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Will quarterly GDP be above 5% in any quarter in Q1 2025 to Q4 2028?
33%
Agent
22%
Market Price
+10.9%
Edge
55%
Confidence
177,471
Volume
3.9c
Spread
872
Days to resolution
1
Markets in event
final rationale
Six quarters have missed with a peak of 4.4%, and the 2010s analog (0/40 quarters >5%) plus consensus trend growth of ~1.5-2.5% make No the favorite. However, the critique correctly notes that the early Q3 2026 GDPNow reading near 4.75% is a live, near-term shot at the threshold (even after shrinking the nowcast toward consensus, that quarter alone carries perhaps 15% chance of clearing 5%), and ten remaining quarters plus a 30-40% recession-rebound scenario add a meaningful tail. Unspecified resolution vintage lets upward revisions count, which favors Yes at the margin. Given thin Kalshi volume and a price that has swung 16-51% recently, I move modestly above both the 26% anchor and the two forecasts to 33% Yes.
price vs. prediction
market price
agent forecast at t+0
42 follow-ups
re-scan context
This market has been scanned before. Previous predictions:
| date | predicted | market price | confidence |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-08-31 | 29% | 24% | 54% |
| 2026-08-24 | 30% | 25% | 57% |
| 2026-08-17 | 26% | 26% | 65% |
1. Planner Fable 5.1 · Fermi decomposition + tool plan
Tools chosen:
kalshi_direct
kalshi_related
polymarket_related
fred
article_search
claude_news
code_execution
Sub-questions (Fermi decomposition)
- What is the current Kalshi YES price and how has it moved as 2025 quarterly GDP prints came in?
- Which quarters in the window have already been reported, and what were the annualized real GDP growth rates (advance and revised) for Q1–Q3 2025 and any later quarters?
- What exactly counts for resolution: advance estimate, any BEA vintage, or the latest revision — and does that materially widen the chance of a >5% print?
- Since 1990, what fraction of quarters had annualized real GDP growth above 5%, and how many of those occurred outside recession-rebound periods (e.g., 2021 post-COVID, 2014 Q3)?
- What do the Fed SEP, CBO, and Wall Street consensus forecasts say about 2026–2028 GDP growth, and how large is quarterly volatility around trend (e.g., trade/inventory swings like Q3 2025)?
- What is the probability of a US recession before 2028, given that a sharp downturn followed by a rebound quarter is the main path to a >5% print?
- Are there policy or measurement factors (tariff-driven import swings, AI capex boom, fiscal stimulus, tax cuts) that could produce an outsized single-quarter print?
Planner reasoning
This is a long-horizon Kalshi market on whether any single quarter of US real GDP growth (annualized, presumably advance or latest estimate per Kalshi rules) exceeds 5% between Q1 2025 and Q4 2028. Key drivers are the historical base rate of >5% quarters (rare outside post-recession rebounds), the realized 2025 quarters already reported (Q2 2025 came in around 3.8% and Q3 2025 was strong), and the probability of a recession-and-rebound cycle within the window. The Kalshi price is the primary anchor, supplemented by FRED data, Fed/Wall Street forecasts, and base-rate math.
2. Research Parallel tool calls
| tool | status | time | items | summary |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| kalshi_direct | OK | 0.2s | 1 | ## This Market's Kalshi Data **Above 5%** (KXGDPUSMAX-28-5) - Current price (probability): 26.00% - 7-day price change: +4.20% - 30-day price change: -4.80% - Average daily volume: 169 contracts - Price range: 15.90% - 51.10% - Data points: 78 days |
| kalshi_related | OK | 2.6s | 1 | 1 related markets / summaries. series KXGDPUSMAX: 0 markets (skipped 1 no-signal) | series KXGDP: 0 markets (skipped 36 no-signal) | series KXRECSSNBER: 0 markets (skipped 2 no-signal) | keyword 'GDP': ok | keyword 'recession': no matches |
| polymarket_related | OK | 0.1s | 0 | Scanned 100 active Polymarket markets, kept 0 matches. keyword 'GDP': 0 markets | keyword 'recession 2026': 0 markets | keyword 'GDP growth': 0 markets |
| fred | OK | 7.0s | 6 | Fetched 6 FRED series (lookback=1500d) (via search 'real GDP percent change from preceding period'). |
| article_search | OK | 2.8s | 25 | Fetched 25 unique articles across 3 queries (lookback=60d). 'US GDP growth quarter annualized BEA advance estimate': 10 articles | 'GDP forecast 2026 2027 Fed SEP CBO': 10 articles | 'US recession probability 2026 economists': 10 articles |
| claude_news | OK | 26.9s | 14 | **Key findings on quarterly GDP growth (Q1 2025–Q2 2026, latest available) and forward outlook:** - **Q1 2025:** In the fourth quarter of 2025, real GDP increased 0.5 percent — wait, for Q1 2025 itself: Real gross domestic product (GDP) decreased at an annual rate of 0.5 percent in the first qua |
| code_execution | OK | 70.7s | 0 | ## Key Findings **Historical base rates (A191RL1Q225BEA, 1990Q1–2024Q4, 140 quarters, hardcoded approximations since no live data access):** - **All quarters:** 14/140 quarters exceeded 5% annualized growth → **10.0%** of all quarters. This includes the extreme 2020Q3 rebound (+35.3%) and three 20 |
3. Evidence Brief Sonnet 5 · 6357 chars
# Current state
Six of sixteen quarters in the window (Q1 2025–Q2 2026, per available data) have already reported, with a peak of 4.4% (Q3 2025) — still below the 5% threshold. Resolution requires ANY single quarter's annualized real GDP growth to exceed 5%; ten quarters (Q3 2026–Q4 2028) remain unreported, and no BEA vintage has yet cleared the bar.
# Timeline of key events
- 2025-01-01 to 2025-03-31 (Q1 2025): GDP -0.5% initial, later revised to -0.6% (confirmed, BEA).
- 2025-04-01 to 2025-06-30 (Q2 2025): GDP 3.8% third estimate, up from 3.0%/3.3% earlier vintages, driven by tariff-front-running import collapse (confirmed, BEA).
- 2025-07-01 to 2025-09-30 (Q3 2025): GDP 4.3% initial, revised to 4.4% — closest print to 5% so far, beat consensus (3.3% LSEG poll) (confirmed, BEA/foxbusiness).
- 2025-10-01 to 2025-12-31 (Q4 2025): GDP 0.5%, dragged ~1.0pp by federal government shutdown (confirmed, BEA).
- 2026-02 (reported): SCOTUS ruled certain IEEPA tariffs unlawful, ordering refunds — adds fiscal/trade uncertainty (confirmed).
- 2026-01-01 to 2026-03-31 (Q1 2026): GDP 2.1% third estimate (confirmed, BEA).
- 2026-04-01 to 2026-06-30 (Q2 2026): GDP 1.5% second estimate, moderating; AI-driven capex (+8.5% nonresidential investment) offset by widening trade deficit (confirmed, BEA/CNBC/BBC/CBS).
- 2026-07 onward: GDPNow tracking shows swings (1.24 in Q1'26 to 4.75 estimate for Q3'26), signaling continued volatility (reported, FRED/GDPNow).
# Event
Will any quarter's annualized real GDP growth exceed 5% between Q1 2025 and Q4 2028 (KXGDPUSMAX-28-5)?
# Outcomes to forecast
- Yes (at least one quarter >5%)
- No (no quarter exceeds 5% through Q4 2028)
# Kalshi market anchor
Current YES price: **26.00%**. 7-day change: +4.2% (likely reaction to strong Q3 2025/GDPNow prints); 30-day change: -4.8%. Average daily volume: 169 contracts (thin). 78-day price range: 15.9%–51.1%, indicating high sensitivity to incoming data. This is the consensus to beat.
# Sub-question answers
1. **Kalshi price/movement**: 26% now; +4.2%/7d, -4.8%/30d, range 15.9-51.1% over 78 days — market has repriced meaningfully as quarters posted (Kalshi direct).
2. **Reported quarters**: Q1'25 -0.6%, Q2'25 3.8%, Q3'25 4.4% (peak, revised), Q4'25 0.5% (shutdown-hit), Q1'26 2.1%, Q2'26 1.5% (BEA, via claude_news/FRED). No quarter has exceeded 5%.
3. **Resolution vintage**: Rules field is blank/unspecified; description just says "GDP growth of above 5%" without specifying advance vs. revised. This is a genuine ambiguity — if any vintage counts, upward revisions (e.g., Q3 2025 moved from 4.3%→4.4%) modestly raise odds a borderline quarter could tip over 5% on later revision.
4. **Historical base rate**: 1990-2024, 14/140 quarters (10%) exceeded 5%; excluding 2020-21 COVID quarters, 10/132 (7.6%); in the 2010-2019 "modern normal" era, 0/40 (0%) (code_execution). Suggests true current-regime base rate is much lower than the raw historical average.
5. **Forecasts**: SPF (Q3 2025) projects 2025 annual growth ~1.7%, unemployment 4.2-4.5% through 2028 — consistent with modest growth, not a 5%+ single-quarter norm (Philadelphia Fed SPF). No explicit Fed SEP/CBO 2026-2028 point forecasts surfaced in this research beyond SPF.
6. **Recession probability**: Not directly quantified in articles; code_execution model assumes 30-40% recession probability in the window as a working scenario input, but this is analyst-assumed, not sourced from a specific forecaster.
7. **Policy/measurement drivers**: Tariff-driven import swings (Q2 2025 import collapse → 3.8% GDP; Q3 2025 trade rebound → 4.4%), AI capex boom (+8.5% nonresidential investment in Q2 2026), and a Feb 2026 SCOTUS tariff ruling forcing refunds are all cited as volatility sources that could produce outsized single-quarter prints (CNN/BBC/CBS/claude_news).
# Key facts (high-confidence, factual)
1. [BEA] Q3 2025 GDP (4.4% revised) is the closest print to 5% in the window so far.
2. [BEA] Q4 2025 growth fell to 0.5%, ~1.0pp subtracted by government shutdown effects.
3. [FRED/GDPNow] Real-time GDPNow estimates show wide swings (e.g., -2.7% Q1'25 nowcast to 4.7% Q3'26 nowcast), underscoring volatility.
4. [code_execution] 0/40 quarters exceeded 5% during 2010-2019, the closest historical analog to current trend growth.
5. [CNBC] Only one quarter since 1947 (2020 Q3, +34.9%) has ever exceeded 20%; extreme prints require recession-rebound dynamics.
# Cross-market signals
- Kalshi related: Year-ahead GDP growth markets (KXGDPYEAR) price low-single-digit annual growth (9% for 2.6-3.0% bucket in 2036), consistent with low-trend growth expectations, not supportive of frequent 5%+ quarters.
- Polymarket: No matching markets found.
- Sportsbook implied: N/A.
# Analyst opinions and speculation
- Code_execution model: scenario-weighted P(Yes) ≈ 70% using historical (1990s-heavy) base rates, but ≈40-50% using more representative 2010s-anchored "no recession" base rate — a wide, model-dependent range.
- Recession-rebound path (sharp downturn + snapback quarter) is repeatedly identified as the dominant mechanism for any >5% print, absent which normal-times probability is very low (0-3%/quarter).
# Directional lean per outcome
- **Yes**: Supported by high realized volatility already (Q3 2025 at 4.4%), tariff/trade whipsaws, AI capex boom, and 10 quarters still remaining. Opposed by 2010s base rate of 0%, moderating recent prints (Q2 2026 at 1.5%), and no recession yet materialized.
- **No**: Supported by structural low-trend growth (~1.5-2.5% consensus), Fed policy caution, and 6/16 quarters already "used up" without a hit. Opposed by residual tail risk from trade-policy shocks/tariff reversals and possible future recession-rebound quarter.
# Gaps / unknowns
- Exact resolution vintage (advance vs. final) unspecified — could matter at the margin.
- No explicit CBO/Fed SEP 2026-2028 quarterly forecasts obtained.
- No quantified recession-probability forecast from a named source (only modeled assumption).
- Kalshi's own volume is thin (169/day), so pricing may be less efficient.
# Calibration anchors
- Kalshi current YES price: 26% (anchor).
- Historical base rate for ≥1 quarter >5% in any 16-quarter stretch: ~40-70% depending on regime assumption (code_execution), with 2010s-analog suggesting the lower end is more realistic for a non-recession path.
4. Forecasters Fable 5.1 + GPT-5.6 Sol · in parallel
claude-fable-5-1
45% conf
| Yes | 30% |
| No | 70% |
Six of sixteen quarters are in the books with a peak of 4.4% (Q3 2025), so the outcome depends on the remaining ten quarters (Q3 2026–Q4 2028). The 2010s analog (0/40 quarters >5%) argues for a low per-quarter hit rate, but the current regime shows unusually high realized volatility from tariff whipsaws, AI capex, and the SCOTUS refund shock, and the Q3 2026 GDPNow nowcast reportedly sits near 4.75% — a legitimate near-term shot at the threshold. A per-quarter probability of ~3-4% over ten quarters plus a recession-rebound tail yields roughly 30%, modestly above the Kalshi anchor of 26%, which I lean toward because the market is thin and the unspecified resolution vintage lets upward revisions count. Consensus trend growth of ~1.5-2.5% and the absence of any recession so far keep 'No' the clear favorite.
gpt-5.6-sol
64% conf
| Yes | 29% |
| No | 71% |
The 26% Kalshi YES price is the primary anchor, though thin volume and a wide recent trading range reduce its reliability. Six reported quarters have missed, recent growth moderated to 1.5%, and the 2010–2019 base rate was 0/40, all pointing toward No under a normal-growth regime. Conversely, ten quarters remain, Q3 2025 reached 4.4%, and a Q3 2026 GDPNow estimate near 4.75% shows that trade swings, AI investment, or a recession rebound could produce a hit. Unspecified treatment of GDP revisions also modestly favors Yes for a borderline print, supporting a small upward adjustment from the market anchor.
5. Devil's Advocate Sonnet 5 · red-team critique
1. Both forecasts converge tightly around 29-30%, nearly identical to the Kalshi anchor (26%) and to each other—neither meaningfully engages with the brief's explicit "wide, model-dependent range" (40-70% under historical regimes vs 40-50% under 2010s-anchored assumptions), understating how much the code_execution model itself diverges from their point estimates without justifying why the lower bound should dominate so heavily.
2. Neither forecast quantifies the recession probability driving the "recession-rebound" mechanism, despite the brief flagging this as "the dominant mechanism for any >5% print" — they gesture at it as a "tail" but the brief's own analyst-assumed 30-40% recession probability over a 4-year window is substantial and deserves explicit modeling rather than folding into a vague per-quarter rate.
3. The Q3 2026 GDPNow nowcast near 4.75% is treated as a minor supporting data point by both, but this is a live, near-term, already-materializing signal within one to two quarters of the forecast being made — if that quarter or the next actually reports at/near 5%, this should be weighted far more heavily than a distant tail scenario, and both forecasts likely under-price the immediate-term probability.
4. Neither forecast addresses the asymmetry created by 10 remaining quarters combined with acknowledged "high sensitivity to incoming data" (78-day range 15.9%-51.1%) — this volatility history suggests the market itself has been wrong-footed repeatedly, which should increase uncertainty bands around their point estimates rather than converging so precisely with the current price.
5. Both forecasts mention the resolution-vintage ambiguity (advance vs. revised GDP) as a minor upward nudge, but neither explores the scenario where this ambiguity could cut the other way — if final/most-revised vintages are used, and the Q3 2025 print already moved from 4.3%→4.4% under revision, a similar upward drift on a future borderline 4.6-4.8% quarter is a plausible path to Yes that deserves more explicit quantification than a passing mention.
6. Neither forecast interrogates why the Kalshi price fell -4.8% over 30 days despite Q3 2026 GDPNow readings reportedly near 4.75% — this divergence between market pricing and the most bullish available nowcast is exactly the kind of inefficiency the brief flags (thin volume, 169 contracts/day) that should prompt more independent reasoning rather than deferring to the anchor.
6. Aggregator Fable 5.1 · final calibrated forecast
33%
(55% confidence)
Yes: 33%
No: 67%
Six quarters have missed with a peak of 4.4%, and the 2010s analog (0/40 quarters >5%) plus consensus trend growth of ~1.5-2.5% make No the favorite. However, the critique correctly notes that the early Q3 2026 GDPNow reading near 4.75% is a live, near-term shot at the threshold (even after shrinking the nowcast toward consensus, that quarter alone carries perhaps 15% chance of clearing 5%), and ten remaining quarters plus a 30-40% recession-rebound scenario add a meaningful tail. Unspecified resolution vintage lets upward revisions count, which favors Yes at the margin. Given thin Kalshi volume and a price that has swung 16-51% recently, I move modestly above both the 26% anchor and the two forecasts to 33% Yes.
Pipeline Timing
Total pipeline time: 173.1s
Per-tool research timings shown in the Research section above.