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No change in Bank of England’s interest rates after September 2026 meeting?
89%
Agent
92%
Market Price
-3.5%
Edge
72%
Confidence
101,560
Volume
1.0c
Spread
20
Days to resolution
5
Markets in event
final rationale
Five consecutive 2026 holds, ~90% economist consensus for a hold through year-end, the 92.5% Polymarket price on this exact contract, and an elevated ~68–80% historical hold rate for non-MPR September meetings all point the same direction. The main counterweight, correctly flagged by the critique, is meeting-dated OIS implying only ~72–76% hold with residual skew to a hike, plus an escalating hawkish dissent trajectory (8–1 → 7–2 → 6–3) and July CPI reaccelerating to 2.9% — so I shade below the Polymarket anchor rather than matching it. However, OIS a month out routinely carries residual risk premium that decays as data arrives, and the dovish offsets (unemployment at 5.0%, weak GDP, services CPI easing to 3.4%, Bailey signalling no urgency) make an immediate September hike unlikely; a 6–3 vote still needs two more converts. I land at 0.89 Yes, with the 11% No mass roughly 85/15 skewed toward a hike over a cut.
price vs. prediction
market price
agent forecast at t+0
56 follow-ups
re-scan context
| date | predicted | market price | confidence |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-08-21 | 92% | 92% | 75% |
| 2026-08-14 | 86% | 90% | 67% |
1. Planner Opus 5
Tools chosen:
polymarket_direct
polymarket_related
kalshi_related
claude_news
claude_news
fred
gdelt_news
wikipedia
code_execution
Sub-questions (Fermi decomposition)
- What is the current Polymarket YES price (and its recent trajectory) for 'no change' at the September 2026 BoE meeting?
- What is the Bank Rate level as of mid-2026, and what did the BoE decide at its most recent meetings (Feb/Mar/May/Jun/Aug 2026)?
- What do OIS/market-implied UK rate expectations imply for a cut/hold at the September 17, 2026 meeting?
- What is the historical base rate of 'no change' at BoE MPC meetings, and specifically at non-Monetary Policy Report (non-forecast-round) meetings such as September?
- What are the latest UK CPI, wage growth, and unemployment readings, and are they trending in a direction that would force a September move?
- Does Kalshi (or other venues) have a comparable BoE September 2026 market, and does its price disagree with Polymarket?
Planner reasoning
This is a Polymarket question on whether the BoE holds Bank Rate at its September 2026 MPC meeting. The primary anchor is the Polymarket price; secondary anchors are Kalshi's central-bank decision series and market pricing/OIS expectations for UK rates. Key drivers are UK inflation/labour data, the BoE's recent cut cadence (quarterly cuts pattern), and whether September is a 'live' meeting (historically the BoE has favoured acting at MPR meetings in Feb/May/Aug/Nov).
2. Research
| tool | status | time | items | summary |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| polymarket_direct | OK | 0.3s | 1 | ## This Market's Polymarket Data **No change in Bank of England’s interest rates after September 2026 meeting?** - Current price (probability): 92.50% - 7-day price change: -0.50% - 30-day price change: +7.00% - Total volume: $101,560 (USD notional) - Price range: 51.50% - 95.50% - Data points: 65 |
| polymarket_related | OK | 2.1s | 0 | Scanned 100 active Polymarket markets, kept 0 matches. keyword 'Bank of England': 0 markets | keyword 'Bank Rate': 0 markets | keyword 'BoE interest rate': 0 markets |
| kalshi_related | OK | 2.0s | 2 | 2 related markets / summaries. series KXCBDECISION: 0 markets (skipped 0 no-signal) | series KXBOE: 0 markets (skipped 0 no-signal) | keyword 'Bank of England': ok | keyword 'bank rate': ok |
| claude_news | OK | 23.5s | 17 | **Bank of England 2026 MPC meeting history & Bank Rate path** - Bank Rate has held at **3.75%** through every 2026 meeting so far (Feb, March, April, June, July), after being cut to that level in December 2025: that followed the previous cut in December 2025, when Bank Rate was reduced to 3.75% . |
| claude_news | OK | 29.2s | 15 | ## Key findings on UK macro data and BoE rate outlook (September 2026) **Inflation (CPI/CPIH)** - The Consumer Prices Index (CPI) rose by 2.9% in the 12 months to July 2026, up from 2.6% the previous month. ONS: https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/inflationandpriceindices/bulletins/consumerpriceinflat |
| fred | OK | 2.0s | 0 | no series_ids supplied and search_text resolved nothing |
| gdelt_news | OK | 90.6s | 20 | GDELT: 20 articles across 3 queries (lookback=45d). 'Bank of England September 2026 rate decision': error HTTPSConnectionPool(host='api.gdeltproject.org', port=443): Read timed out. (read timeout=30) | 'MPC vote Bank Rate cut 2026': 10 hits | 'UK interest rate expectations 2026': 10 hits |
| wikipedia | OK | 2.0s | 2 | Fetched 2 Wikipedia entries (0 missing pages). |
| code_execution | OK | 53.4s | 0 | ## Key Findings - **Full sample (all 45 MPC meetings, Feb 2021–Aug 2026 constructed series):** 23 "no change" (hold) decisions → **base rate ≈ 51.1%**. This period is dominated by the 2022-23 hiking cycle, which pulls the all-meeting hold rate down. - **Non-MPR meetings only (Mar/Jun/Sep/Dec — the |
3. Evidence Brief Sonnet 5, 6347 chars
# Current state
Bank Rate has been held at 3.75% since the December 2025 cut, through five consecutive 2026 meetings (Feb–Jul), with MPC dissent shifting from dovish (wanting cuts) early in the year to hawkish (wanting hikes) by mid-2026 amid Middle East-driven energy inflation. The September 17, 2026 decision is not yet made; markets and economists heavily favor another hold, but this is a forecast, not yet a resolved fact.
# Timeline of key events
- 2025-12: Bank Rate cut to 3.75% (confirmed, BoE).
- 2026-02-04: Held at 3.75%, MPC voted 5–4 (4 wanted a cut to 3.5%) — dovish dissent (confirmed, BoE).
- 2026-03: Held at 3.75%, unanimous vote; Middle East conflict cited as raising energy/commodity prices (confirmed, BoE).
- 2026-04: Held at 3.75%, MPC voted 8–1 (1 wanted a hike to 4%) — dissent flips hawkish (confirmed, BoE).
- 2026-06: Held at 3.75%, MPC voted 7–2 (2 wanted a hike); OIS curve briefly eased on a Middle East peace-deal announcement (confirmed, BoE).
- 2026-07-30: Held at 3.75%, MPC voted 6–3 (3 wanted a hike to 4%) — dubbed a "hawkish hold" by analysts; Bailey did not signal imminent hike (confirmed, BoE/HOA).
- 2026-08 (data for July): CPI rose to 2.9% (from 2.6%), first reacceleration since March 2026; services CPI 3.4% (down from 3.6% in June); wage growth 3.5% regular/4.1% total; unemployment rose to 5.0% (confirmed, ONS).
- 2026-08-13/18: Economist survey (56/64, ~90%) expects hold through year-end; OIS pricing (as of 8/17) implies ~72–76% probability of hold at Sept 17 meeting, with residual skew toward a hike (+7bp implied move) (reported, HOA/centralbank.watch/bluegamma.io).
- 2026-09-17: Scheduled MPC decision (pending — not yet occurred).
# Event
Will the Bank of England leave Bank Rate unchanged at its September 17, 2026 MPC meeting (relative to the pre-meeting level)?
# Outcomes to forecast
Yes (no change) / No (any change, up or down)
# Kalshi market anchor
No kalshi_direct data was returned for this ticker; the market data available under this exact ticker is from **Polymarket**: current YES ("No change") price = **92.5%**, 7-day change –0.5%, 30-day change +7.0% (price range 51.5–95.5% over 65 days), volume ~$101,560. This is treated as the primary consensus anchor in absence of a distinct Kalshi quote. Kalshi's own BoE-specific series (KXBOE) returned zero active markets.
# Sub-question answers
1. **Polymarket YES price/trajectory** — 92.5% currently, up sharply from a 30-day low near 51.5–55%, and largely flat over the past week (Polymarket direct).
2. **Current Bank Rate & recent decisions** — 3.75% since Dec 2025; held at every 2026 meeting through July: Feb (5–4, dovish dissent), Mar (unanimous), Apr (8–1, hawkish dissent), Jun (7–2), Jul (6–3, "hawkish hold") (BoE minutes via claude_news).
3. **OIS/market-implied expectations** — OIS pricing as of mid-Aug 2026 implies ~72–76% probability of no change, with the residual probability skewed toward a hike (+7bp average implied move) rather than a cut (bluegamma.io, centralbank.watch).
4. **Historical base rate of no-change** — All-meeting hold rate ~51% (2021–2026 sample); non-MPR meetings (Mar/Jun/Sep/Dec, the September slot) show ~68% hold rate; September-only small sample (n=5) ~80% (code_execution analysis). September, as a non-forecast-round meeting, historically has an elevated hold propensity.
5. **Latest CPI/wages/unemployment** — CPI 2.9% (July 2026, up from 2.6%); services CPI 3.4% (down from 3.6% June); wage growth 3.5%/4.1% (regular/total); unemployment up to 5.0%; GDP growth weak (ONS/moneytothemasses). Inflation reacceleration and hawkish dissent argue against a September cut; weak growth/rising unemployment offers modest dovish counter-pressure, but not enough per survey/market data to flip the call toward a cut.
6. **Kalshi comparable market / disagreement with Polymarket** — No distinct Kalshi BoE September 2026 market found (KXBOE series empty); no cross-venue price disagreement observable from raw data.
# Key facts (high-confidence)
1. [BoE] Bank Rate = 3.75%, unchanged since Dec 2025 through Jul 2026 (5 straight holds).
2. [BoE] Jul 2026 vote 6–3 hold, with dissent entirely hawkish (want hike to 4%).
3. [ONS] CPI 2.9% in July 2026, up from 2.6% — first reacceleration since March.
4. [HOA] ~90% of surveyed economists (13–18 Aug 2026) expect hold through year-end.
5. [bluegamma.io/centralbank.watch] OIS-implied hold probability 72–76%, residual risk skewed to a hike.
# Cross-market signals
- Kalshi related: no BoE-specific market found; unrelated Fed-funds/Atlanta Fed markets only.
- Polymarket (this ticker): 92.5% YES for no-change — notably higher than OIS (72–76%) and economist-survey-implied consensus.
- Sportsbook implied: n/a.
# Analyst opinions and speculation
- "Hawkish hold" framing (HOA, cambridgecurrencies) — growing internal support for a hike (2→3 dissenters) but Bailey signaling no urgency.
- moneytothemasses flags weak GDP/rising unemployment as dovish counterweight, but this view is a minority framing versus the hold-consensus mainstream.
- 2026 rate forecasts range 3.50–4.25%, with hold as base case but hike to 4.00% a live risk if services inflation stays elevated.
# Directional lean per outcome
- **Yes (no change)**: Strongly favored — 5 consecutive 2026 holds, ~90% economist consensus, 72–76% OIS-implied, 92.5% Polymarket price, ~68% non-MPR historical base rate. All signals point the same direction.
- **No (change)**: Weak — if a change occurs, most evidence (hawkish MPC dissent, CPI reacceleration to 2.9%, OIS residual skew) suggests a hike is more likely than a cut, but overall change probability is low (~8–25% depending on source).
# Gaps / unknowns
- No direct Kalshi price for this exact contract in raw data — relying on Polymarket as anchor; true Kalshi consensus may differ.
- August/September CPI, wage, and MPR data (which would directly precede the Sept 17 decision) not yet available in research.
- Polymarket's 92.5% is notably more confident than OIS/survey figures (72–90%); the gap is unexplained and could reflect thin/late-mover liquidity or overconfidence.
# Calibration anchors
- Polymarket YES price (proxy anchor): 92.5%.
- OIS-implied hold probability: 72–76%; economist survey: ~90%.
- Historical base rate for non-MPR (September-slot) meetings: ~68%; September-only small-sample: ~80%.
4. Forecasters Opus 5 + GPT-5.6 Sol, in parallel
claude-opus-5
72% conf
| Yes | 90% |
| No | 10% |
Bank Rate has been held at 3.75% at all five 2026 meetings, and the Polymarket anchor for this exact contract sits at 92.5% for 'no change,' with ~90% of surveyed economists expecting a hold through year-end. OIS pricing implies a somewhat lower 72–76% hold probability with the residual skewed to a hike, and the July 6–3 hawkish-dissent vote plus CPI reacceleration to 2.9% keep a 4.00% hike a live tail risk. Offsetting that, rising unemployment (5.0%), weak GDP, falling services CPI (3.4%) and Bailey's lack of urgency argue against imminent action, and September is a non-MPR meeting with an elevated historical hold rate (~68–80%). I settle slightly below the Polymarket price to respect the OIS gap and the still-unseen August/September data, landing at ~0.90.
gpt-5.6-sol
73% conf
| Yes | 88% |
| No | 12% |
The 92.5% Polymarket YES price is the primary consensus anchor, while five consecutive holds and roughly 90% economist support for holding through year-end strongly favor Yes. The historical 68% hold rate at non-MPR meetings also supports a September hold, and weak growth plus 5.0% unemployment reduce the urgency of a hike. However, the 72–76% OIS-implied hold probability, CPI reacceleration to 2.9%, and three hawkish dissenters indicate materially greater change risk than the proxy market price suggests. I therefore forecast Yes below the 92.5% anchor, with any No outcome more likely to arise from a hike than a cut.
5. Devil's Advocate Sonnet 5
1. Both forecasters converge tightly (0.88–0.90) without adequately explaining why they discount OIS (72–76%) so heavily in favor of Polymarket (92.5%)—the brief explicitly flags this ~15-20pt gap as "unexplained" and possibly due to "thin/late-mover liquidity," yet neither forecast seriously entertains that Polymarket could be the mispriced outlier rather than OIS.
2. Neither forecast grapples with the missing August/September CPI and wage data that will directly precede the meeting; the brief flags this as a key gap, and given the July reacceleration to 2.9% CPI with hawkish dissent trending (2→3 dissenters over three meetings), an extrapolation of that dissent trajectory could push the hike probability meaningfully higher than either forecaster's ~10-12% No allocation.
3. Both forecasters treat the "hawkish dissent momentum" (5-4 dovish → unanimous → 8-1 hawkish → 7-2 → 6-3) as a static tail risk rather than a trend; if dissent continues escalating (e.g., to 5-4 hawkish by September), a hike becomes far more plausible than the flat ~10% No probability implies, and neither forecast explicitly models this trajectory.
4. Neither critique addresses the specific asymmetry within the "No" outcome — both note "hike more likely than cut" but don't quantify it, leaving ambiguity about whether their ~10-12% No mass is split 90/10 hike/cut or something else, which matters for any sub-market on direction of change.
5. Both anchor heavily on Polymarket despite explicit brief caveats that this is a "proxy" anchor with no direct Kalshi quote and a suspiciously high 30-day run-up (from ~51.5% to 92.5%); neither forecaster discusses what might have driven that rally (e.g., a specific hawkish data point or event) or whether it's justified versus representing a herding/momentum effect.
6. The historical base-rate section notes September-only sample is small (n=5, ~80% hold rate) — both forecasters cite this as supportive but don't flag the sample-size fragility, potentially overstating its evidentiary weight relative to the more robust ~68% non-MPR rate.
6. Aggregator Opus 5
89%
(72% confidence)
Yes: 89%
No: 11%
Five consecutive 2026 holds, ~90% economist consensus for a hold through year-end, the 92.5% Polymarket price on this exact contract, and an elevated ~68–80% historical hold rate for non-MPR September meetings all point the same direction. The main counterweight, correctly flagged by the critique, is meeting-dated OIS implying only ~72–76% hold with residual skew to a hike, plus an escalating hawkish dissent trajectory (8–1 → 7–2 → 6–3) and July CPI reaccelerating to 2.9% — so I shade below the Polymarket anchor rather than matching it. However, OIS a month out routinely carries residual risk premium that decays as data arrives, and the dovish offsets (unemployment at 5.0%, weak GDP, services CPI easing to 3.4%, Bailey signalling no urgency) make an immediate September hike unlikely; a 6–3 vote still needs two more converts. I land at 0.89 Yes, with the 11% No mass roughly 85/15 skewed toward a hike over a cut.
Pipeline Timing
Total pipeline time: 171.8s
Per-tool research timings shown in the Research section above.