Tools chosen: kalshi_direct kalshi_related polymarket_related claude_news gdelt_news code_execution wikipedia

Sub-questions (Fermi decomposition)

Planner reasoning

This is a Kalshi market resolving on whether US annual CO2 emissions fall to ≤4,909.9 MMT by 2025, so the key is (a) the current market price and (b) which data series resolves it (EIA energy-related CO2 vs EPA GHG Inventory total CO2), since EIA energy-related CO2 has already been near or below ~4,800 MMT in 2023-2024 while EPA total CO2 including non-energy sources is higher. Research must pin down the latest reported and projected 2024/2025 emissions figures and the reporting lag relative to the 2030 close date.

# Current state The market resolves YES if actual US CO2 emissions in a given year by 2025 are ≤4,909.9 MMT. This threshold appears calibrated to the **EIA energy-related CO2 series** (an ~18% cut from the 2005 baseline of ~5,999 MMT), not the broader EPA all-GHG inventory. The critical unresolved fact: EIA reporting indicates energy-related CO2 emissions **rose ~2% (+115 MMmt) in 2025** after two years of decline/flat readings, driven by coal-fired generation growth and data-center electricity demand — putting 2025 emissions close to or above the 4,909.9 MMT threshold. Kalshi currently prices YES at only 14%, consistent with this reversal, not with a mechanical trend extrapolation from 2024 levels. # Timeline of key events - 2005: EIA/EPA baseline year for US climate pledges (~5,999 MMT energy CO2 per EIA; ~6,130 MMT per EPA total CO2). [confirmed, code_execution] - 2022: US energy-related CO2 ~5,010 MMT range (implied); EPA total gross GHG 6,343 MMT CO2eq. [confirmed, EPA/EIA] - 2023: Energy-related CO2 fell 3% (~134 MMmt decline), driven by coal-to-gas switching in power sector. EPA gross GHG totaled 6,197.3 MMT CO2eq (down 2.3% YoY). [confirmed, EIA/EPA] - 2024 (Jan 2025 release): Rhodium preliminary estimate: economy-wide GHG emissions fell just 0.2%; US ~20% below 2005 levels; coal production down 12% to decades-low, offset by rising power/transport/buildings emissions. EIA data shows near-flat (+0.1%) energy CO2 YoY. [confirmed/reported, Rhodium & EIA] - 2025-01-20: Trump signs executive order to withdraw US from Paris Agreement (second term). [confirmed, Wikipedia] - 2025 (EIA reporting): Energy-related CO2 emissions rose 2% (~115 MMmt), with power-sector CO2 up 4% (58 MMmt) on higher demand (data centers, manufacturing, hot summer) and coal generation up 13% (+85 TWh, +78 MMmt CO2). [confirmed, EIA "U.S. Energy-Related CO2 Emissions, 2025"] # Event Will US CO2 emissions in a calendar year by 2025 fall to ≤4,909.9 MMT (Kalshi USCLIMATE-2025)? # Outcomes to forecast - Yes (emissions ≤4,909.9 MMT achieved by 2025) - No (not achieved) # Kalshi market anchor **Current YES price: 14.00%** — up +6.0pp over 7 days and +7.4pp over 30 days; range 1.0%–17.9% over 102 data points; avg daily volume 71 contracts (thin but active, trending up in YES probability). [kalshi_direct] # Sub-question answers 1. **Kalshi price/volume** — YES=14%, rising trend (+6pp/7d, +7.4pp/30d), thin volume (~71 contracts/day). [kalshi_direct] 2. **Data source/metric** — Threshold (4,909.9 MMT) most closely matches EIA's energy-related CO2 series (~18.15% below 2005 EIA baseline of 5,999 MMT), not EPA's total-CO2 or all-GHG inventory (which uses a different baseline and scope). [code_execution] 3. **2023-2025 EIA energy CO2 and STEO** — 2023: down 3% (~134 MMmt decline) to roughly ~4,876 MMT; 2024: essentially flat (+0.1% YoY); 2025: EIA reports a 2% increase (~+115 MMmt), reversing the prior decline, driven by coal and power-sector demand growth. [claude_news/EIA] 4. **EPA Inventory total CO2 2023-24** — 2023 gross GHG (all gases, CO2eq) = 6,197.3 MMT CO2eq, down 2.3% from 2022's 6,343 MMT; fossil-fuel CO2 specifically fell 3.0%. No 2024 EPA Inventory figure was found (EPA Inventory typically lags ~18 months; latest published covers 1990-2023). Not directly comparable to the 4,909.9 MMT threshold since EPA figures include all GHGs, not pure CO2. [claude_news] 5. **Baseline/Paris alignment** — 4,909.9 MMT = ~18.15% below EIA's 2005 baseline (5,999 MMT) or ~19.9% below EPA's 2005 baseline (6,130 MMT); neither matches the official 26–28% Paris NDC target cleanly, suggesting the market threshold reflects a different/interim benchmark, not the full Paris commitment. [code_execution] 6. **2025 policy/economic drivers** — Coal-fired generation rose 13% (+85 TWh) in 2025, lifting coal CO2 by 78 MMmt; total power-sector CO2 up 4% (58 MMmt) on record electricity demand from data centers, AI, manufacturing, and hot summer weather — net effect is emissions-increasing, not decreasing, in 2025. Trump's Jan 2025 Paris withdrawal also signals reduced federal push for emissions cuts (EPA rule rollbacks likely, though not detailed in research). [EIA, Wikipedia] 7. **Publication timing** — EIA already publishes preliminary/STEO 2025 energy CO2 estimates (cited as "U.S. Energy-Related CO2 Emissions, 2025"), well before the 2030 market close; final EPA Inventory figures for 2025 would likely appear by ~2027, also before close. Resolution data will be available in time. [EIA] # Key facts (high-confidence, factual) 1. [kalshi_direct] YES=14%, rising over past 30 days. 2. [EIA] 2025 energy-related CO2 rose ~2% (+115 MMmt) YoY, reversing 2023's 3% decline. 3. [EIA] Coal power generation surged 13% in 2025, a major driver of the emissions increase. 4. [EPA] 2023 total gross GHG = 6,197.3 MMT CO2eq; fossil CO2 down 3.0% that year. 5. [Rhodium] 2024 economy-wide GHG emissions nearly flat (-0.2%), ~20% below 2005. 6. [code_execution] Threshold 4,909.9 MMT ≈ 18% below EIA 2005 baseline — an EIA-energy-CO2-style target, not the full 26-28% Paris NDC. # Cross-market signals - Kalshi related: EU 2030 climate goals market at 45.5% YES; India 2030 at 68% YES — both far higher than US 2025's 14%, reflecting the US's near-term/tighter deadline and recent emissions reversal. - Polymarket: No matching climate markets found. - Sportsbook implied: N/A. # Analyst opinions and speculation - EIA's own reporting frames 2025 as an emissions rebound year (coal/data-center driven), directly undermining prior optimistic trend extrapolations. - Rhodium Group's 2024 preliminary estimate (~20% below 2005) suggests the US was in range of, but not clearly past, an 18% cut goal — 2025's reported reversal likely pushes it further from target. - The code_execution Monte Carlo estimate (94-98% YES) appears **stale/wrong** — it did not incorporate the actual EIA-reported 2025 emissions increase and should be heavily discounted in favor of the direct EIA 2025 figures and the Kalshi price. # Directional lean per outcome - **Yes**: Supported by multi-year decline 2019-2024 and EPA/Rhodium data showing ~20% below 2005 as of 2024; weakened by EIA's 2025 report of a 2% emissions increase. - **No**: Supported by EIA's direct 2025 finding of rising energy CO2 (+115 MMmt) driven by coal and data-center demand, Trump's Paris withdrawal reducing federal mitigation pressure, and Kalshi's low/rising-toward-no pricing (86% implied NO). # Gaps / unknowns - No official finalized 2025 total figure (EIA figure appears to be a STEO estimate or partial-year figure) — exact magnitude vs. 4,909.9 MMT not confirmed with precision. - Unclear whether Kalshi resolution uses EIA energy CO2 or another metric; rules field is blank. - No EPA Inventory data for 2024/2025 yet published. # Calibration anchors - Kalshi current YES price: 14% (anchor), trending up. - EIA reported 2025 energy CO2 increase of ~2% (115 MMmt) is the single most decision-relevant, up-to-date data point, and points toward NO. - Precedent: EU 2030 goals priced at 45.5%, India 2030 at 68% — both more likely met than US 2025, consistent with the US's short timeframe and recent reversal.

1. Both forecasters converge tightly around 14-16% and essentially just restate the Kalshi anchor plus the EIA rebound narrative, but neither interrogates whether "by 2025" could mean "any year up to and including 2025 counts as YES" rather than "2025 specifically" — the event text says "in a calendar year by 2025," which could allow 2023's ~4,876 MMT (below threshold per the brief's sub-question 3) to already satisfy YES, a structural point that would push probability much higher than 14-16% if true; this ambiguity is flagged in the brief's gaps section but neither forecast meaningfully engages with it. 2. Both treat the 2023 estimate of "~4,876 MMT" (from sub-question 3) as basically irrelevant, yet if that figure is accurate and the market's resolution language covers any qualifying year, this alone could resolve YES regardless of 2025's rebound — this is a serious unresolved rules ambiguity that deserves more explicit hedging or a wider confidence interval rather than confident convergence near 15%. 3. Neither forecast discusses the precision/reliability of the "+115 MMmt" 2025 EIA figure, which the brief explicitly caveats as likely a STEO/preliminary estimate ("exact magnitude vs. 4,909.9 MMT not confirmed with precision") — treating this partial/preliminary number as near-certain confirmation of NO is an overconfidence risk both forecasters share. 4. Both forecasts anchor tightly to Kalshi's 14% price without much independent weight, converging within 2pp of it and each other — this is reasonable given thin volume, but neither considers that thin volume (~71 contracts/day) trending up +7.4pp/30d could reflect a small number of informed traders overreacting to a single EIA press release rather than robust price discovery, warranting a slightly wider band. 5. Neither forecaster meaningfully addresses the resolution-source ambiguity itself (EIA vs. EPA vs. some blended metric) as a distinct source of variance — given the brief notes "rules field is blank," a scenario where the market resolves off EPA's all-GHG inventory (which has a different baseline/scope, per point 5) rather than EIA energy CO2 is underexplored and could materially shift the answer either direction. 6. Both cite Trump's Paris withdrawal as a NO-supporting driver, but this executive/political signal is symbolic for a threshold about 2025 emissions already realized in the data — it's a weak causal link for 2025 outcomes (withdrawal announced Jan 2025, too late to meaningfully affect 2025 emissions) and its inclusion in both rationales as supporting evidence is a minor reasoning artifact rather than substantive evidence.

17% (59% confidence)

Yes: 17% No: 83%

The 4,909.9 MMT threshold best matches EIA's energy-related CO2 series, and EIA's 2025 reporting shows a ~2% (+115 MMmt) rebound driven by a 13% jump in coal generation and record data-center/manufacturing power demand — a clear move away from the target in the specific resolution year. Kalshi's 14% YES price (thin ~71 contracts/day, but trending up) is the primary anchor and is consistent with that rebound. The devil's advocate raises a genuine structural point: if 'by 2025' means any calendar year through 2025 qualifies, EIA's 2023 figure (plausibly near or below ~4,876 MMT) could already satisfy YES; combined with unresolved source ambiguity (EIA energy CO2 vs. EPA all-GHG) and the preliminary/STEO nature of the 2025 number, this warrants pushing modestly above the market rather than converging exactly on it. The Paris withdrawal is symbolic and near-irrelevant causally for 2025 emissions, so it gets no weight. Final: YES 17%, slightly above the 14% anchor to price the rules ambiguity.

Total pipeline time: 195.3s