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GDP growth in 2035? — 1.6% to 2.0%
13%
Agent
14%
Market Price
-1.0%
Edge
62%
Confidence
14,744
Volume
5.0c
Spread
3469
Days to resolution
14
Markets in event
final rationale
The 1.6–2.0% band is centered exactly on the CBO/Fed 1.8% consensus, but it is only 0.4pp wide against annual real GDP growth dispersion of ~1.5–2.3pp, so parametric models give 6–11% while the 2000–2024 empirical frequency gives ~20%; the blended 10–15% range brackets the 14¢ market price. The critique's strongest points — potential Q4/Q4 resolution (higher variance), recent prints all above 2.0% (2023–2025), and rising nominal-growth pricing — are mildly asymmetric toward No, while the overstated precision of a decade-out trend-extrapolated baseline argues against treating 1.8% as a hard anchor. I therefore stay close to the market anchor but shade slightly below it to 13%, which remains well inside the fair-value band. No is heavily favored purely on band-narrowness mechanics.
price vs. prediction
market price
agent forecast at t+0
55 follow-ups
re-scan context
| date | predicted | market price | confidence |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-08-22 | 13% | 14% | 62% |
| 2026-07-31 | 10% | 9% | 50% |
1. Planner Opus 5
Tools chosen:
kalshi_direct
kalshi_related
fred
code_execution
claude_news
polymarket_related
Sub-questions (Fermi decomposition)
- What is the current Kalshi YES price for KXGDPYEAR-35-B1.8 and what do the other buckets in the KXGDPYEAR-35 ladder imply about the market's full probability distribution for 2035 real GDP growth?
- Historically, what fraction of calendar years since 1950 (and since 1990) had US annual real GDP growth between 1.6% and 2.0%, i.e. the unconditional base rate for this 0.4pp bin?
- What is the standard deviation / dispersion of annual US real GDP growth, and given a central forecast near 1.8%, what probability mass falls in a 0.4pp-wide bin around it?
- What are CBO's long-term economic projections and the Fed SEP longer-run real GDP growth estimate for the mid-2030s, and where do they place the central expectation for 2035?
- How exactly does Kalshi define/resolve 'real GDP growth' for the year (annual average vs Q4/Q4, which BEA vintage), and does that change the bucket probability?
- Does Polymarket or another venue price any comparable long-horizon US GDP growth market that disagrees with Kalshi?
Planner reasoning
This is a very long-horizon macro question (2035 annual US real GDP growth in a 0.4pp-wide bucket around the CBO's long-run trend of ~1.8%). The key inputs are the Kalshi market's own price and the full bucket ladder for KXGDPYEAR-35, the historical base rate of annual real GDP growth landing in 1.6-2.0%, and official long-run projections (CBO/Fed SEP longer-run) that anchor the central tendency. Since no near-term news can move a 2035 outcome, the work is mostly base-rate and distribution math.
2. Research
| tool | status | time | items | summary |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| kalshi_direct | OK | 0.2s | 1 | ## This Market's Kalshi Data **1.6% to 2.0%** (KXGDPYEAR-35-B1.8) - Current price (probability): 14.00% - 7-day price change: +1.00% - 30-day price change: +6.00% - Average daily volume: 983 contracts - Price range: 8.00% - 15.00% - Data points: 15 days |
| kalshi_related | OK | 4.2s | 2 | 2 related markets / summaries. series KXGDPYEAR: 0 markets (skipped 100 no-signal) | series KXGDP: 0 markets (skipped 36 no-signal) | keyword 'GDP growth 2035': ok | keyword 'GDP growth year': ok |
| fred | OK | 7.1s | 5 | Fetched 5 FRED series (lookback=3650d) (via search 'real gross domestic product annual percent change'). |
| code_execution | OK | 34.5s | 0 | **US Real GDP Growth (%, annual avg, BEA NIPA Table 1.1.1) — hardcoded 1948‑2024 series analysis** - **Full sample (1948‑2024, n=77):** mean = 3.13%, sd = 2.33 pp; only **7.8%** of years (6/77) fell in the narrow [1.6%, 2.0%] band — post‑war growth was historically much higher/more volatile than to |
| claude_news | OK | 28.3s | 12 | ## Key Findings **CBO Long-Term Projections (most recent: Feb 2026 "Budget and Economic Outlook: 2026 to 2036")** - Real GDP growth slows to 1.8 percent from 2027 on, reflecting several factors that roughly offset each other in CBO's newest baseline — this directly covers 2035. Source: https://ww |
| polymarket_related | OK | 4.0s | 0 | Scanned 100 active Polymarket markets, kept 0 matches. keyword 'GDP growth': 0 markets | keyword 'US GDP': 0 markets | keyword 'recession': 0 markets |
3. Evidence Brief Sonnet 5, 6150 chars
# Event
Kalshi market KXGDPYEAR-35-B1.8: resolves YES if US real GDP growth in 2035 falls in the 1.6%–2.0% bucket.
# Outcomes to forecast
- Yes (2035 real GDP growth 1.6%–2.0%)
- No (growth outside that band)
# Kalshi market anchor
**Current YES price: 14¢** (probability 14%). 7-day change: +1pt; 30-day change: +6pt (up from 8% a month ago to 15% peak, now 14%). Avg daily volume ~983 contracts — decent liquidity for a decade-out niche market. Trend is upward, suggesting market is converging toward CBO/Fed consensus view that ~1.8% is the most likely single point estimate. [kalshi_direct]
# Sub-question answers
1. **Kalshi YES price / ladder** — B1.8 bucket priced at 14%. Adjacent series data show KXGDPYEAR-36-B2.8 (2036, 2.6–3.0% bucket) at 10%, implying the ladder spreads probability across multiple buckets with no single bucket dominating; full distribution not directly visible but 14% for the CBO/Fed consensus-centered bucket is plausible if unremarkable. [kalshi_related]
2. **Historical base rate** — 1948–2024 full sample: 7.8% of years in band; 1990–2024: 17.1%; 2000–2024 (most relevant): 20.0% (5/25 years). [code_execution]
3. **Dispersion around 1.8% central forecast** — Historical sd (2000-2024) ≈1.76pp. Normal-model estimates centered at 1.8%: sd=1.5→10.6%, sd=2.0→8.0%, sd=2.5→6.4%. Empirical base rate (~20%) is 2-3x higher than parametric-normal estimates, implying realized growth clusters more tightly than a symmetric normal assumption suggests. [code_execution]
4. **CBO/Fed projections for 2035** — CBO's Feb 2026 baseline: growth "slows to 1.8%... from 2027 on," directly covering 2035; prior Jan 2025 baseline: "averages roughly 1.8% a year from 2027 to 2035." Fed SEP longer-run median stable at 1.8% through Dec 2025. AI productivity boost (~0.1pp/yr per CBO) offsets weaker immigration-driven labor growth, keeping 1.8% central estimate intact. [claude_news/CBO/Fed]
5. **Resolution definition (annual avg vs Q4/Q4, BEA vintage)** — Not specified in rules text; no research found clarifying which measure/vintage Kalshi uses. This is a genuine gap — could matter since Q4/Q4 growth has historically higher variance than annual-average growth.
6. **Polymarket/other venues** — No comparable long-horizon US GDP growth market found; scan of 100 active Polymarket markets returned zero matches for GDP/recession keywords. [polymarket_related]
# Key facts (high-confidence, factual)
1. [claude_news/CBO] CBO Feb 2026 and Jan 2025 baselines both project ~1.8% average real GDP growth for the mid-2030s including 2035.
2. [claude_news/Fed] Fed SEP longer-run real GDP growth median stable at 1.8% across March–Dec 2025 releases.
3. [code_execution] 2000-2024 empirical base rate for a year landing in [1.6%,2.0%] is 20% (5/25 years); sd of annual growth ≈1.76-2.33pp depending on sample window.
4. [kalshi_direct] Current YES price 14%, up 6pts over 30 days, avg volume 983 contracts.
5. [fred] Recent realized annual growth rates (A191RL1A225NBEA): 2023=2.9%, 2024=2.8%, 2025=2.1% — all above the 1.6-2.0% band recently, though Q-over-Q data (A191RO1Q156NBEA) show 2025 quarters near 2.0-2.4%.
# Cross-market signals
- Kalshi related: KXGDPYEAR-36-B2.8 (2036, 2.6-3.0% band) priced at 10%; KXNOMGDPGROWTH nominal-growth markets (Above 5%/6% thresholds) priced 36-37%, rising sharply (+9pt in 7 days) — suggests some repricing of nominal growth/inflation expectations upward, indirectly relevant to real growth path.
- Polymarket: No comparable market exists.
- Sportsbook implied: N/A (not applicable to economic data).
# Analyst opinions and speculation
- CBO and Fed consensus strongly converge on ~1.8% as central estimate for 2035 growth — this is the strongest structural anchor and sits at the midpoint of the Yes band.
- White House has floated 3.0% annual growth (WSJ), far above CBO/Fed — an outlier, low-credibility view given no methodological backing cited, more political messaging than a base-rate-consistent forecast.
- Penn Wharton estimates AI cumulative level effect of +1.5% GDP by 2035 (not annual growth rate) — modest impact, unlikely to push single-year 2035 growth materially outside the 1.6-2.0% band on its own.
- code_execution synthesis: fair value likely 10-15%, bracketing the current 14% Kalshi price — market appears reasonably calibrated, perhaps slightly rich vs. normal-model estimates but conservative vs. empirical 20% recency base rate.
# Directional lean per outcome
- **Yes (1.6-2.0%)**: Supported by CBO/Fed 1.8% central point estimate sitting inside band; supported by 2000-2024 empirical base rate (20%) implying decent chance any given year lands here. Opposed by: narrow 0.4pp width mechanically caps probability under any dispersion model (6-11% normal-model range); recent actual years (2023-2025) have all printed above 2.0%, showing realized growth often overshoots trend.
- **No**: Supported by inherent difficulty of any single year landing in a narrow band a decade out — GDP growth is volatile (sd 1.5-2.3pp) and single-year outcomes frequently fall outside a tight 0.4pp target even when centered correctly; supported by recent 3 years all >2.0%. Base case: No is more likely (~85-86%) simply due to band narrowness vs. distribution width.
# Gaps / unknowns
- Exact Kalshi resolution methodology (annual-average vs Q4/Q4 BEA measure, data vintage) not confirmed — could shift effective volatility/base rate.
- No visibility into full KXGDPYEAR-35 ladder (all buckets) to cross-check implied total probability sums to ~100%.
- No independent forecaster (e.g., Blue Chip, IMF) point estimates gathered for 2035 specifically beyond CBO/Fed.
- 2035 is 9+ years out — no market/analyst has published a de novo probabilistic distribution specific to that year beyond trend extrapolation.
# Calibration anchors
- Kalshi current YES price: **14%** (primary anchor, uptrending).
- 2000-2024 empirical base rate for band: ~20%.
- Full-sample (1948-2024) base rate: ~8%.
- Normal-model estimates centered at 1.8% (CBO/Fed consensus): 6-11% depending on assumed sd.
- Blended "fair value" estimate from research: ~10-15%, closely bracketing current Kalshi price.
4. Forecasters Opus 5 + GPT-5.6 Sol, in parallel
claude-opus-5
62% conf
| Yes | 14% |
| No | 86% |
The 1.6–2.0% band is centered exactly on the CBO/Fed consensus long-run estimate of 1.8% for 2035, which is the strongest structural anchor, but the band is only 0.4pp wide against an annual-growth standard deviation of ~1.5–2.3pp. Parametric normal models centered at 1.8% imply only 6–11%, while the 2000–2024 empirical base rate of landing in this band is ~20%; blended fair value is ~10–15%. Recent prints (2023: 2.9%, 2024: 2.8%, 2025: 2.1%) all sit above the band, and no unique information contradicts the market. The Kalshi YES price of 14¢ (up 6pts in 30 days on decent volume) sits squarely inside the fair-value range, so I anchor there.
gpt-5.6-sol
62% conf
| Yes | 14% |
| No | 86% |
The 14% Kalshi YES price is the strongest anchor and falls within the brief's estimated 10%–15% fair-value range. CBO and Fed projections center 2035 growth at 1.8%, supporting Yes, while the 2000–2024 empirical frequency of 20% suggests meaningful clustering in the band. However, the band is only 0.4 percentage points wide, and dispersion-based models assign it just 6%–11%, strongly favoring No despite the centered forecast. Uncertainty about the resolution measure and the decade-long horizon does not justify moving materially from the market consensus.
5. Devil's Advocate Sonnet 5
1. Both forecasts converge identically on 14% with near-identical reasoning, essentially just restating the brief's blended estimate rather than independently stress-testing it—this suggests herding on the Kalshi anchor rather than genuine independent analysis, and neither explores why they didn't lean toward the empirical 20% base rate given CBO/Fed's strong point-estimate confidence.
2. Neither forecast addresses the resolution-definition gap (sub-question 5: annual avg vs Q4/Q4, BEA vintage) with any probabilistic adjustment—if Q4/Q4 is used, variance is higher, mechanically favoring No more strongly, yet both simply treat this as a non-issue rather than a source of tail risk or asymmetric adjustment.
3. Both ignore the recency signal buried in the evidence: 2023-2025 all printed above 2.0% (2.9%, 2.8%, 2.1%), suggesting a possible regime of structurally higher realized growth than the 1.8% CBO trend-line assumes, which should arguably pull the distribution's mode rightward and reduce Yes probability below 14%, not just be footnoted.
4. Neither forecast grapples with the 9-year forecasting horizon uncertainty explicitly—no analyst has produced a de novo 2035-specific distribution, and CBO/Fed "1.8%" is a baseline projection method inherited from trend extrapolation, not a probabilistic forecast with quantified confidence intervals for a single year, so treating it as a hard anchor may overstate certainty.
5. The cross-market signal that nominal GDP growth markets (KXNOMGDPGROWTH) are repricing sharply upward (+9pt in 7 days, now 36-37% for Above 5%/6%) is not incorporated at all—if nominal growth expectations are rising (likely inflation-driven but possibly real-growth-driven too), this could be a leading indicator worth a small downward adjustment to Yes that neither forecaster discusses.
6. Both forecasts stop at reciting the 10-15% "blended fair value" without independently deriving or challenging it—for instance, neither notes that the parametric normal-model range (6-11%) and empirical base rate (20%) disagree by nearly 2x, and simply splitting the difference at 14% (matching the market) may be an anchoring bias rather than a resolved analytical judgment.
6. Aggregator Opus 5
13%
(62% confidence)
Yes: 13%
No: 87%
The 1.6–2.0% band is centered exactly on the CBO/Fed 1.8% consensus, but it is only 0.4pp wide against annual real GDP growth dispersion of ~1.5–2.3pp, so parametric models give 6–11% while the 2000–2024 empirical frequency gives ~20%; the blended 10–15% range brackets the 14¢ market price. The critique's strongest points — potential Q4/Q4 resolution (higher variance), recent prints all above 2.0% (2023–2025), and rising nominal-growth pricing — are mildly asymmetric toward No, while the overstated precision of a decade-out trend-extrapolated baseline argues against treating 1.8% as a hard anchor. I therefore stay close to the market anchor but shade slightly below it to 13%, which remains well inside the fair-value band. No is heavily favored purely on band-narrowness mechanics.
Pipeline Timing
Total pipeline time: 104.6s
Per-tool research timings shown in the Research section above.