forecasting
agent
← back to scans

Will the upper bound of the target range for the federal funds rate in effect at 11:59 PM ET on December 31, 2027 be above 3.25%?

kalshiEconomics·2026-09-15·view on kalshi ↗
79%
Agent
80%
Market Price
-1.0%
Edge
64%
Confidence
10,164
Volume
5.0c
Spread
472
Days to resolution
21
Markets in event
final rationale
The range is already 3.50%–3.75%, so 'No' requires at least two 25bp cuts (three if the widely expected Sept 16, 2026 hike lands) within ~15 months, against a backdrop of core PCE still above target, a hawkish Chair Warsh, stable ~4.1% unemployment, and a June SEP end-2027 median of 3.6% with hawkish dispersion. Both forecasters drew the same inference from the sub-questions and landed near the 77% Kalshi anchor; the critique's strongest point is that the ~25% recession odds overstate the No tail, since a recession must be early and severe enough to force 50–75bp of cuts by end-2027. Offsetting that, a 15-month horizon historically sees 50bp+ moves fairly often (including insurance-cut episodes), Warsh's reaction function is unclear, and the market slipped 6pp over the past week, so I only nudge modestly above the anchor rather than to the 80–85% the critique suggests.
price vs. prediction
market price agent forecast at t+0
33 follow-ups
1. Planner Fable 5.1 · Fermi decomposition + tool plan
Tools chosen: kalshi_direct kalshi_related polymarket_related fred article_search claude_news code_execution
Sub-questions (Fermi decomposition)
  1. What is the current federal funds target range upper bound, and what end-2027 rate is implied by fed funds / SOFR futures?
  2. What does the latest FOMC Summary of Economic Projections median dot show for end-2027 and for the longer-run neutral rate?
  3. Who is likely to succeed Powell as Fed chair in May 2026, and how much more dovish is the expected FOMC composition through 2027?
  4. What are the current trends in core PCE/CPI inflation and unemployment, and do they support cutting below 3.25% (i.e., to a 3.00-3.25% range or lower) within two years?
  5. What is the probability of a US recession before end-2027 that would force the Fed to cut well below neutral?
  6. How do Kalshi sibling threshold markets (e.g., above 2.75%, 3.00%, 3.50%) and Polymarket price the end-2027 rate distribution, and is the distribution internally consistent?
Planner reasoning
This is a long-horizon monetary policy question about where the Fed's target range will sit at end-2027. The key drivers are the current policy rate, the market-implied easing/tightening path (futures, dot plot longer-run median near 3.0%), the identity and leanings of Powell's successor as chair in 2026, and macro trajectory (inflation stickiness vs. labor market weakening / recession risk). Kalshi's own price is the primary anchor, with sibling threshold markets and Polymarket for triangulation.
2. Research Parallel tool calls
toolstatustimeitemssummary
kalshi_direct OK 0.2s 1 ## This Market's Kalshi Data **Above 3.25%** (KXFEDFUNDSYEAR-28JAN01-T3.25) - Current price (probability): 77.00% - 7-day price change: -6.00% - 30-day price change: +3.00% - Average daily volume: 380 contracts - Price range: 66.00% - 83.00% - Data points: 26 days
kalshi_related OK 5.5s 3 3 related markets / summaries. series KXFEDFUNDSYEAR: 0 markets (skipped 100 no-signal) | series KXFED: 0 markets (skipped 87 no-signal) | series KXFEDDECISION: 0 markets (skipped 60 no-signal) | series KXFEDCHAIR: 0 markets (skipped 0 no-signal) | keyword 'fed funds rate 2027': ok | keyword 'federa
polymarket_related OK 0.1s 0 Scanned 100 active Polymarket markets, kept 0 matches. keyword 'fed funds rate 2027': 0 markets | keyword 'fed rate cut': 0 markets | keyword 'fed chair': 0 markets | keyword 'interest rates 2027': 0 markets | keyword 'recession': 0 markets
fred OK 7.7s 6 Fetched 6 FRED series (lookback=730d).
article_search OK 5.8s 35 Fetched 35 unique articles across 4 queries (lookback=60d). 'FOMC dot plot 2027 federal funds rate projection': 10 articles | 'fed funds futures pricing 2027 rate cuts': 10 articles | 'next Fed chair Powell successor nomination': 10 articles | 'Fed neutral rate estimate longer run dot': 10 articles
claude_news OK 32.5s 14 **Federal funds rate & related findings (as of mid-September 2026):** - **Current target range**: The current US federal funds target range is 3.50%–3.75%, held since December 2025, most recently confirmed on 29 July 2026 under Chair Kevin Warsh. A September 16, 2026 decision is pending, with ma
code_execution OK 41.1s 0 ## Key Findings - **Base-case estimate:** Using futures-implied Dec-2027 fed funds upper bound of **3.125%** (midpoint of the assumed 3.00–3.25% market path) and a 2-year-ahead policy-rate forecast-error SD of **112.5 bp** (midpoint of 100–125 bp), the continuous-normal approximation gives **P(uppe
3. Evidence Brief Sonnet 5 · 6730 chars
# Current state The federal funds target range is currently 3.50%–3.75% (effective rate 3.63%, as of 2026-09-11), already above the 3.25% threshold. A September 16, 2026 FOMC decision is pending, with markets and Fed communications leaning toward another hike (to 3.75%–4.00%) given hawkish rhetoric from new Chair Kevin Warsh and above-target inflation. Resolution depends on the range in effect 2027-12-31, still ~15 months away, so substantial cutting or a recession could still bring it back to/below 3.25%, but the current trajectory is hiking, not cutting. # Timeline of key events - 2025-12: Fed range held at 3.50%–3.75% (confirmed, FRED/DFEDTARU). - 2026-05: Kevin Warsh becomes Fed Chair (confirmed, multiple sources); initially framed as dovish pick. - 2026-06: FOMC SEP dot plot: 2026 median 3.8%, 2027 median 3.6%, 2028 median 3.4%, long-run 3.1% (reported, PIMCO/Bondsavvy) — implies 2027 year-end range materially above 3.25%. - 2026-07-24/29: Commentary/markets debate a hike; futures price ~26-35% odds of a hike at upcoming meeting (reported, CNBC). - 2026-08: Warsh's Jackson Hole speech is hawkish, says Fed may need to hike further absent clear disinflation (reported, Yahoo/Eurasia Review). - 2026-08-12: July 2026 CPI report shows inflation still elevated but improving modestly (reported, CNBC). - 2026-09-08/14: Markets price ~60% odds of a hike at the Sept 16, 2026 meeting; Warsh criticized for lack of clear "reaction function" (reported, CNN/CNBC). - 2026-09-11: Effective fed funds rate 3.63%, range 3.50–3.75% still in effect (confirmed, FRED). - 2026-09-16 (pending): FOMC decision — consensus/markets lean toward a hike to 3.75–4.00% (reported/anticipated, not yet confirmed in data provided). # Event Will the fed funds target range upper bound in effect at end of 2027-12-31 be above 3.25%? # Outcomes to forecast - Yes (upper bound > 3.25%) - No (upper bound ≤ 3.25%) # Kalshi market anchor **Current YES price: 77%** (KXFEDFUNDSYEAR-28JAN01-T3.25). 7-day change: -6pp; 30-day change: +3pp. Price range over lookback: 66%-83%. Avg daily volume: 380 contracts (moderate liquidity). Market has drifted down slightly in the last week but remains up over the month — consistent with a hawkish-but-uncertain macro backdrop. # Sub-question answers 1. **Current range / futures-implied end-2027 rate**: Current range is 3.50%–3.75% (FRED, confirmed). Futures reportedly price further hikes to ~4.2% by Dec 2026 and ~4.6% by Sept 2027 (claude_news/streetstats.finance) — well above 3.25%, though this source's reliability is uncertain given it conflicts with the code_execution tool's dovish base case. 2. **Latest SEP dots for 2027 / longer-run**: June 2026 SEP median: 2026=3.8%, 2027=3.6%, 2028=3.4%, longer-run=3.1% (PIMCO/Bondsavvy, reported). Five of 18 participants cluster at 3.75–4.00% for end-2027; only 3 dots above, 10 below that cluster — dispersion exists but median sits comfortably above 3.25%. 3. **Fed chair succession**: Warsh already took office May 2026 (ahead of the "May 2026" question framing, confirmed) and has proven hawkish, not dovish as initially expected — pushing against, not toward, a sub-3.25% outcome. 4. **Inflation/unemployment trends**: Core PCE ~3.3% in 2026 easing to ~2.1-2.5% by 2027 (SEP/usbank, reported); unemployment stable at 4.1-4.4% (FRED, confirmed) — no clear disinflationary or labor-market deterioration signal that would force aggressive cuts by end-2027. 5. **Recession probability**: ~25% probability over next 12 months per one bank estimate (usbank, reported), not base case; Q2 GDP growth slowed to 1.5% annualized — some downside risk but not dominant. 6. **Sibling markets/Polymarket consistency**: Kalshi related markets show longer-dated buckets (2034-2036) with lower/rising thresholds priced inconsistently across maturities (highly illiquid, 30-79 contracts/day) — limited cross-market signal. Polymarket has zero matching markets. No internal Kalshi ladder for FEDFUNDSYEAR-2027 was returned to check monotonicity directly. # Key facts (high-confidence, factual) 1. [FRED] Fed funds range 3.50%-3.75%, effective rate 3.63% as of 2026-09-11. 2. [FRED] Core PCE index rising steadily; unemployment 4.1% (Aug 2026), down slightly from 4.4% (late 2025). 3. [claude_news/PIMCO] June 2026 SEP 2027 median dot = 3.6%, longer-run = 3.1%. 4. [claude_news] Warsh (Fed Chair since May 2026) delivered hawkish Jackson Hole remarks in Aug 2026. 5. [Kalshi] Current YES price for this exact market = 77%. # Cross-market signals - Kalshi related: KXWARSHOUT (Warsh removed as chair before 2028) priced at only 3% — implies market does not expect Fed leadership disruption to alter policy path. - Longer-dated Kalshi Fed funds buckets (2034-2036) are illiquid and show erratic swings (18-26pp moves), limited use for triangulation. - Polymarket: no relevant markets found. - No sportsbook-equivalent signal applicable. # Analyst opinions and speculation - Some FOMC hawks/analysts (Mericle-type Wall Street commentary) flag risk of two hikes in 2026 cycle, pushing 2027 higher. - U.S. Bank: 25% recession odds over 12 months, not base case — moderate downside tail risk. - CBO/Brookings commentary (unrelated to Fed path directly) assumes ~4% average rates persisting for structural fiscal reasons. # Directional lean per outcome - **Yes (>3.25%)**: Strongly supported — current rate already above threshold at 3.50-3.75%, SEP median and Warsh's hawkish stance point to hikes not cuts, inflation still elevated (core PCE >2% target). This is the fundamentals-consistent lean. - **No (≤3.25%)**: Would require ~3+ cuts (75-100bp) from current level within 15 months, likely only via a recession (~25% probability per one estimate) or sharp disinflation not yet evident in data. # Gaps / unknowns - No confirmed outcome of the 2026-09-16 FOMC meeting (hike vs. hold) in the data provided. - code_execution tool's ~45% estimate is built on a stale/incorrect assumption (dovish cutting cycle to 3.00-3.25%) that contradicts the actual fundamental data (hiking cycle, range already at 3.50-3.75%) — this estimate should be heavily discounted/disregarded. - No verified 2027-specific FOMC dot beyond June 2026 SEP; a fresh September 2026 SEP (with updated 2027/2029 dots) may exist but wasn't captured. - No direct Polymarket or Kalshi sibling ladder for this specific 2027 contract to cross-check monotonicity. # Calibration anchors - Kalshi current YES price: 77% (primary anchor). - Structural anchor: current rate (3.50-3.75%) is already ~25-50bp above the 3.25% threshold; SEP median trajectory keeps 2027 above threshold — supports maintaining/leaning toward Kalshi's 77%, possibly modestly higher given hawkish momentum, absent recession.
4. Forecasters Fable 5.1 + GPT-5.6 Sol · in parallel
claude-fable-5-1
58% conf
Yes 76%
No 24%
The current target range is 3.50%–3.75% (upper bound 3.75%), so 'No' requires at least two 25bp cuts (three if the widely expected Sept 2026 hike occurs) within ~15 months. The June 2026 SEP median for end-2027 is 3.6%, Chair Warsh has been hawkish at Jackson Hole, core PCE remains above target, and unemployment is stable at ~4.1% — none of which points to an imminent easing cycle. The main path to 'No' is a recession (~25% 12-month odds per U.S. Bank) or faster-than-expected disinflation prompting normalization cuts, which is a real but non-base-case tail over a long horizon. Kalshi prices YES at 77%, and the fundamentals broadly justify that level, so I anchor closely with a slight discount for the long horizon and historical frequency of 50bp+ moves over 15 months.
gpt-5.6-sol
69% conf
Yes 78%
No 22%
The 77% Kalshi YES price is the primary anchor, and current rates plus the June 2026 SEP modestly support a higher estimate. The current 3.75% upper bound, a 3.6% end-2027 median dot, and uncertain futures indications of further hikes all point toward Yes. Warsh’s hawkish stance, still-elevated inflation, and stable unemployment make substantial easing less likely, while the roughly 25% recession estimate leaves a meaningful No tail. Related markets add little because of poor liquidity, so I move only slightly above consensus to 78%.
5. Devil's Advocate Sonnet 5 · red-team critique
1. Both forecasts anchor tightly to the 77% Kalshi price (76%/78%) without independently stress-testing the "No" tail; given the SEP median (3.6% for 2027) sits well above 3.25% and the current rate is already 25-50bp above threshold with a hiking bias, the fundamentals arguably justify a higher YES probability (80-85%) than the market price, yet neither forecaster explores why they aren't diverging upward more from Kalshi. 2. Neither forecast adequately addresses the asymmetry in the "No" pathway: reaching ≤3.25% by end-2027 requires not just a recession but a recession severe/early enough to trigger 75-100bp+ of cuts within a compressed window, which is a much lower-probability event than the raw "25% recession odds" figure suggests — both forecasts implicitly treat the recession probability as roughly equal to the "No" probability without discounting for the additional conditions needed. 3. The brief flags that futures reportedly price rates as high as 4.6% by Sept 2027 (from a source flagged as "uncertain reliability" but directionally hawkish) and that 5 of 18 SEP dots cluster at 3.75-4.00% for 2027 — this dispersion toward the hawkish side is underweighted by both forecasters, who treat the SEP median as the central case without acknowledging asymmetric upside risk to the YES outcome. 4. Both forecasts fail to explicitly account for the pending Sept 16, 2026 FOMC decision as a near-term catalyst that could immediately shift the anchor point (e.g., a confirmed hike to 3.75-4.00% would make "No" even more remote, since it would require even more cuts to breach 3.25%); this omission means their estimates may already be stale relative to the imminent meeting outcome. 5. The brief notes the Kalshi market has moved down 6pp over 7 days despite a hawkish backdrop, which is a mild contrarian signal (possibly reflecting some dovish repricing or profit-taking) that neither forecaster interrogates — both treat the 30-day uptrend as more informative than the recent 7-day reversal without explaining why. 6. Neither forecast meaningfully engages with the "Warsh reaction function" uncertainty flagged in the brief (Sept 2026 commentary noting he's "criticized for lack of clear reaction function"), which introduces genuine policy-path uncertainty that could justify wider error bars/lower confidence than the 0.58-0.69 confidence levels stated.
6. Aggregator Fable 5.1 · final calibrated forecast
79% (64% confidence)
Yes: 79% No: 21%
The range is already 3.50%–3.75%, so 'No' requires at least two 25bp cuts (three if the widely expected Sept 16, 2026 hike lands) within ~15 months, against a backdrop of core PCE still above target, a hawkish Chair Warsh, stable ~4.1% unemployment, and a June SEP end-2027 median of 3.6% with hawkish dispersion. Both forecasters drew the same inference from the sub-questions and landed near the 77% Kalshi anchor; the critique's strongest point is that the ~25% recession odds overstate the No tail, since a recession must be early and severe enough to force 50–75bp of cuts by end-2027. Offsetting that, a 15-month horizon historically sees 50bp+ moves fairly often (including insurance-cut episodes), Warsh's reaction function is unclear, and the market slipped 6pp over the past week, so I only nudge modestly above the anchor rather than to the 80–85% the critique suggests.
Pipeline Timing
Total pipeline time: 142.7s
Per-tool research timings shown in the Research section above.