Tools chosen: polymarket_direct polymarket_related kalshi_related claude_news gdelt_news wikipedia code_execution

Sub-questions (Fermi decomposition)

Planner reasoning

This is a low-base-rate geopolitical tail event with a strict resolution bar (executed coup attempt by state actors, widely reported). The key anchors are the current Polymarket price and the state of Ukrainian civil-military relations (Zelensky vs. Zaluzhny tensions, corruption scandals, martial law/elections, ceasefire negotiations). Research should establish the market price, recent political instability news, and a historical base rate for coups in Ukraine and comparable states.

# Current state No coup attempt has occurred or been reported in Ukraine as of the data cutoff (~Aug 2026); the market tracks whether one will be "widely reported" through Dec 31, 2026. Zelensky remains president amid a widening corruption scandal, a major military leadership shake-up (Syrsky sacked, Drapatyi installed), and popular unrest — but all reporting characterizes this as political/legal crisis and personnel turnover, not an attempted seizure of power by state/military actors. # Timeline of key events - 2021 & 2024 (confirmed): SBU announced foiled plots (2021 alleged Russia-linked plot; May 2024 arrest of two army colonels for a plot to kidnap/assassinate Zelensky; July 2024 SBU said it foiled a pro-Russian NGO plot) — none classified by independent media as executed coup attempts. [Wikipedia: 2024 Ukrainian coup attempt allegations; claude_news] - 2025-11 (confirmed): "Mindichgate" corruption scandal erupts, implicating Yermak and Zelensky's inner circle via Energoatom scheme; Zelensky initially refuses to fire Yermak. [claude_news] - 2026-01-02 (confirmed): Yermak resigns as Chief of Staff; replaced by Budanov (former military intelligence chief), placing a top security figure in Zelensky's inner circle. [Wikipedia/claude_news] - 2026-02 (reported): Zaluzhny publicly criticizes 2023 counteroffensive — described as his first direct political attack on Zelensky; Carnegie/Euronews report Zelensky pledges then backtracks on elections, saying they require ceasefire/security guarantees first. [Carnegie, Euronews] - 2026-04/05 (confirmed): Yermak/Mindich summoned to Anti-Corruption Court, do not appear; investigation continues without charges. [Kyiv Independent] - 2026-07 (confirmed): Zelensky fires Defense Minister Fedorov, sparking days of Kyiv protests; then sacks Commander-in-Chief Syrsky amid backlash, replacing him with Drapatyi. [GDELT: JPost, NY Post, SCMP, Kyiv Post, RTE, multiple outlets] - 2026-07-23 (rumored, low-credibility): NaturalNews headline claims "Zelensky faces coup threat, mass defections" — a fringe outlet, not corroborated by mainstream sources; treat as speculative framing, not an established coup attempt. [NaturalNews] - 2026-08 (reported): UnHerd analysis "How corruption could bring down Zelensky" discusses scandal-driven political vulnerability, not an active coup. [UnHerd] - 2026 (ongoing): Polymarket's own coup-attempt contract trades at 7.5%, near its 50-day low of 6%, with 30-day trend slightly negative despite the July leadership turmoil. # Event Will there be a widely-reported coup attempt in Ukraine (coordinated effort by military/security/state actors to overthrow the government) by Dec 31, 2026? # Outcomes to forecast - Yes - No # Kalshi market anchor No Kalshi-direct price was returned for this specific ticker; nearest available data is the **Polymarket price for this same event: 7.5% YES**, down from a 16.5% high, up +1.5% over 7 days but -2% over 30 days, on $151k volume across 50 days. Related Kalshi Ukraine-election market ("Before 2027") has collapsed from ~30% to 2% (-18% in 7 days), signaling markets see near-zero chance of any near-term disruptive political transition, including via election or coup. # Sub-question answers 1. **Polymarket price/history** — 7.5% current, range 6-16.5%, +1.5% 7d, -2% 30d, $151k volume. [polymarket_direct] 2. **Historical base rate** — Ukraine has had zero coup attempts in 34 years of independence; global base rate for at-risk states ~5-12%/year. Blended/war-adjusted model estimates ~8-15% for a 12-month window, up to ~25-30% tail risk. [code_execution] 3. **Zelensky-military/SBU friction** — Significant: Zaluzhny and Budanov consistently outpoll Zelensky by 10-15 points in trust surveys; Zaluzhny's Feb 2026 interview was his first direct political attack; Zelensky sacked army chief Syrsky and Defense Minister Fedorov in July 2026 amid protests. No reports of SBU/military plotting to seize power. [claude_news, GDELT] 4. **Corruption scandal impact** — "Mindichgate" forced Yermak's resignation (Jan 2026); new tapes suggest possible personal profit by Zelensky (unconfirmed, sitting president shielded from prosecution); scandal has weakened Zelensky's standing and fueled protests but remains a legal/political crisis, not an insurrection (70 searches, $4M seized, only 2 of 9 suspects bailed as of Aug 2026). [Lawfare, Kyiv Independent, UnHerd] 5. **Coup allegations 2025-2026** — No credible independent source has characterized any 2025-2026 event as an executed coup attempt; only a fringe NaturalNews headline ("coup threat") exists, unsupported by mainstream reporting. [GDELT, claude_news] 6. **Ceasefire/peace deal backlash risk** — Not directly addressed in research; Zaluzhny's rising influence and elections-postponement narrative suggest a post-ceasefire election or leadership contest is the more likely destabilizing event, not a coup. [inference from Carnegie/Pravda USA] 7. **Related markets** — Kalshi's Ukraine election market cratered from ~30% to 2%; Zelensky-Putin meeting markets are very low (0.6-11%), suggesting broader market consensus that major Ukrainian political disruption (elections, meetings, coups) is unlikely near-term. # Key facts (high-confidence, factual) 1. [polymarket_direct] Coup-attempt market YES = 7.5%, near multi-month lows. 2. [claude_news] Yermak resigned Jan 2026 amid corruption scandal; Budanov (ex-intel chief) now heads President's Office. 3. [GDELT, multiple] Zelensky sacked Syrsky and Fedorov in July 2026 amid protests, but replaced them through normal appointment (Drapatyi), not extra-constitutional means. 4. [Wikipedia] No coup attempts in Ukraine's 34-year independent history; only foiled-plot allegations in 2021 and 2024. 5. [kalshi_related] Ukraine election-before-2027 market collapsed from 30% to 2% in recent weeks. # Cross-market signals - Kalshi related: Ukraine election market 2% (down sharply); Zelensky-Putin meeting markets 0.6-11%, all low. - Polymarket: This event's own contract at 7.5%, trending slightly up short-term but down over 30 days; polymarket_related found no other active Ukraine/coup markets. - Sportsbook implied: N/A. # Analyst opinions and speculation - UnHerd (Aug 2026): corruption scandal "could bring down Zelensky" — political, not coup framing. - NaturalNews (Jul 2026): fringe claim of "coup threat, mass defections" — unverified, low credibility. - Carnegie/Pravda USA: speculation centers on eventual elections and Zaluzhny's political rise, not a coup. # Directional lean per outcome - **Yes**: Elevated elite tension (Zaluzhny/Budanov popularity, Syrsky/Fedorov firings, corruption scandal reaching Zelensky's circle) creates unusual instability backdrop versus Ukraine's historical zero-coup baseline; war-stress models put tail risk at 20-30%. - **No**: No credible source has called any 2025-2026 event a coup attempt; leadership changes have followed formal dismissal/appointment processes; Ukraine's institutional history shows strong resistance to coups even during Maidan/war; both Polymarket (7.5%) and correlated Kalshi election market (2%, falling) price disruption as unlikely. # Gaps / unknowns - No direct Kalshi price for this specific ticker was retrieved (relied on Polymarket as proxy). - No confirmation of active plotting by named military figures (Zaluzhny, Budanov) beyond political criticism/popularity. - Impact of a hypothetical 2026 ceasefire on backlash risk is unaddressed by primary sources. # Calibration anchors - Polymarket YES (proxy anchor): 7.5%, range 6-16.5% over 50 days. - Base-rate model: ~8-15% central estimate for 12-month coup-attempt probability under wartime elite stress; historical Ukraine base rate near 0%. - Precedent: 2021 and 2024 foiled-plot allegations never escalated to independently-recognized coup attempts, despite significant media attention — suggesting resolution bar is high and rarely met.

1. Both forecasts cluster tightly (5-8%) directly around the Polymarket anchor, but neither seriously engages with the brief's own base-rate model, which pegs a 12-month wartime-elite-stress coup probability at 8-15% with tail risk to 20-30% — Forecast 1's 5% is actually below both the anchor and this model's floor, and its rationale for shading down ("only 4-5 months remain") doesn't obviously justify going lower than the market itself. 2. Neither forecaster flags the resolution-criteria mismatch: the brief notes 2021 and 2024 "foiled plot" allegations never counted as coup attempts despite heavy coverage, meaning the bar for YES is unusually high — yet the base-rate model likely blends in these looser precedents, so both forecasts should more explicitly discount the model estimate toward the stricter Polymarket-implied bar rather than average between them. 3. The brief explicitly identifies an unaddressed gap — "ceasefire/peace deal backlash risk" — as a plausible mechanism for destabilization in the remaining window, and neither forecast incorporates this scenario (e.g., a peace deal triggering nationalist/military backlash against Zelensky), which is a specific tail case that could raise YES probability beyond the smooth anchor-based estimate. 4. Neither analysis weighs the significance of Budanov's move from military-intelligence chief to head of the President's Office: this could cut either way (a loyalist controlling internal security reduces coup risk) or (an insider with military-intelligence ties and levers of power increases tail risk) — this structural detail is absent from both rationales despite being a key fact in the brief. 5. Both forecasts effectively treat the Kalshi-correlated "election before 2027" collapse (30%→2%) as strong corroborating evidence for low coup risk, but a collapsing election market could equally reflect diminished appetite for *any* constitutional transition (making an extra-constitutional one relatively more attractive if elite conflict escalates) — this alternative interpretation is not considered by either forecaster. 6. Forecast 1's downward shade from the 7.5% anchor and Forecast 2's upward shade both move in different directions from the same anchor for similar reasoning (time remaining, elite tension), yet neither forecaster explicitly reconciles why they diverge from each other or justifies deviating from the market anchor by a specific magnitude rather than simply anchoring near 7-8%.

6% (69% confidence)

Yes: 6% No: 94%

The same-event Polymarket anchor sits at 7.5% near multi-month lows, and that price covers a full 12-month window while only ~4-5 months remain from the data cutoff, justifying a modest shade down. The resolution bar is demonstrably high: Ukraine's 2021 and 2024 'foiled plot' allegations, despite heavy coverage, were never characterized by independent media as coup attempts, so the brief's 8-15% base-rate model likely blends looser precedents and should be discounted toward the stricter market-implied bar. Against that, the critique's points on ceasefire backlash risk, Budanov's control of the President's Office, and elite friction (Zaluzhny/Budanov outpolling Zelensky, Syrsky/Fedorov firings amid protests) keep genuine tail risk alive, so I do not cut as far as Forecast 1's 5%. All 2026 leadership changes proceeded through formal constitutional dismissal/appointment, and the collapsed Kalshi election market plus low Zelensky-Putin meeting markets corroborate low disruption odds, though I weight that signal only lightly given its ambiguous interpretation. Final call: 6% YES, essentially at the anchor with a small time-decay adjustment.

Total pipeline time: 291.1s