 months, BIMCO calling current transit "very risky") converge on mine clearance alone plausibly not being resolved until roughly Q4 2026 at the earliest, before accounting for insurer and carrier confidence lags that have historically added further weeks-to-months on top of physical clearance (washingtonpost.com, investinglive.com). BOTTOM LINE: The reference class — seven-plus consecutive sibling Polymarket contracts using the identical ≥60 7-day-average "returns to normal" threshold — has resolved No every single time since the crisis began in February 2026, with actual traffic stuck near 1-4 ships/day (≈3% of the ~74/day pre-crisis norm) as of early October; expert mine-clearance and insurance-normalization timelines (6+ months, contingent on durable de-escalation) and the slow-moving nature of a 7-day average make a jump to ≥60 by November 30 a significant break from the established pattern rather than a continuation of it. NOT FOUND: No instance of IMF PortWatch's Hormuz 7-day average actually reaching 60+ at any point since the February 2026 disruption began; no confirmed, published mine-clearance completion certified by an independent (non-CENTCOM) party; no specific dated forecast from IMF PortWatch itself (it only reports historical data, not projections).

YES means: IMF PortWatch publishes a 7-day moving average of "Arrivals of Ships" (transit calls) for the Strait of Hormuz at or above 60 for at least one date between market creation and November 30, 2026. - [2026-09-25/26] Iran's foreign minister Abbas Araghchi proposed reopening the Strait of Hormuz and resuming nuclear talks within seven days if the Trump administration accepts its conditions , and this is not an isolated gesture: US and Iranian negotiators are exploring a phased agreement that could reopen the Strait of Hormuz in exchange for Washington lifting its economic blockade of Iran , with talks explicitly continuing around the UN General Assembly. The single fastest path to a YES resolution is a repeat of the June 2026 pattern (below) triggered by exactly this kind of deal, now reportedly on the table again. - [2026-09-29/30] An average of 10 million barrels of oil a day has passed through the strait this month, according to Kpler, up sharply from earlier in the war but below the pre-war level of 16 million barrels a day , and separately oil shipments through the strait and alternative routes have returned to nearly 80% of pre-war regional levels, the Wall Street Journal reported . This shows the underlying physical/insurance capacity to move large volumes already exists, even though vessel-count (not barrel-volume) is the metric that resolves this market. - [2026-09-30] A JewishInsider report confirms the mechanism behind the rebound: Persian Gulf crude exports rebounded to nearly 13 million barrels a day in September , driven by active US naval protection of tankers, demonstrating that when the US commits escort assets, flows can scale quickly without a formal reopening deal. - [2026-06-24] Precedent exists for a rapid vessel-count jump close to the 60 threshold: per IMF PortWatch data compiled by a live tracker, daily transits reached **51 on 24 June 2026** and 46 on 25 June, immediately after the Islamabad MOU was signed — up from just 16-29/day a week earlier, showing the 7-day average can move from single digits into the 40s-50s range within roughly two weeks of a credible deal. - [2026-06-14/17] That June episode had a clear trigger replicable today: the United States and Iran reached an agreement to end fighting and reopen the Strait of Hormuz, with Trump posting "I hereby fully authorize the toll free opening of the Strait of Hormuz, and, simultaneously herewith, authorize the immediate removal of the United States Naval blockade" , followed by formal signing within days — illustrating that a political breakthrough, not just incremental military protection, is what produces the steepest traffic jumps. - [2026-09-29] Momentum toward a deal is bipartisan-adjacent internationally: a coalition of 80 countries called for the urgent reopening of the strait, with Bahrain's Foreign Minister saying "We call for the full restoration of navigational rights and principles without delay" , adding diplomatic pressure that did not exist at the same intensity during earlier failed attempts. - [2026-09-26] Domestic political incentives favor a fast US deal before November: Trita Parsi suggested Araghchi implied a speedy agreement would help U.S. President Donald Trump ahead of November's midterm elections , giving Washington a timing motive to conclude talks within the market's window. - [2026-10-01] Even absent a deal, baseline vessel counts are already trending up modestly on non-IMF trackers: a tracker citing Windward reported 42 transits on a recent Sunday with growing southern-corridor convoy activity, and gCaptain-sourced reporting notes Gulf producers are adapting logistics (offshore transfers) around the strait rather than halting activity — signs of market participants positioning for a reopening rather than retrenching. - [2026-10-01] Markets are already pricing some probability of a nearer-term normalization: the sibling Polymarket "returns to normal by October 31" contract was quoted around 3%, implying non-trivial (if low) probability mass assigned by traders to a rapid reopening materializing before the November 30 deadline of this contract, which has five more weeks of runway than the October 31 version. - Mechanism for YES: (1) US and Iran conclude a phased deal (e.g., blockade-lift-for-reopening swap under discussion since Sept 25), (2) Iran implements safe-passage guarantees similar to the June MOU's 60-day toll-free provision, (3) within roughly 1-2 weeks shippers resume transits at scale as they did in late June, pushing the 7-day average from current ~3 past 50 within the move, and (4) continued momentum or a second wave of catch-up traffic (backlogged vessels, as seen after the April/June agreements) pushes the average over 60 before November 30. BOTTOM LINE: The strongest YES path is a repeat of the documented June 2026 precedent — a US-Iran deal (now reportedly being negotiated again as of late September) rapidly lifting the 7-day average from near-zero into the 40s-50s within about two weeks, followed by a modest further acceleration (helped by backlog clearance and election-timed US incentives) to clear 60 before November 30; this would require both a new agreement to be reached/signed and to hold without the attacks-driven collapse that ended the June rally by early July. NOT FOUND: No confirmed signed deal or ceasefire as of October 2, 2026 (talks remain at the proposal/exploratory stage per September 25-30 reporting); no IMF PortWatch data point above 60 7-day average at any time since the crisis began (peak was 51 on June 24, still 9 points short); no official timetable from US or Iranian negotiators for concluding the current "phased agreement" talks.

YES means: IMF PortWatch publishes a 7-day moving average of "Arrivals of Ships" transit calls for the Strait of Hormuz at or above 60 for at least one date between market creation (Aug 11, 2026) and November 30, 2026. - [2026-10-01] An independent live tracker's own reopening-probability model puts the chance of the identical ≥60 threshold being hit "by Oct 31" at just 3%, and lists a sibling Kalshi contract for the Nov 1 deadline still trading with no resolution, underscoring that even informed aggregators see the November 30 bar as very unlikely to be cleared: "Odds it returns to normal 3%by Oct 31 · see the reopening curve... Reopening Strait of Hormuz traffic returns to normal by October 31? Polymarket·$1.5M vol·closes 1 Nov 2026 3% market price." - [2026-10-01] Trump explicitly raised, rather than lowered, the odds of renewed large-scale conflict inside the Nov 30 window: in a TIME interview he said "renewed large-scale U.S. bombing of Iran after the November midterm elections is possible... he does not believe peace with Iran is ever possible." The midterms fall Nov 3, squarely inside this market's remaining window, meaning any resumed bombing campaign would occur while the Nov 30 clock is still running. - [2026-10-01] The same report confirms Trump rejected Iran's latest ceasefire/reopening offer as insufficient: "Trump also said he rejected an Iranian ceasefire offer presented over the weekend... the offer to open the Strait of Hormuz fell short of what Washington now wants, and that Iran wants a deal but he is seeking a broader one." This is a harder, more specific rejection than the Sept 26 rejection already noted by colleagues, confirming no deal is imminent as of Oct 1. - [2026-09-26] CNBC's framing of the same rejection makes clear Trump is not merely stalling but actively planning to escalate: "Trump rejected Iran's proposal and has told aides he views renewed U.S. bombing after the midterm elections as likely, The Wall Street Journal reported, citing U.S. officials." A resumed air war would almost certainly suppress, not restore, transit traffic before Nov 30. - [2026-09-26] RT's account adds a mechanism detail missing from prior reports: Washington is not just declining a deal but has declared it will not lift the blockade regardless: "Washington has informed Iran and regional mediators that he has no intention of lifting the maritime blockade." Since a US naval blockade remains a direct legal/physical barrier to transit, its continuation is a status-quo-inertia argument for NO independent of mine-clearance timelines. - [2026-10-01] Despite rhetoric about oil "returning to pre-war levels," the underlying IMF PortWatch figure that actually governs resolution remained stuck at the lowest level yet documented: live tracker data for October 1 shows "IMF PortWatch recorded 1 transit on 2026-09-27, against a pre-crisis baseline of 85 per day" , a figure repeated across independent trackers (straits.live, iransitrep) with no sign of an uptick in the ship-count (as opposed to oil-volume) metric that the resolution criteria specifically require. - [2026-10-01] Violence against shipping continued into October itself, not just late September, per the same brief: "Reuters reports that three oil tankers were hit by projectiles in the strait on Tuesday, citing Marisks... The attacker has not been identified." , with a follow-up brief noting one tanker caught fire and a supertanker was also struck near Oman — i.e., attacks are still active as the market's clock runs, not a fading tail risk. - [2026-09-27] A competing narrative device, the "armedconflicts.org" tracker, labels the situation "Reopening (constrained)" based on stale June 2026 deal language, illustrating a resolution-criteria technicality risk for a NO case: aggregator sites can conflate oil-volume recovery or diplomatic "reopening" announcements with the actual IMF PortWatch ship-count metric the market resolves on, but "volumes remain only ~5–10% of normal while mines are cleared" even under that more optimistic framing from mid-June — a level still far below the 60 threshold months later in September/October. - [Mechanism] Resolution requires the 7-day moving average itself (not single-day spikes, oil-barrel volumes, or AIS-based alternative trackers like Windward/Kpler) to cross 60; colleagues' reports already show Kpler's oil-volume rebound and Windward's ~16-17 daily AIS counts are structurally different metrics that do not feed IMF PortWatch's own figure, so even a genuine oil-flow recovery narrative (as pushed by Trump and some wires) would not mechanically move the resolution variable without a corresponding舰-count rebound that has not yet appeared in PortWatch's own data through Sept 27. - [Timeline arithmetic] With PortWatch publishing on a roughly 4-7 day lag and the 7-day average needing sustained high daily counts (not a single day) to cross 60, a last-minute diplomatic breakthrough would need to occur by roughly mid-to-late November at the latest to leave enough time for both a physical traffic ramp-up and the lagged data to publish a qualifying average before Nov 30 — a very tight runway given no ceasefire exists as of Oct 1 and Trump has floated resuming bombing only after Nov 3. BOTTOM LINE: Every available data point through October 1, 2026 shows the IMF PortWatch 7-day average still near 1-4% of the 60 threshold, the US blockade intact, ceasefire talks stalled by a fresh, specific Trump rejection, and an explicit presidential threat of renewed bombing inside the market's own window — all pointing toward continuation of the unbroken "No" pattern established by every prior sibling contract since February 2026. NOT FOUND: Any confirmed ceasefire, blockade-lifting agreement, or mine-clearance certification dated after October 1, 2026; any IMF PortWatch-published daily or 7-day-average figure after September 27, 2026 showing an upward inflection in ship counts.