Scan: Israeli airspace closed by October 31, 2026?

1. Planner Fable 5.1 · Fermi decomposition + tool plan

Tools chosen: polymarket_direct resolution_source article_search claude_news gdelt_news polymarket_related kalshi_related wikipedia code_execution

Sub-questions (Fermi decomposition)

What is the current Polymarket YES price and how has it trended since market creation?
Has the Israel Civil Aviation Authority or Israel Airports Authority already issued a NOTAM or order closing the Tel Aviv FIR (LLLL) to commercial traffic since this market was created?
How many times in 2023–2026 has Israel fully closed its airspace to commercial aviation, and what triggered each closure (Iranian strikes vs. Houthi/Hezbollah fire)?
What is the current state of Israel–Iran hostilities and the probability of another round of direct missile exchanges before October 31, 2026 (including ceasefire status, nuclear talks, and threats of renewed strikes)?
Are Houthi or Hezbollah missile/drone attacks currently causing Ben Gurion flight suspensions, and would such suspensions qualify as a general FIR closure under the rules or be excluded as partial/temporary ATM measures?
What do related Polymarket/Kalshi markets (Israel strikes Iran, Iran strikes Israel, Israel–Iran ceasefire holds, Hezbollah war) imply about escalation odds over the same horizon?

Planner reasoning

Israeli airspace (LLLL FIR) has been fully closed to commercial traffic several times recently (April 2024 Iranian attack, October 2024, June 2025 Israel–Iran war), almost always in connection with direct Iranian missile exchanges. The forecast therefore hinges on the probability of another major Israel–Iran (or large-scale regional) escalation before Oct 31, 2026, whether any qualifying closure has already occurred since market creation, and how strictly the 'general closure' rule is interpreted versus brief/partial suspensions from Houthi or Hezbollah fire. Market price and cross-venue escalation markets are the key anchors.

2. Research Parallel tool calls

tool	status	time	items	summary
polymarket_direct	OK	0.2s	1	## This Market's Polymarket Data Israeli airspace closed by October 31, 2026? - Current price (probability): 12.00% - 7-day price change: +1.50% - 30-day price change: +1.50% - Total volume: $15,505 (USD notional) - Price range: 10.50% - 12.50% - Data points: 4 days
resolution_source	OK	5.5s	1	already_resolved=no; matches_criteria=True; last_updated=unknown (references a future date, June 28, 2026, for Terminal 1 reopening, suggesting the page is current as of some point before that date). The fetched IAA homepage shows normal airport operations (Ben Gurion, Haifa, Ramon, Herzliya, Rosh P
article_search	OK	34.0s	25	Fetched 25 unique articles across 3 queries (lookback=45d). 'Israel airspace closed NOTAM Ben Gurion flights suspended': 10 articles \| 'Israel Iran missile strikes escalation ceasefire': 10 articles \| 'Ben Gurion airport closure Houthi Hezbollah missile': 10 articles
claude_news	OK	25.4s	11	## Key Findings: Israel Airspace Closure Risk (through Oct 31, 2026) - Extensive history of closures in 2026: Israeli airspace was fully closed to civilian traffic when the war began. As an attack is launched on Iran, Israel closed its airspace to civilian flights, with the Transportation Mini
gdelt_news	OK	198.6s	0	GDELT: 0 articles across 3 queries (lookback=30d). 'Israel airspace closed': error HTTPSConnectionPool(host='api.gdeltproject.org', port=443): Read timed out. (read timeout=30) \| 'Ben Gurion flights suspended': error GDELT rate-limited after retries (429) \| 'Iran Israel strike': error GDELT rate-lim
polymarket_related	OK	0.7s	13	Polymarket search over 5 keyword(s), kept 13 matches. keyword 'Israel Iran': 4 markets \| keyword 'Iran strike': 0 markets \| keyword 'Israeli airspace': 4 markets \| keyword 'Hezbollah Israel': 0 markets \| keyword 'Iran ceasefire': 5 markets
kalshi_related	OK	4.7s	3	3 related markets / summaries. keyword 'Israel Iran': ok \| keyword 'Iran strike Israel': ok \| keyword 'Israel airspace': ok
wikipedia	OK	0.6s	4	Fetched 4 Wikipedia entries (1 missing pages).
code_execution	OK	16.9s	0	## Base Rate Analysis: Israeli Airspace Closure by Oct 31, 2026 Model setup: Poisson process with base hazard rate λ = 3 closures / 36 months ≈ 0.0833 closures/month, derived from 3 confirmed full closures (Apr 2024, Oct 2024, Jun 2025) tied to Iran-linked missile exchanges over Jan 2023–mi

3. Evidence Brief Sonnet 5 · 7173 chars

# Current state The Tel Aviv FIR (LLLL) is currently open to commercial traffic; the Israel Airports Authority's official site shows normal operations at Ben Gurion, Haifa, Ramon and other airports with no closure NOTAM in effect [resolution_source]. However, the Israel–Iran ceasefire established after the Feb–Apr 2026 "Operation Roaring Lion" war has been fragile, reportedly collapsing by July 2026, with renewed Iranian strikes on US regional bases (Jordan) as recently as Sept 1, 2026 [claude_news, ToI]. The question resolves YES only on an official general closure of commercial aviation in the FIR — not on airline-level cancellations, partial/sector restrictions, or Houthi/Hezbollah-caused flow restrictions. # Timeline of key events - 2024-04-13: Iran's "True Promise" missile/drone barrage on Israel; regional airspace closures (confirmed, Wikipedia). - 2024-10-01: Iran's "True Promise II" ~200-missile strike on Israel (confirmed, Wikipedia). - 2025-05/06: Houthi missile strikes inside Ben Gurion perimeter (May 2025); Ben Gurion fully closed 11 days during the "Twelve-Day War" with Iran (June 2025) (confirmed, Wikipedia). - 2026-02-28 to 2026-04-09: "Operation Roaring Lion" — full 40-day Israeli airspace closure amid direct Israel-Iran war (reported, israelwelcome.com/claude_news). - 2026-06-28: IAA-announced Terminal 1 reopening date, indicating normalized operations by that point (confirmed, IAA site). - 2026-07: US-Iran ceasefire "effectively broken down"; renewed action near Strait of Hormuz; Tel Aviv FIR nonetheless open (reported, safeairspace.net). - 2026-08-19/22: Israel strikes Syrian air base near Idlib/Damascus, unrelated direct FIR impact (confirmed, NPR/BBC). - 2026-09-01: Iran strikes US bases/interests in Jordan region; sirens in Jordan; Trump casts doubt on ceasefire durability (confirmed, ToI). - 2026-09-08 (rumored): A low-tier outlet (tech-insider.org) claims Polymarket YES hit 96% for an "Israel closes its airspace by..." market — this conflicts with actual Polymarket data (12%, range 10.5–12.5%) and is treated as unreliable/likely mislabeled, not an established fact. - 2026-09-13: Reports of Israel's foreign-policy realignment away from Western allies (confirmed, CNN) — not directly airspace-relevant. - Present (~mid-Sept 2026): IAA site shows normal operations, no closure notice (confirmed, resolution_source). # Event Will Israeli airspace (Tel Aviv FIR/LLLL) be officially closed to general commercial aviation at any point between market creation and October 31, 2026? # Outcomes to forecast Yes / No # Kalshi market anchor No direct Kalshi-native price returned; the ticker mirrors the Polymarket market. Polymarket YES = **12.0%** (current), up from a 10.5% low; 7-day and 30-day trend both +1.5pp (only 4 days of data exist, so trend window ≈ market lifetime). Total volume $15.5k — thin market. This is the working consensus anchor. # Resolution source IAA official homepage (iaa.gov.il) fetched: shows normal operations across Ben Gurion, Haifa, Ramon, Herzliya, Rosh Pina; references Terminal 1 reopening for June 28, 2026; no NOTAM or closure order mentioned. Gov.il pages (Ministry of Transport, CAA) returned HTTP 403 (inaccessible). Inference: airspace currently open; not yet resolved YES. # Sub-question answers 1. **Polymarket YES price/trend**: 12.0% currently, range 10.5–12.5% over ~4 days of data; +1.5pp trend [polymarket_direct]. 2. **Has NOTAM closure already occurred?** No evidence found; IAA site shows normal operations with no closure notice [resolution_source]. 3. **Historical closures**: 3 confirmed full FIR/airport closures 2024–2025 (Apr 2024, Oct 2024 Iranian strikes; Jun 2025 Twelve-Day War, 11-day closure), plus a 40-day full closure Feb 28–Apr 9, 2026 (Operation Roaring Lion). All tied to direct Iran-Israel exchanges; Houthi strikes (May 2025) did not trigger full closure [Wikipedia, claude_news]. 4. **Current Iran-Israel hostility state**: Ceasefire post-Roaring Lion reportedly broke down by July 2026; Iran struck US bases in Jordan Sept 1, 2026; Trump publicly doubted ceasefire durability. Polymarket "ceasefire continues through Oct 31" priced 80.5% YES (~19.5% break risk) [claude_news, polymarket_related]. 5. **Houthi/Hezbollah-driven suspensions**: No current evidence of active suspensions in research window; historically such attacks (e.g., May 2025 Houthi strike) caused partial/localized impacts, excluded under market rules as sector/ATM restrictions, not full FIR closure. 6. **Related markets implication**: Nested Polymarket airspace-closure buckets show rising cumulative risk with time: Sept 30 close = 3.05%, Oct 31 = 12%, Dec 31 = 21%. Iran ceasefire markets show declining confidence over longer horizons (91.5% through Sep30 → 80.5% Oct31 → 66.5% Dec31), consistent with moderate but rising escalation risk. # Key facts 1. [resolution_source] IAA site shows normal ops, no closure NOTAM as of latest check. 2. [polymarket_direct] YES priced 12%, thin volume ($15.5k), 4 days old. 3. [claude_news/ToI] Ceasefire fragile; Iran struck US bases in Jordan Sept 1, 2026. 4. [Wikipedia] 3+ full closures in past ~2.5 years, all Iran-strike-triggered. 5. [claude_news] 40-day full closure Feb-Apr 2026 during direct Israel-Iran war. # Cross-market signals - Polymarket airspace buckets: Sep30=3%, Oct31=12%, Dec31=21% (monotonic, coherent). - Polymarket ceasefire-continues markets: Sep30=91.5%, Oct31=80.5%, Nov30=71.5%, Dec31=66.5%. - Kalshi related markets (PM succession, defense minister) show no direct signal on airspace. - Low-quality source claiming 96% YES on Sept 8 conflicts sharply with actual Polymarket data; discounted as unreliable/rumored. # Analyst opinions and speculation - code_execution Poisson base-rate model: ~53% mid-case (λ unchanged, 9-month window), ranging 15% (calm) to 87% (active escalation) — much higher than market price, but likely overstates due to clustering/non-Poisson dynamics and ignores current post-Roaring-Lion cooldown. - claude_news synthesis leans toward "very high" risk given 2026's closure frequency, but this pre-dates the current market’s actual 12% pricing, suggesting on-the-ground conditions may have calmed since Sept 1 spike. # Directional lean per outcome - **Yes**: Recent precedent (3 full closures in 30 months, including a 40-day 2026 closure), fragile ceasefire, active Iran-US regional strikes Sept 1, 2026. - **No**: Current airspace open per official source; market pricing only 12%; ceasefire markets show 80%+ confidence through Oct 31; no NOTAM issued; thin-volume market suggests limited urgency. # Gaps / unknowns - Exact market creation date/anchor point unclear (data only spans 4 days). - No verification of whether Sept 1 Iran strikes triggered any Israeli-side closure. - Conflicting/unreliable secondary source (96% claim) not reconciled with primary Polymarket data. - No GDELT confirmation (rate-limited/timeout). # Calibration anchors - Kalshi/Polymarket current YES: 12%. - Nested buckets: Sep30 3%, Dec31 21% — market treats Oct31 as intermediate risk point. - Historical base rate: ~3-4 full closures per 30 months during active Iran conflict cycles.

4. Forecasters 5 draws · Fable 5.1 + GPT-5.6 Sol

claude-fable-5-1

52% conf

Yes	14%
No	86%

The resolution source (IAA site) shows the Tel Aviv FIR fully open with no closure NOTAM, and the Polymarket/Kalshi anchor prices YES at 12% with coherent nested buckets (Sep30 3%, Dec31 21%). The historical base rate is meaningful — roughly four full closures in 30 months, all triggered by direct Iran-Israel exchanges, including a 40-day closure in Feb–Apr 2026 — and the ceasefire is fragile (Sept 1 Iranian strikes on US bases in Jordan; ceasefire-continues market at 80.5% through Oct 31). However, a ceasefire breakdown does not automatically mean a full FIR closure, the region appears to be in a post-war cooldown, and Houthi/Hezbollah-driven partial restrictions are excluded. I nudge slightly above the thin-volume market anchor to ~14% given the elevated regional risk over a ~6-week window.

claude-fable-5-1

47% conf

Yes	14%
No	86%

The resolution source (IAA site) shows normal operations with no closure NOTAM, so YES requires a new full FIR closure within roughly six to seven weeks. Historically, all four full closures since 2024 (including the 40-day Feb–Apr 2026 closure) were triggered by direct Iran–Israel exchanges, and the ceasefire is fragile (Iran struck US bases in Jordan on Sept 1; Polymarket prices ~19.5% ceasefire-break risk through Oct 31), but a ceasefire break does not automatically imply a general commercial closure, and Houthi/Hezbollah-driven partial restrictions are excluded. The nested Polymarket buckets (Sep 30 = 3%, Oct 31 = 12%, Dec 31 = 21%) are coherent and anchor the consensus at 12%; I nudge slightly higher to 14% given the naive per-month closure base rate (~0.13/month) and the recent escalation, but discount for post-war clustering and cooldown.

claude-fable-5-1

52% conf

Yes	13%
No	87%

The resolution source (IAA site) shows the Tel Aviv FIR fully open with no closure NOTAM, so YES requires a fresh official general closure within ~6.5 weeks. The market anchor is 12% YES (Polymarket-mirrored, thin volume), coherent with nested buckets (Sep30 3%, Dec31 21%) and with related ceasefire markets implying ~19.5% chance of an Iran-Israel ceasefire break by Oct 31 — not every break produces a full FIR closure, though all past full closures (Apr/Oct 2024, Jun 2025, Feb-Apr 2026) were Iran-strike-triggered. Historical frequency (~4 closures in 30 months) implies a naive ~20% for the window, but post-Roaring-Lion cooldown and the fact that Sept 1 Iranian strikes on Jordan did not trigger any Israeli closure argue for staying near the market. The 96% rumor is discounted as unreliable. I lean marginally above the anchor at 13% given the fragile ceasefire and demonstrated propensity for full closures when Iran engages directly.

gpt-5.6-sol

68% conf

Yes	14%
No	86%

The 12% Polymarket YES price is the primary consensus anchor, though its thin $15.5k volume warrants modest uncertainty. The IAA currently reports normal operations and no general closure, while Houthi or Hezbollah disruptions would not qualify unless they produced an official FIR-wide commercial closure. Historical closures show that direct Iran-Israel exchanges can rapidly trigger YES, and the reportedly weakened ceasefire plus Iran's September 1 regional strikes elevate that tail risk. However, the related market still assigns roughly 80.5% probability to the ceasefire continuing through October 31, so I move only slightly above the 12% anchor.

gpt-5.6-sol

68% conf

Yes	13%
No	87%

The 12% Polymarket YES price is the best consensus anchor, although its thin $15.5k volume limits reliability. The IAA currently shows normal operations and no general closure notice, strongly favoring No at present. Historical full closures during direct Iran-Israel exchanges and the fragile ceasefire, including renewed Iranian regional strikes on September 1, create meaningful escalation risk through October 31. I move slightly above the market to 13% because recent direct-conflict closures demonstrate that escalation can rapidly produce the qualifying official closure, while Houthi or localized disruptions generally would not qualify.

6. Final plain mean of 5 draws

14% (57% confidence)

Yes: 14% No: 86%

Mean of 5 draws (0.14, 0.14, 0.13, 0.14, 0.13). The resolution source (IAA site) shows the Tel Aviv FIR fully open with no closure NOTAM, and the Polymarket/Kalshi anchor prices YES at 12% with coherent nested buckets (Sep30 3%, Dec31 21%). The historical base rate is meaningful — roughly four full closures in 30 months, all triggered by direct Iran-Israel exchanges, including a 40-day closure in Feb–Apr 2026 — and the ceasefire is fragile (Sept 1 Iranian strikes on US bases in Jordan; ceasefire-continues market at 80.5% through Oct 31). However, a ceasefire breakdown does not automatically mean a full FIR closure, the region appears to be in a post-war cooldown, and Houthi/Hezbollah-driven partial restrictions are excluded. I nudge slightly above the thin-volume market anchor to ~14% given the elevated regional risk over a ~6-week window.

Pipeline Timing

Total pipeline time: 289.8s

Per-tool research timings shown in the Research section above.