Tools chosen: polymarket_direct polymarket_related kalshi_related claude_news gdelt_news wikipedia code_execution

Sub-questions (Fermi decomposition)

Planner reasoning

Impeachment of a South Korean president requires a 2/3 supermajority (200 of 300 seats) in the National Assembly; Lee Jae-myung's Democratic Party bloc holds roughly 170+ seats and the next legislative election is 2028, so the arithmetic makes a Yes resolution near-impossible absent a mass defection within his own party. Research should confirm current seat math, verify no motion has been filed or scandal is escalating, and anchor on the Polymarket price plus any cross-venue signal.

# Current state No impeachment motion against President Lee Jae-myung has been formally tabled in the National Assembly; his own Democratic Party (DP) holds a ruling supermajority (~161-190 seats depending on allies), far above the ~100-seat opposition PPP bloc and far short of what opposition would need to force a vote. A grassroots petition (100k+ signatures) demanded impeachment in June 2026 but carries no binding legal effect. Lee's approval has fallen sharply (67%→~43-44%) amid housing-tax controversy, but this is a popularity decline, not a resolution-relevant event. # Timeline of key events - 2025: Lee Jae-myung inaugurated as President (confirmed, Wikipedia). - 2026-06-22/23: Multiple polls show Lee's disapproval exceeding approval for first time since inauguration (reported, Korea Herald/Korea Times). - 2026-06-26: Gallup poll shows approval at lowest point since taking office (reported). - 2026-06-28/29: National Assembly petition demanding Lee's impeachment collects 100,000+ signatures in two days; analysts say it is unlikely to lead to actual impeachment given DP's Assembly majority (reported, Korea Herald). - 2026-07-10 to 2026-08-14: Series of polls (Gallup, Realmeter, National Barometer Survey) show continued approval decline to record lows (43-49%), largely attributed to confusion over an Aug. 3 property tax policy announcement (reported). - 2026-08-18: Lee appoints special counsel to probe June 3 election ballot-shortage allegations, unrelated to his own criminal cases (reported). - Ongoing (2026): Ruling party pushes "fabricated indictment" special counsel bill relating to Lee's North Korea remittances, Daejang-dong, and Wirye cases, which were suspended after he took office; PPP objects strongly (reported). - Ongoing (2026): Lee proposes constitutional reform (four-year, two-term presidency), splitting PPP and drawing "insurrection" accusations from PPP chairman; also causing friction within DP ranks (reported). - No formal impeachment motion filed to date (as of latest research, mid-to-late Aug 2026). # Event Will Lee Jae-myung be formally impeached (National Assembly passes impeachment motion) before Dec 31, 2026 (market close; Constitutional Court outcome irrelevant)? # Outcomes to forecast Yes / No # Kalshi market anchor This is a Polymarket-sourced ticker being cross-referenced; no native Kalshi price for this exact market was returned. Closest Kalshi analog: "Will Lee Jae-myung serve his full term? — Yes" (KXFULLTERMSKPRES-29) at 53% YES (down 31pts in 30 days, down 4pts in 7 days) — implying meaningfully elevated risk to Lee's tenure, though "not serving full term" ≠ "impeached." Polymarket's own market for this exact question prices YES at 11.45% (up from 3.5% low over 91 days; +4.25% 7-day, +3.95% 30-day trend), volume only $20,305 — thin market, rising trend. # Sub-question answers 1. **Polymarket price/history** — Currently 11.45% YES, up from a 3.5% low over the past 91 days; steadily rising (+4.25% 7d, +3.95% 30d), but total volume is thin ($20,305) [polymarket_direct]. 2. **Seat math** — 300-seat Assembly; DP-led ruling bloc ~161-193 seats, opposition PPP+allies ~107-110 seats. Impeaching the president requires 200/300 (2/3). Opposition is ~90-93 votes short and would need nearly half the ruling coalition to defect [claude_news, code_execution]. 3. **Active motion status** — No impeachment motion has been proposed/tabled in the Assembly; only a citizen petition (100k+ signatures, June 2026) exists, which experts say is very unlikely to translate into an actual motion given DP's majority [Korea Herald via claude_news/gdelt]. 4. **Scandal/fracture risk** — Lee faces suspended criminal cases (North Korea remittances, Daejang-dong, Wirye); DP is pushing a bill to potentially quash these charges, opposed by PPP. Constitutional reform proposal (term structure) has caused friction within DP itself (e.g., DP lawmaker Kim Yong-min's warnings) but nothing suggesting 30+ DP defections toward impeachment [claude_news]. 5. **Historical base rate** — 3 of 8 presidencies since 1988 saw a passed impeachment motion (Roh 2004, Park 2016, Yoon 2024) — annualized hazard ~7.9%/year, naive 13-month estimate ~8.5%. Critically, in all three cases the opposition already held/near the 200-seat threshold — unlike Lee's situation [code_execution]. 6. **2026 catalyst window** — June 2026 local elections and Lee's own criminal case proceedings are noted but sources don't identify a specific discrete 2026 catalyst; his cases are currently suspended/postponed, reducing near-term legal-catalyst risk [claude_news]. # Key facts (high-confidence, factual) 1. [Wikipedia] Presidential impeachment requires 2/3 (200/300) Assembly vote, then Constitutional Court review (irrelevant to this market's resolution). 2. [claude_news/code_execution] DP-led bloc holds ~161-193 seats; opposition ~107-110 — opposition needs unprecedented mass ruling-party defection. 3. [Korea Herald, gdelt] No formal impeachment motion filed as of latest reporting (Aug 2026); only a non-binding petition exists. 4. [gdelt/Korea Herald] Lee's approval fell from 67% (Apr 2026) to 43-44% (mid-Aug 2026), first time disapproval exceeded approval since taking office. # Cross-market signals - Kalshi related: "Serve full term — Yes" at 53% (sharp 31-point monthly drop) — signals rising tenure risk broadly, but conflates resignation/health/other risks with impeachment specifically. - Polymarket (own market): 11.45% YES, rising trend, thin volume ($20k). - No sportsbook data available. # Analyst opinions and speculation - Claude_news synthesis: "none of which currently constitute a credible impeachment pathway before year-end 2026," citing DP majority insulation. - Code_execution structural model: adjusts naive 8.5% historical base rate down to ~1-3% given the unprecedented defection requirement. - Petition analysts (Korea Herald): impeachment petition "unlikely" to succeed given DP majority. # Directional lean per outcome - **Yes**: Supported by falling approval, ongoing scandal/prosecution narratives, PPP's "insurrection" rhetoric on reform, rising Polymarket trend (3.5%→11.45%), Kalshi full-term proxy dropping to 53%. Opposed by binding seat-math wall (need ~90+ DP defectors), no formal motion filed, DP has no incentive to self-impeach. - **No**: Strongly favored — supermajority structurally protects Lee; historical precedents required opposition-held supermajority, absent here; no motion has even been introduced. # Gaps / unknowns - No direct Kalshi YES price was returned for this specific ticker (only Polymarket price used as proxy). - Unclear how much of the Kalshi "full term" market's 31-point drop reflects impeachment risk vs. other risks (resignation, health, term-limit reform outcomes). - No detail on whether the constitutional reform fight could escalate into a genuine trigger before Dec 2026. # Calibration anchors - Polymarket YES price (own market): 11.45%, rising trend — best direct anchor. - Kalshi proxy (full-term serve): 53% YES, falling — a looser but relevant signal of tenure risk. - Structural/base-rate model: ~1-3% adjusted probability given seat-math constraints, contrasted with unadjusted historical rate ~8.5%.

1. Both forecasters converge on identical 6.0% figures despite ostensibly independent reasoning, which is itself suspicious—neither explains why they landed well below Polymarket's 11.45% anchor (a >45% discount) rather than, say, 8-9%, and this precise convergence suggests possible anchoring on each other rather than independent derivation from the structural model's stated 1-3% range. 2. Both cite the code_execution structural model's "1-3%" adjusted estimate but then settle on 6%, roughly double the top of that range, without justifying why they weight the raw Polymarket price so heavily against their own structural analysis—this tension is unresolved in both rationales. 3. Neither forecast meaningfully engages with the Kalshi full-term proxy's dramatic 31-point monthly drop to 53%; both dismiss it as "conflating" other risks, but a proxy market moving that sharply could still contain information relevant to elevated impeachment tail risk (e.g., if scandal/DP-fracture dynamics worsen) that neither incorporates into scenario analysis. 4. Neither forecast considers a scenario where the DP itself turns on Lee (e.g., over the "fabricated indictment" special counsel bill controversy or intra-party friction from Kim Yong-min's warnings on constitutional reform) — this is the only plausible pathway to 200 votes, and neither assigns explicit probability to intra-DP fracture escalating over the next 4+ months given rising disapproval could pressure DP incumbents facing future elections. 5. Both forecasts treat the thin $20k Polymarket volume as a reason for discounting the price, but neither addresses that thin markets can also underprice tail risk (few participants willing to bet on low-probability events) — this cuts both ways and isn't just a reason to discount toward No. 6. Neither rationale explicitly addresses the 4+ month window remaining (through Dec 31, 2026) during which approval could continue falling from 43% into truly crisis territory (30s or lower), which historically (Park 2016) preceded rapid defection cascades once scandal reached critical mass — the brief's own historical base-rate section flags this dynamic but neither forecaster stress-tests it.

6% (71% confidence)

Yes: 6% No: 94%

Impeachment requires 200/300 votes, and Lee's own DP-led bloc holds ~161-193 seats while the opposition has only ~107-110 — meaning the only pathway runs through a mass defection of ~90 ruling-coalition lawmakers against their own president, with no motion even tabled and only a non-binding petition on the record. The critique is right that the Park 2016 precedent shows ruling-party defection cascades are possible, but that required approval collapsing to ~5% amid a criminal conspiracy scandal, not the 43-44% housing-tax-driven slump Lee faces; intra-DP friction over constitutional reform and the special-counsel bill is nowhere near that scale. I therefore stay well below Polymarket's thin, trend-chasing 11.45% and treat the Kalshi full-term proxy's drop as mostly reflecting resignation/term-reform/other tenure risks rather than an Assembly impeachment vote in the next four months. I allow a modest premium over the purely structural 1-3% estimate to cover an unforeseen scandal-plus-fracture cascade and the possibility that thin markets underprice tails, landing at 6%.

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