Strait of Hormuz traffic returns to normal by December 31?

- [2026-09-27] IMF PortWatch's own published data (mirrored by MacroMicro) shows the Strait of Hormuz 7-day moving average of transit calls at **3.14**, with daily transit calls of only 1-4 vessels, far below the 60 threshold needed for "Yes." https://en.macromicro.me/collections/27263/usiran-war/148236/supply-chain-imf-strait-of-hormuz-daily-transit-calls-transit-trade-volume - [2026-09-20] PortWatch recorded just 1 transit against a pre-crisis baseline of roughly 85/day, a figure repeatedly cited across multiple daily briefs through month-end. IMF PortWatch recorded 1 vessels transiting the Strait of Hormuz on 2026-09-20, against a pre-crisis baseline of roughly 85 per day. https://straits.live/briefs/2026-09-29 - [2026-09-27] The most recent PortWatch-published day (as of trackers' Oct 1 update) still shows only 1 transit call, continuing the pattern of near-total AIS-visible closure. IMF PortWatch recorded 1 transit on 2026-09-27, against a pre-crisis baseline of 85 per day; the oil price feed is currently down. https://straits.live/briefs/2026-10-01 - [2026-09-29] Despite the low PortWatch vessel counts, non-PortWatch tanker-tracking sources (Kpler, TankerTrackers) report oil flow volumes nearing pre-war levels, a divergence the question's resolution source does not credit. Commercial traffic through the Strait of Hormuz increased dramatically in September, according to maritime tracking firms, inching closer to prewar levels as some speculate that Iran is losing leverage against the U.S. in the seven-month-long war. An average of 10 million barrels of oil have passed through the strait daily, according to data from maritime tracking agency Kpler. https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2026/sep/29/hormuz-traffic-nears-prewar-levels-iran-war-simmers/ - [2026-09-30] Fresh kinetic attacks continue to disrupt the strait even as diplomacy proceeds: Brent stood at $102.90, a move of -2.26%, as of 02:57 UTC, with IMF PortWatch recording 1 transit on 2026-09-27; Iraq is importing petrol via Syria's Baniyas port as a bypass route, and U.S.-Iran talks continue after President Trump rejected Iran's strait-reopening proposal. https://straits.live/briefs/2026-09-30 - [2026-09-29] On the diplomatic track, Iran's seven-day reopening roadmap (offered Sept 23 via mediators) was rejected by Trump, with indirect talks continuing but no agreement reached. The latest turns came after President Trump said over the weekend he's rejecting an offer from Iran to reopen the Strait of Hormuz and resume talks on its nuclear program. https://www.cbsnews.com/live-updates/iran-war-us-trump-talks-strait-of-hormuz/ - [2026-10-01] Tankers continue to be attacked even amid signs flows are loosening: The Maritime Executive reports three vessels were struck in the Strait of Hormuz as Iran's grip on traffic loosens. https://straits.live/briefs/2026-10-01 - [2026-10-02] Diplomatic track remains unresolved; the latest roadmap proposes a road map for a regionwide ceasefire of up to 60 days, a phased reopening of Hormuz, an end to the US blockade of Iran and a halt to attacks on Arab neighbours , with no confirmed reopening yet. https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2026/10/02/red-sea-not-hormuz-saudi-arabia-foreign-policy-houthis - [2026-10-01] Sibling Kalshi markets on the same PortWatch metric are pricing this scenario with a steep term structure: the "before Nov 1, 2026" contract traded at 5%, the "before Jan 1, 2027" contract at 17%, and the "before Jul 1, 2027" contract at 47%, implying markets see a gradual, not imminent, recovery. https://straits.live/ - [2026-09-07] Even as fighting continued, U.S. officials claimed the strait was "fully open" while independent trackers showed sharply reduced traffic, a dispute over data that has persisted through September. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/liveblog/2026/9/7/iran-war-live-tehran-to-announce-new-hormuz-shipping-route-in-coming-days - [2026-09-10] Earlier in September, Reuters-sourced ship-tracking data already showed depressed transit counts well below pre-war norms. Before the Iran war began in February, the Strait of Hormuz typically handled about 125 large commercial vessels a day, with traffic through the waterway accounting for roughly 20 percent of the world's daily crude oil and LNG supplies. https://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/iran/2026/09/iran-260910-rferl05.htm - [2026-03-15] For context on scale needed: in March 2026 a weekly Kalshi market noted 41 transit calls over seven days (7-day MA ~5.9), illustrating how far current levels remain from the 60 7-day-MA threshold even compared to earlier "low" war-time readings. https://kalshi.com/markets/kxhormuztrafficw/traffic-through-the-strait-of-homuz/kxhormuztrafficw-26mar15 BOTTOM LINE: As of the most recent IMF PortWatch publication date (2026-09-27), the official 7-day moving average of Strait of Hormuz transit calls sits around 3, roughly 5% of the 60-threshold needed for "Yes," and remains near crisis lows despite active but unresolved ceasefire/reopening diplomacy and separate (non-PortWatch) reports of recovering oil-volume flows; nothing in the data trail suggests PortWatch's AIS-based vessel count is close to a sustained jump to 60. NOT FOUND: I could not directly load the live interactive IMF PortWatch chart/CSV (the official page render requires JavaScript not captured by fetch), so all PortWatch-sourced figures here are via secondary mirrors (MacroMicro, straits.live, global-energy-flow.com) rather than the primary chart itself; I also could not confirm any specific scheduled resumption date or signed reopening agreement as of 2026-10-02.

- [2026-02-28] The current Strait of Hormuz disruption began when the US and Israel launched an air war against Iran, triggering an Iranian blockade/mining campaign; shipping traffic through the Strait of Hormuz has been largely blocked by Iran since 28 February 2026, when the United States and Israel launched an air war against Iran, and in retaliation the IRGC issued warnings forbidding passage, boarded and attacked merchant ships, and laid sea mines. Source: en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2026_Strait_of_Hormuz_crisis - [2026-10-02] Reference-class base rate from Polymarket's own sibling "returns to normal" markets (same 60/day 7DMA threshold) is 100% NO across every resolved instance to date: end of April, May 15, end of May, June 15, end of June, July 7, July 15, and July 31 all resolved "No" with Outcome proposed: No, No dispute, Final outcome: No (April 30) and identical outcomes on the June 15, June 30, July 15 and July 31 markets. Source: polymarket.com/event/strait-of-hormuz-traffic-returns-to-normal-by-april-30, polymarket.com/event/strait-of-hormuz-traffic-returns-to-normal-by-june-15, polymarket.com/event/strait-of-hormuz-traffic-returns-to-normal-by-july-31 - [2026-08-10] A still-open sibling market, "returns to normal by November 30," opened 2026-08-10 and as of early September reporting, persistent geopolitical tensions from the U.S.-Iran conflict continue to suppress commercial transits through the Strait of Hormuz to roughly 7-9% of pre-war levels of 120-140 vessels daily, with elevated war-risk premiums, routing restrictions, and sanctions exposure deterring major operators. Source: polymarket.com/event/strait-of-hormuz-traffic-returns-to-normal-by-november-30-20260810151158765 - [2026-10-02] Current directly-observed traffic level is far below the 60/day threshold: ~3 ships/day are transiting the Strait of Hormuz as of 2026-10-01 (IMF PortWatch 7-day avg), about 3% of the pre-crisis norm of roughly 74 transits per day. Source: straitofhormuz.report/today - [2026-09-27] The most recent IMF-sourced figure from a tracking aggregator shows Daily Transit Calls (7-Day Moving Avg) of 3.14 on 2026-09-27 , confirming the independent straitofhormuz.report figure. Source: en.macromicro.me - [2026-07-31] Historical trajectory shows the index has repeatedly spiked and relapsed rather than trending toward normal: traffic reached a 2026 peak 7DMA of 32 in early July before dropping yet again last week, bringing the flow of ships through the Middle East passageway to levels not seen since March, with transits down 52.4 percent between July 20–26 vs July 13-19 per Lloyd's List Intelligence. Source: news.usni.org/2026/07/31 - [2026-05-08] An external forecasting panel (RAND Forecasting Initiative) framed the question as the "highest 7DMA reached at any point through year-end" and set an initial crowd probability distribution giving roughly 55% combined weight to the 7DMA reaching 75 or higher at some point, but this was drafted in a period (April 2026) when the baseline had already collapsed from a pre-crisis 93.7 average in 2025 to a low of 2.7 in late March 2026, and 12.0 on 19 April 2026. Source: randforecastinginitiative.org - [2026-08-27] Even during a nominal partial reopening via Iran-Oman workaround routes, actual flows stayed minimal: what little traffic remains consists mostly of tankers operating under naval escort or with tracking systems switched off, moving through a workaround after Iran and Oman agreed to temporary shipping routes , and a parallel Al Jazeera analysis found roughly 130 ships sailed through the strait each day pre-crisis, compared with only 236 in total passing over 19 days in August 2026 (≈12/day). Source: aljazeera.com/news/2026/8/27, aljazeera.com/news/2026/8/20 - [2026-09-01 approx] The sibling "by December 31" market itself (this contract) opened with much higher implied odds than warranted by fundamentals: a recent U.S.-Iran diplomatic agreement enabled initial reopening with vessel transits resuming at a trickle, and market-implied odds of 90.5% for normalized traffic by year-end reflected trader consensus that logistical hurdles would be resolved before December 31 — but that optimistic pricing from months ago has not been borne out by subsequent data showing the 7DMA back near 3/day by late September/early October. - [2026-07-31] Pre-crisis "normal" (the 60/day threshold) is well below average historical throughput, implying the bar itself is not extreme but the current gap is enormous: daily transits have remained in the low teens or single digits through early August—well below pre-crisis norms of roughly 60 vessels. Source: polymarket.com/event/strait-of-hormuz-traffic-returns-to-normal-by-july-31 BOTTOM LINE: Every prior sibling "Hormuz returns to normal" Polymarket contract (covering roughly eight consecutive deadlines from April through July 2026) has resolved NO, and the current 7-day moving average (~3/day as of early October 2026) remains roughly 20x below the 60-threshold with no sustained upward trend, only brief spikes that have each relapsed — the outside view strongly favors NO for the December 31 deadline as well. NOT FOUND: No explicit third-party forecaster (e.g., Metaculus) probability specifically for the December 31 threshold was located; only a RAND panel's initial (pre-collapse) distribution for a related "highest 7DMA by year-end" question and Polymarket's own sibling-market history were available.

YES means: IMF PortWatch publishes a Strait of Hormuz 7-day moving average of "Arrivals of Ships" (transit calls) at or above 60 on at least one date between now and December 31, 2026. - [2026-09-23] Iran handed US envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner a written roadmap proposing a road map for a regionwide ceasefire of up to 60 days, a phased reopening of Hormuz, an end to the US blockade of Iran and a halt to attacks on Arab neighbours , mediated by Qatar, Pakistan and Egypt — an active, high-level channel that is the only realistic trigger for a fast reopening. - [2026-09-25] Iran separately floated a faster variant: Iran has sent a new proposal to Washington that it would reopen the Strait of Hormuz and resume talks on its nuclear program in seven days if the US lifted its naval blockade, waived oil sanctions and observed a ceasefire that includes Lebanon — showing Tehran itself is now floating single-digit-day reopening timelines, not months. - [2026-09-30] Crude actually moving through the strait has already rebounded to pre-war scale by volume: the rebound is uneven as refined product shipments from the Middle East remain constrained; crude transiting Hormuz reached a seven-day average of 13.5 million barrels per day as of Monday, which matches a prewar baseline for shipments through the strait, according to data published Wednesday by Kpler . - [2026-10-01] That volume recovery is recent and steep: from a rough average of about 6 million to 8 million barrels of oil a day in the middle of September, average weekly flows are now nearly double, or about 13.5 million barrels a day, according to shipping firm Kpler — a doubling in roughly two weeks shows the underlying physical capacity to scale quickly exists. - [2026-10-02] US military tracking (not AIS-dependent) shows far more ships moving than PortWatch registers: the JMIC noted that independent tracking data indicated single-digit numbers transiting in both directions, while US NCAGS data indicated traffic flows averaging approximately 30 vessel transits per day for the last 96 hours , and separately US Central Command saying thousands of ships and 1 billion barrels of oil have passed though the waterway in recent months — implying the "floor" visible to AIS-based PortWatch could leap sharply if vessels resume broadcasting. - [2026-09-30] The gap between physical flow and AIS-visible counts is explicitly a transponder-switching phenomenon, not a hard capacity limit: more than 70% of the crude oil that crossed Hormuz in August switched tankers off the coast of the United Arab Emirates or Oman, according to Kpler — meaning a change in operator behavior (e.g., post-ceasefire confidence to broadcast AIS) rather than new ship supply is the main missing ingredient for a PortWatch jump. - [2026-09-25] A precedent for abrupt inflection exists: after the earlier June 17 memorandum of understanding and blockade lift, armedconflicts.org notes the US lifted its naval blockade on 18 June 2026 and tanker traffic rebounded to about 20 transits on 19 June — the most since early June , showing the 7DMA can move within a single day of a deal taking effect, even though that episode later relapsed. - [2026-09-29] Market-based confirmation that oil traders see de-escalation progressing: Kpler-sourced reporting states crude exports reached an estimated 16.328 million barrels per day (bpd) in September – their highest level since the war began in late February... Middle East crude exports have recovered to just less than 80 percent of their pre-war level . - [2026-10-01] Saudi Arabia's pivot of volumes into Hormuz (after Red Sea pipeline attacks) further swells the physical traffic base from which an AIS-compliant subset could be drawn: Saudi shipments through Hormuz jumped to 2.58 million barrels per day in September from around one million bpd in August, giving the kingdom 43 per cent of the strait's oil traffic... The increase came as flows through the Bab Al Mandeb strait more than halved . - [2026-10-02] The diplomatic track remains live, not collapsed, with both sides still exchanging formal counter-proposals as of this week per the Sept 23 roadmap reporting, leaving roughly three full months (Oct–Dec) for a deal to be struck and for a post-deal AIS-visibility surge (as seen in June) to push the 7DMA over 60 for even a single qualifying day, which is all the resolution criteria require. BOTTOM LINE: The strongest YES path is not gradual organic traffic growth but a step-change: a finalized ceasefire/reopening deal (the Sept 23 roadmap) coinciding with tankers switching AIS back on, since physical throughput (NCAGS ~30/day, Kpler crude volumes near pre-war levels) already appears far above the ~3 reported by AIS-dependent PortWatch; precedent (June 2026) shows such jumps can occur within a day of a deal, and three months remain for it to happen and hold for a 7-day window. NOT FOUND: No confirmed signed agreement, reopening date, or any AIS-visible transit count approaching double digits (let alone 60) as of October 2, 2026; could not access CNBC's full Sept 30 article or any PortWatch-direct figure beyond September 27 to see if a post-roadmap uptick has yet begun.

YES means: IMF PortWatch publishes a 7-day moving average of "Arrivals of Ships" (transit calls) for the Strait of Hormuz at or above 60 on at least one date between market creation and December 31, 2026. - [2026-05-21] The UAE's state-owned oil company (ADNOC) estimates full flows through Hormuz will not resume until 2027, even if a deal is reached quickly — an industry-insider forecast that post-dates the market's May 11 open and implicitly rules out a sustained 60/day reading by Dec 31, since "full flows" is a far higher bar than the 60 threshold yet is itself not expected until after year-end. - [2026-09-26] Trump explicitly rejected Iran's latest reopening offer, telling aides via WSJ reporting that he views renewed U.S. bombing after the midterm elections as likely , meaning the diplomatic track that would need to precede any traffic recovery is stalled, not advancing, with escalation risk rising into November-December. - [2026-09-25] Even Iran's own rejected proposal only promised reopening "within seven days" after a deal — i.e., no deal currently exists, and Trump rejected Iran's seven-day proposal to reopen the Strait of Hormuz and enter a ceasefire, and said he's considering renewed military strikes against the country after the midterm elections , so the fastest plausible path to a reopening announcement is now pushed past the November 3 midterms at the earliest. - [2026-10-01] Trump reiterated that escalation, not de-escalation, is the live option: the US president rejected a recent proposal from Iran that would have reopened the Strait of Hormuz in exchange for US concessions such as ending a blockade on Iranian ports or easing oil sanctions , confirming there is no agreement on the table as of two days before this report. - [2026-10-01/10-02] Physical attacks on shipping continue even where some traffic exists: September saw at least 16 attacks on vessels in the Strait, primarily tankers, including four incidents in a 24-hour period on 28 and 29 September , and a further tanker fire was reported October 1 — an active-conflict pattern incompatible with normalized AIS-visible commercial transits reaching 60/day. - [2026-10-02] Even the most optimistic current flow claims are well under the PortWatch-measured pattern needed: JMIC/NCAGS data cited by Seatrade show independent tracking data indicated single-digit numbers transiting in both directions, while US NCAGS data indicated traffic flows averaging approximately 30 vessel transits per day for the last 96 hours — the higher, non-AIS NCAGS estimate (30/day) is still only half the 60-threshold, and PortWatch's own AIS-based count remains near 1-3/day. - [2026-09-23 proposal] Iran's own best-case diplomatic roadmap (cited in colleagues' Oct 2 note) envisions only a "phased reopening," not an immediate jump to normal: a seven-day plan aimed at ending the conflict contemplates sequencing, not an instant 20x surge in transit calls. - [2026-06-08] History shows reopenings have already failed once under materially better conditions than today: the June 17 MOU reopens — 25 transits recorded, blockade officially lifted... Traffic hits a two-month high with 25 transits according to AXSMarine , yet even that post-deal peak (25) was still far below 60, and the deal collapsed within weeks — showing that even a signed, implemented agreement has not historically been sufficient to reach the threshold. - [2026-09-04] A parliamentary research briefing confirms independent trade-data corroboration of the crisis depth, noting shipping levels through the strait remain very low even under the conditional ceasefire framework that has existed intermittently since spring. - [2026-09-23/2026-10-02] A regionwide ceasefire roadmap under discussion (cited by colleagues, Modern Diplomacy) itself proposes "up to 60 days" for phased elements, meaning even if talks resumed today a phased Hormuz reopening clause would likely not reach full normalization before Dec 31 given the compressed ~90-day remaining window. - [2026-10-02] CENTCOM's narrative of success (claiming "thousands of ships and 1 billion barrels" transited in recent months) is directly disputed by continued attacks and by PortWatch's AIS-based near-zero counts, underscoring that even if political/military actors claim normalization, the specific AIS-derived PortWatch metric this market resolves on has shown no comparable improvement — a resolution-criteria technicality working against YES regardless of rhetoric. - [2026-10-02] With roughly 90 days left before the Dec 31 deadline and the current 7DMA near 1-3 (vs. the June 2026 post-deal peak of only ~25), the gap to 60 remains roughly 2-3x even the best historical post-ceasefire peak, and no new agreement, mine-clearance completion, or insurance-market normalization has been confirmed as of this report's date. BOTTOM LINE: Every available current indicator — Trump's rejection of Iran's reopening proposal, his stated expectation of renewed bombing after the midterms, continuing tanker attacks into October, PortWatch's own near-zero AIS counts, and ADNOC's own 2027 "full flows" estimate — points toward continued suppression of transit calls well below 60 through December 31, with no mechanism currently in motion that could plausibly deliver a sustained jump even to the June 2026 post-deal peak (~25), let alone 60. NOT FOUND: No confirmed signed reopening agreement, mine-clearance completion date, or insurance-market "all clear" as of October 2, 2026; no official IMF PortWatch chart/CSV figure newer than Sept 27 was accessible via direct fetch (secondary mirrors only).