Scan: GDP growth in 2035? — 1.6% to 2.0%

date	predicted	market price	confidence
2026-08-29	13%	14%	62%
2026-08-22	13%	14%	62%
2026-07-31	10%	9%	50%

1. Planner Fable 5.1 · Fermi decomposition + tool plan

Tools chosen: kalshi_direct kalshi_related polymarket_related fred code_execution claude_news article_search

Sub-questions (Fermi decomposition)

What is the current Kalshi YES price for the 1.6%-2.0% bucket and how is probability distributed across the neighboring KXGDPYEAR-35 buckets (do they sum to ~100%)?
What share of US annual real GDP growth outcomes since 1950 (and since 1990/2000) fell in the 1.6%-2.0% range, and what is the standard deviation of annual growth around its trend?
What are the current long-run projections for US potential/real GDP growth in the 2030-2035 window from CBO's long-term budget outlook, the Fed's longer-run SEP median, and private forecasters (e.g., Goldman, Blue Chip)?
What is the base-rate probability that any given year (like 2035) is a recession or recession-adjacent year with growth below 1%, given ~1 in 6-7 years historically?
How does the market resolve — annual-average real GDP growth per BEA's advance estimate released early 2036, or Q4/Q4 — and does this affect which figure to model?
Do other Kalshi GDP-year markets (2026-2034) or Polymarket long-run growth markets imply a consistent trend-growth distribution, and does 2035 pricing deviate from it?

Planner reasoning

This is a decade-out question about a narrow 0.4pp bucket of annual US real GDP growth, so the forecast hinges almost entirely on (a) the long-run trend growth estimate for the mid-2030s (CBO/Fed longer-run ~1.7-2.0%) and (b) the historical dispersion of annual growth around trend, including recession probability. The market price is the anchor; historical base rates via FRED and code execution plus institutional long-run projections will refine whether this bucket is the modal one and how much mass it captures.

2. Research Parallel tool calls

tool	status	time	items	summary
kalshi_direct	OK	0.2s	1	## This Market's Kalshi Data 1.6% to 2.0% (KXGDPYEAR-35-B1.8) - Current price (probability): 13.00% - 7-day price change: -2.00% - 30-day price change: +5.00% - Average daily volume: 822 contracts - Price range: 8.00% - 15.00% - Data points: 18 days
kalshi_related	OK	4.1s	2	2 related markets / summaries. series KXGDPYEAR: 0 markets (skipped 100 no-signal) \| keyword 'GDP growth 2035': ok \| keyword 'GDP growth 2030': ok
polymarket_related	OK	4.1s	0	Scanned 100 active Polymarket markets, kept 0 matches. keyword 'GDP growth': 0 markets \| keyword 'US GDP 2035': 0 markets \| keyword 'recession': 0 markets
fred	OK	4.7s	3	Fetched 3 FRED series (lookback=27000d) (via search 'real potential GDP long-term projection').
code_execution	OK	35.2s	0	## Key Findings Historical base rates (1950–2024, US real GDP growth): - Full sample (75 yrs): only 5/75 years (6.7%) fell in the [1.6%, 2.0%] band — this is a narrow window historically. - Post-1990 (34 yrs): 4/34 years (11.8%) — 2011 (1.6%) and 2016 (1.8%) are the recent hits.
claude_news	OK	25.5s	7	Long-run US real GDP growth projections relevant to 2035 (1.6%–2.0% range question): - CBO (Jan 2025, Budget & Economic Outlook 2025-2035): From 2027 to 2035, real GDP is projected to grow by 1.8 percent a year, on average, roughly in line with the growth of real potential GDP. https://ww
article_search	OK	4.2s	30	Fetched 30 unique articles across 3 queries (lookback=365d). 'US potential GDP growth 2030s CBO long-term outlook': 10 articles \| 'Fed longer-run GDP growth estimate productivity AI': 10 articles \| 'US labor force growth immigration long-run GDP trend': 10 articles

3. Evidence Brief Sonnet 5 · 6925 chars

# Current state The market resolves based on whether full-year 2035 US real GDP growth falls in [1.6%, 2.0%]; actual data won't be known until BEA's 2035 annual estimate (likely released ~Jan-Feb 2036, before the market's Feb 28 2036 close). Kalshi currently prices this bucket at 13% YES, having risen from a low of 8% over the past 30 days before pulling back 2pts in the last week — reflecting genuine two-sided uncertainty nearly a decade before resolution, not a near-certain outcome. # Timeline of key events - 2025-01: CBO Budget & Economic Outlook (2025-2035) projects real GDP growth averaging **1.8%/yr from 2027-2035** (confirmed, cbo.gov). - 2025-03: CBO Long-Term Budget Outlook (2025-2055) projects real GDP growth averaging **1.6%/yr** over 2025-2055, with potential GDP growth ~1.7% (confirmed, cbo.gov). - 2025-09: Fed SEP longer-run median growth ~1.8% (confirmed, FRED). - 2025-09: CBO alternative-scenarios update reaffirms ~1.6-1.8% long-term growth band amid rising debt-to-GDP trajectory (confirmed). - 2025-11: Extended government shutdown estimated to cut Q4 2025 GDP growth by 1-2pp per CBO/Goldman (confirmed, transient near-term shock, not directly relevant to 2035). - 2026-01: CBO Budget & Economic Outlook (2026-2036) update: stronger near-term 2026 growth (tax-law effects) but out-year (mid-2030s) growth still converging to ~1.8%, matching prior projections (confirmed, cbo.gov). - 2026-01/06: Fed SEP (March, June 2026) longer-run projection holds near 1.8%; near-term 2027-2028 quarterly projections trend down toward that anchor (confirmed, FRED). - Kalshi 2035 GDP-band market: 30-day trend +5pts (8%→13%), 7-day trend -2pts, suggesting mild upward repricing of the modal band recently reversing slightly (confirmed, Kalshi). # Event Will US real GDP growth in 2035 fall between 1.6% and 2.0% (Kalshi ticker KXGDPYEAR-35-B1.8)? # Outcomes to forecast - Yes (growth lands in [1.6%, 2.0%]) - No (growth falls outside this band) # Kalshi market anchor **Current YES price: 13%** (KXGDPYEAR-35-B1.8). 7-day change: -2pts; 30-day change: +5pts. Price range over 18 observed days: 8%-15%. Average daily volume: 822 contracts — moderate liquidity for a decade-out contract. # Sub-question answers 1. **Current price & neighboring buckets** — This bucket: 13%. Neighboring 2035 bucket data wasn't directly returned (only 2030/2036 comparables surfaced); 2030's [2.6-3.0%] bucket prices 20%, 2036's [2.6-3.0%] prices 9% — suggests broad, roughly consistent distribution across years without full bucket-sum confirmation. [kalshi_related] 2. **Historical base rate** — Full sample 1950-2024: 5/75 years (6.7%) in [1.6,2.0%]. Post-1990: 4/34 (11.8%). Post-2000: 4/24 (16.7%), reflecting structurally slower/less volatile growth recently. [code_execution/FRED] 3. **Long-run projections** — CBO (Jan 2025): 1.8%/yr avg 2027-2035. CBO (Mar 2025 long-term): 1.6%/yr avg 2025-2055 (potential ~1.7%). Fed SEP longer-run median: ~1.8% (held through Sep 2025-June 2026). Consensus clusters at 1.6-1.8%, squarely inside or just at the edge of the question band. [claude_news/CBO/Fed] 4. **Recession-year base rate** — Not directly computed, but historical data implies roughly 1-in-6-7 years have sub-1% or negative growth; 2020 (-2.1%) is the clear recent example. [FRED A191RL1A225NBEA] 5. **Resolution basis (annual vs Q4/Q4)** — Unconfirmed: searches could not verify whether Kalshi uses annual-average or Q4/Q4 BEA vintage; Fed SEP figures are explicitly Q4/Q4, which could differ from an annual-average reading. [claude_news — explicitly noted as unverified] 6. **Cross-year consistency** — Limited data; 2030 and 2036 bucket prices for different bands don't allow direct distribution comparison, but volumes/pricing patterns look internally consistent with a modal bucket near "trend growth" pricing highest. [kalshi_related] # Key facts (high-confidence, factual) 1. [Kalshi] Current YES = 13%, up from 8% a month ago, down 2pts this week. 2. [CBO 2025] Official long-run forecasts center on 1.6-1.8% average annual growth through mid-2030s. 3. [Fed SEP] Longer-run median growth ~1.8%, stable across 2025-2026 SEPs. 4. [FRED GDPPOT] Potential GDP (GDPPOT series) implies ~1.75-1.8% annualized potential growth in 2034-2036. 5. [code_execution] Post-2000 historical hit-rate for this exact band: 16.7%; Monte Carlo mixture model estimates ~12% probability. # Cross-market signals - Kalshi related: 2030 [2.6-3.0%] band = 20% YES (30d +12pts); 2036 [2.6-3.0%] band = 9% YES; nominal GDP 2035 >5% = 37% YES (rising fast, +9pts/week) — suggests inflation expectations firming, which could pull real growth bucket distributions. - Polymarket: No matching markets found (0/100 scanned). - Sportsbook implied: N/A (not applicable to macro data market). # Analyst opinions and speculation - CBO/Fed converge on ~1.8% as the modal single-year growth expectation for the mid-2030s, which would land inside the Yes band if realized without recession or boom deviation. - Rising federal debt (CBO: 100%→156% of GDP by 2055) and demographic headwinds (slowing population/immigration per NPR/CBO) are cited as structural drags that could keep trend growth capped near 1.6-1.8%, supporting the Yes band as "consensus" outcome. - AI/productivity upside is mentioned in search queries but no explicit quantified 2035 estimate was returned — a real but unquantified upside risk to the No (above 2.0%) side. # Directional lean per outcome - **Yes (1.6-2.0%)**: Supported by CBO and Fed longer-run consensus (~1.6-1.8%) sitting inside the band; historical post-2000 base rate (16.7%) exceeds current Kalshi price (13%), suggesting market may be undervaluing this bucket. Opposing: full-sample base rate only 6.7%; single-year outcomes are volatile (recession risk ~1-in-6-7 years) and rarely land in a narrow 0.4pp band even when trend is centered there. - **No**: Supported by high variance of annual growth (std dev ~2pp), meaning even if trend is 1.8%, actual realized year likely misses the band; recession or boom years dominate probability mass outside [1.6,2.0%]. # Gaps / unknowns - Exact Kalshi resolution methodology (annual-average vs Q4/Q4, BEA vintage) unconfirmed — could shift modeling if Q4/Q4 basis used (matches Fed SEP convention). - Full bucket-by-bucket probability distribution for 2035 series not retrieved (only 2030/2036 comparables), so can't confirm buckets sum to 100% or identify neighboring bucket pricing. - No Polymarket cross-check available. # Calibration anchors - Kalshi current YES price: 13% (anchor). - Historical base rate for this specific band: 6.7% (full sample 1950-2024), 16.7% (post-2000). - Monte Carlo/mixture model estimate: ~11.5-12%. - Precedent: single-year GDP-bucket markets tend to price near model-implied ~10-20% for a modal 0.4pp band a decade out; current 13% sits within that range, roughly fair-to-slightly-cheap versus post-2000 empirical rate.

4. Forecasters Fable 5.1 + GPT-5.6 Sol · in parallel

claude-fable-5-1

44% conf

Yes	14%
No	86%

CBO and Fed longer-run projections cluster at 1.6-1.8%, placing the modal 2035 outcome squarely inside this band, but a 0.4pp bucket a decade out captures only a slice of a distribution whose realized-year standard deviation is roughly 1.2-2pp (recessions like 2020 and booms like 2021 dominate the tails). A simple density calculation (0.4pp × normal density at mode with sd ~1.2-1.5) yields ~11-13%, matching the brief's Monte Carlo (~12%) and sitting between the full-sample base rate (6.7%) and the post-2000 hit rate (16.7%). The Kalshi anchor of 13% looks approximately fair; I nudge slightly higher because the band is centered on consensus trend and post-2000 growth volatility has been lower, but unresolved methodology (annual vs Q4/Q4) and unquantified AI-productivity upside cap the adjustment. Net: ~14% Yes.

gpt-5.6-sol

67% conf

Yes	13%
No	87%

Kalshi's 13% YES price is the strongest anchor, and the approximately 12% mixture-model estimate independently supports it. CBO, Fed, and potential-GDP projections center near 1.6%-1.8%, making this the modal band, while the post-2000 historical hit rate of 16.7% provides modest upside. However, annual growth volatility, recession risk, and possible productivity-driven upside leave most probability outside such a narrow 0.4-point interval. The unresolved annual-average versus Q4/Q4 methodology and lack of a full neighboring-bucket distribution argue against moving away from the market consensus.

5. Devil's Advocate Sonnet 5 · red-team critique

Both forecasts converge tightly around 13-14% and essentially anchor to Kalshi price without meaningfully testing whether the market itself could be mispriced—given the brief flags a 30-day rise from 8%→13% (a 63% relative increase) that could reflect informed repricing toward the post-2000 base rate (16.7%), neither forecaster seriously entertains pushing toward that higher historical rate despite noting it exceeds current price.

Neither forecast addresses the resolution-methodology gap (annual-average vs Q4/Q4) with any directional weighting—if Q4/Q4 is used (matching Fed SEP convention), volatility could differ meaningfully from annual-average smoothing, yet both merely flag it as "unresolved" without adjusting the probability distribution or confidence interval width accordingly.

The 2035 target is a full decade out with only moderate liquidity (822 avg daily volume) and just 18 observed days of pricing—both forecasters treat the market price as near-authoritative despite the brief's own framing that this is "genuine two-sided uncertainty," which should arguably widen error bars rather than tightly cluster estimates within 1pp of each other (14% vs 13%).

Neither forecaster explores the asymmetry within the "No" outcome—i.e., whether growth is more likely to land above 2.0% (AI-productivity upside, per brief's unquantified mention) versus below 1.6% (recession risk)—which matters for adjacent-bucket hedging/trading strategy questions even though it's not directly the resolution question.

The cross-market signal that nominal GDP 2035 >5% is pricing 37% YES and rising fast (+9pts/week) suggesting firming inflation expectations is mentioned in the brief but neither forecast integrates how higher expected inflation might correlate with real growth compositions (e.g., higher nominal growth could accompany either higher real growth or higher inflation with flat real growth), a potential source of updating that both ignore.

Both forecasts treat the CBO/Fed consensus (~1.8%) as if it strongly predicts single-year realized growth, but neither quantifies how much historical evidence shows single-year outcomes deviate from decade-out trend forecasts specifically (i.e., trend forecasts have historically had wide realized errors even when accurate on average), which would justify a lower probability than the naive density calculation implies.

6. Aggregator Fable 5.1 · final calibrated forecast

13% (56% confidence)

Yes: 13% No: 87%

Both forecasters and the Kalshi anchor converge at 13-14%, and the critique does not expose a shared flaw that justifies moving beyond them: a 0.4pp band centered on the ~1.8% consensus trend with realized single-year volatility of ~1.2-1.5pp implies roughly 11-13%, consistent with the Monte Carlo (~12%). The post-2000 hit rate of 16.7% is an upper bound because it conditions on a known stable trend, whereas a decade-out forecast also carries uncertainty about where trend itself will sit (debt, demographics, AI productivity), which flattens the density and offsets the base-rate upside. The unresolved annual-vs-Q4/Q4 methodology adds noise but no clear directional bias. Net: hold at the market's 13% Yes.

Pipeline Timing

Total pipeline time: 133.8s

Per-tool research timings shown in the Research section above.