Tools chosen: polymarket_direct polymarket_related kalshi_related claude_news gdelt_news wikipedia code_execution

Sub-questions (Fermi decomposition)

Planner reasoning

This is a Polymarket political-longevity question with a ~13-month horizon, so the market price is the primary anchor and news flow on Ukrainian elections, martial law, ceasefire/peace deal negotiations, and Zelenskyy's domestic scandals (e.g., Yermak/Mindich corruption case) are the key drivers. Sub-questions should target the concrete pathways to a 'Yes': resignation as part of a US-brokered peace deal, elections held after martial law lifts, impeachment/removal, or health/incapacity.

# Current state Zelenskyy remains in office as of the latest data (Aug 2026); martial law has been extended repeatedly (19th extension, through at least 2026-08-02, with a further 90-day extension proposed from 2026-08-02). No election has been scheduled, and Zelenskyy has tied any vote to a ceasefire plus security guarantees — a condition not yet met. # Timeline of key events - 2025-11-28 — Chief of staff Andriy Yermak resigns/is dismissed after NABU/SAPO raid on his home tied to "Mindichgate" (Energoatom) corruption scandal; also removed from National Security Council/Stavka (confirmed — SCMP, Yahoo, Kyiv Independent). - 2025-12 — Zelenskyy states readiness to hold elections within 60-90 days if US/allies can secure the vote, following Trump pressure (reported — globalsecurity.org). - 2026-02 — Zelenskyy walks back quick-election talk, says elections only after security guarantees and ceasefire (confirmed statement — Euronews, WSWS). - 2026-02 — FT reports possible US-driven election timeline; Ukrainian parliamentary/legal analysts note 60-day (parliamentary)/90-day (presidential) legal minimums make rapid post-ceasefire elections logistically unfeasible (reported — uncancelednews.substack.com). - 2026-06 (May 30–Jun 3 poll) — Rating Group poll: Zelenskyy 32% first-round vs Zaluzhnyi 16%, Budanov 11%; gap widened from 6 to 16 pts, indicating strengthened relative position (reported — Pravda). - 2026-07-13 — Zelenskyy proposes further 90-day martial law/mobilization extension from 2026-08-02 (confirmed — Ukrainska Pravda). - 2026-07-26 — "Fedorov crisis": another minister dismissal escalates political turmoil (reported — Daily Sabah). - 2026-08 — Zelenskyy actively engaged in normal presidential duties (Armenia diplomacy, Saudi talks, defense minister nomination) — no resignation signals (confirmed — GDELT/AA/Politico). # Event Will Volodymyr Zelenskyy cease to be President of Ukraine (resignation, removal, or any cessation) at any point before 2026-12-31? # Outcomes to forecast - Yes (Zelenskyy leaves office before end of 2026) - No (Zelenskyy remains president through end of 2026) # Kalshi market anchor No direct Kalshi YES price was returned for this specific ticker in the research (kalshi_direct output absent from raw data). The closest Kalshi proxy, "When will Ukraine hold a presidential election? — Before 2027," prices at 8% (down sharply from 30% a month ago, -22% 30-day trend, ~1,258 avg daily volume) — a reasonable soft ceiling, since an election is the primary plausible pathway to Zelenskyy's exit. Treat this as the best available Kalshi-adjacent anchor (~8%), corroborated by Polymarket's own market on this exact question at 7.5%. # Sub-question answers 1. **Polymarket price/trend** — Current 7.5%, +1% (7d), -2% (30d), range 5.5–18.5% over 90 days, $3.04M volume (Polymarket direct). 2. **Peace framework election requirement** — Reports (Trump-driven) suggested elections within 60-90 days of a ceasefire, but Ukrainian law requires ~60 days (parliamentary)/90 days (presidential) minimum prep, making near-term elections logistically tight even with a ceasefire (uncancelednews.substack.com). No signed ceasefire as of Aug 2026. 3. **Martial law status** — Currently extended through at least 2026-08-02, with a further 90-day extension proposed (to ~Nov 2026) (Ukrainska Pravda). Elections cannot legally be held while martial law is in force (Law "On legal status of martial law"); it must be lifted first, which Zelenskyy says requires security guarantees. 4. **Recent Zelenskyy statements** — Dec 2025: open to elections in 60-90 days with allied security guarantees; Feb 2026: walked back, tying elections strictly to ceasefire + security guarantees (Euronews, WSWS). No resignation statements found. 5. **Corruption scandal impact** — Yermak dismissed (Nov 2025) after Mindich/Energoatom raids; Kremlin called it a "profound political crisis." However, no formal impeachment/no-confidence process reported, and July 2026 polling shows Zelenskyy's approval intact/improved relative to Zaluzhnyi — scandal weakened inner circle but not clearly Zelenskyy's own position. 6. **Base rate for wartime incumbent exit in 13 months** — Code-execution base-rate modeling: 5-20% annualized hazard implies ~5-22% for a 13-month window via constant hazard; combined pathway model (election + loss/step-down + scandal + health) yields base case ≈19.9% (range 8.3%-36.9% across scenarios). 7. **Cross-market signals** — Kalshi's Ukraine election market (8%, sharply down from 30%) and Polymarket's own market (7.5%) roughly converge near 7-8%, both trending down as ceasefire/election hopes fade. # Key facts (high-confidence, factual) 1. [Wikipedia/Pravda] Martial law continuously in effect since 2022-02-24, most recently extended to ~2026-08-02, with further extension proposed. 2. [SCMP/Kyiv Independent] Yermak resigned Nov 2025 amid Energoatom corruption probe; replaced by Umerov (also under investigation, not charged). 3. [Euronews] Zelenskyy (Feb 2026): elections only after ceasefire + security guarantees. 4. [Pravda] Zelenskyy's poll lead over Zaluzhnyi widened to 16 pts by June 2026. 5. [Polymarket] This exact market trades at 7.5%, down from 18.5% high, over 90 days. # Cross-market signals - Kalshi related: Ukraine presidential election "Before 2027" at 8% (was 30% a month ago); Zelenskyy-Putin meeting/talk markets near 0.6-12%, implying low near-term ceasefire probability. - Polymarket: This market itself at 7.5%; no other directly related active Polymarket markets found (0 matches for Ukraine election/ceasefire keywords). - Sportsbook implied: N/A. # Analyst opinions and speculation - WSWS (Dec 2025) speculated Zaluzhny would beat Zelenskyy in an election — contradicted by later 2026 polling. - Substack/parliamentary analysts argue rapid elections are legally unfeasible even post-ceasefire, dampening near-term "Yes" pathway. - Kremlin (Peskov) framed Yermak scandal as a "profound political crisis," a partisan framing to be discounted. # Directional lean per outcome - **Yes**: Corruption scandal, war fatigue, potential US-brokered ceasefire pressure for elections could force a vote before year-end; base-rate/pathway modeling suggests 8-20% range. - **No** (favored): Martial law extended into Q4 2026, no ceasefire signed, legal minimums (60-90 days) make election-driven exit within 2026 tight even if ceasefire occurs soon; Zelenskyy's polling position has strengthened, not weakened; both Kalshi-adjacent (8%) and Polymarket (7.5%) markets price low probability, trending down. # Gaps / unknowns - No direct Kalshi YES price for this specific ticker was retrieved. - No confirmed ceasefire timeline or signed agreement as of latest data (Aug 2026). - Unclear whether any formal impeachment/no-confidence motion has been filed in the Rada. # Calibration anchors - Polymarket price for this exact market: 7.5% (anchor, since Kalshi direct unavailable). - Kalshi proxy (Ukraine election before 2027): 8%, down from 30% a month prior. - Base-rate/pathway modeling: 8-20% central range for wartime incumbent exit in 13 months absent scheduled elections.

1. Both forecasts anchor almost entirely on the Kalshi/Polymarket election-market proxies (7.5-8%), but that proxy measures "election held before 2027," which is a *subset* of ways Zelenskyy could leave office — it excludes non-election pathways like a Rada-forced resignation, coup, health event, or assassination, so anchoring the whole "Yes" probability so tightly to the election proxy likely underweights these alternative exit routes even though both forecasters nominally mention them as "residual risk." 2. Neither forecast grapples with the divergence between the base-rate/pathway model (8-20%, central ~19.9%) and the market anchor (7.5-8%); they both default to the market price without explaining why the pathway model's much higher central estimate should be discounted rather than blended, which is a potential reference-class/anchoring error favoring market efficiency assumptions over structural base rates. 3. The brief notes political turmoil is escalating, not static — the "Fedorov crisis" (2026-07-26, "another minister dismissal escalates political turmoil") is very recent and post-dates the polling data both forecasts cite (June 2026), yet neither forecast adjusts for the possibility that this newer instability signal outpaces the polling snapshot showing Zelenskyy's strength. 4. Both forecasts treat the Polymarket 7.5% figure as a clean, stable anchor, but the brief shows this exact market has ranged 5.5–18.5% over 90 days with a recent uptick (+1% over 7 days) after a longer decline — the very recent reversal (from decline to slight increase) is not discussed and could signal fresh uncertainty (e.g., from the Fedorov crisis) that neither forecaster incorporates. 5. Neither forecast explicitly addresses the "Gaps/unknowns" item that it's "unclear whether any formal impeachment/no-confidence motion has been filed" — if such a motion were to emerge given the compounding scandals (Yermak, Fedorov, Mindichgate), this could open a faster non-election exit pathway that isn't well captured by the election-market proxy they both lean on. 6. Both forecasts converge very closely (6% and 8%) despite using materially different reasoning emphasis, and neither explores a scenario where a sudden US-brokered ceasefire in Q3/Q4 2026 combined with intense Trump pressure (as seen in Dec 2025) could compress the legal 60-90 day minimums via emergency legislation or waiver — a tail scenario dismissed too quickly as "logistically unfeasible" without considering political will to bypass normal procedure under external pressure.

7% (74% confidence)

Yes: 7% No: 93%

Polymarket's market on this exact question (7.5%) already prices all exit pathways, not just elections, so the critique's point about non-election routes is largely absorbed by that anchor rather than additive to it. Structurally, martial law is extended into Q4 2026, elections are legally barred while it is in force, no ceasefire is signed, and even a sudden breakthrough would face 60-90 day statutory prep minimums that overrun the remaining ~5-month window. Zelenskyy's own standing has strengthened (32% vs Zaluzhnyi's 16% in June 2026) with no impeachment or no-confidence process reported, so the Yermak/Fedorov turmoil has hit his circle more than him. The pathway model's ~20% central estimate assumed a 13-month window and generic wartime hazards; with only five months left and a hostile legal environment for elections, a modest discount toward the market is warranted, though I nudge slightly above the shortest-window reading to respect assassination/health/coup tails and escalating political instability.

Total pipeline time: 299.6s