Scan: GDP growth in 2030? — 2.6% to 3.0%

date	predicted	market price	confidence
2026-08-27	15%	19%	59%
2026-08-20	13%	14%	58%
2026-07-16	13%	17%	50%

1. Planner Fable 5 · Fermi decomposition + tool plan

Tools chosen: kalshi_direct kalshi_related fred code_execution claude_news polymarket_related

Sub-questions (Fermi decomposition)

What is the current Kalshi price for the 2.6%-3.0% bucket and how do all sibling buckets in the KXGDPYEAR-30 series price the full distribution of 2030 GDP growth?
Historically, in what fraction of years has US annual real GDP growth landed in any given 0.5pp band around 2.6-3.0% (base rate from ~1950-2024 and from ~2000-2024)?
What are current long-run forecasts of US potential/trend GDP growth for the late 2020s (CBO, Fed SEP longer-run, IMF, major banks), and do any project growth above 2.5% by 2030?
What is the estimated probability of a US recession occurring in or immediately before 2030, which would pull growth well below the band?
Are there structural upside factors (AI productivity boom, fiscal stimulus, immigration/labor force changes) that credible forecasters believe could push 2030 growth to 2.6%+?
How does resolution work — which vintage/measure of 'real GDP growth in 2030' (annual average vs Q4/Q4, which BEA release) determines the outcome, and how much revision risk is there?

Planner reasoning

This is a long-horizon (resolves early 2031) question about whether US real GDP growth in 2030 lands in a narrow 0.5pp band (2.6%-3.0%). The dominant inputs are the base rate of annual GDP growth falling in such a band, long-run consensus forecasts (CBO/Fed potential growth ~1.8-2.0%), and how the Kalshi bucket structure prices the full distribution. Historical data plus de-vigging the sibling buckets will drive the estimate more than news.

2. Research Parallel tool calls

tool	status	time	items	summary
kalshi_direct	OK	0.2s	1	## This Market's Kalshi Data 2.6% to 3.0% (KXGDPYEAR-30-B2.8) - Current price (probability): 20.00% - 7-day price change: +3.00% - 30-day price change: +12.00% - Average daily volume: 1607 contracts - Price range: 8.00% - 20.00% - Data points: 12 days
kalshi_related	OK	2.6s	2	2 related markets / summaries. series KXGDPYEAR: 0 markets (skipped 100 no-signal) \| keyword 'GDP growth 2030': ok \| keyword 'GDP growth': ok
fred	OK	5.6s	6	Fetched 6 FRED series (lookback=3650d) (via search 'real GDP annual growth rate').
code_execution	OK	53.5s	0	## Key Findings: P(2030 GDP growth ∈ [2.6%, 3.0%]) Historical base rates (empirical) - Postwar 1950–2024: 13/75 years fell in [2.6%, 3.0%] → base rate ≈ 17.3% - 2000–2024: 8/25 years in-band → base rate ≈ 32.0% (notably higher than full postwar sample, reflecting more moderate v
claude_news	OK	29.5s	12	Based on research (as of early 2026 vintage forecasts): - CBO 10-year outlook (Jan 2025): CBO projects economic growth cools from an estimated 2.3 percent in calendar year 2024 to 1.9 percent in 2025 and 1.8 percent in 2026 amid higher unemployment and lower inflation , with growth remaining m
polymarket_related	OK	2.5s	0	Scanned 100 active Polymarket markets, kept 0 matches. keyword 'GDP growth': 0 markets \| keyword 'US recession': 0 markets \| keyword 'GDP 2030': 0 markets

3. Evidence Brief Sonnet 5 · 5341 chars

# Event Kalshi market KXGDPYEAR-30-B2.8: resolves YES if US real GDP growth in calendar year 2030 falls between 2.6% and 3.0%. # Outcomes to forecast - Yes (2030 real GDP growth 2.6%–3.0%) - No (growth outside this band) # Kalshi market anchor Current YES price: **20%** (up from 8% low; +3pp over 7 days, +12pp over 30 days). Avg daily volume ~1,607 contracts over 12 days of data — a liquid, actively-traded bucket with clear upward momentum in implied probability. # Sub-question answers 1. **Kalshi pricing of bucket/siblings** — This bucket (2.6–3.0%) prices at 20% and has risen sharply (30-day +12pp). Sibling market for 2036 same-band prices at only 10%, and other GDP buckets (e.g., 2035's 1.6–2.0% band) trade in the 13–15% range — suggesting the market sees 2030 growth as more likely to be elevated than 2036, but full distribution across all 2030 buckets wasn't retrievable (series query returned no other bucket data). [kalshi_direct/kalshi_related] 2. **Historical base rates** — Postwar (1950–2024): 13/75 years in [2.6%,3.0%] ≈ 17.3%. 2000–2024: 8/25 ≈ 32.0%. 2010–2024: 6/15 ≈ 40.0% (small-sample, likely inflated). [code_execution] 3. **Long-run trend forecasts** — CBO: potential growth ~2.2% (2025-29), declining to ~1.9% after 2029, implying 2030 potential near ~1.9%. Fed longer-run SEP: ~1.8%. IMF: 2026 at 2.4%, decelerating toward ~2% medium-term. None of the major institutional forecasts project baseline 2030 growth above 2.5%. [claude_news, cbo.gov, federalreserve.gov, imf.org] 4. **Recession probability near 2030** — Not directly quantified for 2030 specifically, but Deloitte flags elevated recession risk tied to AI capex/spending pullback; code_execution model assumes 25–35% cumulative recession probability blended into 2030. [claude_news/Deloitte; code_execution] 5. **Structural upside factors** — AI productivity boom is the main cited upside case (IMF April 2026 WEO, World Bank GEP) that could lift growth toward/above 2.6%, but this is explicitly flagged as an upside scenario, not baseline. No specific fiscal/immigration argument was found supporting 2.6%+ by 2030. [claude_news/IMF/World Bank] 6. **Resolution mechanics** — Not addressed in raw research; series description doesn't specify vintage (annual avg vs Q4/Q4) or BEA release used. Revision risk unknown/unaddressed. **Gap.** # Key facts (high-confidence, factual) 1. [kalshi_direct] YES price 20%, 30-day change +12pp, volume ~1,607/day — strong recent bid-up. 2. [FRED A191RL1A225NBEA] Actual annual real GDP growth: 2023=2.9%, 2024=2.8%, 2025=2.1% (partial/estimate). 3. [CBO] Potential GDP growth projected ~2.2% (2025-29) → ~1.9% (post-2029). 4. [Fed SEP] Longer-run growth estimate ~1.8%. 5. [IMF Jan 2026] 2026 growth projected 2.4%, decelerating toward potential thereafter. 6. [code_execution] Parametric normal-distribution fit (μ~2.1%, σ~2.0%) gives P(band)≈7.5-8.5%, well below raw historical hit rate. # Cross-market signals - **Kalshi related**: 2036 identical band (2.6-3.0%) prices only 10% (half of 2030's 20%), implying market expects near-term (2030) growth closer to this band than longer-out years — but internal consistency questionable given absence of other 2030 bucket prices. - **Polymarket**: No matching markets found (0 results for GDP/recession/2030 keywords) — no cross-check available. - **Sportsbook implied**: N/A (not applicable to this event type). # Analyst opinions and speculation - IMF/World Bank: AI productivity gains could be an upside catalyst pushing growth above baseline, but this is a risk scenario, not consensus. - Deloitte: warns AI capex slowdown could tip economy into recession — a downside risk cutting against the 2.6-3.0% band. - Institutional consensus (CBO, Fed, IMF) converges on 2030 potential/trend growth of ~1.8-2.2%, meaningfully below the question's band. # Directional lean per outcome - **Yes (2.6-3.0%)**: Supported by recent actual data (2023: 2.9%, 2024: 2.8% — both in-band) and 2000-2024 historical base rate (~32%) and rising Kalshi price/momentum. Opposed by near-unanimous institutional forecasts (CBO/Fed/IMF) placing 2030 trend growth well below 2.6%, and parametric modeling (~7-15%) suggesting Kalshi's 20% may still be generous relative to fundamentals-based estimate. - **No**: Supported by structural growth deceleration consensus and recession risk (AI-driven pullback per Deloitte); this is the parametric/institutional-forecast favored outcome, and code_execution's synthesized estimate (10-15%) implies No should be ~85-90%, somewhat higher than Kalshi's implied 80%. # Gaps / unknowns - Resolution mechanics (which BEA vintage/measure, annual avg vs Q4/Q4) not specified in rules or research — meaningful for precision near band edges. - No visibility into full 2030 bucket distribution (only one bucket's price available) to check internal consistency/arbitrage. - No direct 2030-specific recession probability estimate from a named forecaster. - Polymarket comparison unavailable. # Calibration anchors - Kalshi current YES price: **20%** (anchor), trending up strongly (+12pp/30 days). - Historical base rates: 17% (1950-2024), 32% (2000-2024). - Model-based synthesis (code_execution): ~10-15% central estimate, range 7-20%. - Institutional trend forecasts (CBO/Fed/IMF) imply baseline 2030 growth (~1.8-2.4%) below band, favoring No.

4. Forecasters Fable 5 + GPT-5.6 Sol · in parallel

claude-fable-5

42% conf

Yes	17%
No	83%

Kalshi anchors YES at 20% with upward momentum, but forecasting a narrow 40bp band five years out warrants dispersion-based estimates: a parametric fit (μ~2.1%, σ~2.0%) gives only ~8%, while historical base rates run 17% (1950-2024) to 32% (2000-2024). Institutional consensus (CBO ~1.9%, Fed ~1.8%, IMF decelerating toward ~2%) places 2030 trend growth below the band, and recession risk (Deloitte's AI-capex warning) adds further downside tail mass outside the band. The AI-productivity upside case could push growth in-band but is explicitly non-baseline. I land slightly below the Kalshi price at 17%, blending the market anchor with the fundamentals-favored lower estimates.

gpt-5.6-sol

63% conf

Yes	17%
No	83%

Kalshi anchors YES at 20%, with recent upward momentum and substantial trading activity supporting a nontrivial chance of landing in the band. Historical frequencies point toward YES, particularly the 32% rate since 2000, but CBO, Fed, and IMF forecasts place 2030 trend growth around 1.8%–2.2%, below the 2.6% threshold. AI productivity provides upside, while recession and AI-investment pullback risks widen the distribution toward outcomes outside this narrow band; the parametric estimate of roughly 8% also argues against exceeding the market price. I therefore move modestly below Kalshi to 17%, while allowing for annual volatility, recent in-band growth, and unresolved measurement mechanics.

5. Devil's Advocate Sonnet 5 · red-team critique

Both forecasts converge suspiciously close (17% each) and move below Kalshi's 20% despite explicit "strong upward momentum" (+12pp/30 days, +3pp/7 days) — neither explains why they're fading a live, liquid, trending market rather than weighting recent price action more heavily, especially given the brief flags 2023–2024 actual growth (2.9%, 2.8%) sat squarely in-band.

Neither forecaster addresses the internal inconsistency flagged in the brief: the 2036 sibling market for the identical band prices at only 10% vs 2030's 20%, and full 2030 bucket distribution is unavailable — this arbitrage/consistency check is ignored entirely rather than being used to sanity-check whether 20% is itself mispriced high or low.

Both rely heavily on the parametric normal model (μ~2.1%, σ~2.0% → ~8%) as a key anchor, but this model was already flagged in the brief as producing estimates "well below raw historical hit rate" and inconsistent with recent actuals (2023-24 both in-band) — treating it as near-equal evidence to institutional trend forecasts risks double-counting the "growth is decelerating" narrative while underweighting realized recent-year data.

Neither forecast discusses resolution mechanics risk (annual avg vs Q4/Q4, BEA vintage) explicitly flagged as a "Gap" — given the band is only 40bp wide, measurement/vintage ambiguity could meaningfully shift probability mass near the edges and deserves at least a mention of uncertainty-widening.

Both forecasts treat recession risk purely as a factor pushing toward "No" (below band), but a sharp recession could also produce a rebound year with growth above 3.0% (as in post-2020 recovery), and neither considers the "No via above-band" tail explicitly — the brief's outcome framing (No = outside band on either side) isn't decomposed by forecasters into "too low" vs "too high" No-scenarios.

Given confidence scores diverge widely (0.42 vs 0.63) despite identical point probabilities and nearly identical rationales, neither justifies why their confidence in the same 17/83 split differs so much — this inconsistency in stated confidence isn't explained by any distinct evidence weighting between the two.

6. Aggregator Fable 5 · final calibrated forecast

19% (52% confidence)

Yes: 19% No: 81%

Both forecasts converge at 17%, modestly fading the Kalshi 20% anchor, but the critique correctly notes that the fundamentals-based reasons (CBO/Fed/IMF trend forecasts, parametric model) are public information likely already priced into a liquid market with strong recent upward momentum. The parametric ~8% estimate is likely too low given recent actuals (2023: 2.9%, 2024: 2.8% both in-band) and the 2000-2024 base rate of ~32%, so I don't weight it heavily. Forecasting a 40bp band five years out is dominated by dispersion, and institutional trend forecasts of ~1.8-2.2% do sit below the band, justifying staying at or slightly below market rather than above. I land at 19%, essentially deferring to the market anchor with a small fundamentals-driven haircut, acknowledging the 'No' side includes both below-band (most likely) and above-band tail scenarios.

Pipeline Timing

Total pipeline time: 134.4s

Per-tool research timings shown in the Research section above.