Scan: Israeli airspace closed by December 31, 2026?

1. Planner Fable 5.1 · Fermi decomposition + tool plan

Tools chosen: polymarket_direct polymarket_related kalshi_related resolution_source claude_news article_search gdelt_news wikipedia code_execution

Sub-questions (Fermi decomposition)

What is the current Polymarket YES price for Israeli airspace closure by Dec 31, 2026, and how has it trended?
How many times between 2023 and 2025 did Israel's Civil Aviation Authority/IAA issue a NOTAM fully closing the Tel Aviv FIR (LLLL) to commercial aviation, and for how long each time (base rate per year)?
Were past 'airspace closures' (April 2024, Oct 2024, June 2025) formally full-FIR NOTAM closures, or Ben Gurion/airport suspensions that might be excluded as 'subset of the region' closures under the rules?
Has any full Israeli airspace closure already occurred since this market was created (when was the market created)?
What is the current state of Israel-Iran, Israel-Hezbollah, and Israel-Houthi hostilities, and what do related markets price for a renewed Israel-Iran strike/war in 2026?
Are there current official Israeli CAA/IAA notices or NOTAMs indicating airspace restrictions or closure right now?

Planner reasoning

This is a geopolitical tail-risk question with a long horizon (through end of 2026). Israel has fully closed its airspace multiple times in 2024-2025 (April 2024 Iranian attack, October 2024, June 2025 Iran war), so the base rate of a full LLLL FIR closure in any given year is nontrivial and depends heavily on the Israel-Iran/Hezbollah/Houthi conflict trajectory. Key uncertainties are the current market price, whether a qualifying closure has already happened since market creation, how prior closures were formally issued (full FIR NOTAM vs. Ben Gurion airport suspension, which matters under exclusion vii), and the near-term probability of renewed large-scale missile exchanges.

2. Research Parallel tool calls

tool	status	time	items	summary
polymarket_direct	OK	0.3s	1	## This Market's Polymarket Data Israeli airspace closed by December 31, 2026? - Current price (probability): 21.50% - 7-day price change: +3.50% - 30-day price change: +3.50% - Total volume: $16,008 (USD notional) - Price range: 18.00% - 21.50% - Data points: 5 days
polymarket_related	OK	1.3s	8	Polymarket search over 4 keyword(s), kept 8 matches. keyword 'Israel airspace': 5 markets \| keyword 'Iran strike Israel': 0 markets \| keyword 'Israel Iran war': 0 markets \| keyword 'airspace closed': 3 markets
kalshi_related	OK	5.5s	3	3 related markets / summaries. keyword 'Israel airspace': ok \| keyword 'Iran Israel strike': ok \| keyword 'Israel Iran war': ok
resolution_source	OK	4.4s	1	already_resolved=no; matches_criteria=True; last_updated=unknown. The fetched IAA homepage shows normal airport operations, arrivals/departures info, and notices such as 'Opening of Terminal 1 for aviation activity on June 28, 2026' and parking notices, with no mention of an airspace closure or NOTA
claude_news	OK	32.8s	16	Based on research, here are the key findings: 1. Israel has already closed its airspace multiple times in 2026: - Israel closed its airspace on Feb 28, 2026 as the US and Israel launched joint strikes on Iran, with the Transport Ministry confirming closure "in light of the strikes carried o
article_search	OK	46.6s	21	Fetched 21 unique articles across 4 queries (lookback=60d). 'Israel closes airspace NOTAM commercial flights': 10 articles \| 'Ben Gurion flights suspended missile attack': 10 articles \| 'Israel Iran strike 2026': 10 articles \| 'Israel Civil Aviation Authority airspace closure': 10 articles
gdelt_news	OK	159.2s	30	GDELT: 30 articles across 4 queries (lookback=30d). 'Israel airspace closed': 10 hits \| 'Israel Iran missile attack': error GDELT rate-limited after retries (429) \| 'Ben Gurion airport closed': 10 hits \| 'Israel Hezbollah escalation': 10 hits
wikipedia	OK	1.1s	4	Fetched 4 Wikipedia entries (0 missing pages).
code_execution	OK	24.7s	0	## Base-Rate Analysis: Israeli Full Airspace Closure by End of 2026 Data setup: - Observation window: N = 7 years (2019–2025) - Years with at least one full closure: K = 2 (2024, 2025 — Iranian missile attacks). 2023 excluded (partial closure only, per question's framing). **Annual

3. Evidence Brief Sonnet 5 · 7701 chars

# Current state Israeli airspace (Tel Aviv FIR/LLLL) is currently open under normal commercial operations as of the most recent check (IAA homepage, no closure NOTAM). The market resolves YES only if a *full-FIR* closure occurs after contract issuance (~Aug/Sept 2026); pre-issuance closures (e.g., Feb 2026) do not count. Underlying risk driver is the unresolved, attritional Israel-Iran conflict plus active Israel-Hezbollah strikes in Lebanon. # Timeline of key events - **2024-04-13** (confirmed, Wikipedia): Iran's "True Promise" missile/drone attack; Israel and several regional states closed airspace ahead of/during the attack. - **2024-10-01** (confirmed, Wikipedia): Iran's "True Promise II" ~200-missile attack; regional airspace closures again reported. - **2025-06** (confirmed, Wikipedia): "Twelve-Day War" with Iran; Ben Gurion Airport closed **11 days** — unclear if full-FIR NOTAM or airport-only closure. - **2026-02-28** (confirmed, Al Jazeera/JPost): US-Israel joint strikes on Iran ("Operation Roaring Lion"); Israel's Transport Ministry closed airspace; Ben Gurion shut for days; gradual reopening announced. This predates market creation and likely doesn't count toward this contract. - **2026-06-07/08** (reported, claude_news): Renewed Israel-Iran strike exchange plus Hezbollah rocket salvos — described as last direct Israel-Iran fire exchange as of Sept 2026. - **2026-07** (reported): EASA issues advisory note on FIR risk (not a closure). - **2026-08-19 to 09-16** (confirmed, multiple outlets): Israel strikes Syria (Aug 19), Ben Gurion chaos/staff shortage disruptions (Aug 20-25), Israeli strikes on Lebanon killing multiple people (Aug 27–Sept 6), US sanctions on Iran's aviation sector (Sept 8), United Airlines resumes TLV service (Sept 9), further Lebanon strikes (Sept 16). - **Early Sept 2026** (reported): Aviation officials recommended immediate Ben Gurion closure amid fresh Iranian missile launches; authorities kept airport open. - **Mid-Sept 2026** (reported): Ben Gurion operating with limited, not full, restrictions; foreign carriers plan gradual return Oct-Nov under fragile truce; no direct Iran-Israel fire for 9+ consecutive days. # Event Will Israeli airspace (Tel Aviv FIR/LLLL) be closed to commercial aviation (full-FIR NOTAM closure, not subset/airport-only) between market creation and Dec 31, 2026? # Outcomes to forecast Yes / No # Kalshi market anchor No kalshi_direct tool output was returned. The only direct-market data available is from **polymarket_direct** for this exact ticker/question: **YES = 21.5%**, up from 18% thirty days ago (+3.5% both 7d and 30d trend), volume ~$16k, only 5 days of data (recently listed/thin market). Treat this as the working anchor in absence of Kalshi-specific data. # Resolution source IAA homepage (iaa.gov.il/en) fetched: shows normal operations, arrivals/departures, Terminal 1 reopening notice (June 2026), parking notices — **no current closure NOTAM**. Two gov.il pages (Ministry of Transport, CAA) returned HTTP 403 (inaccessible). Status quo = no closure in effect; not a comprehensive real-time NOTAM feed, so this doesn't rule out earlier/future closures. # Sub-question answers 1. **Polymarket YES price/trend**: 21.5%, trending up (+3.5% over both 7d/30d), thin volume (~$16k, 5 data points) [polymarket_direct]. 2. **Base rate 2023-2025**: ~2 of 7 years (2024, 2025) had qualifying full closures (2023 excluded as partial-only); code_execution model estimates full-year 2026 probability of ~25-33% from historical base rate alone [code_execution]. 3. **Nature of past closures**: April/Oct 2024 strikes triggered multi-country airspace closures described broadly as FIR-level; June 2025 "Twelve-Day War" closure was reported as an 11-day **Ben Gurion Airport** closure — ambiguous whether this was a full-FIR NOTAM or airport/subset closure that would be excluded under rule (vii) [Wikipedia; unresolved ambiguity]. 4. **Already occurred since market creation?**: The clear full-airspace closure (Feb 28, 2026) predates likely contract issuance (market shows only 5 days of trading data, implying creation ~Aug/Sept 2026); resolution_source confirms no closure currently in effect. No closure has yet occurred within the contract's counting window [claude_news; resolution_source]. 5. **Current hostilities state**: Israel-Iran in "war of attrition," last direct fire exchange June 7-8, 2026; US-Iran confrontation continues via sanctions/attrition. Hezbollah ceasefire (April) technically holds despite ongoing Israeli strikes in Lebanon (Sept 4-6, Sept 16). Houthi attacks paused per ceasefire but leader warns of possible resumption [claude_news]. Related Polymarket "Iran full airspace closure by Dec 31" priced 25%; by Sept 30 only 6.5-2.9%; by Oct 31 11.5-12.5% [polymarket_related]. 6. **Current NOTAMs**: None indicating closure; IAA shows normal ops; early-Sept recommendation for Ben Gurion closure was not implemented; mid-Sept status is "limited, not fully closed" [resolution_source; claude_news]. # Key facts 1. [polymarket_direct] Same-question market prices YES at 21.5%, up from 18% in 30 days. 2. [resolution_source] IAA shows normal operations, no closure NOTAM currently. 3. [Wikipedia/claude_news] Israel has had at least 3 major closure episodes in ~2.5 years (Apr'24, Oct'24, Jun'25) plus a large one Feb 2026, showing elevated recurring risk. 4. [claude_news] As of mid-Sept 2026, no direct Iran-Israel fire for 9+ days; situation is fragile calm, not resolved peace. 5. [code_execution] Pure historical base rate for a full-year window: ~25-33%. # Cross-market signals - Kalshi related: No direct Israel-airspace Kalshi market found; adjacent Israel politics markets show unrelated volatility [kalshi_related]. - Polymarket: "Israeli airspace closed by Sept 30" = 2.9%; "by Oct 31" = 11.5%; "by Dec 31" (this market) = 21.5% — monotonic increase with time horizon, consistent internally [polymarket_related]. - Polymarket "Iran full airspace closure by Dec 31" = 25%, roughly matching Israel figure, suggesting correlated risk pricing. # Analyst opinions and speculation - FutureSearch/Octagon forecasters (June 2026): ~21% odds of major closure by June 30, citing Israel's shift to a "resilience" policy of keeping airspace open even during conflict. - Later forecaster estimate (Sept 2026): only ~6% odds by Sept 30, citing strong economic disincentives against closure absent an imminent high-level threat [claude_news]. # Directional lean per outcome - **Yes**: Recurring historical pattern of closures during Iran escalations (2x in 2024, 1x in 2025, 1x in Feb 2026); ongoing low-boil Israel-Hezbollah strikes; fragile, reversible ceasefires with Iran/Houthis; 3+ months remain in window. - **No**: Israel's explicit post-Feb-2026 policy shift toward keeping airspace/Ben Gurion open even amid strikes (resilience posture); no direct Iran-Israel fire in 9+ days; current IAA status is normal; market pricing (21.5%) and analyst estimates (6-21%) lean toward No. # Gaps / unknowns - Whether the June 2025 Ben Gurion 11-day closure legally qualifies as full-FIR (rather than excluded airport/subset closure) is unresolved — affects base-rate calibration. - Exact market creation date/contract issuance timestamp not confirmed (inferred ~Aug/Sept 2026 from 5-day price history). - No live NOTAM feed monitored; possibility of an unreported/very recent closure not captured. # Calibration anchors - Polymarket YES price (same question): **21.5%**, upward trending. - Historical base rate for full-year full-FIR closure: **~25-33%** (small sample, n=7 years). - Analyst point estimates range **6%-25%** depending on recency/framing of escalation risk.

4. Forecasters 5 draws · Fable 5.1 + GPT-5.6 Sol

claude-fable-5-1

52% conf

Yes	18%
No	82%

The only direct market anchor (Polymarket, same question) prices YES at 21.5% with thin volume; no closure has occurred in the counting window and the IAA shows normal operations with no closure NOTAM. Base rates support elevated risk (full-FIR closures in Apr'24, Oct'24, Feb'26, possibly Jun'25), but pro-rated to the ~3.5 months remaining the historical rate alone implies ~10%, and Israel's post-Feb-2026 'resilience' policy of keeping airspace open even amid Iranian launches (early-Sept closure recommendation rejected) plus 9+ days without direct Israel-Iran fire argue further against a full-FIR closure. Offsetting upward: the Iran war of attrition is unresolved, Hezbollah strikes continue, and the Houthi ceasefire is fragile, so a renewed major exchange within the window is plausible. Netting these, I shade slightly below the market anchor to ~18% YES.

claude-fable-5-1

50% conf

Yes	18%
No	82%

The only direct market anchor is Polymarket at 21.5% YES for this exact question; no Kalshi price exists. Sub-question evidence leans No: IAA shows normal operations with no closure NOTAM, Israel has adopted an explicit 'resilience' posture of keeping airspace open even during strikes (early-Sept closure recommendation was rejected), and there has been no direct Iran-Israel fire for 9+ days. The historical base rate (~25-33% per full year) pro-rates to roughly 10% for the ~3.5 months remaining, but is boosted by the unresolved attritional Iran conflict, ongoing Hezbollah strikes, and reversible ceasefires; the resolution requirement of a full-FIR (not airport-only) closure further narrows YES. Netting these, I shade slightly below the thin, upward-trending Polymarket price to ~18%.

claude-fable-5-1

52% conf

Yes	17%
No	83%

The only direct market signal is Polymarket at 21.5% YES (thin, ~$16k volume), which is the anchor. The historical base rate of ~25-33% for a full year translates to roughly 8-12% for the ~3.5 months remaining in the window, and the June 2025 episode may not even qualify as a full-FIR closure, lowering the effective base rate further. Israel's explicit post-Feb-2026 'resilience' posture (keeping Ben Gurion open even when officials recommended closure in early Sept), the 9+ day lull in direct Iran-Israel fire, and the IAA showing normal operations all point toward No, while the unresolved war of attrition with Iran and ongoing Lebanon strikes keep tail risk real. I shade slightly below the market anchor given the strict full-FIR resolution bar and the short remaining horizon.

gpt-5.6-sol

68% conf

Yes	21%
No	79%

The 21.5% same-question Polymarket price is the best available consensus anchor, though its thin volume and short history limit reliability. Historical closures during major Iran escalations support meaningful YES risk, but the 25–33% base rate covers full years and includes ambiguity over whether some episodes were full-FIR closures. No qualifying post-issuance closure is documented, the IAA currently shows normal operations, and recent officials kept airspace open despite missile-related concerns, supporting NO. Ongoing Iran and Hezbollah tensions keep the forecast near the market anchor rather than materially below it.

gpt-5.6-sol

66% conf

Yes	22%
No	78%

The 21.5% same-question Polymarket price is the best available consensus anchor, though its short history and roughly $16k volume limit its reliability. Repeated closure episodes during prior Iran escalations and continuing Israel-Iran and Israel-Hezbollah tensions support meaningful YES risk through year-end. However, Israeli airspace is currently open, recent authorities declined recommendations to close Ben Gurion, and Israel's resilience policy favors continued operations absent an imminent major attack. These factors largely validate the market price, with only a slight upward adjustment to 22% for recurring escalation risk.

6. Final plain mean of 5 draws

19% (58% confidence)

Yes: 19% No: 81%

Mean of 5 draws (0.18, 0.18, 0.17, 0.21, 0.22). The only direct market anchor (Polymarket, same question) prices YES at 21.5% with thin volume; no closure has occurred in the counting window and the IAA shows normal operations with no closure NOTAM. Base rates support elevated risk (full-FIR closures in Apr'24, Oct'24, Feb'26, possibly Jun'25), but pro-rated to the ~3.5 months remaining the historical rate alone implies ~10%, and Israel's post-Feb-2026 'resilience' policy of keeping airspace open even amid Iranian launches (early-Sept closure recommendation rejected) plus 9+ days without direct Israel-Iran fire argue further against a full-FIR closure. Offsetting upward: the Iran war of attrition is unresolved, Hezbollah strikes continue, and the Houthi ceasefire is fragile, so a renewed major exchange within the window is plausible. Netting these, I shade slightly below the market anchor to ~18% YES.

Pipeline Timing

Total pipeline time: 266.9s

Per-tool research timings shown in the Research section above.