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Will another country leave OPEC in 2026?
17%
Agent
20%
Market Price
-2.5%
Edge
58%
Confidence
182,719
Volume
1.0c
Spread
103
Days to resolution
1
Markets in event
final rationale
Mean of 5 draws (0.16, 0.16, 0.16, 0.18, 0.19). The UAE's exit (effective May 1, 2026) is already done, so this resolves YES only if a second member (Venezuela, Iraq, Nigeria, etc.) makes an official withdrawal announcement in the ~3.5 months remaining; as of mid-September no government has done so, and OPEC+ has continued routine joint quota-setting (Aug output hike, Sept unchanged decision, 2027 baseline review), signaling cohesion. The only concrete signal is a secondhand report that Venezuela is 'weighing' an exit, with no official statement; Iraq and Nigeria friction is about quotas, not membership. The Polymarket proxy anchor is 19.5% and falling (from a 39.5% post-UAE peak), and the historical base rate scaled to the remaining window is ~15–18%, with the 2018–2019 Qatar→Ecuador cluster the main argument for elevated contagion risk. Weighing the absence of any official rhetoric and the short window against genuine tail risk from Venezuela, I land slightly below the market at ~16% YES.
price vs. prediction
market price
agent forecast at t+0
29 follow-ups
re-scan context
This market has been scanned before. Previous predictions:
| date | predicted | market price | confidence |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-08-27 | 14% | 18% | 64% |
1. Planner Fable 5.1 · Fermi decomposition + tool plan
Tools chosen:
polymarket_direct
resolution_source
claude_news
article_search
gdelt_news
polymarket_related
kalshi_related
wikipedia
code_execution
Sub-questions (Fermi decomposition)
- What is the current Polymarket YES price and how has it moved since the UAE announcement on April 28, 2026?
- Which OPEC members have publicly expressed dissatisfaction with quotas or hinted at leaving since the UAE exit (Iraq, Nigeria, Kuwait, Algeria, Iran, Libya, Venezuela, Gabon, Congo, Equatorial Guinea)?
- What is the historical base rate of OPEC withdrawals per year (Qatar 2019, Ecuador 2020, Angola 2023, UAE 2026), and do exits cluster after a major exit?
- Have any member governments officially commented on their OPEC membership status (reaffirming or reconsidering) since April 28, 2026?
- Are there upcoming OPEC/OPEC+ ministerial meetings in 2026 where quota fights could precipitate an exit announcement, and what is the current state of quota negotiations?
- How is credible reporting (Reuters, Bloomberg) framing the likelihood of a domino effect following the UAE departure?
Planner reasoning
The UAE's April 2026 exit from OPEC is the trigger; the question is whether a second member (e.g., Iraq, Kazakhstan is not a member but OPEC+, Nigeria, Kuwait, Algeria, Gabon, Congo, Libya, Iran, Venezuela, Equatorial Guinea, Saudi Arabia) formally announces withdrawal by year-end. Base rates matter: exits historically are rare (Qatar 2019, Ecuador 2020, Angola 2023, UAE 2026) but tend to cluster when quota disputes flare, so we need the current market anchor, news on quota tensions post-UAE, and any official statements from candidate governments.
2. Research Parallel tool calls
| tool | status | time | items | summary |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| polymarket_direct | OK | 0.5s | 1 | ## This Market's Polymarket Data **Will another country leave OPEC in 2026?** - Current price (probability): 19.50% - 7-day price change: -7.00% - 30-day price change: +12.00% - Total volume: $182,719 (USD notional) - Price range: 6.50% - 39.50% - Data points: 91 days |
| resolution_source | FAILED | 0.4s | 1 | https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/uae-says-it-quits-opec-opec-statement-2026-04-28/: HTTP 401; https://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about_us/25.htm: HTTP 403 |
| claude_news | OK | 25.4s | 13 | ## Findings - **UAE confirmed exit (context):** On April 28, 2026, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) announced that it was leaving OPEC, effective on May 1. This is the largest producer ever to leave the cartel. Source: [EIA](https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=67804) - **No other membe |
| article_search | OK | 0.9s | 20 | Fetched 20 unique articles across 4 queries (lookback=60d). 'OPEC member withdraw leave exit 2026': 10 articles | 'OPEC quota dispute Iraq Nigeria Kuwait after UAE exit': 10 articles | 'OPEC ministerial meeting 2026 production cuts tension': 10 articles | 'country considering leaving OPEC': 10 artic |
| gdelt_news | OK | 137.5s | 20 | GDELT: 20 articles across 3 queries (lookback=45d). 'OPEC withdrawal': 10 hits | 'leave OPEC': error GDELT rate-limited after retries (429) | 'OPEC membership quota dispute': 10 hits |
| polymarket_related | OK | 0.6s | 11 | Polymarket search over 3 keyword(s), kept 11 matches. keyword 'OPEC': 2 markets | keyword 'oil production': 5 markets | keyword 'Saudi oil': 4 markets |
| kalshi_related | OK | 9.0s | 0 | 0 related markets / summaries. keyword 'OPEC': no matches | keyword 'oil price': no matches |
| wikipedia | OK | 0.4s | 4 | Fetched 4 Wikipedia entries (3 missing pages). |
| code_execution | OK | 31.0s | 0 | **Quantitative findings:** - **Historical base rate (2010–2026, 17 yrs):** 5 withdrawal-announcement years (2016 Indonesia, 2018 Qatar, 2019 Ecuador, 2023 Angola, 2026 UAE) → empirical annual base rate = **5/17 ≈ 29.4%** of years see at least one exit announcement; implied Poisson rate λ = 0.294 ev |
3. Evidence Brief Sonnet 5 · 6979 chars
# Current state
The UAE officially exited OPEC on April 28/May 1, 2026 (confirmed), leaving 11 members. This market only resolves YES if a *second* current member (Algeria, Congo, Eq. Guinea, Gabon, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, Venezuela) makes an **official government announcement** of withdrawal before Dec 31, 2026 GST. As of the most recent reporting (mid-September 2026), no such official announcement exists — only analyst speculation and one "weighing exit" report on Venezuela.
# Timeline of key events
- **2026-04-28**: UAE announces withdrawal from OPEC (confirmed — Reuters/market description).
- **2026-05-01**: UAE exit takes effect; OPEC drops to 11 members (confirmed — EIA, Wikipedia).
- **2026-08-02**: OPEC+ agrees September output hike, completing rollback of voluntary cuts; remaining members still coordinating jointly (confirmed — CNBC).
- **2026-08-21**: Iraq publicly calls for a higher OPEC output quota (6–10m bpd ambition); a compliance/quota dispute, not an exit threat (reported — Shafaqna/BNN Bloomberg).
- **2026-08-28/31**: Reports that Venezuela is "weighing" an OPEC exit amid US discussions about stakes in its oil fields; market watchers speculate Venezuela "could be next" (reported/rumored — Union Leader, Zalebs; no government confirmation).
- **2026-09-06/07**: OPEC+ holds output policy unchanged for October; group described as shifting focus to 2027 quota-baseline negotiations, implying continued cohesion (confirmed — CNBC, multiple wire outlets).
- **2026-09-09**: Iraq again pushes for a larger quota allocation (reported — Econotimes).
- **Through mid-Sept 2026**: No second official OPEC withdrawal announcement identified in any source.
# Event
Will a second OPEC member (beyond the UAE) officially announce withdrawal from OPEC before Dec 31, 2026?
# Outcomes to forecast
Yes / No
# Kalshi market anchor
No Kalshi-direct price was returned by tools (kalshi_related found 0 matches for "OPEC"/"oil price"). **Best available cross-market anchor is Polymarket**: current YES = **19.5%**, down 7pts over 7 days, up 12pts over 30 days, range 6.5%–39.5% over 91 days, volume ~$183k. Treat this as a proxy consensus; true Kalshi price is unknown/unretrieved — flag as a gap.
# Resolution source
Tool failed (Reuters 401, OPEC.org 403). No direct confirmation retrievable of resolution-page status; relying on secondary reporting (EIA, OilPrice, Wikipedia) confirming UAE's exit as the only completed withdrawal to date.
# Sub-question answers
1. **Polymarket YES price/movement**: 19.5% currently; +12% over 30 days (rising fear of contagion) but −7% over the last 7 days (cooling); peaked at 39.5% shortly after the UAE announcement, troughed at 6.5%. [Polymarket]
2. **Members expressing dissatisfaction**: Iraq is pushing hard for a much higher output quota (8–10m bpd) [Shafaqna/BNN Bloomberg, Aug 2026]; Nigeria repeatedly exceeds its quota (1.67m bpd in July) [Tribune Online]; Venezuela is reported to be "weighing" an exit amid US oil-field investment talks [Union Leader, Aug 2026]. None of these constitute official withdrawal statements.
3. **Historical base rate**: Withdrawal-announcement years since 2010: 2016 (Indonesia), 2018 (Qatar), 2019 (Ecuador), 2023 (Angola), 2026 (UAE) → ~5/17 years, implying an unconditional annual P(≥1 exit) ≈25%. Scaled to the ~3.5 months remaining in 2026 with 11 members, base case ≈15–18%; a clustering-adjusted (contagion) scenario raises this to ~30–45%. [code_execution]
4. **Official government comments on membership status**: None found reaffirming or reconsidering membership officially; only unnamed "market watcher"/analyst commentary (CNBC, Fox Business) and one reported Venezuela "weighing" story, not a government statement. [claude_news, gdelt_news]
5. **Upcoming OPEC+ meetings/quota state**: OPEC+ held an Oct 2026 meeting confirming unchanged output (Sept 6-7), completed its 2025 voluntary-cut rollback in August, and is now focused on a 2027 baseline capacity-review process (Jan–Sept 2026 timeline) — a structural process that has so far kept the 11 remaining members aligned rather than fracturing. [CNBC, AllAfrica]
6. **Domino-effect framing**: Reuters/CNBC/Fox Business/Al Jazeera all discuss domino-effect risk, naming Iraq, Nigeria, and especially Venezuela as candidates, but consistently caveat this as speculative; Al Jazeera and other outlets argue full collapse is not imminent since remaining members still benefit from coordination. [claude_news synthesis]
# Key facts (high-confidence, factual)
1. UAE exit effective May 1, 2026; OPEC now has 11 members. [EIA, Wikipedia]
2. No second official withdrawal has occurred as of mid-September 2026. [OilPrice, claude_news]
3. OPEC+ continued normal quota-setting activity through Aug–Sept 2026 (output holds, 2027 baseline review). [CNBC]
4. Iraq and Nigeria have quota/compliance friction but no exit rhetoric from governments. [Shafaqna, Tribune]
# Cross-market signals
- Kalshi related: none found (0 matches).
- Polymarket (same event): 19.5% YES, volatile (6.5–39.5% range), trending down last week.
- Polymarket related: "OPEC dissolves in 2026?" priced far lower (3.85% YES), consistent with market view that a full breakup is unlikely even if one more member leaves.
- No sportsbook signal available (not applicable to this event type).
# Analyst opinions and speculation
- Fox Business/analysts: warn of possible "full cartel collapse," citing domino risk (speculative).
- CNBC analysts (Lipow, others): name Iraq, Nigeria, Venezuela as at-risk; Venezuela flagged most concretely due to US-friendly political shift and production recovery.
- Al Jazeera/other observers: argue collective benefits of staying likely deter most members; no imminent collapse.
# Directional lean per outcome
- **Yes**: Venezuela reported "weighing" exit amid US investment talks; Iraq/Nigeria quota friction; historical clustering precedent (Qatar 2018→Ecuador 2019 within ~10 months) supports elevated near-term risk after UAE's exit.
- **No**: No official government withdrawal announced in ~4.5 months since UAE exit; OPEC+ has continued normal joint quota-setting (Aug–Sept 2026 meetings); Polymarket has pulled back from its post-announcement peak (39.5%→19.5%); "dissolves" market prices near-zero, suggesting broad market skepticism of a fast cascade.
# Gaps / unknowns
- No verified Kalshi price for this specific ticker.
- Resolution-source pages (Reuters, OPEC.org) inaccessible; relying on secondary sources.
- No confirmation of any OPEC ministerial meeting scheduled in Oct–Dec 2026 that could catalyze a formal exit decision.
# Calibration anchors
- Polymarket YES (proxy anchor): 19.5%, recent range 6.5–39.5%.
- Base-rate model: 15–18% (no clustering) to 32–45% (clustering-adjusted); point estimate ~20–30%.
- Precedent: OPEC exits/announcements in 2016, 2018, 2019, 2023, 2026 — roughly one every 3–4 years historically, but 2018-2019 saw a cluster within ~10 months.
4. Forecasters 5 draws · Fable 5.1 + GPT-5.6 Sol
claude-fable-5-1
52% conf
| Yes | 16% |
| No | 84% |
The UAE's exit (effective May 1, 2026) is already done, so this resolves YES only if a second member (Venezuela, Iraq, Nigeria, etc.) makes an official withdrawal announcement in the ~3.5 months remaining; as of mid-September no government has done so, and OPEC+ has continued routine joint quota-setting (Aug output hike, Sept unchanged decision, 2027 baseline review), signaling cohesion. The only concrete signal is a secondhand report that Venezuela is 'weighing' an exit, with no official statement; Iraq and Nigeria friction is about quotas, not membership. The Polymarket proxy anchor is 19.5% and falling (from a 39.5% post-UAE peak), and the historical base rate scaled to the remaining window is ~15–18%, with the 2018–2019 Qatar→Ecuador cluster the main argument for elevated contagion risk. Weighing the absence of any official rhetoric and the short window against genuine tail risk from Venezuela, I land slightly below the market at ~16% YES.
claude-fable-5-1
50% conf
| Yes | 16% |
| No | 84% |
No Kalshi price was retrievable; the Polymarket proxy sits at 19.5% YES and has been fading (-7pts in a week, down from a 39.5% peak after the UAE announcement). Roughly 3.5 months remain, and the unconditional base rate of an OPEC exit announcement (~25%/yr) scaled to that window gives ~15-18%, with some upward pressure from post-UAE contagion risk (2018-19 Qatar/Ecuador cluster) and the Venezuela 'weighing exit' report. Against that, no government has issued any official withdrawal or exit-reconsideration statement in the ~4.5 months since the UAE left, OPEC+ has kept normal quota-setting cohesion (Aug-Sept meetings, 2027 baseline review), and the 'OPEC dissolves' market at ~4% signals broad skepticism of a fast cascade. I land slightly below the Polymarket anchor given the short remaining window and absence of any concrete official signal.
claude-fable-5-1
55% conf
| Yes | 16% |
| No | 84% |
The only completed 2026 exit is the UAE (effective May 1), so resolution requires a second official government withdrawal announcement in the ~3.5 months remaining; as of mid-September none exists, only a rumored Venezuela 'weighing' story and Iraq/Nigeria quota friction that reads as bargaining, not exit rhetoric. OPEC+ held normal output meetings in August and September and is engaged in a 2027 baseline review, signaling continued cohesion among the 11 remaining members. The historical base rate (~25% per full year for any exit) scaled to the remaining window gives roughly 15–18%, and the Polymarket proxy at 19.5% (down from a 39.5% post-UAE peak, falling 7 pts in the last week) is consistent with that; the 'OPEC dissolves' market at ~4% confirms broad skepticism of a fast cascade. With no Kalshi price available, I anchor slightly below Polymarket given the short window and absence of any official signal, while leaving meaningful weight for a Venezuela surprise or contagion-cluster precedent (Qatar→Ecuador 2018–19).
gpt-5.6-sol
66% conf
| Yes | 18% |
| No | 82% |
The best available consensus anchor is Polymarket at 19.5% YES because no Kalshi-direct price was retrieved. Venezuela’s reported consideration of an exit and Iraq’s quota dispute create some risk, but neither has produced an official government withdrawal statement. Continued OPEC+ coordination through September and the limited time remaining favor No, so I place YES slightly below the proxy market at 18%.
gpt-5.6-sol
67% conf
| Yes | 19% |
| No | 81% |
The best available consensus anchor is Polymarket at 19.5% YES, with no direct Kalshi price retrieved. Venezuela's reported consideration of an exit and Iraq's quota dispute create a credible path to YES, but neither has produced an official government withdrawal statement. Continued OPEC+ coordination, the 2027 baseline-review process, and the absence of a second announcement through mid-September favor NO with only about three and a half months remaining. I therefore stay close to the proxy market while shading YES slightly downward because the resolution requires a formal announcement rather than speculation.
6. Final plain mean of 5 draws
17%
(58% confidence)
Yes: 17%
No: 83%
Mean of 5 draws (0.16, 0.16, 0.16, 0.18, 0.19). The UAE's exit (effective May 1, 2026) is already done, so this resolves YES only if a second member (Venezuela, Iraq, Nigeria, etc.) makes an official withdrawal announcement in the ~3.5 months remaining; as of mid-September no government has done so, and OPEC+ has continued routine joint quota-setting (Aug output hike, Sept unchanged decision, 2027 baseline review), signaling cohesion. The only concrete signal is a secondhand report that Venezuela is 'weighing' an exit, with no official statement; Iraq and Nigeria friction is about quotas, not membership. The Polymarket proxy anchor is 19.5% and falling (from a 39.5% post-UAE peak), and the historical base rate scaled to the remaining window is ~15–18%, with the 2018–2019 Qatar→Ecuador cluster the main argument for elevated contagion risk. Weighing the absence of any official rhetoric and the short window against genuine tail risk from Venezuela, I land slightly below the market at ~16% YES.
Pipeline Timing
Total pipeline time: 216.1s
Per-tool research timings shown in the Research section above.