Scan: Strait of Hormuz traffic returns to normal by October 31?

date	predicted	market price	confidence
2026-09-11	9%	8%	69%
2026-09-02	5%	10%	72%
2026-08-24	11%	16%	73%

1. Planner Fable 5.1 · picks the research tools

Tools chosen: polymarket_direct resolution_source polymarket_related kalshi_related article_search

Planner reasoning

This is a Polymarket question resolving on IMF Portwatch's Strait of Hormuz transit-call data, so polymarket_direct and resolution_source (the Portwatch page) are mandatory anchors. Cross-venue signals from Kalshi and other Polymarket Hormuz markets (different thresholds/dates) help triangulate the implied trajectory, and a targeted article_search for the latest reported Portwatch daily transit figures and shipping-insurer/war-risk status gives the specific numbers the general loops may miss.

2. Research parallel tool calls + 4 web research loops (Sonnet 5) · read raw by the forecasters

at a glance

RESEARCH DIGEST (built in code: tool summaries and each report's bottom line; the forecasters read the full tool outputs and reports) Tools - polymarket_direct: ## This Market's Polymarket Data **Strait of Hormuz traffic returns to normal by October 31?** - Current price (probability): 7.00% - 7-day price change: -0.50% - 30-day price change: -8.50% - Total volume: $758,055 (USD notional) - Price range: 5.50% - 22.50% - Data points: 43 days - resolution_source: already_resolved=unclear; matches_criteria=True; last_updated=unknown. The fetched page content is truncated/empty and only shows placeholder text ('chokepoint6'), providing no actual transit call figures or 7-day moving average data for the Strait of Hormuz. - polymarket_related: Polymarket search over 3 keyword(s), kept 24 matches. keyword 'Strait of Hormuz': 8 markets | keyword 'Hormuz transit': 8 markets | keyword 'Hormuz traffic': 8 markets - kalshi_related: 0 related markets / summaries. keyword 'Hormuz': no matches | keyword 'Strait of Hormuz shipping': no matches - article_search: Fetched 8 unique articles across 2 queries (lookback=14d). 'IMF PortWatch Strait of Hormuz daily transit calls 7-day average latest figure': 8 articles | 'Strait of Hormuz tanker transits per day war risk insurance reopening': 8 articles Research loops, bottom lines - current state: As of the latest confirmed IMF PortWatch data (8 transits/day, 7-day MA far below 60, as of 2026-09-13) and corroborating weekly vessel counts (14-36 vessels/weekend vs. a pre-crisis norm implying 60+/day), traffic remains at a small fraction of the 60-call threshold with no sign of an imminent reopening; Iran continues to declare the strait closed and attacks/incidents persist, making a jump to ≥60 by October 31 highly inconsistent with the current trajectory. - base rate: The reference class of near-identical monthly "return to normal (7DMA≥60)" markets has resolved NO every single time since the war began in February 2026 (April, May, June, July, August, mid-September, and late-September contracts all collapsed toward ~0-1% Yes), and even optimistic mid-2026 forecasts (Kalshi's 56-57% for Aug/Sep, Polymarket's 90.5% for year-end) proved badly wrong in the bullish direction, while current traffic (~5-20 vessels/day vs. baseline ~85-130) remains roughly 4-8x below - yes case: The single most credible route to YES is a fast, comprehensive US-Iran political settlement (building on the Islamabad MoU/Oman route framework, and possibly catalyzed by a Trump-Xi/UNGA diplomatic push) that both actually lifts Iran's restrictions and the US naval blockade, restoring commercial confidence enough to push the 7-day average from ~8 up to 60+ before October 31; precedent shows such deals can be announced within days once political will aligns, but each prior attempt (April, May, Ju - no case: All available evidence — the latest published PortWatch figures (~8/day vs. threshold of 60), independent ship-tracking data, continued attacks on tankers, Iran's declared closure, carrier rerouting postures, and the collapse of the two prior reopening frameworks — strongly supports a No resolution; market pricing (1-5% Yes on comparable near-term contracts) corroborates this.

tools

tool	status	time	items	summary
polymarket_direct	OK	0.3s	1	## This Market's Polymarket Data Strait of Hormuz traffic returns to normal by October 31? - Current price (probability): 7.00% - 7-day price change: -0.50% - 30-day price change: -8.50% - Total volume: $758,055 (USD notional) - Price range: 5.50% - 22.50% - Data points: 43 days
resolution_source	OK	2.9s	1	already_resolved=unclear; matches_criteria=True; last_updated=unknown. The fetched page content is truncated/empty and only shows placeholder text ('chokepoint6'), providing no actual transit call figures or 7-day moving average data for the Strait of Hormuz.
polymarket_related	OK	0.4s	24	Polymarket search over 3 keyword(s), kept 24 matches. keyword 'Strait of Hormuz': 8 markets \| keyword 'Hormuz transit': 8 markets \| keyword 'Hormuz traffic': 8 markets
kalshi_related	OK	1.9s	0	0 related markets / summaries. keyword 'Hormuz': no matches \| keyword 'Strait of Hormuz shipping': no matches
article_search	OK	0.5s	8	Fetched 8 unique articles across 2 queries (lookback=14d). 'IMF PortWatch Strait of Hormuz daily transit calls 7-day average latest figure': 8 articles \| 'Strait of Hormuz tanker transits per day war risk insurance reopening': 8 articles

research loops · 4/4 ok · 14 searches · 7 page reads

dimension	status	time	searches	page reads	report
current state	OK	26s	2	2	4602 chars
base rate	OK	42s	4	2	5577 chars
yes case	OK	34s	5	1	4833 chars
no case	OK	30s	3	2	4561 chars

report: current state

- [2026-09-13] The most recent IMF PortWatch data point cited across multiple sources shows the Strait of Hormuz recorded only 8 transits on that date, against a pre-crisis baseline of roughly 85 per day, far below the 60 threshold needed for "Yes." (https://straits.live/briefs/2026-09-22) - [2026-09-21] A total of 14 vessels transited the strait over the weekend, down from 36 the previous weekend, with 11 exiting and 3 entering; seven exiting vessels took the Iranian route. (https://www.thenationalnews.com/business/energy/2026/09/21/strait-of-hormuz-vessel-traffic-remains-thin-amid-middle-east-tensions/) - [2026-09-21] Iran's Parliament Speaker warned the strait would remain closed until Tehran's conditions are met, as US-Iran tensions escalate. (https://www.thenationalnews.com/business/energy/2026/09/21/strait-of-hormuz-vessel-traffic-remains-thin-amid-middle-east-tensions/) - [2026-09-21] US CENTCOM commander Adm Brad Cooper said momentum was building, noting primary transit lanes were clear of mines and thousands of ships had passed through, and that the US had assisted over 2,000 commercial ships with more than one billion barrels of crude moved since the crisis began — but this reflects cumulative escort activity, not current daily normal traffic. (https://www.thenationalnews.com/business/energy/2026/09/21/strait-of-hormuz-vessel-traffic-remains-thin-amid-middle-east-tensions/) - [2026-09-22] IMF PortWatch recorded 8 transits on 2026-09-13 against a pre-crisis baseline of 85/day; the strait remains a live operational hazard, with two seafarers injured when tankers were struck by projectiles, and an LPG tanker hit by debris from unknown projectiles. (https://straits.live/briefs/2026-09-22) - [2026-09-22] The closure picture is contested: gCaptain and TradeWinds News carry Iran's declaration that the strait is closed, while UA.NEWS reports 12 vessels crossed over the weekend. (https://straits.live/briefs/2026-09-22) - [2026-09-21] The Strait of Hormuz is effectively closed to commercial shipping, with 8 ships transiting on September 13 versus roughly 85/day normal. (https://straits.live/) - [2026-09-15] Traffic through the Strait of Hormuz is back down following a brief pick-up, per NBC News tracker updated Sept. 15, 2026. (https://www.nbcnews.com/data-graphics/strait-of-hormuz-ports-traffic-trump-us-iran-war-rcna331507) - [2026-04-10] Historical context: even during a two-week ceasefire in April, maritime traffic through Strait of Hormuz remained restricted, with industry estimates indicating traffic had dropped by nearly 95% compared to pre-crisis levels. (https://www.newsonair.gov.in/maritime-traffic-through-strait-of-hormuz-remains-restricted-despite-two-week-ceasefire-between-tehran-washington) - [2026-02-28] Background: shipping traffic through the Strait of Hormuz has been largely blocked by Iran since 28 February 2026, when the United States and Israel launched an air war against Iran. The crisis has continued essentially unbroken through September 2026, now in its seventh month. (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2026_Strait_of_Hormuz_crisis) - [2026-09-22] The official IMF PortWatch chokepoint6 page (resolution source) currently displays a banner noting due to the ongoing conflict in the region, there are reports of GPS jamming, AIS spoofing, and vessels going dark, urging users to use the data with care. This flags potential data quality/measurement issues affecting the transit-call count itself. (https://portwatch.imf.org/pages/chokepoint6) - [2026-09-20] The Strait of Hormuz remains effectively closed to commercial traffic, with Iran maintaining its position that no reopening will occur until Washington meets its conditions. (https://straits.live/briefs/2026-09-20) BOTTOM LINE: As of the latest confirmed IMF PortWatch data (8 transits/day, 7-day MA far below 60, as of 2026-09-13) and corroborating weekly vessel counts (14-36 vessels/weekend vs. a pre-crisis norm implying 60+/day), traffic remains at a small fraction of the 60-call threshold with no sign of an imminent reopening; Iran continues to declare the strait closed and attacks/incidents persist, making a jump to ≥60 by October 31 highly inconsistent with the current trajectory. NOT FOUND: The exact, dated numeric IMF PortWatch 7-day moving average time series for dates after 2026-09-13 (the official CSV/chart could not be rendered via fetch, only cached references to the 2026-09-13 value of 8 were found); no official IMF PortWatch bulletin or ceasefire/reopening announcement dated within the last 14 days was found.

report: base rate

- [2026-05-04] Early in the crisis, prediction markets (Kalshi) were far too optimistic: traders gave a 57% chance traffic in the strait would return to normal by September 1, with odds for August hovering around 56% . Both thresholds were missed, showing markets/forecasters have systematically overestimated recovery speed for this exact "7DMA ≥ 60" reference class. https://www.cnbc.com/2026/05/04/strait-of-hormuz-traffic-disrupted-until-september-kalshi-traders-say.html - [2026-05-08] A RAND Forecasting Initiative brief noted the 7DMA averaged 93.7 across 2025, reached 107.3 on 24 February 2026 just before the disruption, fell to a low of 2.7 in late March 2026, and stood at 12.0 on 19 April 2026 — illustrating how far and how fast the metric collapsed from baseline, and how slowly it has crept back. https://www.randforecastinginitiative.org/question_queue/questions/1767-what-will-be-the-highest-7-day-moving-average-of-daily-transit-calls-arrivals-of-ships-at-the-strait-of-hormuz-as-reported-by-imf-portwatch-for-any-date-between-8-may-2026-and-31-december-2026 - [2026-06-18] At an earlier optimistic peak (tied to a short-lived June ceasefire/MOU), the December 31 "normal by" Polymarket market spiked to 90.5% for normalized traffic by year-end, reflecting trader consensus that logistical hurdles would be resolved well before December 31 — a forecast that proved far too bullish once the reopening broke down in July. https://polymarket.com/event/strait-of-hormuz-traffic-returns-to-normal-by-december-31 - [2026-07-30] A market tracker summarized the pattern of repeated false dawns: a US-Iran ceasefire in early April and a memorandum of understanding in mid-June reopened it toll-free from around 17 June, though traffic stayed well below normal; the strait closed, reopened, then effectively closed again , with the June agreement breaking down in early July after attacks on vessels. https://carraglobe.com/strait-of-hormuz-closure-2026/ - [2026-08-27] By late August, Al Jazeera reported traffic through the chokepoint had fallen from more than 100 vessels a day to just five , underscoring that even after ~6 months, no sustained recovery toward the 60-threshold had occurred. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/8/27/how-a-95-percent-drop-in-hormuz-traffic-changed-global-shipping - [2026-09-01] A market-analytics summary noted daily vessel transits remained in the single digits as of September 1, 2026, significantly below the 10-day average of approximately 14 vessels , and cited EIA expectations of only slow, limited increases into 2027. https://www.octagonai.co/markets/commodities/oil/strait-of-hormuz-traffic-returns-to-normal-by - [2026-09-01] Analysts quoted by Al Jazeera observed that even with modest partial recovery to ~130 ships/day over parts of August, this remained well below pre-war baseline, with Iran retaining "significant capacity to disrupt maritime traffic" despite growing use of alternative logistics. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/8/20/are-hormuz-ships-more-willing-to-defy-iran-or-the-us-what-data-shows - [2026-09-17] The immediately-preceding Polymarket contract, "...by September 30," traded around 1% Yes with commentary that commodity traffic sat at roughly 6% of pre-crisis norms, averaging just 5–17 vessels versus the typical 70-plus, with only three AIS-visible crossings on September 16 — this contract subsequently expired/was tracking toward No. https://polymarket.com/event/strait-of-hormuz-traffic-returns-to-normal-by-september-30-20260702154339440 - [2026-09-22] The prior monthly contracts in this same series ("by April 30," "by end of May," "by June 30," "by July 31," "by August 31," "by September 15," "by September 30") all trended toward and settled near 0-1% Yes as their deadlines approached, establishing an unbroken base-rate track record of "No" resolutions for this specific reference class since the war began in February 2026. https://polymarket.com/event/strait-of-hormuz-traffic-returns-to-normal-by-october-31-20260810151043583 - [2026-09-22] Live independent tracker straits.live recorded IMF PortWatch recording 8 transits on 2026-09-13 against a pre-crisis baseline of 85 per day , consistent with continued severe suppression well under the 60-threshold. https://straits.live/ - [2026-09-22] The current "by October 31" market itself prices Yes at 7%, with its own market-context commentary stating recent tracking shows averages near 20% of that baseline amid ongoing U.S.-Iran kinetic exchanges, mine risks, GPS interference, and selective routing requirements , deeming rapid normalization "improbable." https://polymarket.com/event/strait-of-hormuz-traffic-returns-to-normal-by-october-31-20260810151043583 BOTTOM LINE: The reference class of near-identical monthly "return to normal (7DMA≥60)" markets has resolved NO every single time since the war began in February 2026 (April, May, June, July, August, mid-September, and late-September contracts all collapsed toward ~0-1% Yes), and even optimistic mid-2026 forecasts (Kalshi's 56-57% for Aug/Sep, Polymarket's 90.5% for year-end) proved badly wrong in the bullish direction, while current traffic (~5-20 vessels/day vs. baseline ~85-130) remains roughly 4-8x below the required threshold with only ~5-6 weeks left. NOT FOUND: No systematic academic/statistical base-rate study of "chokepoint traffic recovery times after conflict" was found; could not find an explicit historical precedent (e.g., 1980s Tanker War) with comparable IMF PortWatch-style daily transit data for cross-era comparison.

report: yes case

- [2026-09-13] IMF PortWatch recorded 8 daily transits at the Strait of Hormuz, against a pre-crisis baseline of ~85/day, showing the metric is far below the 60 threshold needed for YES: "IMF PortWatch recorded 8 transits on 2026-09-13 against a pre-crisis baseline of 85 per day." (https://straits.live/briefs/2026-09-20) - [2026-09-09] Reuters/ship-tracking data showed shipping through the Strait of Hormuz fell to seven vessel transits on September 9, down from 12 a day earlier and half the 10-day average of 14 , with the pre-war baseline noted at about 125 large commercial vessels a day (https://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/iran/2026/09/iran-260910-rferl05.htm). - [2026-09-16] The most plausible YES pathway is a negotiated reopening: Iran's FM Araghchi told China's Wang Yi that "the authorities of Iran and Oman have reached an agreement on a plan to reopen the Strait of Hormuz to shipping," and that "Iran has already agreed with Oman on a plan to reopen the Strait of Hormuz." (https://tass.com/world/2188349) - [2026-09-13] However, Iran explicitly downplayed this as a reopening trigger: an understanding with Oman "in no way means the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz," with Iran's condition being "the return of the United States to its commitments under the Islamabad memorandum." (https://en.mehrnews.com/news/247709/Oman-deal-will-not-mean-reopening-of-Hormuz-Araghchi) - [2026-09-16] China is pushing diplomacy ahead of a Trump-Xi summit: Wang Yi urged the opening of the Strait of Hormuz "at an early date" and urged Tehran and Washington to rebuild the negotiation mechanism and return to the Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding. (https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/iran-war-oprep.htm) - [2026-09-21] Diplomatic momentum continues ahead of UNGA: Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian will lead an Iranian delegation at the United Nations General Assembly in New York, amid renewed hopes for a diplomatic solution to the Middle East conflict. (https://www.cnbc.com/2026/09/21/us-iran-war-trump-hormuz.html) - [2026-05-28] A precedent exists for rapid, negotiated reopening announcements: in May 2026 US and Iranian negotiators reached a tentative deal to extend a fragile ceasefire in the three-month conflict by 60 days, reopen the Strait of Hormuz and establish a framework for broader talks on Tehran's nuclear program. Such deals materialized before but broke down (https://thehill.com/policy/international/5900355-us-iran-ceasefire-extension-deal/). - [2026-04-08] Similarly, in April 2026 Iran and the US agreed a ceasefire explicitly tied to Hormuz: the Secretary of War Pete Hegseth "reinforc[ed] that the Strait of Hormuz is now open and commerce will flow," under terms where "the US and Israel have agreed to suspend the bombing Iran for a period of two weeks, provided that Tehran ensures the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz." This shows that a political deal could, in principle, quickly restore high transit volumes if both sides comply (https://www.newsonair.gov.in/us-says-strait-of-hormuz-set-to-open-for-commercial-shipping). - [2026-09-21] Despite diplomatic talk, Eurasia Group analysts assess "Iran's leadership will stick with resistance... as Tehran seeks to use military proxies and tanker attacks to keep a chokehold on shipping flows," and that Tehran has insisted it would not reopen the Strait of Hormuz until Washington fulfills its commitments under the June memorandum (https://www.cnbc.com/2026/09/21/us-iran-war-trump-hormuz.html). - [2026-09-18] Iran's diplomatic tone has softened somewhat: "the Iranian response on the diplomatic channel ran toward dialogue and away from confrontation," with Araghchi in Beijing claiming Iran has agreed a plan with Oman to reopen the Strait of Hormuz—though "no Omani official has yet confirmed" this. (https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/iran-war-oprep.htm) BOTTOM LINE: The single most credible route to YES is a fast, comprehensive US-Iran political settlement (building on the Islamabad MoU/Oman route framework, and possibly catalyzed by a Trump-Xi/UNGA diplomatic push) that both actually lifts Iran's restrictions and the US naval blockade, restoring commercial confidence enough to push the 7-day average from ~8 up to 60+ before October 31; precedent shows such deals can be announced within days once political will aligns, but each prior attempt (April, May, July) failed to sustain a real traffic rebound, and Iran has explicitly stated the Oman routing deal does not equal reopening. NOT FOUND: No confirmation that Oman has agreed to jointly manage the Strait; no IMF PortWatch data point since 2026-09-13 was found (most recent verified figure is 8 transits); no evidence of any 7-day MA approaching 60 at any point during the current crisis since February 2026.

report: no case

- [2026-09-22] Live tracker straits.live reports the Strait is "Effectively no, it is closed to commercial shipping as of 21 September 2026. 8 ships transited on September 13 vs ~85/day normal." This is roughly 9% of the pre-crisis baseline, vastly below the 60 threshold needed to resolve Yes. https://straits.live/ - [2026-09-13] Most recent officially cited IMF PortWatch reading: "IMF PortWatch recorded 8 transits on 2026-09-13 against a pre-crisis baseline of 85 per day." This is the latest available PortWatch data point referenced by trackers, still far under 60. https://straits.live/ - [2026-09-22] Independent prediction markets are pricing this outcome as very unlikely: the Polymarket "returns to normal by September 30" contract sits at 1%, and Kalshi's "above 60 before November 1, 2026" contract is priced around 5%, both far below breakeven for Yes. https://straits.live/ - [2026-09-10] Reuters-sourced reporting states "Shipping through the Strait of Hormuz fell to seven vessel transits on September 9, down from 12 a day earlier and half the 10-day average of 14" , confirming persistently depressed traffic in the weeks just before the question's evaluation window even opened widely. https://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/iran/2026/09/iran-260910-rferl05.htm - [2026-09-03] Al Jazeera reported multiple independent maritime-data providers showing very low transits: Kpler counted "just six vessels crossed the strait on Wednesday, 11 on Tuesday and five on Monday," putting "the 10-day average at 13 vessels per day" , with the Joint Maritime Information Center describing traffic as "far below baseline," despite a "modest uptick from recent lows" . https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/9/3/how-much-oil-is-going-through-hormuz-how-data-doesnt-match-us-claims - [2026-09-13] Iran's Foreign Minister said "the U.S. must adhere to its 'commitments under the Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding' before Tehran would allow the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz to commercial shipping," and separately that "The memorandum was considered defunct by all sides before its expiration last month amid renewed fighting between the U.S. and Iran." This shows the last major diplomatic reopening framework has already collapsed. https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2026/sep/13/iranian-foreign-minister-us-must-abide-ceasefire-deal-strait-hormuz/ - [2026-09-21/22] Active kinetic incidents continue: UKMTO reported an LPG tanker was struck by debris from unknown projectiles, injuring two seafarers, and gCaptain/TradeWinds reported additional tanker attacks and Iran's declared closure of the strait — indicating no operational normalization is imminent. https://straits.live/ - [2026-09] Major container carriers (MSC, Maersk, CMA CGM, Hapag-Lloyd, COSCO, ONE, Evergreen, HMM, Yang Ming) remain in rerouting/suspended posture around the Cape of Good Hope rather than resuming normal Hormuz transits, per carrier advisories compiled by the tracker. https://straits.live/ - [Historical pattern] Two prior ceasefire/reopening announcements (April 8 two-week truce, and the May-June "Islamabad" 60-day MOU) both promised reopening of the strait but traffic "remained far below pre-war levels" after each, and both frameworks subsequently broke down, illustrating a repeated failure pattern for reopening pledges. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/4/7/trump-suspends-iran-bombing-for-two-weeks-following-dire-threats , https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2026/sep/13/iranian-foreign-minister-us-must-abide-ceasefire-deal-strait-hormuz/ - [Deadline arithmetic] With PortWatch publishing weekly on a lag (readings as of mid-September only reaching ~8 transits/day, roughly 13% of the 60 threshold), traffic would need an almost sevenfold increase sustained over a full week to hit the 60 threshold before October 31 — a magnitude of recovery not seen even during the brief April/June ceasefire windows. BOTTOM LINE: All available evidence — the latest published PortWatch figures (~8/day vs. threshold of 60), independent ship-tracking data, continued attacks on tankers, Iran's declared closure, carrier rerouting postures, and the collapse of the two prior reopening frameworks — strongly supports a No resolution; market pricing (1-5% Yes on comparable near-term contracts) corroborates this. NOT FOUND: The exact IMF PortWatch downloadable CSV value for dates after September 13, 2026, and any confirmed post-September-22 diplomatic breakthrough that would materially change the trajectory before October 31, 2026.

3. Forecasters 5 draws · Fable 5.1 + GPT-5.6 Sol · plain mean

claude-fable-5-1

72% conf

Yes	5%
No	95%

(0) Resolution check: the resolution source page could not be rendered, but every secondary read of IMF PortWatch puts the most recent 7-day MA in the single digits (8 transits on 2026-09-13 vs. a ~85-107 pre-crisis baseline); no source shows any date since market creation with a 7DMA ≥60, so the condition is not met and would require a roughly seven-fold, week-sustained surge in transits. (a) About 5.5 weeks remain until October 31, with PortWatch publishing on a lag. (b) Status quo: Iran declares the strait closed, tankers are still being struck (UKMTO incidents Sept 21-22), container carriers remain rerouted via the Cape, and weekend counts fell from 36 to 14 vessels — nothing changes and this resolves No. (c) NO scenario: UNGA/Beijing diplomacy produces talk but no comprehensive US-Iran deal, or a deal is announced but, as in April and June, traffic recovers only to 10-30/day because insurers and carriers hold back; the 7DMA never approaches 60. (d) YES scenario: a rapid, comprehensive settlement (Islamabad MoU revival plus lifting of the US blockade, catalyzed by Trump-Xi/UNGA) is fully implemented within days, escorts and insurers return en masse, and PortWatch records a 60+ 7DMA by late October — but even the April ceasefire only reached a 7DMA of 12 and the June reopening never hit 60, so this is a low-probability tail. The Polymarket anchor is 7% and Kalshi's equivalent 'above 60 before Nov 1' sits near 5%; every prior monthly contract in this series has resolved No, and markets have historically been too bullish on recovery speed, so I shade slightly below the anchor to 5%.

claude-fable-5-1

72% conf

Yes	5%
No	95%

(0) Not resolved: the latest cited IMF PortWatch reading is ~8 transits/day on 2026-09-13 (7DMA far below 60), and independent trackers (Reuters/Kpler, The National) show 5–17 vessels/day through 21 September; the resolution-source fetch returned no data, but every secondary read of it is consistent. (a) About 5.5 weeks remain to October 31, and PortWatch publishes on a lag, so a deal would realistically need to land by mid-October and then produce ~60/day sustained for a full week. (b) Status quo is No: Iran declares the strait closed, tankers are still being struck (UKMTO 21–22 Sept), major carriers remain on Cape routing, and the Islamabad MoU framework is defunct. (c) NO scenario: the standoff persists through UNGA/Trump-Xi diplomacy with traffic stuck in the 5–20/day range, or a partial deal (Oman routing) produces only a modest uptick, exactly as the April and June ceasefires did—traffic never approached 60 even during those windows, and every prior monthly contract in this series (April through September 30) resolved No. (d) YES scenario: a comprehensive US–Iran settlement in the next 2–3 weeks that lifts both Iran's restrictions and the US blockade, with insurers and carriers rushing back fast enough to push the 7DMA over 60 before month-end; this requires a speed of recovery with no precedent in this crisis, plus PortWatch's AIS-spoofing/dark-vessel banner means counts may understate real traffic. Anchoring on the Polymarket price of 7% (Kalshi analogue ~5%) and adjusting slightly down for the seven-fold gap, the one-week-average requirement, the publication lag, and the unbroken No track record, I land at 5%.

claude-fable-5-1

72% conf

Yes	5%
No	95%

(0) Not resolved: the latest cited IMF PortWatch reading is 8 transits on 2026-09-13 against a 60 threshold, and independent trackers (Reuters/Kpler, The National) show 5–17 vessels/day through 9/21, so the 7DMA is roughly an order of magnitude below 60; the resolution-source fetch returned no data but nothing in the research suggests any reading near 60 since February. (a) About 5.5 weeks remain until the October 31 data date, with PortWatch publishing on a lag. (b) Status quo: Iran declares the strait closed, tankers are still being struck (UKMTO 9/21-22), carriers remain on Cape routing, and the 7DMA stays in the single/low double digits — a NO. (c) NO scenario: UNGA/Beijing diplomacy produces talk but no US return to the Islamabad MoU; Iran maintains selective closure and traffic drifts at 10–20/day. (d) YES scenario: a rapid comprehensive US-Iran settlement (Oman routing plan plus lifting of US blockade) in late September/early October, followed by a sevenfold traffic surge sustained for a week — but neither the April nor June ceasefires produced anything close to 60 (RAND: 7DMA 12.0 on 4/19), and every prior monthly contract in this series resolved NO. Anchoring on Polymarket's 7% (Kalshi comparable ~5%), I shade slightly lower given the unbroken NO track record and the mechanical difficulty of a 7x jump in a 7-day average within the window, keeping a small tail for a surprise deal and PortWatch measurement noise (AIS spoofing warning).

gpt-5.6-sol

73% conf

Yes	6%
No	94%

(0) The resolving condition is not documented as already met: the official IMF PortWatch page could not be rendered, while the latest cited PortWatch observation was only 8 transits on September 13 versus the required 7-day average of 60. (a) About 39 days remain until October 31, although publication lag and the rules’ 14-day grace period may delay final resolution. (b) If nothing changes, continuing single-digit or low-teens traffic makes No the status quo outcome. (c) No results if the conflict, Iranian restrictions, tanker attacks, carrier rerouting, and insurance risks persist, or if another nominal ceasefire fails to restore sustained traffic as earlier April and June arrangements did. (d) Yes requires a rapid US-Iran settlement and operational reopening soon enough for commercial traffic to rise roughly sevenfold and remain high for a full week; the reported Oman framework and diplomatic activity provide a narrow pathway, but Iran has said that framework does not itself mean reopening. I anchor on Polymarket’s 7% Yes price and move slightly lower to 6% because every prior monthly contract in this series has failed, current traffic remains drastically below threshold, and recent attacks continue, while retaining material uncertainty because the official post-September-13 PortWatch series is unavailable.

gpt-5.6-sol

78% conf

Yes	6%
No	94%

(0) The condition is not shown as already met: the official IMF PortWatch page could not be numerically read, while the latest cited PortWatch observation was only 8 transits on September 13 and no evidence shows a 7-day average of at least 60 since the market opened. (a) About 39 days remain until October 31, after which the rules allow up to 14 days for publication of final-period data. (b) If conditions remain unchanged, traffic stays far below 60 and the market resolves No. (c) The No scenario is continued US-Iran conflict, tanker attacks, carrier avoidance, and failure of diplomatic frameworks, leaving traffic around the recent 5–17 daily range. (d) The Yes scenario requires a prompt and credible US-Iran settlement, followed by enough commercial confidence and operational reopening to sustain roughly 60 daily PortWatch calls for a full week before the deadline. I anchor near Polymarket's 7% Yes price and move slightly lower because every earlier monthly contract in this series failed, the latest traffic is about one-seventh of the threshold, and prior reopening agreements did not produce sustained normalization. The unreadable current PortWatch series and possible AIS/GPS measurement problems prevent greater certainty and leave some chance that a diplomatic breakthrough or qualifying publication occurs.

4. Final plain mean of 5 draws

5% (73% confidence)

Yes: 5% No: 95%

Mean of 5 draws (0.05, 0.05, 0.05, 0.06, 0.06). (0) Resolution check: the resolution source page could not be rendered, but every secondary read of IMF PortWatch puts the most recent 7-day MA in the single digits (8 transits on 2026-09-13 vs. a ~85-107 pre-crisis baseline); no source shows any date since market creation with a 7DMA ≥60, so the condition is not met and would require a roughly seven-fold, week-sustained surge in transits. (a) About 5.5 weeks remain until October 31, with PortWatch publishing on a lag. (b) Status quo: Iran declares the strait closed, tankers are still being struck (UKMTO incidents Sept 21-22), container carriers remain rerouted via the Cape, and weekend counts fell from 36 to 14 vessels — nothing changes and this resolves No. (c) NO scenario: UNGA/Beijing diplomacy produces talk but no comprehensive US-Iran deal, or a deal is announced but, as in April and June, traffic recovers only to 10-30/day because insurers and carriers hold back; the 7DMA never approaches 60. (d) YES scenario: a rapid, comprehensive settlement (Islamabad MoU revival plus lifting of the US blockade, catalyzed by Trump-Xi/UNGA) is fully implemented within days, escorts and insurers return en masse, and PortWatch records a 60+ 7DMA by late October — but even the April ceasefire only reached a 7DMA of 12 and the June reopening never hit 60, so this is a low-probability tail. The Polymarket anchor is 7% and Kalshi's equivalent 'above 60 before Nov 1' sits near 5%; every prior monthly contract in this series has resolved No, and markets have historically been too bullish on recovery speed, so I shade slightly below the anchor to 5%.

Pipeline Timing

Total pipeline time: 76.4s

Per-tool research timings shown in the Research section above.