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Will inflation reach more than 5% in 2026?
5%
Agent
7%
Market Price
-2.0%
Edge
77%
Confidence
313,820
Volume
2.0c
Spread
122
Days to resolution
8
Markets in event
final rationale
The 2026 peak (4.2% in May) already passed without breaching 5%, and CPI has cooled to 3.4% with two straight months of declines, so YES now requires a fresh shock larger than the Iran-war spike within just five remaining prints. Getting from 3.4% to above 5% YoY would take an abrupt ~1.6pp acceleration — no forecaster (even hawkish PIIE at ~4%) or market signal (breakevens ~2.3%) supports this. The critique correctly notes the 'any single month' trigger and live tariff pass-through channel keep tail risk alive, which justifies staying near rather than far below the Polymarket 7% anchor. I set YES at 5%, splitting the two forecasts while retaining modest energy/tariff-shock tail risk.
price vs. prediction
market price
agent forecast at t+0
48 follow-ups
re-scan context
This market has been scanned before. Previous predictions:
| date | predicted | market price | confidence |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-08-23 | 5% | 8% | 78% |
| 2026-08-16 | 6% | 8% | 76% |
1. Planner Fable 5 · Fermi decomposition + tool plan
Tools chosen:
polymarket_direct
fred
kalshi_related
polymarket_related
claude_news
code_execution
Sub-questions (Fermi decomposition)
- What is the current 12-month headline CPI rate and its month-over-month trend in the most recent BLS reports?
- What do professional forecasters (Fed SEP, Cleveland Fed nowcast, SPF, Wall Street banks) project for CPI inflation through 2026?
- What are market-implied inflation expectations (breakevens, inflation swaps) for the 2026 horizon, and are they anywhere near 5%?
- Are there identifiable shocks (new tariffs, energy price spikes, fiscal stimulus, supply chain disruptions) that could plausibly push 12-month CPI above 5% during 2026?
- Historically, how often has 12-month CPI risen by ~2 percentage points or more within a 12-18 month window from a starting point around 3%?
- What probabilities do related Kalshi and Polymarket inflation markets assign to various 2025-2026 CPI thresholds?
Planner reasoning
This market resolves YES if any monthly BLS CPI report in 2026 shows 12-month headline CPI above 5.0%. Current inflation is around 3%, so the key questions are the current trajectory, tariff/policy shocks that could push inflation up sharply, and what forecasters and market-implied measures expect for 2026. The Polymarket price is the primary anchor; FRED data and cross-market checks on Kalshi inflation markets provide triangulation.
2. Research Parallel tool calls
| tool | status | time | items | summary |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| polymarket_direct | OK | 0.4s | 1 | ## This Market's Polymarket Data **Will inflation reach more than 5% in 2026?** - Current price (probability): 7.00% - 7-day price change: +0.00% - 30-day price change: -6.50% - Total volume: $313,820 (USD notional) - Price range: 6.00% - 31.00% - Data points: 90 days |
| fred | OK | 5.1s | 4 | Fetched 4 FRED series (lookback=730d). |
| kalshi_related | OK | 2.9s | 2 | 2 related markets / summaries. keyword 'inflation': ok | keyword 'CPI': ok |
| polymarket_related | OK | 0.1s | 0 | Scanned 100 active Polymarket markets, kept 0 matches. keyword 'inflation 2026': 0 markets | keyword 'CPI': 0 markets |
| claude_news | OK | 19.6s | 14 | Based on my research: - **Latest CPI reading**: US headline CPI was 3.40% in July 2026, down from 3.50% in June, easing for a second consecutive month , well below the 5% threshold. (tradingeconomics.com) - **2026 peak so far**: Inflation had earlier spiked to 4.2% in May 2026 due to an energy s |
| code_execution | OK | 73.9s | 0 | ## Key Findings **Historical base rate (simulated monthly CPI YoY series, 1960–2024, from known annual BLS averages with realistic monthly interpolation/noise):** - Out of **207 months** where trailing 12-month CPI YoY sat in a "~3%" band (2.5%–3.5%), the frequency of subsequently breaching 5% YoY |
3. Evidence Brief Sonnet 5 · 6136 chars
# Current state
As of the most recent BLS data (July 2026), 12-month headline CPI stands at 3.4%, down from 3.5% in June and well below the 5% threshold; the 2026 peak so far was 4.2% in May, driven by an Iran-war energy shock, and inflation has since eased for two straight months. Resolution triggers YES if ANY month's 12-month CPI print in 2026 exceeds 5% (not just December) — since the year's peak-to-date (4.2%) already fell short and the trend is now downward with only ~5 months (Aug–Dec 2026) remaining, the bar is functionally about whether a fresh, larger shock hits before year-end.
# Timeline of key events
- 2026-05: CPI YoY spikes to 4.2%, 2026 peak, attributed to energy shock from Iran conflict (reported, tradingeconomics.com).
- 2026-06-17: FOMC (June SEP) raises 2026 headline PCE inflation forecast to 3.6% (core 3.3%), up from March's 2.7% (confirmed, CNBC/Forbes).
- 2026-06: CPI YoY eases to 3.5% (reported, tradingeconomics.com).
- 2026-07: CPI YoY eases further to 3.4%; core CPI 2.5% (reported, tradingeconomics.com).
- 2026 (undated, ongoing): PIIE's Orszag/Posen argue upside risk could push inflation past 4% by year-end, citing tariffs, fiscal deficit, tight labor market (analyst opinion, PIIE).
- 2026 (undated): NY Fed survey finds ~75% of tariff-affected firms passing on some cost increases (reported, arete-wa.com); Deloitte assumes tariffs ease toward ~5% average rate and oil averages $85/bbl in 2026, dampening further pressure (forecast).
# Event
Will 12-month CPI (any month in 2026, per BLS) exceed 5%?
# Outcomes to forecast
- Yes (>5% in any 2026 month)
- No (never exceeds 5% in 2026)
# Kalshi market anchor
No distinct kalshi_direct output was returned for this ticker; the only direct pricing data available is from polymarket_direct (ticker matches exactly): current YES price 7.0%, flat over 7 days, down 6.5 points over 30 days, off a 90-day high of 31% (low 6%), volume $313,820. Treat 7% as the best available consensus anchor. Related Kalshi CPI markets found (KXUSCPIYEAR series) reference 2034–2036 horizons and are not directly comparable.
# Sub-question answers
1. **Current CPI trend** — July 2026 headline CPI YoY = 3.4%, down from 3.5% (June) and 4.2% (May peak); core CPI 2.5% in July, easing two consecutive months (tradingeconomics.com via claude_news).
2. **Forecaster projections** — Fed June 2026 SEP: 3.6% headline PCE, 3.3% core for 2026 (CNBC/Forbes). Morningstar: ~2.7% for 2026. RSM: above 2% target but not near 5%. Most hawkish mainstream view (PIIE, Orszag/Posen): could exceed 4% by year-end 2026 — still under 5%.
3. **Market-implied expectations** — 10yr breakeven (T10YIE) 2.31%, 5yr breakeven 2.31% (Aug 2026, FRED); Michigan 1-yr expected inflation spiked to 3.5% in May 2026 but fell back to 2.39% by August. None approach 5%.
4. **Potential shocks** — Iran-war energy shock already drove the May 2026 4.2% peak; tariff pass-through is real (~75% of affected firms raising prices, NY Fed survey) but Deloitte assumes tariffs ease to ~5% average rate and oil averages $85/bbl in 2026 — a moderating, not escalating, baseline. No new large shock identified for H2 2026.
5. **Historical base rate** — Simulated 1960–2024 data: from a ~3% CPI starting point, probability of breaching 5% within 12 months ≈ 4.5%, within 18 months ≈ 6.6%, within 24 months ≈ 9.6% (code_execution), historically driven by 1970s oil shocks, late-1980s overheating, and 2021–22 pandemic surge.
6. **Cross-market pricing** — Polymarket prices this exact event at 7% (down sharply from a 31% high). No comparable Kalshi 2026-specific CPI threshold market was found.
# Key facts (high-confidence, factual)
1. [FRED/tradingeconomics] July 2026 CPI YoY = 3.4%, June = 3.5%, May peak = 4.2%.
2. [CNBC/Forbes] June 2026 FOMC SEP: 2026 headline PCE inflation forecast raised to 3.6%.
3. [FRED] 5yr/10yr breakevens ~2.3% as of late Aug 2026; no market pricing near 5%.
4. [Polymarket] This exact market trades at 7% YES, down from 31% three months ago.
5. [code_execution] Historical base rate of 3%→5%+ CPI jump within 12-18 months ≈ 5-7%.
# Cross-market signals
- Kalshi related: only long-horizon (2034–2036) CPI markets found; not informative for 2026.
- Polymarket: this market (matching ticker) at 7%, declining trend, high historical range (6-31%) suggests market has already de-risked substantially as actual data came in below 5%.
- Sportsbook implied: n/a.
# Analyst opinions and speculation
- PIIE (Orszag/Posen): inflation could "surprise to the upside," potentially exceeding 4% by end-2026 due to tariffs, fiscal deficit, tight labor market, and drifting expectations — the most hawkish credible view found, still short of 5%.
- Deloitte/RSM: baseline assumes tariff/oil moderation, keeping inflation elevated but well under 5%.
- No analyst or institution surveyed forecasts >5% for 2026.
# Directional lean per outcome
- **Yes (>5%)**: Supported only by tail-risk shock scenarios (new energy crisis, aggressive tariff escalation) and the fact that a 4.2% spike already occurred once in 2026. Opposed by: actual data already cooling to 3.4%, no forecaster above ~4%, breakevens near 2.3%, only ~5 months remain, Polymarket at 7% and falling.
- **No (≤5%)**: Strongly favored — current trajectory, unanimous forecaster consensus, low market-implied expectations, and historical base rates (~5-10%) for such a jump all point to No, especially given the year's peak already passed without breaching 5%.
# Gaps / unknowns
- No true Kalshi order-book data (kalshi_direct) retrieved for this specific ticker; anchor relies on Polymarket.
- August–December 2026 CPI prints not yet available; unclear if any residual tariff/energy pass-through could reaccelerate prints late in the year.
- Exact dating of PIIE/NY Fed/Deloitte publications not specified.
# Calibration anchors
- Polymarket current YES price: 7% (anchor, declining trend).
- Historical base rate for 3%→5%+ CPI jump within 12-18 months: ~5-7% (code_execution simulation).
- Given actual 2026 peak (4.2%) already passed and current 3.4%/falling, true probability likely below the 7% anchor — perhaps 3-5%.
4. Forecasters Fable 5 + GPT-5.6 Sol · in parallel
claude-fable-5
78% conf
| Yes | 4% |
| No | 96% |
The 2026 peak so far was 4.2% in May (Iran energy shock), and CPI has since cooled to 3.4% by July with only ~5 months of prints remaining. No forecaster surveyed projects above ~4% (PIIE's hawkish scenario), breakevens sit near 2.3%, and the Fed's own upgraded 2026 forecast is 3.6% PCE. Polymarket prices this exact event at 7% and falling from a 31% high; reaching >5% now requires a fresh, larger shock than the one already absorbed. Given the declining trajectory and historical base rate (~5-7% for a 3%→5% jump), I place YES slightly below the market anchor at 4%.
gpt-5.6-sol
76% conf
| Yes | 6% |
| No | 94% |
The best available consensus anchor is Polymarket's 7% YES price, with no directly comparable Kalshi market. July CPI was 3.4%, down from May's 4.2% peak, so a breach now requires a fresh shock during the remaining five months. Mainstream forecasts, roughly 2.3% breakevens, and even the hawkish PIIE scenario remain below 5%, while historical breach rates are only about 5-7% over a longer 12-18 month window. I therefore move modestly below the 7% anchor, while retaining tail risk for renewed energy disruption or unexpectedly strong tariff pass-through.
5. Devil's Advocate Sonnet 5 · red-team critique
1. Both forecasts converge tightly (4-5.5%) near the Polymarket anchor without independently stress-testing whether 7% itself might already be stale or mispriced given thin volume ($313,820) and a 90-day range of 6-31%—neither forecaster questions why Polymarket hasn't fully collapsed to ~2-3% if the "No" case is truly this strong, which could indicate residual uncertainty the forecasters are underweighting.
2. Neither forecaster explicitly addresses the mechanical asymmetry that YES only requires ONE month >5% out of five remaining prints (Aug-Dec), meaning even a temporary one-month spike (e.g., a base-effect quirk or short-lived tariff pass-through shock) resolves YES regardless of subsequent reversion — this "any single month" trigger deserves more explicit treatment than the aggregate trend framing both use.
3. Both cite the historical base rate (~5-7% for a 3%→5% jump within 12-18 months) as roughly consistent with their final answer, but the brief's base rate is for a *starting point of ~3%*, whereas the actual starting point is 3.4% already down from a 4.2% peak — using the higher recent peak as anchor (not the current 3.4%) might argue for a somewhat different (likely lower, given already-observed cooling) base rate than blindly applying the generic 3% reference class.
4. Neither forecaster meaningfully engages with the NY Fed finding that "~75% of tariff-affected firms passing on some cost increases" as a live, ongoing inflationary channel — this is dismissed via Deloitte's moderating assumption, but if tariff escalation resumes (e.g., new rounds), this pass-through could compound with residual energy volatility, a compounding-shock scenario neither model discusses.
5. Both forecasts are nearly identical in structure and reasoning (same evidence, same anchor, same conclusion ~4-5.5%), suggesting insufficient independent stress-testing of tail scenarios — e.g., a renewed Iran/Mideast escalation or an oil price shock analogous to May's driver — which historically has been the dominant cause of >5% breaches per the brief's own base-rate note ("historically driven by 1970s oil shocks... 2021-22 pandemic surge"), yet neither model quantifies this specific scenario probability separately from the generic base rate.
6. Confidence levels (0.78, 0.76) seem high given both models acknowledge meaningful unknowns (Aug-Dec prints unavailable, no true Kalshi order-book data, exact PIIE timing unclear) — this stated confidence may not fully reflect the residual data-gap uncertainty flagged in the brief's "Gaps/unknowns" section.
6. Aggregator Fable 5 · final calibrated forecast
5%
(77% confidence)
Yes: 5%
No: 95%
The 2026 peak (4.2% in May) already passed without breaching 5%, and CPI has cooled to 3.4% with two straight months of declines, so YES now requires a fresh shock larger than the Iran-war spike within just five remaining prints. Getting from 3.4% to above 5% YoY would take an abrupt ~1.6pp acceleration — no forecaster (even hawkish PIIE at ~4%) or market signal (breakevens ~2.3%) supports this. The critique correctly notes the 'any single month' trigger and live tariff pass-through channel keep tail risk alive, which justifies staying near rather than far below the Polymarket 7% anchor. I set YES at 5%, splitting the two forecasts while retaining modest energy/tariff-shock tail risk.
Pipeline Timing
Total pipeline time: 176.4s
Per-tool research timings shown in the Research section above.