Scan: GDP growth in 2032? — 2.1% to 2.5%

date	predicted	market price	confidence
2026-08-29	19%	20%	58%
2026-08-22	18%	20%	52%
2026-07-31	12%	11%	38%

1. Planner Fable 5.1 · Fermi decomposition + tool plan

Tools chosen: kalshi_direct kalshi_related fred code_execution claude_news article_search polymarket_related

Sub-questions (Fermi decomposition)

What is the historical frequency (1948-2024, and post-1990) of US annual-average real GDP growth landing in the 2.1%-2.5% bin, and what is the standard deviation of annual growth around trend?
What do CBO's long-term budget outlook and the Fed's SEP longer-run projection estimate for US potential real GDP growth in the early 2030s (roughly 1.6%-2.0%)?
How does Kalshi define 'GDP growth in 2032' for this series — BEA annual-average growth vs Q4-over-Q4 — and does that change the bin probability?
How are Kalshi prices distributed across the other growth bins for KXGDPYEAR-32, and how do the 2027-2031 versions of this series price the same 2.1-2.5% bin?
What is the unconditional probability of a US recession occurring in a given calendar year (~15-20%), which would push growth below the bin?
What structural forces (labor force growth from demographics/immigration, AI-driven productivity) do forecasters cite as pushing potential growth toward or away from the 2.1-2.5% range by 2032?

Planner reasoning

This is a very long-horizon macro question (resolution in 2033) where current news matters little; the estimate should be driven by the historical distribution of annual US real GDP growth around a projected potential growth rate (~1.7-2.0% per CBO/Fed), the probability of a recession in any given year, and the width of the 2.1-2.5% bin. The Kalshi price and the sibling-bin prices for 2032 and adjacent years are the primary anchor, and FRED annual growth data plus code execution give the base rate.

2. Research Parallel tool calls

tool	status	time	items	summary
kalshi_direct	OK	0.2s	1	## This Market's Kalshi Data 2.1% to 2.5% (KXGDPYEAR-32-B2.3) - Current price (probability): 20.00% - 7-day price change: +9.00% - 30-day price change: +9.00% - Average daily volume: 1249 contracts - Price range: 10.00% - 22.00% - Data points: 10 days
kalshi_related	OK	5.1s	3	3 related markets / summaries. series KXGDPYEAR: 0 markets (skipped 100 no-signal) \| keyword 'GDP growth 2032': ok \| keyword 'GDP growth 2031': ok \| keyword 'GDP growth 2030': ok
fred	OK	6.6s	6	Fetched 6 FRED series (lookback=3650d) (via search 'real potential GDP growth').
code_execution	OK	35.2s	0	## Key Findings Historical base rates (recalled BEA/FRED A191RL1A225NBEA, annual real GDP growth) - Full sample 1948–2024 (n=77): mean 3.15%, sd 2.33pp; fraction in [2.1, 2.5] = 11.7% (9/77 years) - Post-1990 (1991–2024, n=34): mean 2.52%, sd 1.77pp; fraction in [2.1, 2.5] =
claude_news	OK	26.1s	12	Based on research gathered: - CBO (Jan 2025, Budget & Economic Outlook 2025-2035): From 2031 to 2035, the growth of real GDP is projected to average 1.8 percent a year, the same as the growth of real potential GDP. The potential output of the nonfarm business sector is projected to grow at a
article_search	OK	5.3s	23	Fetched 23 unique articles across 3 queries (lookback=365d). 'CBO long-term projection real GDP growth 2030s potential output': 8 articles \| 'US potential GDP growth forecast demographics immigration productivity AI': 8 articles \| 'Fed longer-run GDP growth projection': 8 articles
polymarket_related	OK	5.1s	0	Scanned 100 active Polymarket markets, kept 0 matches. keyword 'GDP growth': 0 markets \| keyword 'recession': 0 markets \| keyword 'US GDP': 0 markets

3. Evidence Brief Sonnet 5 · 5816 chars

# Event Kalshi market KXGDPYEAR-32-B2.3: resolves YES if US real GDP growth in 2032 falls between 2.1% and 2.5% (one bucket among the full KXGDPYEAR-32 distribution). # Outcomes to forecast - Yes (2032 real GDP growth lands in 2.1%–2.5%) - No (growth outside this band) # Kalshi market anchor **Current YES price: 20.00%** (up from 10-22% range over past 10 data points; +9pp over both 7-day and 30-day windows — sharp recent upward momentum). Average daily volume ~1,249 contracts. This is the consensus to beat. [kalshi_direct] # Sub-question answers 1. **Historical frequency of 2.1-2.5% bin** — Full sample 1948-2024 (n=77): 11.7% of years; post-1990 (n=34): 17.6%; post-2000 (n=24): 25.0%, reflecting "growth compression" in the modern era. Std dev of annual growth: ~2.33pp (full sample), ~1.77-1.78pp (post-1990/2000). [code_execution] 2. **CBO/Fed longer-run potential growth** — CBO (Jan 2025): real GDP averages 1.8%/yr 2031-2035, equal to potential; nonfarm business potential output 2.3%/yr. Fed SEP (Mar 2026): longer-run median 2.0% (up from 1.8% in Dec 2025), central tendency 1.8-2.0%, range 1.7-2.5%. [claude_news, fred: GDPC1CTMLR/MDLR/RLLR ~1.7-2.0%] 3. **Kalshi's growth definition** — Not explicitly stated in rules; research did not resolve whether it's BEA annual-average or Q4/Q4. Treated as annual-average (BEA A191RL1A225NBEA convention) per FRED series used in modeling. Gap remains. 4. **Kalshi bin distribution / cross-year comparison** — 2031 bin (same 2.1-2.5% band): 15% (+10% 7d, +4% 30d). 2030's analogous "modal-ish" bin (2.6-3.0%) prices at 20%. 2036's 2.6-3.0% bin: 9%. All show recent upward repricing across years, suggesting a broad regime shift in trader sentiment toward higher growth outcomes. [kalshi_related] 5. **Recession probability per year** — Not directly reported by tools with an explicit 15-20% figure, but the Monte Carlo model assumed a 15% recession-regime probability in its mixture (embedded assumption, not sourced empirically here). [code_execution] 6. **Structural forces** — Goldman Sachs: potential GDP ~2.1% (2025-29) rising to 2.3% in early 2030s on AI productivity gains (+0.4pp boost from AI); immigration slowdown is a key downside risk (elevated 2022-24 immigration had lifted potential to ~2.4% temporarily, versus 1.8% pre-pandemic). CBO notes deaths exceed births starting 2033 — demographic headwind. [claude_news] # Key facts (high-confidence, factual) 1. [kalshi_direct] Current YES price 20%, up 9pp over both 7d and 30d. 2. [fred/A191RL1A225NBEA] Recent actual annual growth: 2022=2.5%, 2023=2.9%, 2024=2.8%, 2025=2.1%. 3. [claude_news/CBO] CBO baseline: 1.8%/yr average real GDP growth 2031-2035. 4. [claude_news/Fed SEP Mar 2026] Longer-run median GDP growth 2.0%, range 1.7-2.5%. 5. [claude_news/Goldman] Goldman potential growth estimate 2.3% for early 2030s (within the Yes band). 6. [code_execution] Model-implied P(bin) ≈ 12-14% across potential-growth sensitivity (1.6%-2.3%). # Cross-market signals - Kalshi related: 2031 same-bin bucket priced at 15% (lower than 2032's 20%), both trending up sharply recently — possible broad Kalshi-wide repricing of growth optimism (AI narrative) rather than 2032-specific signal. - Kalshi 2030 bucket (2.6-3.0%, a higher band) priced at 20%, also up 12pp over 30 days — consistent momentum across multiple years/bins toward higher-growth pricing. - Polymarket: no matching GDP/recession markets found. [polymarket_related] - Sportsbook implied: N/A (not applicable to this event type). # Analyst opinions and speculation - Goldman Sachs (Oct 2025): explicitly places 2.3% potential growth for early 2030s squarely within the Yes band, citing AI productivity (+0.4pp) — the most bullish mainstream estimate. [claude_news] - CBO/Fed baselines (1.8-2.0%) sit just below or at the low edge of the band, implying the "consensus" institutional case is narrowly a miss (No), though within a standard deviation. - Washington Post/CBSNews commentary (2026) emphasizes fiscal/debt drag and demographic headwinds (deaths > births from 2033) as downside risks to growth, not directly quantifying 2032 growth but reinforcing a below-trend narrative. - Government shutdown effects (Nov 2025, Goldman/CBO estimates of 1-2pp GDP drag) show near-term volatility risk, though not directly 2032-relevant. # Directional lean per outcome - **Yes (2.1-2.5%)**: Supported by Goldman's AI-driven potential (2.3%), post-2000 historical base rate (25%), and modest optimism reflected in rising Kalshi prices across multiple year-buckets. Opposed by CBO/Fed baseline (1.8-2.0%, below band), demographic drag (immigration slowdown, negative population growth from 2033), and Monte Carlo model estimate of only 12-14%. - **No**: Supported by convergence of CBO and Fed median projections near 1.8-2.0% (below band), recession-regime tail risk (~15-20%/yr) pulling mass to negative growth, and model estimate placing true probability (~12-14%) below current market price (20%) — suggesting Kalshi may be overpriced for Yes. # Gaps / unknowns - Exact Kalshi resolution definition (annual-average vs Q4/Q4) not confirmed — could meaningfully shift bin boundaries via rounding. - No 2032-specific consensus forecast (all data is model/trend-based, 6+ years out). - Reason for the recent sharp +9pp Kalshi repricing (news-driven vs technical) unidentified. - No recession-probability-specific empirical figure sourced (assumption embedded in model only). # Calibration anchors - Kalshi current YES price: **20%** (anchor, recently trending up). - Model-implied probability: **~12-14%** (below market price, suggesting slight Kalshi overpricing of Yes). - Historical base rates: full-sample 11.7%, post-1990 17.6%, post-2000 25.0% — wide range depending on era chosen, underscoring high uncertainty at 6-year horizon.

4. Forecasters Fable 5.1 + GPT-5.6 Sol · in parallel

claude-fable-5-1

42% conf

Yes	18%
No	82%

The 2.1-2.5% band is a 0.5pp-wide bucket near the center of the plausible distribution for 2032: CBO/Fed longer-run baselines sit at 1.8-2.0% (just below the band) while Goldman's AI-adjusted potential of 2.3% sits inside it. Historical frequency of this bin ranges from 11.7% (full sample) to 25% (post-2000), and a mixture model with ~15% recession risk and ~1pp non-recession dispersion yields roughly 15-20%. The Kalshi anchor of 20% has risen sharply on what looks like a broad cross-year repricing toward growth optimism rather than 2032-specific news, so I shade slightly below it toward the model-implied 12-14% while respecting the modern-era base rate. Unresolved definition (annual-average vs Q4/Q4) adds noise but does not change the central estimate much.

gpt-5.6-sol

55% conf

Yes	17%
No	83%

The 20% Kalshi YES price is the main anchor, while its sharp recent rise appears partly driven by broad growth optimism rather than 2032-specific information. Historical frequencies range from 11.7% to 25.0%, but the dedicated model assigns only 12-14% to this bin. CBO's 1.8% baseline and the Fed's 2.0% longer-run median point just below the band, although Goldman's AI-driven 2.3% estimate supports YES. Balancing these signals, I shade below Kalshi to 17%, with uncertainty increased by the long horizon and unresolved GDP-growth definition.

5. Devil's Advocate Sonnet 5 · red-team critique

Both forecasters converge tightly (17-18%) despite the brief explicitly flagging "high uncertainty at 6-year horizon" and a wide historical base-rate range (11.7%-25%); given this dispersion and the unresolved definitional gap (annual-average vs Q4/Q4), neither forecast's confidence (0.42/0.55) nor point estimate reflects how much genuine model uncertainty exists—a wider stated range or lower confidence would better represent the evidence.

Neither forecast seriously engages with the cross-year Kalshi pattern (2031 bucket at 15%, 2030's analogous bucket at 20%, both also rising sharply) as a *validation* check—if this is truly a "broad repricing" unrelated to fundamentals, that implies the whole Kalshi GDP complex could be systematically mispriced, which should either raise or lower confidence in fading the 20% price, not just get a passing mention.

Both forecasts anchor heavily on the "model-implied 12-14%" Monte Carlo estimate, but the brief states the recession-regime probability (15%) driving this model is "embedded assumption, not sourced empirically"—neither forecaster flags that their downward shading from Kalshi's 20% partly rests on an unvalidated assumption, which is a reference-class/circularity risk worth more scrutiny.

Post-2000 base rate of 25% (the most recent and arguably most relevant regime given "growth compression") is mentioned but effectively discounted to near-zero weight in both forecasts (final answers near 17-18%, far closer to the model estimate and full-sample rate than the recent-era rate); if compression is a genuine structural trend (as Goldman's AI-productivity thesis and CBO's own narrowing central tendency range suggest), the recent-era base rate deserves more weight, potentially pushing Yes higher.

Neither forecast explicitly addresses the demographic tail risk (deaths exceeding births from 2033) or the possibility that this shifts mass toward the No bucket via a lower-growth path, nor do they consider that recession risk could pull the distribution into a bimodal shape (low-growth/negative years vs. moderate-growth years) that a symmetric mixture model may not capture well.

Both treat Goldman's 2.3% estimate as roughly offsetting CBO/Fed's 1.8-2.0%, but Goldman's figure is a "potential growth" (supply-side, long-run) estimate rather than a specific 2032 point forecast, and neither forecaster interrogates whether comparing a potential-output growth rate directly to an annual actual-growth bucket is an apples-to-apples comparison, given actual annual growth is far noisier (2022-2025 actuals ranged 2.1%-2.9%).

6. Aggregator Fable 5.1 · final calibrated forecast

19% (48% confidence)

Yes: 19% No: 81%

This is a 0.5pp-wide bucket sitting near the center of the plausible 2032 distribution: CBO/Fed longer-run estimates (1.8-2.0%) sit just below the band, Goldman's AI-adjusted 2.3% sits inside it, and the 2022-2025 actuals (2.1-2.9%) show how noisy annual prints are around potential. A mixture model with ~85% non-recession years dispersed ~1pp around ~2.1% yields roughly 15-19% for the bin, bracketed by the post-1990 (17.6%) and post-2000 (25%) base rates. The critique is right that the 12-14% model figure rests on an unsourced recession assumption and that the modern-era base rate deserves real weight, so I do not shade as far below Kalshi as the two forecasters did. The recent +9pp repricing appears to be a broad cross-year optimism shift rather than 2032-specific information, so I land just under the 20% market anchor at 19%.

Pipeline Timing

Total pipeline time: 143.8s

Per-tool research timings shown in the Research section above.