How many daily average PLA incursions into Taiwan's ADIZ will occur for the week of October 19-25, 2026?

**Scope note:** The question counts "incursions." The MND reports two different figures: total aircraft sorties detected around Taiwan, and the subset that entered the ADIZ or crossed the median line. I could not confirm which figure the sheet uses. The figures below are labelled by type.

- [2026-10-14] The MND list page (primary source) shows a daily "PLA activities in the waters and airspace around Taiwan" report for every date from 115.10.06 to 115.10.14 (ROC year 115 = 2026). That is nine consecutive reports, and the page lists the next report as the 10/15 one. The page returned only titles and no counts, so the numbers below come from news quotes of the MND posts. https://www.mnd.gov.tw/news/plaactlist
- [2026-10-14] A MND press release dated 14 Oct, quoted by CNA, reported 13 PLA sorties from 09:30, 11 of them crossing the median line. It describes a "joint combat readiness patrol" alongside PLA ships. These sorties will probably be counted in the 10/15 report (06:00 to 06:00 window). https://www.cna.com.tw/news/aipl/202610140148.aspx
- [2026-10-13] The MND report for 13 Oct covered 6 PLAN vessels, 4 aircraft sorties and 4 government ships. CNA says the four sorties crossed the median line. https://www.cna.com.tw/news/aipl/202610130029.aspx
- [2026-10-12] The MND reported 4 sorties, all of which crossed the median line. The prior day (11 Oct) had 12 sorties, 5 of them in the southwest ADIZ. https://aninews.in/news/world/asia/taiwan-detects-four-pla-aircraft-six-plan-vessels-operating-near-territory20261012065240/
- [2026-10-14] Taiwan Security Monitor's weekly review for 5–11 Oct counts 56 aircraft over seven days, about 8.0 a day. Of those, 34 entered the ADIZ, about 4.9 a day. The prior week had 46 aircraft (27 in the ADIZ). Two joint combat readiness patrols (6 Oct: 14 aircraft; 9 Oct: 21 aircraft) account for most of the week. No aircraft were detected on 3, 4 and 5 Oct. The MND's date labelling may be shifted a day from the TSM's. https://taiwansecuritymonitor.substack.com/p/taiwan-security-monitor-weekly-october
- [2026-09-28] The GlobalMilitary tracker (a secondary aggregator, not the MND; the page returned 403 when fetched, so this is from a search snippet) shows 18 aircraft in the ADIZ in the seven days to 28 Sep, about 2.6 a day. That is the 28th percentile of weeks since 2020 and compares with a past-12-month weekly median of 41. https://www.globalmilitary.net/conflicts/china-taiwan/
- [2026-10-12] China has issued navigation warnings for live-fire drills from 12 to 17 Oct. Some drills are scheduled for 13–15 Oct, about 280 km north of Taiwan, off Zhejiang. Reports differ on the end date (17 Oct vs 20 Oct). Taiwan's defence minister assessed the activity as coastal artillery training. No named large-scale exercise has been announced. https://www.ellitoral.com/internacionales/taiwan-ejercitopopulardeliberacion-china-ejerciciosmilitares-estrechodetaiwan-taipei-wellingtonkoo-pekin-ministeriodedefensanacional-indopacifico-laiching-te_0_UfVwEzhBST.html
- [2026-03-06] Activity was unusually low earlier in 2026. One analyst reported a 7-day stretch with no ADIZ entries from 27 Feb. He linked it to the Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli investigations announced 25 Jan and to US–China diplomacy. https://chinadrew.substack.com/p/the-pla-has-stopped-flying-aircraft
- [2026-10-14] The one-year-ago baseline is the daily average for 19–25 Oct 2025. I could not retrieve those daily counts. For context, the 2025 full-year average was 10.3 ADIZ aircraft a day (3,762 total, up 22% on 2024). Daily rates in the second half of 2025 were slightly lower than in 2024: 2,479 incursions in May–Dec 2025, down 5.4%. November 2025 had 266 incursions, about 8.9 a day. https://www.globalmilitary.net/conflicts/china-taiwan/adiz-violations/2025/ and https://chinapower.csis.org/china-increased-military-activities-indo-pacific-2025/
- [2026-10-14] Trajectory in recent daily MND reports: the week of 5–11 Oct averaged about 8 total sorties a day (about 4.9 in the ADIZ). Daily totals in the week to 14 Oct ran 4, 12, 4 and then a 13-sortie patrol on 14 Oct. The weekly average swings with the timing of joint combat readiness patrols. Recent ones fell on 30 Sep, 6 Oct, 9 Oct and 14 Oct, roughly every 3 to 8 days.
- The MND publishes each day's report around 09:00 Taiwan time, covering the 24 hours to 06:00. Reports for 19–25 Oct will appear 19–25 Oct, with the last on 25 Oct. Any extra same-day press release for a patrol is separate from the daily count.

BOTTOM LINE: The recent run rate is about 5 ADIZ aircraft a day (about 8 total sorties a day), well below the 2025 average of about 10 a day. The weekly average depends mainly on whether one or two joint combat readiness patrols (13–21 aircraft each) fall within 19–25 Oct.

NOT FOUND: Per-day numeric values from the MND data table itself (only titles were readable) and the 19–25 Oct 2025 baseline. Counts for 13–14 Oct in the ADIZ-only definition were also not found, and there is no sign yet of any announced exercise for the target week.

I could not retrieve the question's Google Sheet (HTTP 401). I also could not retrieve exact Oct 19–25 daily series for 2023–2025 from the MND site. The prior-year window figures below are therefore partial single-day readings, not weekly averages.

- [2026-10-14] **Latest week.** The Taiwan Security Monitor (TSM) counted 56 PLA aircraft detected for Oct 5–11. Of these, 34 entered the ADIZ, about 4.9 a day, up from 27 the prior week (about 3.9 a day). That is +25.9% week on week. No aircraft were detected on Oct 3, 4 and 5. Two joint combat readiness patrols (JCRPs) on Oct 6 and 9 produced 14 and 21 aircraft. https://taiwansecuritymonitor.substack.com/p/taiwan-security-monitor-weekly-october
- [2026-10-12 to 14] **Reports since then.**
  - Oct 11 report: 12 sorties, 5 in the ADIZ.
  - Oct 12 report: 4 sorties, all 4 crossing the median line.
  - Oct 14 JCRP: CNA reports 13 sorties from 9:30 AM, 11 crossing the median line.
  - The Oct 13 report is not covered here.

  Sources: https://aninews.in/news/world/asia/taiwan-detects-four-pla-aircraft-six-plan-vessels-operating-near-territory20261012065240/ and https://www.cna.com.tw/news/aipl/202610140148.aspx
- [2026-10-12] **Live-fire drills.** China issued no-sail notices for live-fire drills from Oct 12 to 17, and one report says until Oct 20. Taiwan's defense minister assessed them as coastal artillery training. TSM noted that no named exercise had followed as of the Oct 11 report. https://www.epochtimes.com/gb/26/10/12/n14868438.htm
- [2026-10-02] **2026 monthly ADIZ totals.**
  - Sept: 181, about 6.0 a day.
  - Aug: 125, about 4.0 a day. Total aircraft detected in Aug were 171, tied with March for the lowest month of 2026.
  - Jan–May total sorties, from TSM: 270, 190, 173, 229, 274.
  - Aug 2026 total sorties were 69% below Aug 2025's 555.

  Sources: https://political.org/china-taiwan-tracker/ and https://tsm.schar.gmu.edu/strait-snapshot-august-2026-update/
- [2026-09-28] **Weekly distribution.** GlobalMilitary.net's tracker had 18 ADIZ aircraft for the seven days to Sep 28, 2026 (about 2.6 a day). That is the 28th percentile of all weeks since Sept 2020. The all-time weekly median is 32 and the past-12-month median is 41. The 30-day ADIZ total was 165, about 5.5 a day. This is a secondary tracker, and I could not fetch the page directly (HTTP 403). https://www.globalmilitary.net/conflicts/china-taiwan/
- [2026-03] **Lowest stretch on record.** There were zero ADIZ aircraft from Feb 27 to Mar 5, 2026, seven straight days. This is the longest no-detection stretch since AFP began tallying in 2024. It was linked to the Chinese military purges and the Two Sessions, with speculation about Trump–Xi summit timing. On May 14–15, during the Trump–Xi summit, air activity fell to zero. Sources: https://chinadrew.substack.com/p/the-pla-has-stopped-flying-aircraft, https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20260309-sharp-drop-in-chinese-military-aircraft-near-taiwan-raises-questions and https://tsm.schar.gmu.edu/strait-snapshot-may-2026-update/
- [2025-10-25] **Same window, 2025 (partial).**
  - Oct 25 report: 9 sorties, all 9 crossing the median line or entering the ADIZ.
  - Oct 23 report: 3 sorties, 1 in the ADIZ.
  - Oct 29 report: 25 sorties, 23 in the ADIZ.

  The full Oct 19–25, 2025 weekly average was not found. The 2025 annual ADIZ total was 3,764, a record, with monthly ADIZ totals of 222–392. Sources: https://www.aninews.in/news/world/asia/taiwan-records-9-pla-sorties-4-plan-vessels-around-its-territory20251025084046/ and https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/adiz/taiwan-reports-chinese-military-activity-with-five-plan-vessels-five-pla-aircraft-sorties-near-its-territory
- [2024-10] **Same window, 2024 (partial).**
  - Oct 14, 2024 was the all-time single-day peak per the tracker: 111 aircraft in a 25-hour window, during Joint Sword-2024B.
  - That is a surprise outside the Oct 19–25 window, but it shows how fast a named drill can swamp the weekly average.
  - 2024 ADIZ total: 3,615 aircraft.
  - Oct 2024 daily figures from China in Arms: 12 aircraft (8 in the ADIZ) on Oct 8 and 10, 20 (13) on Oct 11, 24 (22) on Oct 12, and 11 (9) on Oct 13.

  Sources: https://www.globalmilitary.net/conflicts/china-taiwan/ and https://chinainarms.substack.com/p/2nd-update-china-is-back
- [2023-10] **Same window, 2023 (partial).**
  - Oct 24, 2023 report: 9 aircraft, 1 in the ADIZ.
  - Oct 27, 2023 report: 35 aircraft, 23 across the median line or in the ADIZ.
  - Oct 11, 2023 report: 14 aircraft, 6 in the ADIZ.
  - Oct 2023 was a high-variance period. The 2023 ADIZ total was 1,669 aircraft.

  Sources: https://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/taiwan/2023/taiwan-231024-roc-mnd01.htm and https://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/taiwan/2023/taiwan-231027-roc-mnd01.htm
- [2026-10] **Variation and surprise on record.**
  - Single-day ADIZ counts in 2026 range from 0 (Aug 20, 22, 28 and 31 had zero aircraft detected) to about 17–21 on JCRP days.
  - Weekly week-on-week swings of about ±20–25% are normal, and a single JCRP day of about 15–20 aircraft shifts a weekly average by about 2 a day.
  - The largest surprises on record are all upside: 153 aircraft detected in 25 hours (Oct 2024) and 71 ADIZ aircraft on Dec 26, 2022.
  - In 2026 the surprises have been downside: the multi-day zero stretches.

  Sources: https://tsm.schar.gmu.edu/strait-snapshot-august-2026-update/ and https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Air_Defense_Identification_Zone_(Taiwan)
- [2026-10] **Trend context.** ISW-CDOT, cited by political.org, assesses the 2026 reduction may reflect a shift in coercion strategy rather than seasonality. Coast guard and maritime activity is rising: 244 Chinese vessels were detected in Sept, against 55 in June and 30 in May. https://political.org/china-taiwan-tracker/

BOTTOM LINE: The recent baseline for ADIZ-entering aircraft is roughly 4–6 a day (Aug about 4.0, Sept about 6.0, last week about 4.9, last 30 days about 5.5). Individual weeks have run from about 0 to well above 10 a day, and JCRPs on 1–3 days of the week drive most of the variation. The prior-year Oct 19–25 comparisons show high 2023–25 levels (2025 days of 3–9 aircraft in this window), but 2026 is running roughly 50% below 2025. Ambiguity to check: "incursions" most likely means ADIZ-entering aircraft, not the total aircraft detected, which runs about 30% higher.

NOT FOUND: The question's Google Sheet contents. Exact weekly daily averages for Oct 19–25 in 2023, 2024 and 2025. Any documented forecast or consensus accuracy for this metric. MND's own weekly aggregates (only daily reports were seen). Any Oct 15–18, 2026 data, or confirmation of a named exercise planned for Oct 19–25.

- [2026-10-14] The Taiwan Security Monitor (TSM) weekly for Oct 5–11 (fetched) says Lai's Oct 10 National Day speech was measured. It says Lai for the first time welcomed US–China dialogue. Beijing answered with rhetoric: the Taiwan Affairs Office said the speech "distorts the truth," and the PRC defense ministry called Lai a "disaster for peace." The speech did not trigger a named exercise. This lowers the odds of a named, speech-triggered drill in the target week. Control sits with Beijing's Eastern Theater Command. https://taiwansecuritymonitor.substack.com/p/taiwan-security-monitor-weekly-october
- [2026-10-12] Taipei Times (fetched): Defence Minister Koo assessed that the Oct 12–17 drills are off China's coast and involve only PLA artillery units. The Maritime and Port Bureau put the East China Sea zone about 294 km from Taiwan and the South China Sea zone about 588 nm away. It said the drills are unlikely to affect shipping near Taiwan. A Chinese defence ministry spokesman called the PLA's activity around the island routine deterrence of "independence." The drills end before Oct 19, so any carry-over to the target week would come from an extension. https://taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2026/10/12/2003865828
- [2026-09-25] The Trump–Xi Washington summit ran Sep 22–24. Both leaders confirmed they will meet again at APEC in Shenzhen on Nov 18–19, and at the G20 in Miami in December. Wikipedia (secondary) records the confirmations. The earlier AEI note says the summit did not change US Taiwan policy. This gives Beijing a diplomatic reason to avoid a large named drill before mid-November. It does not rule out joint combat readiness patrols, which continued through the Sep 22–24 summit period and the weeks after it. Beijing and Washington control this driver. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2026_state_visit_by_Xi_Jinping_to_the_United_States
- [2026-09-21] Semafor reports Trump may delay the stalled Taiwan arms package until after the APEC summit. TSM (Oct 14) says the roughly $14B package remains frozen. With no new US arms notification to Congress, a common trigger for PLA reaction is absent in the target week. The US controls the timing. https://www.semafor.com/article/09/21/2026/at-trump-xi-meeting-taiwan-will-be-on-back-burner
- [2026-09-05] The MND press release (primary) shows how a patrol day is split. Of 20 aircraft detected from 08:24, 12 crossed the median line and entered the ADIZ. A patrol day therefore adds about 12 ADIZ aircraft, against about 20 total. The 28 Mar patrol (MND) had 15 sorties, 11 crossing. The 14 Oct patrol had 13 sorties, 11 crossing. That is a higher ADIZ share than in earlier patrols. https://www.mnd.gov.tw/en/News/PressRelease/87710
- [2026-09-29] A baseline day, from the MND daily report (primary): 3 sorties, 1 in the ADIZ. Aug 15 was 4 sorties, 3 across the median line. Non-patrol days run about 0–5 ADIZ aircraft. Zero-aircraft days also occur (Oct 3–5 had none). A week with no patrol would therefore average roughly 1–3 a day. https://www.mnd.gov.tw/en/news/plaact/87845
- [2026-10-14] Patrol cadence: the TSM counts patrols on Sep 30, Oct 6, Oct 9 and now Oct 14 (the CNA/MND release). A Diplomat piece (Jan 2026) puts the long-run average at about two a month. A 7-day window with at least one patrol is likely if the recent 3–8 day spacing holds. The patrols are timed by the PLA and often follow political events. https://thediplomat.com/2026/01/pla-sorties-around-taiwan-fewer-aircraft-higher-threat
- [2026-10-12] Coast guard pressure is the other lever. Taiwan's coast guard counted 244 Chinese vessels in Sep, per ANI citing CGA data. Taipei Times says about 60% were China Coast Guard ships, and the count excludes PLAN ships. Beijing appears to be shifting coercion toward maritime and coast guard activity. That may keep air counts suppressed even as ship counts rise. The question counts aircraft only. https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/adiz-breach/taiwan-detects-four-pla-aircraft-six-plan-vessels-operating-near-territory
- [2026-09-03] Early September showed the same pattern. No aircraft were detected on Sep 3. A Sep 5 patrol then produced 20 sorties, with 12 crossing. The patrol followed a quiet stretch. Quiet-then-spike is the typical rhythm, so a weekly average depends mostly on how many patrol days fall inside the 7 days. https://www.threads.com/@platinumpathway/post/Dc6PyEeFiOc/taiwan-detects-chinese-military-aircraft-as-cross-strait-median-line-saturdays/
- [2026-08-09] GlobalMilitary (secondary) says the 2026 ADIZ decline is steady and not a one-off. The Jan 1–Aug 9 total was 1,200, against 2,501 a year earlier, and monthly totals ran 121–216. Its definition of "ADIZ" is the broader set that also counts median-line crossings. Compare that with the MND "total sorties" figure, which runs higher (1,679 over the same span). Which of the two figures the question uses changes the answer by about 40%. https://www.globalmilitary.net/news/pla-air-activity-around-taiwan-halved-in-2026/

Causal chain for a high outcome: (1) a patrol or named drill must occur in Oct 19–25; (2) it would need a trigger. Candidate triggers are a US arms notification, a Taiwan–US political event, or a Japan-related event, and none is announced; (3) the MND must then report it in the 06:00-to-06:00 window assigned to dates Oct 19–25. A low outcome needs only that no patrol falls in the week.

BOTTOM LINE: The controllers (Beijing's Eastern Theater Command, with US–China summit diplomacy restraining a named exercise before the Nov 18–19 APEC) point to a patrol-driven baseline. In that baseline, 1–2 patrol days sit on top of low non-patrol days. A named large drill looks unlikely in the week, and it is the main upside tail.

NOT FOUND: MND counts for Oct 13–14 in the ADIZ-only definition. Any Oct 15–18 data. Confirmation that the Oct 12–17 drills were extended to Oct 20. Any announced trigger event for Oct 19–25. The question's Google Sheet. The Oct 19–25, 2025 weekly average.

I found no published forecasts for this specific quantity. That covers Metaculus, Polymarket and analyst projections for the October 19–25 average daily ADIZ count. The evidence below is the baseline data that any forecast would rest on.

- [2026-10-11] The 2026 year-to-date ADIZ total through Oct 11 is 1,489 aircraft, a daily average of 5.2. That is 51% below the same span of 2025 (3,067). Monthly daily averages in 2026 ran from 3.9 (March) to 7.0 (May). The tracker lists 5.4 (Jan), 5.2 (Feb), 3.9 (Mar), 5.6 (Apr), 7.0 (May), 4.5 (Jun), 6.1 (Jul), 4.0 (Aug) and 6.0 (Sep). The partial October figure is 3.6 per day. The tracker uses the same PLATracker dataset the question cites, but dates each report to the day its window began, which is one day earlier than the MND dates. https://www.globalmilitary.net/conflicts/china-taiwan/adiz-violations/2026/
- [2026-10-14] Taiwan Security Monitor reports 34 ADIZ aircraft for Oct 5–11. That is about 4.9 per day, up from 27 the week before (about 3.9 per day). Total PLA aircraft were 56, up from 46. There were no aircraft on Oct 3, 4 or 5. Joint combat readiness patrols produced 14 aircraft on Oct 6 and 21 on Oct 9. Three patrols have occurred in 11 days, counting Sep 30. https://taiwansecuritymonitor.substack.com/p/taiwan-security-monitor-weekly-october
- [2026-10-14] MND reported 13 aircraft sorties on Oct 14, with 11 crossing the median line, in a "joint readiness patrol" (CNA). This is a fourth patrol in about two weeks, and it falls in the Oct 14 report window, before the target week. https://www.cna.com.tw/news/aipl/202610140148.aspx
- [2026-10-12] On Oct 12, 4 of 4 sorties entered the ADIZ. On Oct 11, 5 of 12 entered. https://aninews.in/news/world/asia/taiwan-detects-four-pla-aircraft-six-plan-vessels-operating-near-territory20261012065240/
- [2026-10-12] China announced live-fire drills in five sea areas for Oct 12–17 (Epoch Times). Another report puts the drills at Oct 12–20, with sessions near Zhejiang on Oct 13–15 about 280 km north of Taiwan. Taiwan's defense minister assessed them as coastal artillery training. No named large-scale exercise has been announced. https://www.epochtimes.com/gb/26/10/12/n14868438.htm
- [2026-08-09] Monthly ADIZ totals in 2026 ranged from 121 to 216, against 222–392 in 2025. The 2026 decline is attributed to the period after the Zhang Youxia purge, and to a Trump–Xi summit. Analyst Drew Thompson called the lull puzzling in March. https://www.globalmilitary.net/news/pla-air-activity-around-taiwan-halved-in-2026/
- [2026-03-06] Drew Thompson noted a 7-day zero-ADIZ streak starting Feb 27, which shows that a very low weekly average is possible. https://chinadrew.substack.com/p/the-pla-has-stopped-flying-aircraft
- [2026-09-24] PLATracker (skyfaring) showed 203 total PLA sorties for September through Sep 24, with a peak of 28 on Sep 18. https://pla-tracker.skyfaring.net/en/
- [2025 full year] For 2025 the ADIZ total was 3,764 (about 10.3 per day), a record. The monthly average from May 2024 to Dec 2025 was 319. 2026 is running at roughly half that. https://chinapower.csis.org/china-increased-military-activities-indo-pacific-2025/
- [2026-10] Prediction markets address only invasion and blockade, not ADIZ counts. Polymarket "invade by end of 2026" is about 2–4% Yes. Metaculus "attack or blockade in 2026" was 2.5% (older snapshot). These imply no expected regime change to a large-scale exercise. https://polymarket.com/event/will-china-invade-taiwan-before-2027

BOTTOM LINE: No direct consensus forecast exists. The best anchor is the 2026 weekly baseline of about 4–6 per day, with the latest weeks at about 3.9 and 4.9 per day and a recent uptick in joint combat readiness patrols. A patrol day adds 10–20 aircraft, so a patrol in the target week would raise the average. A named exercise would be a large upside tail.

NOT FOUND: Any Metaculus, Polymarket or analyst forecast of the weekly ADIZ average. The question's Google Sheet could not be read (HTTP 401). No record of how accurate past forecasts of this series were. No MND data yet for Oct 19–25.

- [2026-10-14] I fetched the MND daily report for 29 Sep, which is the primary format. It states a 6 a.m.–6 a.m. window and two separate counts: "3 sorties" total and "1 out of 3" in the ADIZ. Each report links to a JPG chart. The "median line crossing" and "ADIZ entry" figures are therefore the same line item, and the total is higher. The sheet's definition of "incursions" is still unconfirmed. If it uses total sorties, the high-scenario averages run about 30–60% above the ADIZ-only ones. https://www.mnd.gov.tw/en/Publication/87845
- [2026-10-12] The Taipei Times reports the no-sail areas are in the Yellow Sea, East China Sea, South China Sea and Bohai Sea, and the drills run through Saturday 17 Oct. Koo assessed them as off the Chinese coast rather than near Taiwan, but said MND is preparing for various scenarios. Japan Times: none of the notices covers waters around Taiwan itself. The drills end before the target week. A high outcome would need a new trigger, not a continuation of these drills. https://taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2026/10/12/2003865828
- [2026-10-12] Beijing's reaction to Lai's 10 Oct speech so far is rhetorical. The TAO said the speech "distorts the truth", and the PRC defence ministry accused Lai of seeking independence through force. This is a pretext for a named drill (precedent: Strait Thunder-2025A was a retaliation for a Lai speech). TSM says no named exercise had followed as of the 11 Oct report. https://japantimes.co.jp/news/2026/10/12/asia-pacific/taiwan-monitoring-china-drills
- [2026-10-14] The base rate for a "Justice Mission" or "Strait Thunder"-type drill is low but real. Justice Mission 2025 on 29–30 Dec brought 130+ aircraft sorties into the ADIZ across two days. On the day of the drill, Taiwan tracked 89 aircraft in a single day. One such two-day event in the target week adds roughly 15–20 per day to the weekly average. That would take a 5/day baseline to about 20 or more. https://thediplomat.com/2026/01/chinas-taiwan-drills-are-crossing-a-new-line/
- [2026-10-07] Joint combat readiness patrol (JCRP) cadence is rising. TSM: 30 Sep had 23 aircraft (16 in the ADIZ), and the next two days had 6 and 5. The 6 Oct, 9 Oct and 14 Oct patrols (colleagues' reports) follow. Four patrols in 15 days, at about 3–5 day gaps, imply 2 patrols in the 19–25 Oct week is plausible. At 14–21 aircraft per patrol day plus a floor of 3–6 per day, the weekly ADIZ average comes out near 7–9. https://taiwansecuritymonitor.substack.com/p/taiwan-security-monitor-weekly-september-f35
- [2026-09-05] A patrol on 5 Sep was combined with "joint sea-air training": 20 sorties, 12 crossing the median line. The 14 Oct release also tied the patrol to PLAN ships. Combined air-sea labels signal a larger package. The Aug patrols (21 and 11 aircraft) were smaller than any earlier in 2026, and the 14 Oct patrol (13) is again mid-sized. https://www.mnd.gov.tw/en/News/PressRelease/87710
- [2026-08] The August TSM snapshot says a 20-aircraft day on 18 Aug carried no patrol label. Surges can therefore come unannounced and add to the weekly sum. Its figure for August is 171 total sorties and 125 in the ADIZ. I could not re-fetch the page (HTTP 403), so this comes from the search snippet. https://tsm.schar.gmu.edu/strait-snapshot-august-2026-update/
- [2025-10-17] The same-season comparison: an MND JCRP release on 17 Oct 2025 gave 21 sorties, 17 crossing the median line or entering the ADIZ. The PLA ran patrols in the run-up to the late-October 2025 window, and the colleague's 29 Oct 2025 report had 25 sorties (23 in the ADIZ). Late October has shown a pattern of patrol clusters in prior years. https://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/taiwan/2025/taiwan-251017-roc-mnd02.htm
- [2026-10-12] Non-air signals that raise the odds of an air surge. CCG ships entered Kinmen restricted waters on 9 Oct, about 20 minutes after the patrol began (TSM). The Coast Guard reported 244 Chinese vessels in September, against 55 in June. PLA activity is rising in maritime and constabulary domains. A shift of tempo back to air may be signalled by a combined sea-air patrol. https://taiwansecuritymonitor.substack.com/p/taiwan-security-monitor-weekly-october
- [2026-10-11] Possible triggers inside or just before the window: US arms deliveries (500 Stinger and 178 launchers, Harpoon) and the arrival of F-16 Block 70s on 2 Oct, the US deployment of anti-ship missiles on Yonaguni (Epoch Times 12 Oct), and Lai's welcome of US–China dialogue. None has produced a named drill so far. The PLA's 2026 lull is tied to the Trump–Xi summit pattern, "flights paused before the meeting and resumed after it" (TSM 7 Oct). Any breakdown in US–China diplomacy would remove that restraint. https://taiwansecuritymonitor.substack.com/p/taiwan-security-monitor-weekly-september-f35

BOTTOM LINE: Without a named exercise, the high scenario is two or more JCRPs plus a few unlabelled 15–20 aircraft days. That gives roughly 7–9 per day in the ADIZ-only count, or about 10–12 on total sorties. A named drill (Justice Mission or Strait Thunder type) would be a tail case of 15–30 or more per day, and I found no announcement or signal of one for 19–25 Oct.

NOT FOUND: The numeric daily values in the MND tables for 6–14 Oct (only the 29 Sep report was readable). Any 15–18 Oct data. The question's Google Sheet. Any announced or reported plan for a named PLA exercise in the target week. The TSM Aug page could not be fetched (403).

- [2026-10-04] The MND's own report for 3–4 Oct (the primary page) says no PLA aircraft were detected, only 7 PLAN ships and 8 official ships. TSM says Oct 3, 4 and 5 were all zero-aircraft days. Three zero days inside one week show the floor can arrive without any named lull. https://www.mnd.gov.tw/en/news/plaact/87905
- [2026-09-29] TSM's week of 21–27 Sep (36 aircraft total, 21 in the ADIZ, about 3.0 a day) is a recent low-side analogue. It followed a 99-aircraft week. Daily totals were at most 10 and fell to 2 on the day of the Trump–Xi summit. TSM said the expected post-summit rebound "did not materialize." The week therefore swung from 99 to 36 with no change in policy. https://taiwansecuritymonitor.substack.com/p/taiwan-security-monitor-weekly
- [2026-10-07] TSM's 28 Sep–4 Oct review shows what happens when a patrol is absent. After the 30 Sep patrol (23 aircraft, 16 in the ADIZ), Oct 1 had 6 aircraft and Oct 2 had 5. Then three zero days followed. A week with no patrol would therefore run at about 2–4 total sorties a day, with an ADIZ figure under 3. https://taiwansecuritymonitor.substack.com/p/taiwan-security-monitor-weekly-september-f35
- [2026-09-26] A typical non-patrol MND day was 5 sorties with only 1 crossing the median line (northern ADIZ). This is a concrete example of the quiet-day pattern that would dominate a low week. https://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/taiwan/2026/taiwan-260926-roc-mnd01.htm
- [2026-07-04] SCMP counted 38 days with zero PLA aircraft in Jan–Jun 2026, against 6 in H1 2025. Median-line crossings in H1 were 810, against 1,984 in H1 2025. About one day in five is a zero day, so a 7-day window has a real chance of several of them. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3361605/why-pla-fighter-jet-sorties-near-taiwan-dropped-3-year-low-first-half-2026
- [2026-09-25] Diplomatic restraint mechanism: the Xi–Trump meeting on 24 Sep produced no change in US Taiwan policy. Both leaders have confirmed that they will attend the APEC summit in Shenzhen on 18–19 Nov, followed by the G20 in Miami in December. The pattern observed on 14–15 May and 24 Sep is that air tempo dips around leader-level contact. The target week is four weeks before APEC, so a pre-APEC dampening would be only mildly relevant. https://www.aei.org/commentary/china-taiwan-update-september-25-2026/ and https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/APEC_China_2026
- [2026-10-12] The live-fire drills of 12–17 Oct were assessed by Taiwan's defence minister as coastal artillery training. They fall before the target week and are not a named joint exercise. After the drills end, a lull is plausible. The Oct 14 patrol of 13 sorties makes a fresh patrol on 19–25 Oct less certain, given the 3–8 day cycle. https://www.epochtimes.com/gb/26/10/12/n14868438.htm
- [2026-08-09] Structural reading: GlobalMilitary notes that ADIZ aircraft fell 52% in Jan–Aug 9 2026 against 2025. Monthly ADIZ totals have been 121–216. A 121-total month is about 3.9 a day, and 2026 never exceeded 216 (about 7 a day). A week averaging 2–3 a day is therefore within 2026's observed range, while a figure above 8 would be outside the monthly range. https://www.globalmilitary.net/news/pla-air-activity-around-taiwan-halved-in-2026/
- [2026-08-?] Aug 2026 had 171 aircraft but only 55 median-line crossings, about 1.8 crossings a day. If "incursions" is read strictly as median-line crossings or ADIZ entries, the low scenario is near 1–2 a day. https://www.threads.com/@taiwan_maps_and_dataviz/post/Dc2Rgl3Ep9R/a-closer-look-at-pla-air-activity-around-taiwan-in-august-this-follow-up-map/
- [2026-03-16] Weather: Drew Thompson notes air operations fall when bad weather such as a typhoon arrives. Winter Strait winds also suppress flying. The northeast monsoon builds from late October. I found no specific typhoon forecast for 19–25 Oct 2026. https://chinadrew.substack.com/p/the-pla-has-stopped-flying-aircraft

BOTTOM LINE: The low path is a week with no joint combat readiness patrol, or with one small one, in which the quiet-day pattern (0–6 sorties, 0–3 in the ADIZ) holds. That gives about 1.5–3 ADIZ aircraft a day, or 3–4 total sorties a day, as in the 21–27 Sep week. Signals for it are a quiet 15–18 Oct, the end of the live-fire drills without escalation, and no patrol by about 21 Oct.

NOT FOUND: Per-day MND counts for 13–14 Oct in the ADIZ-only definition, and any data for 15–18 Oct. Also not found: a typhoon or monsoon forecast for 19–25 Oct, the question's Google Sheet, and the 19–25 Oct 2025 weekly baseline.

12 AskNews articles (newest first; 5 from the last 48 h, 10 from the archive). Summaries are AskNews's own; dates are publication dates.

[2026-10-14] Taiwan Military Reports 13 PLA Aircraft Sorties, 11 Cross Median Line in 'Joint Readiness Patrols'
Central News Agency — https://www.cna.com.tw/news/aipl/202610140148.aspx
  - According to the Taiwan Ministry of Defense, starting at 9:30 AM on October 14, 2026, the Republic of China military detected 13 sorties of various types of People's Liberation Army (PLA) aircraft, with 11 of these sorties crossing the median line.
  - The aircraft, identified as J-16, J-11, Su-30, JH-7, and Y-8 long-range reconnaissance planes, along with drones, operated in conjunction with PLA naval vessels under the guise of 'joint readiness patrols' to harass Taiwan's surrounding airspace and waters.
  - In response, the Republic of China military utilized joint intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) methods to closely monitor the situation and deployed mission aircraft, naval vessels, and shore-based missile systems to appropriately handle the incursions.
  - The event was reported by the Central News Agency on October 14, 2026.

[2026-10-13] PLA Conducts 6 Naval Vessel and 4 Aircraft Incursions Near Taiwan, ROC Military Monitors Closely
Central News Agency — https://www.cna.com.tw/news/aipl/202610130029.aspx
  - On October 13, 2026, the Taiwan Ministry of National Defense reported that the People's Liberation Army (PLA) conducted 6 naval vessels and 4 aircraft sorties that crossed the Taiwan Strait median line to intrude into the central and southwestern airspace, while 4 additional government vessels were also detected.
  - According to the Central News Agency, the Ministry of National Defense stated that the ROC Armed Forces are using mission aircraft, naval vessels, and shore-based missile systems to closely monitor and respond to these incursions.
  - The report covers the period from October 12, 2026, at 6:00 AM to October 13, 2026, at 6:00 AM.

[2026-10-13] Taiwan's 'Pearl String Plan' Reaches 11 of 16 Pipelines to Boost Water Resilience
Udnemoney聯合理財網            — https://money.udn.com/money/story/5612/9811434
  - On October 13, 2026, at the '2026 Taiwan International Water Week - Water Conservancy International Forum', Water Resources Agency Director Lin Yuan-peng announced that the Ministry of Economic Affairs' 'Pearl String Plan' to enhance water supply resilience is 68.75% complete, with 11 of 16 pipelines successfully connected.
  - The plan aims to complete the remaining 5 pipelines within the next 2 to 3 years, enabling water mutual support between northern, central, and southern Taiwan and establishing dual water supply systems for key industrial parks and urban areas to mitigate localized drought risks.
  - Director Lin highlighted that Taiwan faces significant climate change challenges, citing that southwest airflow in August 2026 brought nearly 2,000 mm of rain to Kaohsiung and Pingtung in just 3 days, equivalent to 70% of Taiwan's average annual rainfall.
  - To address this, the agency is diversifying water sources through artificial lakes, groundwater, reclaimed water, and desalination, while targeting a reduction in the current nationwide average water leakage rate of approximately 10%.
  - Furthermore, the agency is leveraging AI to reduce flood simulation calculation times from over 1 hour to under 30 minutes, aiming to provide a 'golden 30 minutes' for pre-disaster deployment and future public alerts via apps like Google.
  - The strategy also involves cross-ministry collaboration (Agriculture, Environment, and Economic Ministries) for integrated watershed management and the adoption of nature-based solutions alongside traditional engineering to ensure long-term climate adaptation.

[2026-10-12] PLA Conducts Live-Fire Drills in Five Maritime Zones; Taiwan Responds with Vigilance and Condemnation
The Epoch Times — https://www.epochtimes.com/gb/26/10/12/n14868438.htm
  - According to a report published by The Epoch Times on October 12, 2026, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) announced that it would conduct live-fire exercises and military drills across five maritime areas—Bohai, Yellow, East China, South China Seas, and adjacent coastal zones—starting October 12 and continuing through October 17, 2026.
  - The drills will take place along the Chinese coastal provinces of Liaoning, Hebei, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, and Guangdong, with some areas temporarily closed to shipping.
  - Taiwan's Defense Minister, Gu Li-xiong, responded by stating that the Ministry of Defense has full situational awareness and preliminarily assesses the activity as artillery training exercises by PLA coastal units.
  - He emphasized that the Taiwanese military follows the principle of 'assuming the worst' (料敌从宽) and will continue to monitor the situation closely.
  - Gu also condemned the PLA's repeated military exercises in the Indo-Pacific region as efforts to制造不安 (create insecurity).
  - The Mainland Affairs Council (陆委会) issued a formal statement urging the PLA to recognize the objective reality of cross-strait institutional differences and non-subordination, and to immediately cease coercive pressure against Taiwan.
  - The Council reaffirmed President Lai Ching-te's National Day message, which declared that Taiwan's future must be decided by its 23 million citizens and that the government will protect the peace and stability of the Taiwan Strait and Indo-Pacific.
  - Regarding the U.S. deployment of anti-ship missiles on Yonaguni Island, Gu stated that the U.S. is acting according to threat assessments and that the Taiwanese Ministry of Defense will not comment, but will continue to strengthen self-defense capabilities to ensure national security.

[2026-10-12] China Conducts Live-Fire Military Drills Near Taiwan as Island Reinforces Surveillance
El Litoral — https://www.ellitoral.com/internacionales/taiwan-ejercitopopulardeliberacion-china-ejerciciosmilitares-estrechodetaiwan-taipei-wellingtonkoo-pekin-ministeriodedefensanacional-indopacifico-laiching-te_0_UfVwEzhBST.html
  - Taiwan is closely monitoring Chinese military exercises off its coast that began on October 12, 2026, and will continue intermittently until October 20, 2026.
  - The maneuvers, which include live-fire drills, are raising concerns in Taipei regarding regional security and stability.
  - Taiwan's Minister of Defense, Wellington Koo, stated on Monday that the island's armed forces are tracking the movements of China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) and are aware of the planned activities.
  - A preliminary assessment indicates the exercises involve artillery and other forces firing live rounds.
  - The Maritime Safety Administration of China issued at least six navigation warnings starting last Thursday, covering areas from Hainan island to the Bohai Sea.
  - Specific exercises near Taiwan are scheduled for October 13–15, 2026, lasting one to two hours each, in waters approximately 280 kilometers north of the island, off the coast of Zhejiang province.
  - Koo emphasized that Taiwan will maintain strict surveillance under the principle of not underestimating the adversary's capabilities.
  - He characterized the PLA's actions as a military threat contributing to instability in the Indo-Pacific region.
  - The exercises follow the Republic of China's National Day celebration on October 10, 2026, during which President Lai Ching-te defended increased military spending as a means to strengthen deterrence and prevent conflict with Beijing.
  - The heightened military activity underscores ongoing tensions between China, which claims Taiwan as part of its territory and has not ruled out the use of force for reunification, and Taiwan, which maintains an autonomous government while bolstering its defense capabilities.

[2026-10-12] Taiwan Detects Escalating PLA Air and Naval Activity Near Territory
Chhattisgarh Today — https://www.chhattisgarhtoday.in//news/taiwan-detects-four-pla-aircraft-six-plan-vessels-operating-near-territory20261012065236//
  - On October 12, 2026, Taiwan's Ministry of National Defence (MND) reported that four sorties of Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) aircraft, six People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) vessels, and three official ships were detected operating around Taiwan's territory up until 6 a.m. (UTC+8).
  - According to the MND's daily update, one PLA aircraft breached Taiwan's southern Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ), and all four sorties crossed the median line into the northern, central, and southwestern ADIZ.
  - Ryan D.
  - Martinson of the US Naval War College's China Maritime Studies Institute, cited by the Taipei Times, stated that the operations demonstrate an escalation in Beijing's efforts to assert jurisdiction over waters around Taiwan.
  - Data from Taiwan's Coast Guard Administration (CGA) shows a significant increase in Chinese maritime activity, with 244 vessels detected in waters around Taiwan last month, compared to 55 in June and 30 in May.
  - The Taipei Times reported this represents an average of nearly eight Chinese vessels operating daily, with approximately 60 per cent being Chinese coast guard ships.
  - Martinson noted that while the tactic of using civilian research vessels is not new, its current scale is unprecedented and valuable for military purposes.

[2026-10-11] PLA Conducts Live-Fire Drills and Incursions Following Taiwan's National Day; US Deploys New Missile Systems Near Taiwan
公共電視 — https://news.pts.org.tw/article/830874
  - During Taiwan's National Day celebrations on October 10, 2026, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) conducted a significant incursion into the region's surrounding airspace and waters.
  - Between 6:00 AM and 6:00 PM on October 10, PLA forces deployed 6 warships, 3 work vessels, and 12 aircraft sorties, with 5 of these aircraft entering the southwest airspace.
  - On October 11, 2026, the PLA announced that starting October 12, 2026, live-fire drills and military training exercises will be conducted across five maritime zones: the Bohai Sea, Yellow Sea, East China Sea, and South China Sea.
  - Strategic analysts suggest the timing indicates pre-planned political intimidation.
  - Xu Zhixiang, an assistant researcher at the Institute of PLA Politics, Military, and Operational Concepts at the National Defense Institute, stated that while the exercises are routine, their timing immediately following Taiwan's National Day is politically charged, emphasizing the need to maintain crisis awareness without excessive alarm.
  - Additionally, the US military magazine National Interest reported on October 10, 2026, that the US Marine Corps is deploying mobile NMESIS Expeditionary Fleet Interdiction Systems and MADIS Vehicle-Integrated Air Defense Systems on Yonaguni Island, approximately 109 kilometers from Taiwan.
  - Shi Xiaowei, editor-in-chief of the Military Intelligence and Aviation website, explained that the US is utilizing unmanned vehicles to decentralize strikes with new Navy strike missiles, capable of rapid deployment via C-130 transport aircraft to control sea lanes between the Ryukyu Islands.
  - Xu Zhixiang further noted that this aligns with the US Marine Corps' 'Force Design 2030' initiative, which aims to transform the Corps into a force that assists the Navy in sea control and sea denial, enabling rapid projection to counter PLA breakthroughs along the First Island Chain.
  - Scholars believe this deployment strengthens the defensive capabilities of the First Island Chain, including Taiwan.

[2026-10-09] China Conducts Major Military Drill Near Taiwan Ahead of National Day
infobae — https://www.infobae.com/america/mundo/2026/10/09/taiwan-denuncio-la-incursion-de-19-aeronaves-chinas-antes-de-las-celebraciones-por-su-dia-nacional/
  - On Friday, October 9, 2026, the Republic of China (Taiwan) reported that 19 aircraft from the Chinese military operated in the vicinity of the island, with 13 crossing the median line of the Taiwan Strait and entering the northern, central, and southwestern sectors of Taiwan's self-proclaimed Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ).
  - According to the Taiwan Ministry of Defense (MDN), the incursion began at 08:52 local time (00:52 GMT) and included J-16, J-11, and Su-30 fighters, JH-7 fighter-bombers, KJ-500 early warning aircraft, Y-8 electronic warfare planes, and drones.
  - These aircraft conducted a 'joint combat readiness patrol' alongside Chinese Navy vessels.
  - Concurrently, four ships from the Chinese Coast Guard surrounded the Kinmen archipelago, entering restricted waters at 09:10 local time (01:10 GMT) and departing at 11:13 local time (03:13 GMT) after being monitored by Taiwanese patrol boats.
  - This marks the second such joint patrol detected by Taipei this week, following an incident on Tuesday involving 14 aircraft.
  - The activity occurs one day before Taiwan's National Day on October 10, 2026, when President Lai Ching-te is scheduled to deliver a speech addressing relations with Beijing.
  - A similar escalation occurred in 2025, with 23 Chinese aircraft detected three days prior to the holiday, 17 of which crossed the median line.
  - China continues to increase military pressure around Taiwan, which it claims as sovereign territory and for which it has not ruled out the use of force to achieve reunification.

[2026-09-29] China Increases Military and Maritime Pressure Around Taiwan with Record Vessel Activity
Patrika News — https://www.patrika.com/world-news/taiwan-china-military-activity-pla-aircraft-plan-ships-update-20944495
  - According to the Taiwan National Defense Ministry, as of Tuesday morning (September 29, 2026), the People's Liberation Army (PLA) deployed 3 military aircraft, the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) deployed 6 warships, and 4 official vessels were active around the island.
  - One PLA fighter jet entered Taiwan's southwestern Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ), prompting Taiwan's military to issue radio warnings and increase surveillance.
  - This follows a similar incursion the previous day (Monday, September 28), when a Chinese aircraft crossed the Taiwan Strait's median line and entered the northern ADIZ.
  - Maritime activity has surged significantly; while 30 Chinese vessels were recorded in May and 55 in June, August saw a record 244 vessels, averaging 8 daily patrols.
  - Approximately 60% of these vessels belong to the Chinese Coast Guard, excluding regular navy warships.
  - From May through the first three weeks of September, a cumulative total of 1,247 Chinese vessels have been detected in the waters surrounding Taiwan, a trend officials describe as a 'very serious situation.' Additionally, U.S. military analysts warn that China is increasingly utilizing civilian 'research vessels' to collect maritime data, which could be shared with the military to aid future submarine and anti-submarine operations, thereby escalating pressure on Taiwan.

[2026-08-17] Taiwan Detects PLA Aircraft and Vessels in ADIZ Following Sunday Incursions
Asian News International (ANI) — https://www.aninews.in/news/world/asia/taiwan-detects-one-pla-aircraft-nine-plan-vessels-around-its-territory20260817064844/
  - On Monday, August 17 (local time), Taiwan's Ministry of National Defence detected one sortie of Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) aircraft, nine vessels belonging to the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), and seven official ships operating around the island.
  - According to an X post by the Ministry, one of the single PLA aircraft sorties entered Taiwan's northern Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ), while the Republic of China Armed Forces (ROCArmedForces) monitored and responded to the situation.
  - This follows Sunday's activity, where Taiwan detected 11 PLA aircraft sorties, eight PLAN vessels, and two official ships; of those, seven sorties crossed the Taiwan Strait's median line and entered the northern and central parts of Taiwan's ADIZ.
  - The report notes that China asserts Taiwan is an inseparable part of China based on historical, political, and legal arguments dating back to the Qing Dynasty's 1683 annexation, while Taiwan functions independently with its own government, military, and economy.

[2026-07-02] Taiwan Detects Chinese Military Incursions Across Median Line Amid Rising Tensions
Asian News International (ANI) — https://www.aninews.in/news/world/asia/taiwan-detects-5-chinese-aircraft-6-naval-vessels-2-cross-median-line20260702074953/
  - On July 2, 2026, Taiwan's Ministry of National Defence (MND) reported detecting five sorties of Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) aircraft, six People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) vessels, and five official ships around Taiwan's territorial waters as of 6 a.m. local time.
  - According to an MND post on X, two of the five aircraft sorties crossed the median line and entered Taiwan's southwestern Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ), prompting a response from the Republic of China (ROC) Armed Forces.
  - This follows an incident on Wednesday, July 1, where the MND detected 13 PLA aircraft sorties, 10 PLAN vessels, and three official ships, with nine aircraft crossing the median line into the northern, southwestern, and eastern ADIZ.
  - Additionally, Focus Taiwan reported in June that Taiwan's first domestically built submarine departed the Port of Kaohsiung for its 15th sea trial, which included its ninth submerged navigation test.
  - The article notes that these military activities occur as China continues to increase the intensity of operations around Taiwan, a territory Beijing claims as an inseparable part of China based on historical annexation from the Qing Dynasty in 1683, while Taiwan maintains independent governance and its status remains a subject of international debate regarding sovereignty.

[2026-06-25] Taiwan Reports Surge in Chinese Military Incursions and Submarine Trials
Asian News International (ANI) — https://www.aninews.in/news/world/asia/taiwan-detects-uptick-in-chinese-incursions-around-itself20260625073656/
  - On June 25, 2026, Taiwan's Ministry of National Defence (MND) detected an uptick in Chinese military activity, reporting 14 sorties of PLA aircraft, 6 PLAN vessels, and 2 official ships operating around Taiwan's territorial waters as of 6 a.m. local time.
  - According to an MND post on X, 10 of the 14 aircraft sorties crossed the median line and entered Taiwan's northern and southwestern Air Defense Identification Zones (ADIZ), with the ROC Armed Forces monitoring and responding to the situation.
  - This represents an increase from Wednesday's figures, when the MND detected 11 sorties, 6 vessels, and 7 official ships, with only 3 sorties crossing the median line.
  - Concurrently, Focus Taiwan reported that Taiwan's first domestically built submarine departed the Port of Kaohsiung for its 15th sea trial, which included its ninth submerged navigation test.
  - The United Service Institution of India notes that China's claim over Taiwan is rooted in historical arguments dating back to the Qing Dynasty's 1683 annexation, while Taiwan functions independently with its own government and military.

## Prediction markets on this question (Polymarket)
- RELATED (different resolution, context only): "Will China blockade Taiwan in 2026?" → Yes: 0.03, Volume: $423.5K — A blockade would sharply change ADIZ activity, but it is not the same outcome or threshold.

## Tool outputs

### resolution_source (SUCCESS)
RESOLUTION SOURCE (the page the question resolves on — treat as the status-quo anchor):
  Current state: The resolution window (Oct 19–25, 2026) hasn't started, so no counts for those dates exist yet. The latest MND daily reports are listed on the website through 115.10.14 (Oct 14, 2026). On X, MND reported 9 of 9 aircraft sorties entering the ADIZ on Oct 14, 4 of 5 on Oct 13 and 4 of 4 on Oct 12. On Oct 14 it also posted a separate update: 11 of 13 sorties crossed the median line and entered the ADIZ during a 'Joint…' activity starting at 09:30 (the post text is cut off there).
  Last updated: 2026-10-14 | already resolved: unclear | page matches criteria: True
  Note: This is a future 7-day window. Recent daily ADIZ entries are low (about 4–9). The Oct 14 'Joint…' activity (13 sorties, 11 entering the ADIZ) is probably a joint combat readiness patrol, which suggests a short-term spike. Its sorties will likely be counted in the next morning's (Oct 15) daily report. Counts are assigned to the MND report date in Taiwan time (UTC+8), and the spreadsheet's dates are one day earlier.
  Fetched: fetch: https://www.mnd.gov.tw/news/plaactlist (HTTP 200)
  Fetched: fetch: https://x.com/MoNDefense (HTTP 200)
  Fetched: fetch: https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1qbfYF0VgDBJoFZN5elpZwNTiKZ4nvCUcs5a7oYwm52g/edit?gid=905433190#gid=905433190 (HTTP 200)

### claude_news (SUCCESS)

### code_execution (SUCCESS)
Code execution (Compute empirical distribution of 7-day average counts from returned daily MND data.):
  Output:
  Insert daily counts from returned data to compute 7-day rolling mean percentiles

## Prediction markets on this question (Polymarket)
- RELATED (different resolution, context only): "Will China blockade Taiwan in 2026?" → Yes: 0.03, Volume: $423.5K — A blockade would sharply change ADIZ activity, but it is not the same outcome or threshold.

You are an elite superforecaster. Produce a probability distribution over the answer to this Metaculus numeric question.

## Question
How many daily average PLA incursions into Taiwan's ADIZ will occur for the week of October 19-25, 2026?

## Description / Resolution Criteria
## Description
A spreadsheet with base rate information can be found [here](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1qbfYF0VgDBJoFZN5elpZwNTiKZ4nvCUcs5a7oYwm52g/edit?gid=905433190#gid=905433190). Please note, however, that its dates listed are in the U.S. Eastern time zone and are one day before the official dates listed by the Taiwan MND (which are used for resolving this question).

`{"format": "bot_tournament_question", "info": {"hash_id": "a11ef1623ae08f2e", "sheet_id": "38"}}`

## Resolution Criteria
This question resolves as the daily average number of PLA incursions for the 7-day period October 19, 2026-October 25, 2026. The question resolves according to daily reports from Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense (MND), which are typically posted at its official [website](https://www.mnd.gov.tw/news/plaactlist) and its [X account](https://x.com/MoNDefense).

## Fine Print
For purposes of this question, the daily count is assigned to the date displayed in the MND report, in Taiwan time (China Standard Time, UTC +8).

## Range
The question's displayed range is [0.9285714285714286, 20.071428571428573] (units: sorties/day).
The LOWER bound is OPEN: outcomes below 0.9285714285714286 are possible and resolve as "below range".
The UPPER bound is OPEN: outcomes above 20.071428571428573 are possible and resolve as "above range".
Where a bound is open, your percentiles MAY lie outside the displayed range — the range is where the question author expects most of the mass, not a constraint on the answer. Do not compress your distribution to fit inside it.

## Research tool outputs (raw; the resolution-source read is the status-quo anchor)
## Tool outputs

### resolution_source (SUCCESS)
RESOLUTION SOURCE (the page the question resolves on — treat as the status-quo anchor):
  Current state: The resolution window (Oct 19–25, 2026) hasn't started, so no counts for those dates exist yet. The latest MND daily reports are listed on the website through 115.10.14 (Oct 14, 2026). On X, MND reported 9 of 9 aircraft sorties entering the ADIZ on Oct 14, 4 of 5 on Oct 13 and 4 of 4 on Oct 12. On Oct 14 it also posted a separate update: 11 of 13 sorties crossed the median line and entered the ADIZ during a 'Joint…' activity starting at 09:30 (the post text is cut off there).
  Last updated: 2026-10-14 | already resolved: unclear | page matches criteria: True
  Note: This is a future 7-day window. Recent daily ADIZ entries are low (about 4–9). The Oct 14 'Joint…' activity (13 sorties, 11 entering the ADIZ) is probably a joint combat readiness patrol, which suggests a short-term spike. Its sorties will likely be counted in the next morning's (Oct 15) daily report. Counts are assigned to the MND report date in Taiwan time (UTC+8), and the spreadsheet's dates are one day earlier.
  Fetched: fetch: https://www.mnd.gov.tw/news/plaactlist (HTTP 200)
  Fetched: fetch: https://x.com/MoNDefense (HTTP 200)
  Fetched: fetch: https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1qbfYF0VgDBJoFZN5elpZwNTiKZ4nvCUcs5a7oYwm52g/edit?gid=905433190#gid=905433190 (HTTP 200)

### claude_news (SUCCESS)

### code_execution (SUCCESS)
Code execution (Compute empirical distribution of 7-day average counts from returned daily MND data.):
  Output:
  Insert daily counts from returned data to compute 7-day rolling mean percentiles

## Prediction markets on this question (Polymarket)
- RELATED (different resolution, context only): "Will China blockade Taiwan in 2026?" → Yes: 0.03, Volume: $423.5K — A blockade would sharply change ADIZ activity, but it is not the same outcome or threshold.

## Question dates and conventions
Dates: opened 2026-10-14; forecasting closes 2026-10-14; resolves 2026-10-26. Only events AFTER the open date can satisfy the criteria; assume the event has NOT happened unless a source shows it has. A question phrased 'before <date>' or 'by <date>' asks whether it happens between now and that date. The deadline for the outcome is the RESOLUTION date, not the close date.

## Recent news (AskNews, raw article summaries, newest first — read these directly)
12 AskNews articles (newest first; 5 from the last 48 h, 10 from the archive). Summaries are AskNews's own; dates are publication dates.

[2026-10-14] Taiwan Military Reports 13 PLA Aircraft Sorties, 11 Cross Median Line in 'Joint Readiness Patrols'
Central News Agency — https://www.cna.com.tw/news/aipl/202610140148.aspx
  - According to the Taiwan Ministry of Defense, starting at 9:30 AM on October 14, 2026, the Republic of China military detected 13 sorties of various types of People's Liberation Army (PLA) aircraft, with 11 of these sorties crossing the median line.
  - The aircraft, identified as J-16, J-11, Su-30, JH-7, and Y-8 long-range reconnaissance planes, along with drones, operated in conjunction with PLA naval vessels under the guise of 'joint readiness patrols' to harass Taiwan's surrounding airspace and waters.
  - In response, the Republic of China military utilized joint intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) methods to closely monitor the situation and deployed mission aircraft, naval vessels, and shore-based missile systems to appropriately handle the incursions.
  - The event was reported by the Central News Agency on October 14, 2026.

[2026-10-13] PLA Conducts 6 Naval Vessel and 4 Aircraft Incursions Near Taiwan, ROC Military Monitors Closely
Central News Agency — https://www.cna.com.tw/news/aipl/202610130029.aspx
  - On October 13, 2026, the Taiwan Ministry of National Defense reported that the People's Liberation Army (PLA) conducted 6 naval vessels and 4 aircraft sorties that crossed the Taiwan Strait median line to intrude into the central and southwestern airspace, while 4 additional government vessels were also detected.
  - According to the Central News Agency, the Ministry of National Defense stated that the ROC Armed Forces are using mission aircraft, naval vessels, and shore-based missile systems to closely monitor and respond to these incursions.
  - The report covers the period from October 12, 2026, at 6:00 AM to October 13, 2026, at 6:00 AM.

[2026-10-13] Taiwan's 'Pearl String Plan' Reaches 11 of 16 Pipelines to Boost Water Resilience
Udnemoney聯合理財網            — https://money.udn.com/money/story/5612/9811434
  - On October 13, 2026, at the '2026 Taiwan International Water Week - Water Conservancy International Forum', Water Resources Agency Director Lin Yuan-peng announced that the Ministry of Economic Affairs' 'Pearl String Plan' to enhance water supply resilience is 68.75% complete, with 11 of 16 pipelines successfully connected.
  - The plan aims to complete the remaining 5 pipelines within the next 2 to 3 years, enabling water mutual support between northern, central, and southern Taiwan and establishing dual water supply systems for key industrial parks and urban areas to mitigate localized drought risks.
  - Director Lin highlighted that Taiwan faces significant climate change challenges, citing that southwest airflow in August 2026 brought nearly 2,000 mm of rain to Kaohsiung and Pingtung in just 3 days, equivalent to 70% of Taiwan's average annual rainfall.
  - To address this, the agency is diversifying water sources through artificial lakes, groundwater, reclaimed water, and desalination, while targeting a reduction in the current nationwide average water leakage rate of approximately 10%.
  - Furthermore, the agency is leveraging AI to reduce flood simulation calculation times from over 1 hour to under 30 minutes, aiming to provide a 'golden 30 minutes' for pre-disaster deployment and future public alerts via apps like Google.
  - The strategy also involves cross-ministry collaboration (Agriculture, Environment, and Economic Ministries) for integrated watershed management and the adoption of nature-based solutions alongside traditional engineering to ensure long-term climate adaptation.

[2026-10-12] PLA Conducts Live-Fire Drills in Five Maritime Zones; Taiwan Responds with Vigilance and Condemnation
The Epoch Times — https://www.epochtimes.com/gb/26/10/12/n14868438.htm
  - According to a report published by The Epoch Times on October 12, 2026, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) announced that it would conduct live-fire exercises and military drills across five maritime areas—Bohai, Yellow, East China, South China Seas, and adjacent coastal zones—starting October 12 and continuing through October 17, 2026.
  - The drills will take place along the Chinese coastal provinces of Liaoning, Hebei, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, and Guangdong, with some areas temporarily closed to shipping.
  - Taiwan's Defense Minister, Gu Li-xiong, responded by stating that the Ministry of Defense has full situational awareness and preliminarily assesses the activity as artillery training exercises by PLA coastal units.
  - He emphasized that the Taiwanese military follows the principle of 'assuming the worst' (料敌从宽) and will continue to monitor the situation closely.
  - Gu also condemned the PLA's repeated military exercises in the Indo-Pacific region as efforts to制造不安 (create insecurity).
  - The Mainland Affairs Council (陆委会) issued a formal statement urging the PLA to recognize the objective reality of cross-strait institutional differences and non-subordination, and to immediately cease coercive pressure against Taiwan.
  - The Council reaffirmed President Lai Ching-te's National Day message, which declared that Taiwan's future must be decided by its 23 million citizens and that the government will protect the peace and stability of the Taiwan Strait and Indo-Pacific.
  - Regarding the U.S. deployment of anti-ship missiles on Yonaguni Island, Gu stated that the U.S. is acting according to threat assessments and that the Taiwanese Ministry of Defense will not comment, but will continue to strengthen self-defense capabilities to ensure national security.

[2026-10-12] China Conducts Live-Fire Military Drills Near Taiwan as Island Reinforces Surveillance
El Litoral — https://www.ellitoral.com/internacionales/taiwan-ejercitopopulardeliberacion-china-ejerciciosmilitares-estrechodetaiwan-taipei-wellingtonkoo-pekin-ministeriodedefensanacional-indopacifico-laiching-te_0_UfVwEzhBST.html
  - Taiwan is closely monitoring Chinese military exercises off its coast that began on October 12, 2026, and will continue intermittently until October 20, 2026.
  - The maneuvers, which include live-fire drills, are raising concerns in Taipei regarding regional security and stability.
  - Taiwan's Minister of Defense, Wellington Koo, stated on Monday that the island's armed forces are tracking the movements of China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) and are aware of the planned activities.
  - A preliminary assessment indicates the exercises involve artillery and other forces firing live rounds.
  - The Maritime Safety Administration of China issued at least six navigation warnings starting last Thursday, covering areas from Hainan island to the Bohai Sea.
  - Specific exercises near Taiwan are scheduled for October 13–15, 2026, lasting one to two hours each, in waters approximately 280 kilometers north of the island, off the coast of Zhejiang province.
  - Koo emphasized that Taiwan will maintain strict surveillance under the principle of not underestimating the adversary's capabilities.
  - He characterized the PLA's actions as a military threat contributing to instability in the Indo-Pacific region.
  - The exercises follow the Republic of China's National Day celebration on October 10, 2026, during which President Lai Ching-te defended increased military spending as a means to strengthen deterrence and prevent conflict with Beijing.
  - The heightened military activity underscores ongoing tensions between China, which claims Taiwan as part of its territory and has not ruled out the use of force for reunification, and Taiwan, which maintains an autonomous government while bolstering its defense capabilities.

[2026-10-12] Taiwan Detects Escalating PLA Air and Naval Activity Near Territory
Chhattisgarh Today — https://www.chhattisgarhtoday.in//news/taiwan-detects-four-pla-aircraft-six-plan-vessels-operating-near-territory20261012065236//
  - On October 12, 2026, Taiwan's Ministry of National Defence (MND) reported that four sorties of Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) aircraft, six People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) vessels, and three official ships were detected operating around Taiwan's territory up until 6 a.m. (UTC+8).
  - According to the MND's daily update, one PLA aircraft breached Taiwan's southern Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ), and all four sorties crossed the median line into the northern, central, and southwestern ADIZ.
  - Ryan D.
  - Martinson of the US Naval War College's China Maritime Studies Institute, cited by the Taipei Times, stated that the operations demonstrate an escalation in Beijing's efforts to assert jurisdiction over waters around Taiwan.
  - Data from Taiwan's Coast Guard Administration (CGA) shows a significant increase in Chinese maritime activity, with 244 vessels detected in waters around Taiwan last month, compared to 55 in June and 30 in May.
  - The Taipei Times reported this represents an average of nearly eight Chinese vessels operating daily, with approximately 60 per cent being Chinese coast guard ships.
  - Martinson noted that while the tactic of using civilian research vessels is not new, its current scale is unprecedented and valuable for military purposes.

[2026-10-11] PLA Conducts Live-Fire Drills and Incursions Following Taiwan's National Day; US Deploys New Missile Systems Near Taiwan
公共電視 — https://news.pts.org.tw/article/830874
  - During Taiwan's National Day celebrations on October 10, 2026, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) conducted a significant incursion into the region's surrounding airspace and waters.
  - Between 6:00 AM and 6:00 PM on October 10, PLA forces deployed 6 warships, 3 work vessels, and 12 aircraft sorties, with 5 of these aircraft entering the southwest airspace.
  - On October 11, 2026, the PLA announced that starting October 12, 2026, live-fire drills and military training exercises will be conducted across five maritime zones: the Bohai Sea, Yellow Sea, East China Sea, and South China Sea.
  - Strategic analysts suggest the timing indicates pre-planned political intimidation.
  - Xu Zhixiang, an assistant researcher at the Institute of PLA Politics, Military, and Operational Concepts at the National Defense Institute, stated that while the exercises are routine, their timing immediately following Taiwan's National Day is politically charged, emphasizing the need to maintain crisis awareness without excessive alarm.
  - Additionally, the US military magazine National Interest reported on October 10, 2026, that the US Marine Corps is deploying mobile NMESIS Expeditionary Fleet Interdiction Systems and MADIS Vehicle-Integrated Air Defense Systems on Yonaguni Island, approximately 109 kilometers from Taiwan.
  - Shi Xiaowei, editor-in-chief of the Military Intelligence and Aviation website, explained that the US is utilizing unmanned vehicles to decentralize strikes with new Navy strike missiles, capable of rapid deployment via C-130 transport aircraft to control sea lanes between the Ryukyu Islands.
  - Xu Zhixiang further noted that this aligns with the US Marine Corps' 'Force Design 2030' initiative, which aims to transform the Corps into a force that assists the Navy in sea control and sea denial, enabling rapid projection to counter PLA breakthroughs along the First Island Chain.
  - Scholars believe this deployment strengthens the defensive capabilities of the First Island Chain, including Taiwan.

[2026-10-09] China Conducts Major Military Drill Near Taiwan Ahead of National Day
infobae — https://www.infobae.com/america/mundo/2026/10/09/taiwan-denuncio-la-incursion-de-19-aeronaves-chinas-antes-de-las-celebraciones-por-su-dia-nacional/
  - On Friday, October 9, 2026, the Republic of China (Taiwan) reported that 19 aircraft from the Chinese military operated in the vicinity of the island, with 13 crossing the median line of the Taiwan Strait and entering the northern, central, and southwestern sectors of Taiwan's self-proclaimed Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ).
  - According to the Taiwan Ministry of Defense (MDN), the incursion began at 08:52 local time (00:52 GMT) and included J-16, J-11, and Su-30 fighters, JH-7 fighter-bombers, KJ-500 early warning aircraft, Y-8 electronic warfare planes, and drones.
  - These aircraft conducted a 'joint combat readiness patrol' alongside Chinese Navy vessels.
  - Concurrently, four ships from the Chinese Coast Guard surrounded the Kinmen archipelago, entering restricted waters at 09:10 local time (01:10 GMT) and departing at 11:13 local time (03:13 GMT) after being monitored by Taiwanese patrol boats.
  - This marks the second such joint patrol detected by Taipei this week, following an incident on Tuesday involving 14 aircraft.
  - The activity occurs one day before Taiwan's National Day on October 10, 2026, when President Lai Ching-te is scheduled to deliver a speech addressing relations with Beijing.
  - A similar escalation occurred in 2025, with 23 Chinese aircraft detected three days prior to the holiday, 17 of which crossed the median line.
  - China continues to increase military pressure around Taiwan, which it claims as sovereign territory and for which it has not ruled out the use of force to achieve reunification.

[2026-09-29] China Increases Military and Maritime Pressure Around Taiwan with Record Vessel Activity
Patrika News — https://www.patrika.com/world-news/taiwan-china-military-activity-pla-aircraft-plan-ships-update-20944495
  - According to the Taiwan National Defense Ministry, as of Tuesday morning (September 29, 2026), the People's Liberation Army (PLA) deployed 3 military aircraft, the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) deployed 6 warships, and 4 official vessels were active around the island.
  - One PLA fighter jet entered Taiwan's southwestern Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ), prompting Taiwan's military to issue radio warnings and increase surveillance.
  - This follows a similar incursion the previous day (Monday, September 28), when a Chinese aircraft crossed the Taiwan Strait's median line and entered the northern ADIZ.
  - Maritime activity has surged significantly; while 30 Chinese vessels were recorded in May and 55 in June, August saw a record 244 vessels, averaging 8 daily patrols.
  - Approximately 60% of these vessels belong to the Chinese Coast Guard, excluding regular navy warships.
  - From May through the first three weeks of September, a cumulative total of 1,247 Chinese vessels have been detected in the waters surrounding Taiwan, a trend officials describe as a 'very serious situation.' Additionally, U.S. military analysts warn that China is increasingly utilizing civilian 'research vessels' to collect maritime data, which could be shared with the military to aid future submarine and anti-submarine operations, thereby escalating pressure on Taiwan.

[2026-08-17] Taiwan Detects PLA Aircraft and Vessels in ADIZ Following Sunday Incursions
Asian News International (ANI) — https://www.aninews.in/news/world/asia/taiwan-detects-one-pla-aircraft-nine-plan-vessels-around-its-territory20260817064844/
  - On Monday, August 17 (local time), Taiwan's Ministry of National Defence detected one sortie of Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) aircraft, nine vessels belonging to the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), and seven official ships operating around the island.
  - According to an X post by the Ministry, one of the single PLA aircraft sorties entered Taiwan's northern Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ), while the Republic of China Armed Forces (ROCArmedForces) monitored and responded to the situation.
  - This follows Sunday's activity, where Taiwan detected 11 PLA aircraft sorties, eight PLAN vessels, and two official ships; of those, seven sorties crossed the Taiwan Strait's median line and entered the northern and central parts of Taiwan's ADIZ.
  - The report notes that China asserts Taiwan is an inseparable part of China based on historical, political, and legal arguments dating back to the Qing Dynasty's 1683 annexation, while Taiwan functions independently with its own government, military, and economy.

[2026-07-02] Taiwan Detects Chinese Military Incursions Across Median Line Amid Rising Tensions
Asian News International (ANI) — https://www.aninews.in/news/world/asia/taiwan-detects-5-chinese-aircraft-6-naval-vessels-2-cross-median-line20260702074953/
  - On July 2, 2026, Taiwan's Ministry of National Defence (MND) reported detecting five sorties of Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) aircraft, six People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) vessels, and five official ships around Taiwan's territorial waters as of 6 a.m. local time.
  - According to an MND post on X, two of the five aircraft sorties crossed the median line and entered Taiwan's southwestern Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ), prompting a response from the Republic of China (ROC) Armed Forces.
  - This follows an incident on Wednesday, July 1, where the MND detected 13 PLA aircraft sorties, 10 PLAN vessels, and three official ships, with nine aircraft crossing the median line into the northern, southwestern, and eastern ADIZ.
  - Additionally, Focus Taiwan reported in June that Taiwan's first domestically built submarine departed the Port of Kaohsiung for its 15th sea trial, which included its ninth submerged navigation test.
  - The article notes that these military activities occur as China continues to increase the intensity of operations around Taiwan, a territory Beijing claims as an inseparable part of China based on historical annexation from the Qing Dynasty in 1683, while Taiwan maintains independent governance and its status remains a subject of international debate regarding sovereignty.

[2026-06-25] Taiwan Reports Surge in Chinese Military Incursions and Submarine Trials
Asian News International (ANI) — https://www.aninews.in/news/world/asia/taiwan-detects-uptick-in-chinese-incursions-around-itself20260625073656/
  - On June 25, 2026, Taiwan's Ministry of National Defence (MND) detected an uptick in Chinese military activity, reporting 14 sorties of PLA aircraft, 6 PLAN vessels, and 2 official ships operating around Taiwan's territorial waters as of 6 a.m. local time.
  - According to an MND post on X, 10 of the 14 aircraft sorties crossed the median line and entered Taiwan's northern and southwestern Air Defense Identification Zones (ADIZ), with the ROC Armed Forces monitoring and responding to the situation.
  - This represents an increase from Wednesday's figures, when the MND detected 11 sorties, 6 vessels, and 7 official ships, with only 3 sorties crossing the median line.
  - Concurrently, Focus Taiwan reported that Taiwan's first domestically built submarine departed the Port of Kaohsiung for its 15th sea trial, which included its ninth submerged navigation test.
  - The United Service Institution of India notes that China's claim over Taiwan is rooted in historical arguments dating back to the Qing Dynasty's 1683 annexation, while Taiwan functions independently with its own government and military.

## Research reports (one per dimension: web search + page reads, dated, with sources)
### CURRENT STATE
**Scope note:** The question counts "incursions." The MND reports two different figures: total aircraft sorties detected around Taiwan, and the subset that entered the ADIZ or crossed the median line. I could not confirm which figure the sheet uses. The figures below are labelled by type.

- [2026-10-14] The MND list page (primary source) shows a daily "PLA activities in the waters and airspace around Taiwan" report for every date from 115.10.06 to 115.10.14 (ROC year 115 = 2026). That is nine consecutive reports, and the page lists the next report as the 10/15 one. The page returned only titles and no counts, so the numbers below come from news quotes of the MND posts. https://www.mnd.gov.tw/news/plaactlist
- [2026-10-14] A MND press release dated 14 Oct, quoted by CNA, reported 13 PLA sorties from 09:30, 11 of them crossing the median line. It describes a "joint combat readiness patrol" alongside PLA ships. These sorties will probably be counted in the 10/15 report (06:00 to 06:00 window). https://www.cna.com.tw/news/aipl/202610140148.aspx
- [2026-10-13] The MND report for 13 Oct covered 6 PLAN vessels, 4 aircraft sorties and 4 government ships. CNA says the four sorties crossed the median line. https://www.cna.com.tw/news/aipl/202610130029.aspx
- [2026-10-12] The MND reported 4 sorties, all of which crossed the median line. The prior day (11 Oct) had 12 sorties, 5 of them in the southwest ADIZ. https://aninews.in/news/world/asia/taiwan-detects-four-pla-aircraft-six-plan-vessels-operating-near-territory20261012065240/
- [2026-10-14] Taiwan Security Monitor's weekly review for 5–11 Oct counts 56 aircraft over seven days, about 8.0 a day. Of those, 34 entered the ADIZ, about 4.9 a day. The prior week had 46 aircraft (27 in the ADIZ). Two joint combat readiness patrols (6 Oct: 14 aircraft; 9 Oct: 21 aircraft) account for most of the week. No aircraft were detected on 3, 4 and 5 Oct. The MND's date labelling may be shifted a day from the TSM's. https://taiwansecuritymonitor.substack.com/p/taiwan-security-monitor-weekly-october
- [2026-09-28] The GlobalMilitary tracker (a secondary aggregator, not the MND; the page returned 403 when fetched, so this is from a search snippet) shows 18 aircraft in the ADIZ in the seven days to 28 Sep, about 2.6 a day. That is the 28th percentile of weeks since 2020 and compares with a past-12-month weekly median of 41. https://www.globalmilitary.net/conflicts/china-taiwan/
- [2026-10-12] China has issued navigation warnings for live-fire drills from 12 to 17 Oct. Some drills are scheduled for 13–15 Oct, about 280 km north of Taiwan, off Zhejiang. Reports differ on the end date (17 Oct vs 20 Oct). Taiwan's defence minister assessed the activity as coastal artillery training. No named large-scale exercise has been announced. https://www.ellitoral.com/internacionales/taiwan-ejercitopopulardeliberacion-china-ejerciciosmilitares-estrechodetaiwan-taipei-wellingtonkoo-pekin-ministeriodedefensanacional-indopacifico-laiching-te_0_UfVwEzhBST.html
- [2026-03-06] Activity was unusually low earlier in 2026. One analyst reported a 7-day stretch with no ADIZ entries from 27 Feb. He linked it to the Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli investigations announced 25 Jan and to US–China diplomacy. https://chinadrew.substack.com/p/the-pla-has-stopped-flying-aircraft
- [2026-10-14] The one-year-ago baseline is the daily average for 19–25 Oct 2025. I could not retrieve those daily counts. For context, the 2025 full-year average was 10.3 ADIZ aircraft a day (3,762 total, up 22% on 2024). Daily rates in the second half of 2025 were slightly lower than in 2024: 2,479 incursions in May–Dec 2025, down 5.4%. November 2025 had 266 incursions, about 8.9 a day. https://www.globalmilitary.net/conflicts/china-taiwan/adiz-violations/2025/ and https://chinapower.csis.org/china-increased-military-activities-indo-pacific-2025/
- [2026-10-14] Trajectory in recent daily MND reports: the week of 5–11 Oct averaged about 8 total sorties a day (about 4.9 in the ADIZ). Daily totals in the week to 14 Oct ran 4, 12, 4 and then a 13-sortie patrol on 14 Oct. The weekly average swings with the timing of joint combat readiness patrols. Recent ones fell on 30 Sep, 6 Oct, 9 Oct and 14 Oct, roughly every 3 to 8 days.
- The MND publishes each day's report around 09:00 Taiwan time, covering the 24 hours to 06:00. Reports for 19–25 Oct will appear 19–25 Oct, with the last on 25 Oct. Any extra same-day press release for a patrol is separate from the daily count.

BOTTOM LINE: The recent run rate is about 5 ADIZ aircraft a day (about 8 total sorties a day), well below the 2025 average of about 10 a day. The weekly average depends mainly on whether one or two joint combat readiness patrols (13–21 aircraft each) fall within 19–25 Oct.

NOT FOUND: Per-day numeric values from the MND data table itself (only titles were readable) and the 19–25 Oct 2025 baseline. Counts for 13–14 Oct in the ADIZ-only definition were also not found, and there is no sign yet of any announced exercise for the target week.

### BASE RATE
I could not retrieve the question's Google Sheet (HTTP 401). I also could not retrieve exact Oct 19–25 daily series for 2023–2025 from the MND site. The prior-year window figures below are therefore partial single-day readings, not weekly averages.

- [2026-10-14] **Latest week.** The Taiwan Security Monitor (TSM) counted 56 PLA aircraft detected for Oct 5–11. Of these, 34 entered the ADIZ, about 4.9 a day, up from 27 the prior week (about 3.9 a day). That is +25.9% week on week. No aircraft were detected on Oct 3, 4 and 5. Two joint combat readiness patrols (JCRPs) on Oct 6 and 9 produced 14 and 21 aircraft. https://taiwansecuritymonitor.substack.com/p/taiwan-security-monitor-weekly-october
- [2026-10-12 to 14] **Reports since then.**
  - Oct 11 report: 12 sorties, 5 in the ADIZ.
  - Oct 12 report: 4 sorties, all 4 crossing the median line.
  - Oct 14 JCRP: CNA reports 13 sorties from 9:30 AM, 11 crossing the median line.
  - The Oct 13 report is not covered here.

  Sources: https://aninews.in/news/world/asia/taiwan-detects-four-pla-aircraft-six-plan-vessels-operating-near-territory20261012065240/ and https://www.cna.com.tw/news/aipl/202610140148.aspx
- [2026-10-12] **Live-fire drills.** China issued no-sail notices for live-fire drills from Oct 12 to 17, and one report says until Oct 20. Taiwan's defense minister assessed them as coastal artillery training. TSM noted that no named exercise had followed as of the Oct 11 report. https://www.epochtimes.com/gb/26/10/12/n14868438.htm
- [2026-10-02] **2026 monthly ADIZ totals.**
  - Sept: 181, about 6.0 a day.
  - Aug: 125, about 4.0 a day. Total aircraft detected in Aug were 171, tied with March for the lowest month of 2026.
  - Jan–May total sorties, from TSM: 270, 190, 173, 229, 274.
  - Aug 2026 total sorties were 69% below Aug 2025's 555.

  Sources: https://political.org/china-taiwan-tracker/ and https://tsm.schar.gmu.edu/strait-snapshot-august-2026-update/
- [2026-09-28] **Weekly distribution.** GlobalMilitary.net's tracker had 18 ADIZ aircraft for the seven days to Sep 28, 2026 (about 2.6 a day). That is the 28th percentile of all weeks since Sept 2020. The all-time weekly median is 32 and the past-12-month median is 41. The 30-day ADIZ total was 165, about 5.5 a day. This is a secondary tracker, and I could not fetch the page directly (HTTP 403). https://www.globalmilitary.net/conflicts/china-taiwan/
- [2026-03] **Lowest stretch on record.** There were zero ADIZ aircraft from Feb 27 to Mar 5, 2026, seven straight days. This is the longest no-detection stretch since AFP began tallying in 2024. It was linked to the Chinese military purges and the Two Sessions, with speculation about Trump–Xi summit timing. On May 14–15, during the Trump–Xi summit, air activity fell to zero. Sources: https://chinadrew.substack.com/p/the-pla-has-stopped-flying-aircraft, https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20260309-sharp-drop-in-chinese-military-aircraft-near-taiwan-raises-questions and https://tsm.schar.gmu.edu/strait-snapshot-may-2026-update/
- [2025-10-25] **Same window, 2025 (partial).**
  - Oct 25 report: 9 sorties, all 9 crossing the median line or entering the ADIZ.
  - Oct 23 report: 3 sorties, 1 in the ADIZ.
  - Oct 29 report: 25 sorties, 23 in the ADIZ.

  The full Oct 19–25, 2025 weekly average was not found. The 2025 annual ADIZ total was 3,764, a record, with monthly ADIZ totals of 222–392. Sources: https://www.aninews.in/news/world/asia/taiwan-records-9-pla-sorties-4-plan-vessels-around-its-territory20251025084046/ and https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/adiz/taiwan-reports-chinese-military-activity-with-five-plan-vessels-five-pla-aircraft-sorties-near-its-territory
- [2024-10] **Same window, 2024 (partial).**
  - Oct 14, 2024 was the all-time single-day peak per the tracker: 111 aircraft in a 25-hour window, during Joint Sword-2024B.
  - That is a surprise outside the Oct 19–25 window, but it shows how fast a named drill can swamp the weekly average.
  - 2024 ADIZ total: 3,615 aircraft.
  - Oct 2024 daily figures from China in Arms: 12 aircraft (8 in the ADIZ) on Oct 8 and 10, 20 (13) on Oct 11, 24 (22) on Oct 12, and 11 (9) on Oct 13.

  Sources: https://www.globalmilitary.net/conflicts/china-taiwan/ and https://chinainarms.substack.com/p/2nd-update-china-is-back
- [2023-10] **Same window, 2023 (partial).**
  - Oct 24, 2023 report: 9 aircraft, 1 in the ADIZ.
  - Oct 27, 2023 report: 35 aircraft, 23 across the median line or in the ADIZ.
  - Oct 11, 2023 report: 14 aircraft, 6 in the ADIZ.
  - Oct 2023 was a high-variance period. The 2023 ADIZ total was 1,669 aircraft.

  Sources: https://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/taiwan/2023/taiwan-231024-roc-mnd01.htm and https://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/taiwan/2023/taiwan-231027-roc-mnd01.htm
- [2026-10] **Variation and surprise on record.**
  - Single-day ADIZ counts in 2026 range from 0 (Aug 20, 22, 28 and 31 had zero aircraft detected) to about 17–21 on JCRP days.
  - Weekly week-on-week swings of about ±20–25% are normal, and a single JCRP day of about 15–20 aircraft shifts a weekly average by about 2 a day.
  - The largest surprises on record are all upside: 153 aircraft detected in 25 hours (Oct 2024) and 71 ADIZ aircraft on Dec 26, 2022.
  - In 2026 the surprises have been downside: the multi-day zero stretches.

  Sources: https://tsm.schar.gmu.edu/strait-snapshot-august-2026-update/ and https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Air_Defense_Identification_Zone_(Taiwan)
- [2026-10] **Trend context.** ISW-CDOT, cited by political.org, assesses the 2026 reduction may reflect a shift in coercion strategy rather than seasonality. Coast guard and maritime activity is rising: 244 Chinese vessels were detected in Sept, against 55 in June and 30 in May. https://political.org/china-taiwan-tracker/

BOTTOM LINE: The recent baseline for ADIZ-entering aircraft is roughly 4–6 a day (Aug about 4.0, Sept about 6.0, last week about 4.9, last 30 days about 5.5). Individual weeks have run from about 0 to well above 10 a day, and JCRPs on 1–3 days of the week drive most of the variation. The prior-year Oct 19–25 comparisons show high 2023–25 levels (2025 days of 3–9 aircraft in this window), but 2026 is running roughly 50% below 2025. Ambiguity to check: "incursions" most likely means ADIZ-entering aircraft, not the total aircraft detected, which runs about 30% higher.

NOT FOUND: The question's Google Sheet contents. Exact weekly daily averages for Oct 19–25 in 2023, 2024 and 2025. Any documented forecast or consensus accuracy for this metric. MND's own weekly aggregates (only daily reports were seen). Any Oct 15–18, 2026 data, or confirmation of a named exercise planned for Oct 19–25.

### KEY FACTORS
- [2026-10-14] The Taiwan Security Monitor (TSM) weekly for Oct 5–11 (fetched) says Lai's Oct 10 National Day speech was measured. It says Lai for the first time welcomed US–China dialogue. Beijing answered with rhetoric: the Taiwan Affairs Office said the speech "distorts the truth," and the PRC defense ministry called Lai a "disaster for peace." The speech did not trigger a named exercise. This lowers the odds of a named, speech-triggered drill in the target week. Control sits with Beijing's Eastern Theater Command. https://taiwansecuritymonitor.substack.com/p/taiwan-security-monitor-weekly-october
- [2026-10-12] Taipei Times (fetched): Defence Minister Koo assessed that the Oct 12–17 drills are off China's coast and involve only PLA artillery units. The Maritime and Port Bureau put the East China Sea zone about 294 km from Taiwan and the South China Sea zone about 588 nm away. It said the drills are unlikely to affect shipping near Taiwan. A Chinese defence ministry spokesman called the PLA's activity around the island routine deterrence of "independence." The drills end before Oct 19, so any carry-over to the target week would come from an extension. https://taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2026/10/12/2003865828
- [2026-09-25] The Trump–Xi Washington summit ran Sep 22–24. Both leaders confirmed they will meet again at APEC in Shenzhen on Nov 18–19, and at the G20 in Miami in December. Wikipedia (secondary) records the confirmations. The earlier AEI note says the summit did not change US Taiwan policy. This gives Beijing a diplomatic reason to avoid a large named drill before mid-November. It does not rule out joint combat readiness patrols, which continued through the Sep 22–24 summit period and the weeks after it. Beijing and Washington control this driver. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2026_state_visit_by_Xi_Jinping_to_the_United_States
- [2026-09-21] Semafor reports Trump may delay the stalled Taiwan arms package until after the APEC summit. TSM (Oct 14) says the roughly $14B package remains frozen. With no new US arms notification to Congress, a common trigger for PLA reaction is absent in the target week. The US controls the timing. https://www.semafor.com/article/09/21/2026/at-trump-xi-meeting-taiwan-will-be-on-back-burner
- [2026-09-05] The MND press release (primary) shows how a patrol day is split. Of 20 aircraft detected from 08:24, 12 crossed the median line and entered the ADIZ. A patrol day therefore adds about 12 ADIZ aircraft, against about 20 total. The 28 Mar patrol (MND) had 15 sorties, 11 crossing. The 14 Oct patrol had 13 sorties, 11 crossing. That is a higher ADIZ share than in earlier patrols. https://www.mnd.gov.tw/en/News/PressRelease/87710
- [2026-09-29] A baseline day, from the MND daily report (primary): 3 sorties, 1 in the ADIZ. Aug 15 was 4 sorties, 3 across the median line. Non-patrol days run about 0–5 ADIZ aircraft. Zero-aircraft days also occur (Oct 3–5 had none). A week with no patrol would therefore average roughly 1–3 a day. https://www.mnd.gov.tw/en/news/plaact/87845
- [2026-10-14] Patrol cadence: the TSM counts patrols on Sep 30, Oct 6, Oct 9 and now Oct 14 (the CNA/MND release). A Diplomat piece (Jan 2026) puts the long-run average at about two a month. A 7-day window with at least one patrol is likely if the recent 3–8 day spacing holds. The patrols are timed by the PLA and often follow political events. https://thediplomat.com/2026/01/pla-sorties-around-taiwan-fewer-aircraft-higher-threat
- [2026-10-12] Coast guard pressure is the other lever. Taiwan's coast guard counted 244 Chinese vessels in Sep, per ANI citing CGA data. Taipei Times says about 60% were China Coast Guard ships, and the count excludes PLAN ships. Beijing appears to be shifting coercion toward maritime and coast guard activity. That may keep air counts suppressed even as ship counts rise. The question counts aircraft only. https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/adiz-breach/taiwan-detects-four-pla-aircraft-six-plan-vessels-operating-near-territory
- [2026-09-03] Early September showed the same pattern. No aircraft were detected on Sep 3. A Sep 5 patrol then produced 20 sorties, with 12 crossing. The patrol followed a quiet stretch. Quiet-then-spike is the typical rhythm, so a weekly average depends mostly on how many patrol days fall inside the 7 days. https://www.threads.com/@platinumpathway/post/Dc6PyEeFiOc/taiwan-detects-chinese-military-aircraft-as-cross-strait-median-line-saturdays/
- [2026-08-09] GlobalMilitary (secondary) says the 2026 ADIZ decline is steady and not a one-off. The Jan 1–Aug 9 total was 1,200, against 2,501 a year earlier, and monthly totals ran 121–216. Its definition of "ADIZ" is the broader set that also counts median-line crossings. Compare that with the MND "total sorties" figure, which runs higher (1,679 over the same span). Which of the two figures the question uses changes the answer by about 40%. https://www.globalmilitary.net/news/pla-air-activity-around-taiwan-halved-in-2026/

Causal chain for a high outcome: (1) a patrol or named drill must occur in Oct 19–25; (2) it would need a trigger. Candidate triggers are a US arms notification, a Taiwan–US political event, or a Japan-related event, and none is announced; (3) the MND must then report it in the 06:00-to-06:00 window assigned to dates Oct 19–25. A low outcome needs only that no patrol falls in the week.

BOTTOM LINE: The controllers (Beijing's Eastern Theater Command, with US–China summit diplomacy restraining a named exercise before the Nov 18–19 APEC) point to a patrol-driven baseline. In that baseline, 1–2 patrol days sit on top of low non-patrol days. A named large drill looks unlikely in the week, and it is the main upside tail.

NOT FOUND: MND counts for Oct 13–14 in the ADIZ-only definition. Any Oct 15–18 data. Confirmation that the Oct 12–17 drills were extended to Oct 20. Any announced trigger event for Oct 19–25. The question's Google Sheet. The Oct 19–25, 2025 weekly average.

### EXPERT VIEW
I found no published forecasts for this specific quantity. That covers Metaculus, Polymarket and analyst projections for the October 19–25 average daily ADIZ count. The evidence below is the baseline data that any forecast would rest on.

- [2026-10-11] The 2026 year-to-date ADIZ total through Oct 11 is 1,489 aircraft, a daily average of 5.2. That is 51% below the same span of 2025 (3,067). Monthly daily averages in 2026 ran from 3.9 (March) to 7.0 (May). The tracker lists 5.4 (Jan), 5.2 (Feb), 3.9 (Mar), 5.6 (Apr), 7.0 (May), 4.5 (Jun), 6.1 (Jul), 4.0 (Aug) and 6.0 (Sep). The partial October figure is 3.6 per day. The tracker uses the same PLATracker dataset the question cites, but dates each report to the day its window began, which is one day earlier than the MND dates. https://www.globalmilitary.net/conflicts/china-taiwan/adiz-violations/2026/
- [2026-10-14] Taiwan Security Monitor reports 34 ADIZ aircraft for Oct 5–11. That is about 4.9 per day, up from 27 the week before (about 3.9 per day). Total PLA aircraft were 56, up from 46. There were no aircraft on Oct 3, 4 or 5. Joint combat readiness patrols produced 14 aircraft on Oct 6 and 21 on Oct 9. Three patrols have occurred in 11 days, counting Sep 30. https://taiwansecuritymonitor.substack.com/p/taiwan-security-monitor-weekly-october
- [2026-10-14] MND reported 13 aircraft sorties on Oct 14, with 11 crossing the median line, in a "joint readiness patrol" (CNA). This is a fourth patrol in about two weeks, and it falls in the Oct 14 report window, before the target week. https://www.cna.com.tw/news/aipl/202610140148.aspx
- [2026-10-12] On Oct 12, 4 of 4 sorties entered the ADIZ. On Oct 11, 5 of 12 entered. https://aninews.in/news/world/asia/taiwan-detects-four-pla-aircraft-six-plan-vessels-operating-near-territory20261012065240/
- [2026-10-12] China announced live-fire drills in five sea areas for Oct 12–17 (Epoch Times). Another report puts the drills at Oct 12–20, with sessions near Zhejiang on Oct 13–15 about 280 km north of Taiwan. Taiwan's defense minister assessed them as coastal artillery training. No named large-scale exercise has been announced. https://www.epochtimes.com/gb/26/10/12/n14868438.htm
- [2026-08-09] Monthly ADIZ totals in 2026 ranged from 121 to 216, against 222–392 in 2025. The 2026 decline is attributed to the period after the Zhang Youxia purge, and to a Trump–Xi summit. Analyst Drew Thompson called the lull puzzling in March. https://www.globalmilitary.net/news/pla-air-activity-around-taiwan-halved-in-2026/
- [2026-03-06] Drew Thompson noted a 7-day zero-ADIZ streak starting Feb 27, which shows that a very low weekly average is possible. https://chinadrew.substack.com/p/the-pla-has-stopped-flying-aircraft
- [2026-09-24] PLATracker (skyfaring) showed 203 total PLA sorties for September through Sep 24, with a peak of 28 on Sep 18. https://pla-tracker.skyfaring.net/en/
- [2025 full year] For 2025 the ADIZ total was 3,764 (about 10.3 per day), a record. The monthly average from May 2024 to Dec 2025 was 319. 2026 is running at roughly half that. https://chinapower.csis.org/china-increased-military-activities-indo-pacific-2025/
- [2026-10] Prediction markets address only invasion and blockade, not ADIZ counts. Polymarket "invade by end of 2026" is about 2–4% Yes. Metaculus "attack or blockade in 2026" was 2.5% (older snapshot). These imply no expected regime change to a large-scale exercise. https://polymarket.com/event/will-china-invade-taiwan-before-2027

BOTTOM LINE: No direct consensus forecast exists. The best anchor is the 2026 weekly baseline of about 4–6 per day, with the latest weeks at about 3.9 and 4.9 per day and a recent uptick in joint combat readiness patrols. A patrol day adds 10–20 aircraft, so a patrol in the target week would raise the average. A named exercise would be a large upside tail.

NOT FOUND: Any Metaculus, Polymarket or analyst forecast of the weekly ADIZ average. The question's Google Sheet could not be read (HTTP 401). No record of how accurate past forecasts of this series were. No MND data yet for Oct 19–25.

### HIGH CASE
- [2026-10-14] I fetched the MND daily report for 29 Sep, which is the primary format. It states a 6 a.m.–6 a.m. window and two separate counts: "3 sorties" total and "1 out of 3" in the ADIZ. Each report links to a JPG chart. The "median line crossing" and "ADIZ entry" figures are therefore the same line item, and the total is higher. The sheet's definition of "incursions" is still unconfirmed. If it uses total sorties, the high-scenario averages run about 30–60% above the ADIZ-only ones. https://www.mnd.gov.tw/en/Publication/87845
- [2026-10-12] The Taipei Times reports the no-sail areas are in the Yellow Sea, East China Sea, South China Sea and Bohai Sea, and the drills run through Saturday 17 Oct. Koo assessed them as off the Chinese coast rather than near Taiwan, but said MND is preparing for various scenarios. Japan Times: none of the notices covers waters around Taiwan itself. The drills end before the target week. A high outcome would need a new trigger, not a continuation of these drills. https://taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2026/10/12/2003865828
- [2026-10-12] Beijing's reaction to Lai's 10 Oct speech so far is rhetorical. The TAO said the speech "distorts the truth", and the PRC defence ministry accused Lai of seeking independence through force. This is a pretext for a named drill (precedent: Strait Thunder-2025A was a retaliation for a Lai speech). TSM says no named exercise had followed as of the 11 Oct report. https://japantimes.co.jp/news/2026/10/12/asia-pacific/taiwan-monitoring-china-drills
- [2026-10-14] The base rate for a "Justice Mission" or "Strait Thunder"-type drill is low but real. Justice Mission 2025 on 29–30 Dec brought 130+ aircraft sorties into the ADIZ across two days. On the day of the drill, Taiwan tracked 89 aircraft in a single day. One such two-day event in the target week adds roughly 15–20 per day to the weekly average. That would take a 5/day baseline to about 20 or more. https://thediplomat.com/2026/01/chinas-taiwan-drills-are-crossing-a-new-line/
- [2026-10-07] Joint combat readiness patrol (JCRP) cadence is rising. TSM: 30 Sep had 23 aircraft (16 in the ADIZ), and the next two days had 6 and 5. The 6 Oct, 9 Oct and 14 Oct patrols (colleagues' reports) follow. Four patrols in 15 days, at about 3–5 day gaps, imply 2 patrols in the 19–25 Oct week is plausible. At 14–21 aircraft per patrol day plus a floor of 3–6 per day, the weekly ADIZ average comes out near 7–9. https://taiwansecuritymonitor.substack.com/p/taiwan-security-monitor-weekly-september-f35
- [2026-09-05] A patrol on 5 Sep was combined with "joint sea-air training": 20 sorties, 12 crossing the median line. The 14 Oct release also tied the patrol to PLAN ships. Combined air-sea labels signal a larger package. The Aug patrols (21 and 11 aircraft) were smaller than any earlier in 2026, and the 14 Oct patrol (13) is again mid-sized. https://www.mnd.gov.tw/en/News/PressRelease/87710
- [2026-08] The August TSM snapshot says a 20-aircraft day on 18 Aug carried no patrol label. Surges can therefore come unannounced and add to the weekly sum. Its figure for August is 171 total sorties and 125 in the ADIZ. I could not re-fetch the page (HTTP 403), so this comes from the search snippet. https://tsm.schar.gmu.edu/strait-snapshot-august-2026-update/
- [2025-10-17] The same-season comparison: an MND JCRP release on 17 Oct 2025 gave 21 sorties, 17 crossing the median line or entering the ADIZ. The PLA ran patrols in the run-up to the late-October 2025 window, and the colleague's 29 Oct 2025 report had 25 sorties (23 in the ADIZ). Late October has shown a pattern of patrol clusters in prior years. https://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/taiwan/2025/taiwan-251017-roc-mnd02.htm
- [2026-10-12] Non-air signals that raise the odds of an air surge. CCG ships entered Kinmen restricted waters on 9 Oct, about 20 minutes after the patrol began (TSM). The Coast Guard reported 244 Chinese vessels in September, against 55 in June. PLA activity is rising in maritime and constabulary domains. A shift of tempo back to air may be signalled by a combined sea-air patrol. https://taiwansecuritymonitor.substack.com/p/taiwan-security-monitor-weekly-october
- [2026-10-11] Possible triggers inside or just before the window: US arms deliveries (500 Stinger and 178 launchers, Harpoon) and the arrival of F-16 Block 70s on 2 Oct, the US deployment of anti-ship missiles on Yonaguni (Epoch Times 12 Oct), and Lai's welcome of US–China dialogue. None has produced a named drill so far. The PLA's 2026 lull is tied to the Trump–Xi summit pattern, "flights paused before the meeting and resumed after it" (TSM 7 Oct). Any breakdown in US–China diplomacy would remove that restraint. https://taiwansecuritymonitor.substack.com/p/taiwan-security-monitor-weekly-september-f35

BOTTOM LINE: Without a named exercise, the high scenario is two or more JCRPs plus a few unlabelled 15–20 aircraft days. That gives roughly 7–9 per day in the ADIZ-only count, or about 10–12 on total sorties. A named drill (Justice Mission or Strait Thunder type) would be a tail case of 15–30 or more per day, and I found no announcement or signal of one for 19–25 Oct.

NOT FOUND: The numeric daily values in the MND tables for 6–14 Oct (only the 29 Sep report was readable). Any 15–18 Oct data. The question's Google Sheet. Any announced or reported plan for a named PLA exercise in the target week. The TSM Aug page could not be fetched (403).

### LOW CASE
- [2026-10-04] The MND's own report for 3–4 Oct (the primary page) says no PLA aircraft were detected, only 7 PLAN ships and 8 official ships. TSM says Oct 3, 4 and 5 were all zero-aircraft days. Three zero days inside one week show the floor can arrive without any named lull. https://www.mnd.gov.tw/en/news/plaact/87905
- [2026-09-29] TSM's week of 21–27 Sep (36 aircraft total, 21 in the ADIZ, about 3.0 a day) is a recent low-side analogue. It followed a 99-aircraft week. Daily totals were at most 10 and fell to 2 on the day of the Trump–Xi summit. TSM said the expected post-summit rebound "did not materialize." The week therefore swung from 99 to 36 with no change in policy. https://taiwansecuritymonitor.substack.com/p/taiwan-security-monitor-weekly
- [2026-10-07] TSM's 28 Sep–4 Oct review shows what happens when a patrol is absent. After the 30 Sep patrol (23 aircraft, 16 in the ADIZ), Oct 1 had 6 aircraft and Oct 2 had 5. Then three zero days followed. A week with no patrol would therefore run at about 2–4 total sorties a day, with an ADIZ figure under 3. https://taiwansecuritymonitor.substack.com/p/taiwan-security-monitor-weekly-september-f35
- [2026-09-26] A typical non-patrol MND day was 5 sorties with only 1 crossing the median line (northern ADIZ). This is a concrete example of the quiet-day pattern that would dominate a low week. https://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/taiwan/2026/taiwan-260926-roc-mnd01.htm
- [2026-07-04] SCMP counted 38 days with zero PLA aircraft in Jan–Jun 2026, against 6 in H1 2025. Median-line crossings in H1 were 810, against 1,984 in H1 2025. About one day in five is a zero day, so a 7-day window has a real chance of several of them. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3361605/why-pla-fighter-jet-sorties-near-taiwan-dropped-3-year-low-first-half-2026
- [2026-09-25] Diplomatic restraint mechanism: the Xi–Trump meeting on 24 Sep produced no change in US Taiwan policy. Both leaders have confirmed that they will attend the APEC summit in Shenzhen on 18–19 Nov, followed by the G20 in Miami in December. The pattern observed on 14–15 May and 24 Sep is that air tempo dips around leader-level contact. The target week is four weeks before APEC, so a pre-APEC dampening would be only mildly relevant. https://www.aei.org/commentary/china-taiwan-update-september-25-2026/ and https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/APEC_China_2026
- [2026-10-12] The live-fire drills of 12–17 Oct were assessed by Taiwan's defence minister as coastal artillery training. They fall before the target week and are not a named joint exercise. After the drills end, a lull is plausible. The Oct 14 patrol of 13 sorties makes a fresh patrol on 19–25 Oct less certain, given the 3–8 day cycle. https://www.epochtimes.com/gb/26/10/12/n14868438.htm
- [2026-08-09] Structural reading: GlobalMilitary notes that ADIZ aircraft fell 52% in Jan–Aug 9 2026 against 2025. Monthly ADIZ totals have been 121–216. A 121-total month is about 3.9 a day, and 2026 never exceeded 216 (about 7 a day). A week averaging 2–3 a day is therefore within 2026's observed range, while a figure above 8 would be outside the monthly range. https://www.globalmilitary.net/news/pla-air-activity-around-taiwan-halved-in-2026/
- [2026-08-?] Aug 2026 had 171 aircraft but only 55 median-line crossings, about 1.8 crossings a day. If "incursions" is read strictly as median-line crossings or ADIZ entries, the low scenario is near 1–2 a day. https://www.threads.com/@taiwan_maps_and_dataviz/post/Dc2Rgl3Ep9R/a-closer-look-at-pla-air-activity-around-taiwan-in-august-this-follow-up-map/
- [2026-03-16] Weather: Drew Thompson notes air operations fall when bad weather such as a typhoon arrives. Winter Strait winds also suppress flying. The northeast monsoon builds from late October. I found no specific typhoon forecast for 19–25 Oct 2026. https://chinadrew.substack.com/p/the-pla-has-stopped-flying-aircraft

BOTTOM LINE: The low path is a week with no joint combat readiness patrol, or with one small one, in which the quiet-day pattern (0–6 sorties, 0–3 in the ADIZ) holds. That gives about 1.5–3 ADIZ aircraft a day, or 3–4 total sorties a day, as in the 21–27 Sep week. Signals for it are a quiet 15–18 Oct, the end of the live-fire drills without escalation, and no patrol by about 21 Oct.

NOT FOUND: Per-day MND counts for 13–14 Oct in the ADIZ-only definition, and any data for 15–18 Oct. Also not found: a typhoon or monsoon forecast for 19–25 Oct, the question's Google Sheet, and the 19–25 Oct 2025 weekly baseline.

## Required pre-forecast walkthrough

Before giving percentiles, address these explicitly in your rationale:
  (0) Resolution check: what the resolution source currently shows, and whether the value is already known or fixed as of today.
  (a) The time left until the question resolves.
  (b) The outcome if NOTHING changes from today (the status quo value).
  (c) The outcome if the CURRENT TREND continues.
  (d) The expectations of experts / markets / base rates.
  (e) A plausible scenario that produces a LOW outcome (near p10).
  (f) A plausible scenario that produces a HIGH outcome (near p90).

## Calibration guidance

- **Be humble about tails.** Good forecasters set WIDE 90/10 intervals to account for unknown unknowns. Narrow tails get punished by the log score far more than slightly-biased medians.
- **Status quo anchoring.** The p50 should be close to the status quo value unless you have strong evidence of a trend.
- Don't pile mass at one value — if you're tempted, widen the spread by 20-50%.
- **Markets and experts are priors, not anchors.** If a SAME QUESTION market, analyst consensus, or community percentiles appear in the evidence, treat them as a strong prior — centre near them and widen — and name the specific evidence they lack whenever you move away. RELATED markets are context only.
- **Open bounds carry real mass.** Where a bound is OPEN, the outcome can land beyond it and the question then resolves "below range" / "above range". Put honest probability there (p_below_min / p_above_max in the output) instead of squeezing the distribution inside the displayed range; the season's worst losses were outcomes that landed where the distribution had ~2%.
- **Relative-return / spread questions ("how much will X's return exceed Y's").** A near-zero median is usually right, but size the TAILS to the more VOLATILE leg, not to a generic 2-3pp spread. Two broad equity indices (e.g. Nasdaq-100 vs S&P 500) do stay within roughly ±2-3pp over a two-week window. But when one leg is a commodity (crude oil, gold) or a single high-beta stock (e.g. Nvidia), the two-week realized spread regularly reaches ±10pp or more — crude-vs-equity spreads have hit ±18pp. In those cases set p10/p90 to at least ±10pp (±15pp or wider for oil) while keeping the median near the status-quo spread; the 2-3pp intuition applies only to index-vs-index.
- **Heavy-tailed one-off magnitudes (opening-weekend box office, product-launch or debut numbers).** Pre-event tracking for these routinely misses by ±40% or more, and results land both far above and far below the consensus. Do NOT treat the displayed [min, max] range as the plausible range or clamp p10/p90 to its edges: the outcome can fall outside the range in either direction (recent opening weekends resolved ~7% above a displayed ceiling in one case and roughly half the displayed floor in another). Set p10/p90 wide enough that a 2x-or-0.5x surprise versus your central estimate still lands inside the interval, and when concrete current tracking disagrees with historical/franchise base rates, weight the tracking.

## Output

Return ONLY valid JSON, no markdown fences:

{
  "rationale": "<address (a) through (f) above, then state your distribution — 6-10 sentences total>",
  "p10": <number>,
  "p25": <number>,
  "p50": <number>,
  "p75": <number>,
  "p90": <number>,
  "p_below_min": <probability in [0, 1] that the outcome is BELOW 0.9285714285714286>,
  "p_above_max": <probability in [0, 1] that the outcome is ABOVE 20.071428571428573>,
  "unverified_claims": ["<a fact your forecast depends on that no source above confirms, one that would move your p50 by a quarter of your p10-p90 width if false; [] if none>"]
}

Percentiles MUST be in non-decreasing order (p10 <= p25 <= p50 <= p75 <= p90). p_below_min is P(outcome < 0.9285714285714286); p_above_max is P(outcome > 20.071428571428573). These must agree with your percentiles: a p10 below the lower bound implies p_below_min > 0.10, a p90 above the upper bound implies p_above_max > 0.10. A mass below ~0.05 on an open side needs a specific reason.