Scan: Strait of Hormuz traffic returns to normal by November 30?

date	predicted	market price	confidence
2026-08-30	9%	18%	72%
2026-08-23	15%	22%	63%

1. Planner Fable 5.1 · Fermi decomposition + tool plan

Tools chosen: polymarket_direct resolution_source polymarket_related kalshi_related article_search claude_news gdelt_news wikipedia code_execution

Sub-questions (Fermi decomposition)

What is the most recent 7-day moving average of transit calls for the Strait of Hormuz published on IMF Portwatch, what is its recent trend, and what was the pre-disruption baseline (typical daily transits)?
What caused the current collapse in Hormuz traffic (military conflict, Iranian closure/blockade, mines, attacks on shipping, insurance withdrawal), and when did it begin?
What is the status of de-escalation efforts — ceasefire, US-Iran negotiations, UN or Gulf-state mediation, naval escort/convoy operations, mine-clearing — that would allow commercial traffic to resume before November 30, 2026?
Have major shipping lines, tanker operators, or war-risk insurers announced resumption or continued suspension of Hormuz transits, and at what daily transit rate is traffic currently running versus the 60 threshold?
How quickly did traffic recover in comparable episodes (Hormuz after the June 2025 Israel-Iran war, Red Sea/Bab el-Mandeb after Houthi attacks, Suez after Ever Given), i.e., what is the base rate for a chokepoint returning to ~50%+ of normal within 3-4 months?
What do related prediction markets (Iran ceasefire, US-Iran deal, Hormuz closure/reopening, oil price) on Polymarket and Kalshi imply about the probability of reopening by year-end?
Are there any IMF Portwatch data-publication lags or methodology issues (e.g., AIS spoofing/dark shipping undercounting) that could keep the reported figure below 60 even if physical traffic recovers?

Planner reasoning

This market resolves on a specific numeric threshold (7-day MA of Hormuz transit calls >= 60 on IMF Portwatch) during a period when traffic is evidently disrupted, likely by a US/Israel-Iran conflict or Iranian closure. The key drivers are the current level and trend of the Portwatch series, the political/military trajectory (ceasefire, reopening, mine clearance, insurance), and historical recovery speeds after comparable chokepoint disruptions. The Polymarket price is the primary anchor, with cross-checks from related Hormuz/Iran markets on both venues.

2. Research Parallel tool calls

tool	status	time	items	summary
polymarket_direct	OK	0.2s	1	## This Market's Polymarket Data Strait of Hormuz traffic returns to normal by November 30? - Current price (probability): 11.50% - 7-day price change: +0.00% - 30-day price change: -9.50% - Total volume: $380,318 (USD notional) - Price range: 10.00% - 30.50% - Data points: 41 days
resolution_source	OK	3.3s	1	already_resolved=unclear; matches_criteria=True; last_updated=unknown. The fetched page content is truncated/empty beyond a placeholder label 'chokepoint6', providing no actual transit call figures or 7-day moving average data for the Strait of Hormuz.
polymarket_related	OK	0.5s	20	Polymarket search over 4 keyword(s), kept 20 matches. keyword 'Strait of Hormuz': 5 markets \| keyword 'Iran ceasefire': 5 markets \| keyword 'Iran deal': 5 markets \| keyword 'Hormuz': 5 markets
kalshi_related	OK	5.1s	0	0 related markets / summaries. keyword 'Hormuz': no matches \| keyword 'Iran ceasefire': no matches \| keyword 'Iran': no matches
article_search	OK	1.0s	20	Fetched 20 unique articles across 4 queries (lookback=45d). 'Strait of Hormuz shipping traffic tankers transit': 10 articles \| 'Iran Strait of Hormuz closure blockade': 10 articles \| 'Iran ceasefire negotiations Hormuz reopening': 10 articles \| 'war risk insurance Gulf tankers Hormuz resume': 10 art
claude_news	OK	23.0s	15	## Findings: Strait of Hormuz Traffic Status (as of Sept 20, 2026) Cause of collapse: - Shipping traffic through the Strait of Hormuz has been largely blocked by Iran since 28 February 2026, when the United States and Israel launched an air war against Iran. In retaliation, the IRGC issued w
gdelt_news	OK	178.4s	10	GDELT: 10 articles across 3 queries (lookback=30d). 'Strait of Hormuz shipping': 10 hits \| 'Hormuz tanker traffic': error GDELT rate-limited after retries (429) \| 'Iran Hormuz reopen': error GDELT rate-limited after retries (429)
wikipedia	OK	0.4s	3	Fetched 3 Wikipedia entries (0 missing pages).
code_execution	OK	45.2s	0	## Model Setup - Threshold for "normal" defined as ≥60 transit calls/day (~50% of 110–130 baseline midpoint ~120), current 7‑day MA assumed X=20 calls/day. - Ramp‑to‑reopen model: once reopened, traffic rises linearly from X to 70% of baseline (~84 calls/day) over a 2–6 week window;

3. Evidence Brief Sonnet 5 · 7267 chars

# Current state Strait of Hormuz has been effectively closed since 2026-02-28 (US/Israel strikes on Iran); IMF Portwatch 7-day MA transit calls were ~8 on 2026-09-13 vs a ~85-130/day pre-war baseline — roughly 90%+ below normal and far below the 60 threshold needed for this market to resolve Yes. Resolution requires the Portwatch 7-day MA to hit ≥60 on ANY day before Nov 30, 2026; as of the latest data (mid-to-late Sept 2026) no path to that level is visible, and multiple ceasefire/reopening attempts have already failed. # Timeline of key events - 2026-02-28: US/Israel launch war on Iran; Iran (IRGC) begins blockading Hormuz, attacking ships, laying mines (confirmed — Wikipedia, CNBC). - 2026-04-17: Iran FM announces "reopening"; vessel surge reverses, only ~13 tankers actually transit (reported — claude_news). - 2026-04/07: US imposes naval blockade on Iran (confirmed — NPR). - 2026-06 (mid): US-Iran MOU signed to halt war/reopen strait (confirmed — NPR, CNN). - 2026-07: Conflict resumes; Iran attacks ships not registered with its "Persian Gulf Strait Authority"; MOU collapses (confirmed — CNN, NPR). - 2026-07-08: Kalshi traders price ~43% Yes by Dec 1, 2026; 52% by Jan 1, 2027 (reported — CNBC). - 2026-08-06/07: Iran drafts parliamentary plan to ban US/Israel ships, toll others; Iran-Oman negotiate transit-route corridor (reported — CNBC, NPR). - 2026-08-12: Traffic near 3-month low, ~90% below pre-war 130/day baseline (~13 vessels/5-day avg) (confirmed — CNBC/Kpler). - 2026-08-18: Iran "loses significant control"; Gulf states use VLCC transshipment via Oman + dark-fleet (transponders off) workarounds (reported — CNN). - 2026-08-22 to 08-28: Iran allows some Iraqi tankers through; Qatar mediates after fatal tanker attack; CENTCOM declares shipping lanes mine-free; US Navy blockade cuts Iranian oil exports >80% (reported — GDELT/CNBC/NY Post). - 2026-09-13: IMF Portwatch 7-day MA = 8 transits/day (confirmed — claude_news citing Portwatch). - 2026-09-17: "Day 203" of closure per Straits Daily Brief tracker (reported). - 2026-09-20 (latest): Single-digit daily transits persist; 80 ship attacks/20 seafarer deaths since conflict start; recent missile/drone attack on a US-contracted vessel near the strait (reported — claude_news/Marine Insight). # Event Will IMF Portwatch's 7-day moving average of Strait of Hormuz transit calls reach ≥60 on any day before Nov 30, 2026? # Outcomes to forecast Yes / No # Kalshi market anchor No kalshi_direct price was returned in this research pull. Historical reference: Kalshi traders priced ~43% Yes (by Dec 1, 2026) as of 2026-07-08, with 50%+ confidence pushed to Jan 1, 2027 (52%). Given traffic has since deteriorated further (single-digit transits by September vs. the July pricing environment), current Kalshi pricing is likely well below 43%. # Resolution source Fetched https://portwatch.imf.org/pages/cb5856222a5b4105adc6ee7e880a1730 — page returned only a placeholder ("chokepoint6"), no chart data captured. Correct source, but this snapshot cannot confirm current figures; rely on secondary reporting (claude_news cites Portwatch: 8 transits/day on 2026-09-13). # Sub-question answers 1. **Latest 7-day MA / baseline**: ~8/day on 2026-09-13 (claude_news via Portwatch) vs pre-crisis baseline of 85-130/day (Wikipedia: 85; CNBC: 130). Trend has been near multi-month lows through August-September with only marginal, inconsistent improvement. 2. **Cause**: US/Israel airstrikes on Iran starting 2026-02-28 triggered Iranian blockade, ship attacks, mine-laying, and a toll/registration regime via Iran's "Persian Gulf Strait Authority" (Wikipedia, NPR, CNBC). 3. **De-escalation status**: Two ceasefire/MOU attempts (April, June 2026) both collapsed by July; Iran-Oman negotiating a transit corridor (Aug 2026); Qatar mediating; CENTCOM cleared mines by Aug 28; but direct US-Iran talks remain stalled into September, and Polymarket prices only 12.3% chance of any qualifying US-Iran meeting by Sept 30. 4. **Shipping/insurer behavior**: Traffic running ~8-20/day vs 60 threshold; Gulf states routing via VLCC transshipment outside the strait and "dark" (transponder-off) transits to evade attacks (CNN); Energy Aspects analyst says shippers remain unwilling to return even after mine-clearance. 5. **Recovery base rates**: Comparable Red Sea/Bab-el-Mandeb crisis shows slow recovery — traffic still only ~31 ships/day as of May 2026 (vs. 75/day pre-war) more than a year after ceasefire dynamics began improving; no comparable rapid (3-4 month) full recovery precedent found for a militarized chokepoint closure. 6. **Related markets imply**: Polymarket "Hormuz normal by Dec 31" = 16.5%; "by Sept 30" = 0.95%; Bab-el-Mandeb closed markets and Iran-deal markets (enrichment moratorium, reconstruction funding) all price low (8.5-20%) probabilities of near-term resolution — consistent low-probability signal across the complex. 7. **Data/methodology risk**: Widespread AIS transponder spoofing/dark shipping (CNN) could cause Portwatch to undercount actual physical transits, potentially keeping the reported figure below 60 even if real activity partially recovers — a downside risk specifically for Yes resolution. # Key facts (high-confidence, factual) 1. [Wikipedia/CNBC] Pre-war baseline ~85-130 ships/day; strait effectively closed since 2026-02-28. 2. [claude_news/Portwatch] 7-day MA = 8 transits on 2026-09-13. 3. [CNBC] Two ceasefire/MOU attempts (April, June 2026) both failed by July. 4. [GDELT] CENTCOM cleared mines from shipping lanes by 2026-08-28. 5. [Polymarket] Market itself priced Yes at 11.5%, down from 30.5% high, -9.5% over 30 days. # Cross-market signals - Polymarket (this exact market): 11.5% Yes, downtrending. - Polymarket related: "Hormuz normal by Dec 31" 16.5%; "by Sept 30" 0.95%; Bab-el-Mandeb closed by Oct 31: 12%. - Kalshi (historical, per CNBC): 43% as of July 2026 for this same Dec 1 threshold — likely stale/high vs. current conditions. - No sportsbook data available. # Analyst opinions and speculation - Amrita Sen (Energy Aspects): situation "far from normal," high war-risk premiums, shippers unwilling to return until proven safe. - Multiple outlets frame recurring pattern of "false starts" (April surge reversal, June MOU collapse) as reason for skepticism toward any near-term full reopening. # Directional lean per outcome - **Yes**: Mine-clearance (Aug 28), Iran-Oman corridor talks, Qatari mediation, and US "momentum" claims provide some upside path; runway to Nov 30 still ~2+ months. - **No** (favored): Current traffic (~8/day) is >85% short of the 60 threshold; two prior ceasefires collapsed; talks stalled per September reporting; slow Red Sea precedent (still not fully recovered after 1+ year); dark-shipping undercount risk; all cross-market pricing (11.5-16.5%) supports low probability. # Gaps / unknowns - No direct current Kalshi YES price captured. - No confirmed Portwatch chart data (only secondary citations). - Uncertain whether Iran-Oman corridor deal will materialize or scale traffic meaningfully. # Calibration anchors - Polymarket YES price (best current anchor): 11.5%. - Historical Kalshi pricing (July 2026, likely stale-high): 43%. - Related Polymarket Dec 31 normalization market: 16.5%.

4. Forecasters 5 draws · Fable 5.1 + GPT-5.6 Sol

claude-fable-5-1

62% conf

Yes	10%
No	90%

IMF Portwatch 7-day MA transits were ~8/day on 2026-09-13 versus the ≥60 threshold, meaning traffic would need to increase roughly 7-8x within ~2.5 months after two ceasefire/MOU attempts (April, June) already collapsed and US-Iran talks remained stalled into September. The Red Sea precedent shows chokepoint traffic recovers slowly even after de-escalation, and AIS dark-shipping adds undercount risk against a Yes resolution. No current Kalshi price was captured; the July Kalshi 43% is stale given subsequent deterioration, while Polymarket prices this exact market at 11.5% (downtrending) and the Dec 31 variant at 16.5%. Mine-clearance and Iran-Oman corridor talks provide a narrow upside path, justifying a small but non-trivial Yes probability.

claude-fable-5-1

62% conf

Yes	10%
No	90%

Portwatch 7-day MA was ~8 transits/day on 2026-09-13, more than 85% short of the 60 threshold, with single-digit transits persisting through 2026-09-20 and continued attacks on vessels. Two prior de-escalation attempts (April 'reopening', June MOU) collapsed, US-Iran talks are stalled, and the Red Sea precedent shows chokepoint traffic recovers slowly even after security improves; dark-shipping/AIS-off behavior also risks undercounting in the resolution source. No current Kalshi price was available; the July Kalshi 43% is stale, while the Polymarket equivalent trades at 11.5% (downtrending) and the Dec 31 normalization market at 16.5%. A surprise comprehensive deal in October with a backlog-driven surge remains the main Yes path, warranting ~10% rather than near-zero.

claude-fable-5-1

63% conf

Yes	10%
No	90%

The IMF Portwatch 7-day MA was ~8 transits/day as of 2026-09-13, more than 85% short of the ≥60 threshold, with single-digit transits persisting into late September and continued ship attacks. Two prior ceasefire/MOU attempts (April, June) collapsed, direct US-Iran talks are stalled, and Energy Aspects notes shippers remain unwilling to return even after CENTCOM's mine clearance. The Red Sea precedent shows chokepoint traffic recovering slowly (still ~40% of baseline 1+ year later), and AIS dark-shipping could undercount even a partial physical recovery. No direct Kalshi price was available; the July Kalshi 43% is stale given deterioration, while Polymarket's identical market at 11.5% (downtrending) and the Dec 31 market at 16.5% are the best current anchors, so I settle near 10% Yes, leaving room for a surprise Iran-Oman corridor deal producing a rapid surge within the ~2.5-month runway.

gpt-5.6-sol

76% conf

Yes	10%
No	90%

Traffic at roughly 8 daily transits versus the required 60 points strongly toward No, especially given stalled negotiations and two failed reopening attempts. Persistent attacks, insurer reluctance, alternative routing, and the slow Red Sea recovery precedent make a rapid normalization by November 30 unlikely; AIS-dark shipping also creates resolution-source risk because Portwatch may undercount real traffic. The best current market anchor is Polymarket at 11.5% Yes, while Kalshi's 43% July price is stale and predates further deterioration to single-digit traffic. Mine clearance and mediation preserve a limited reopening path, so Yes remains at 10% rather than near zero.

gpt-5.6-sol

73% conf

Yes	10%
No	90%

The best current market anchor is Polymarket at 11.5% Yes; the only Kalshi reference, 43% in July, is stale and predates the deterioration to roughly 8 daily transit calls. Reaching the 60 threshold by November 30 would require an exceptionally rapid recovery despite two failed reopening attempts, stalled diplomacy, continued attacks, and shippers' persistent risk aversion. Mine clearance and regional mediation preserve a limited Yes path, but the slow Red Sea recovery precedent and Portwatch's likely undercounting of dark transits both favor No. I therefore place Yes slightly below the current cross-market anchor.

6. Final plain mean of 5 draws

10% (67% confidence)

Yes: 10% No: 90%

Mean of 5 draws (0.10, 0.10, 0.10, 0.10, 0.10). IMF Portwatch 7-day MA transits were ~8/day on 2026-09-13 versus the ≥60 threshold, meaning traffic would need to increase roughly 7-8x within ~2.5 months after two ceasefire/MOU attempts (April, June) already collapsed and US-Iran talks remained stalled into September. The Red Sea precedent shows chokepoint traffic recovers slowly even after de-escalation, and AIS dark-shipping adds undercount risk against a Yes resolution. No current Kalshi price was captured; the July Kalshi 43% is stale given subsequent deterioration, while Polymarket prices this exact market at 11.5% (downtrending) and the Dec 31 variant at 16.5%. Mine-clearance and Iran-Oman corridor talks provide a narrow upside path, justifying a small but non-trivial Yes probability.

Pipeline Timing

Total pipeline time: 285.3s

Per-tool research timings shown in the Research section above.