Anchor on the latest observed BCB official daily rate and the realized depreciation trend since the June 26 peg exit, then use the Monte Carlo threshold probabilities (sq1–sq3) as the core distribution, shifting the median down if an IMF/financing deal materializes (sq4) and widening the tails if a regime change is likely (sq5). The weighted blend of directional and threshold sub-questions is used to calibrate the central estimate and the width of the numeric distribution.
## Cross-Market Signals ### Polymarket - "Will Elon Musk post 200-219 tweets from August 7 to August 14, 2026?" → Yes: 0.03, Volume: $365.8K - "Will Elon Musk post 180-199 tweets from August 7 to August 14, 2026?" → Yes: 0.97, Volume: $350.8K - "US announces end of Iranian blockade by August 15, 2026?" → Yes: 0.01, Volume: $2.9M - "US announces end of Iranian blockade by August 22, 2026?" → Yes: 0.10, Volume: $367.1K - "Will Elon Musk post 220-239 tweets from August 7 to August 14, 2026?" → Yes: 0.00, Volume: $270.9K - "US announces end of Iranian blockade by August 31, 2026?" → Yes: 0.21, Volume: $1.4M - "Putin out as President of Russia by August 31, 2026?" → Yes: 0.01, Volume: $642.0K
1. [sq1 | web_search | STRONG cred 80 | DOWN | VERY_RECENT] BCB official rate was 12.08 (applied Aug 3), 11.86 on Aug 9, and 11.62 on Aug 14 — a modest appreciation over early August. 2. [sq3 | web_search | STRONG cred 78 | UP | VERY_RECENT] The most recent reported official rate (Aug 14, 2026) of 11.62 is already below the 12.0 threshold. 3. [sq2 | web_search | MODERATE cred 75 | DOWN | VERY_RECENT] The official fixing peaked around 12.13 (July 31 fixing) and has not been reported at or above 13.0 at any point since the float began. 4. [sq1 | web_search | STRONG cred 82 | UP | RECENT] The rate rose from 9.73 on June 29 to about 12.13 by the July 31 fixing, roughly 25% depreciation in the first month of the managed float. 5. [sq1 | code_execution | WEAK cred 35 | UP | VERY_RECENT] A Monte Carlo extrapolating the post-float drift (30-day log change 0.193) gives a median of ~13.1 for Aug 31, with P(>12.0)=0.75 and P(>13.0)=0.51. 6. [sq3 | code_execution | MODERATE cred 40 | NEUTRAL | VERY_RECENT] The Monte Carlo model anchors on 11.80 (July 29) and assumes persistent drift, ignoring the observed early-August appreciation to 11.62. 7. [sq5 | web_search | MODERATE cred 70 | NEUTRAL | DATED] The float was established by Ministerial Resolution 245 with daily fixing based on weighted-average bank client purchase transactions, i.e., an administratively set fixing. 8. [sq5 | web_search | WEAK cred 45 | NEUTRAL | VERY_RECENT] La Patria describes Bolivia as operating a dual system with an official BCB rate coexisting with a market-based Valor Referencial del Dólar (VRD). 9. [sq4 | article_search | WEAK cred 30 | NEUTRAL | VERY_RECENT] Article search over June–August 2026 returned no coverage of a Bolivia–IMF staff-level agreement or external financing package; only a prior report of a 'potential' IMF deal exists. 10. [sq4 | web_search | MODERATE cred 70 | NEUTRAL | RECENT] Reporting notes the IMF had long warned Bolivia's peg was unsustainable amid falling reserves, and Bolivian officials call an IMF agreement 'indispensable' to resolving the FX crisis. 11. [sq1 | article_search | STRONG cred 90 | NEUTRAL | DATED] President Rodrigo Paz declared a state of emergency on June 20, 2026 after ~50 days of blockades that halted the economy, with at least 14 deaths. 12. [sq1 | web_search | WEAK cred 40 | NEUTRAL | VERY_RECENT] Some search-result text misattributes the June 2026 peg exit to the Arce government rather than Paz, indicating source-quality errors in the retrieved summaries. ## Cross-Market Signals ### Polymarket - "Will Elon Musk post 200-219 tweets from August 7 to August 14, 2026?" → Yes: 0.03, Volume: $365.8K - "Will Elon Musk post 180-199 tweets from August 7 to August 14, 2026?" → Yes: 0.97, Volume: $350.8K - "US announces end of Iranian blockade by August 15, 2026?" → Yes: 0.01, Volume: $2.9M - "US announces end of Iranian blockade by August 22, 2026?" → Yes: 0.10, Volume: $367.1K - "Will Elon Musk post 220-239 tweets from August 7 to August 14, 2026?" → Yes: 0.00, Volume: $270.9K - "US announces end of Iranian blockade by August 31, 2026?" → Yes: 0.21, Volume: $1.4M - "Putin out as President of Russia by August 31, 2026?" → Yes: 0.01, Volume: $642.0K Information gaps: - No daily BCB series for Aug 15–31, 2026 (question opened Aug 10; late-August prints unknown) - No base rates for post-peg-exit FX paths in comparable EM devaluations (overshoot-then-retrace frequency) - No data on BCB reserves, intervention volumes, or FX market turnover post-float - No confirmation of IMF mission timing or staff-level agreement status Key uncertainties: - Whether the early-August appreciation to 11.62 reflects genuine stabilization or thin-market/administrative smoothing - Whether an IMF/external financing announcement lands before Aug 31 - Political stability under Paz (protests, blockades) and its FX spillover - Whether BCB shifts to discretionary fixing or a band, capping the rate
You are an elite superforecaster. Produce a probability distribution over the answer to this Metaculus numeric question.
## Question
What will be the Boliviano-USD exchange rate on August 31, 2026?
## Description / Resolution Criteria
## Description
From 2011 to 2026, the Bolivian boliviano was pegged to the US dollar, maintaining a fixed exchange rate of roughly 6.9 bolivianos per dollar.
Although the currency avoided major issues for most of this period, during 2023, the government could no longer defend the rate, and a secondary rate emerged alongside surging inflation. Following the [2025 election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2025_Bolivian_general_election) of Rodrigo Paz, the government substantially restructured the budget, facing [large-scale protests](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2026_Bolivian_protests) in response, but avoided immediate changes to the peg system.
On June 26, 2026, the Government of Bolivia [announced the end](https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/bolivia-ends-15-year-dollar-peg-attempt-restore-economic-stability-2026-06-27/) of the fixed exchange rate, and established a flexible exchange rate. Initially set at 9.73 on June 29, each day's exchange rate is set based upon actual currency transactions, creating what is known as a managed float.
As of July 29, 2026, the rate has further depreciated to 11.80, as the country continues to face severe liquidity issues, and looks towards a [potential IMF deal](https://www.riotimesonline.com/bolivia-imf-agreement-indispensable-fx-crisis-2026/).
`{"format": "metac_reveal_and_close_in_period", "info": {"post_id": 44963, "question_id": 45106}}`
## Resolution Criteria
This question will resolve as the official Boliviano-US Dollar reference exchange rate on August 31, 2026, as reported by the [Central Bank of Bolivia](https://www.bcb.gob.bo/?q=cotizaciones_tc).
## Fine Print
This question's information (resolution criteria, fine print, background info, etc) is synced with an [original identical question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/44963) which opened on 2026-08-10 17:00:00. This question will resolve based on the resolution criteria and fine print of the linked original question. However, if this question would resolve differently than the original question, then this question will be annulled. Additionally, if the original question's resolution could have been known before this question opened, then this question will be annulled.
## Range
The answer must be a number in [7, 20] (units: Bs/USD).
## Sub-question decomposition (planner)
- (w=0.30) Will the BCB official reference rate on August 31, 2026 be higher (more bolivianos per USD) than the rate prevailing in mid-August 2026 (i.e., continued depreciation rather than stabilization/appreciation)? — Establishes the directional drift of the managed float since the June 26 peg exit, which anchors the central estimate.
- (w=0.25) Will the official rate on August 31, 2026 be at or above 13.0 bolivianos per USD? — Tests the upside/depreciation tail — a continuation of the ~2 bolivianos/month slide seen from 9.73 (June 29) to 11.80 (
- (w=0.20) Will the official rate on August 31, 2026 be below 12.0 bolivianos per USD? — Tests the stabilization/appreciation scenario, e.g., if an IMF program, external financing, or BCB intervention firms th
- (w=0.15) Will Bolivia reach a staff-level or formal financing agreement with the IMF (or announce a major external financing package) before August 31, 2026? — An IMF/external financing deal is the single most likely catalyst for arresting depreciation; absence implies continued
- (w=0.10) Will the government/BCB alter the exchange rate regime again (e.g., reimpose a peg/band, step devaluation, or discretionary fixing that breaks from market-based fixing) before August 31, 2026? — A regime change or administrative fixing would create a discontinuity, making simple extrapolation of the float invalid
## Synthesized evidence
1. [sq1 | web_search | STRONG cred 80 | DOWN | VERY_RECENT] BCB official rate was 12.08 (applied Aug 3), 11.86 on Aug 9, and 11.62 on Aug 14 — a modest appreciation over early August.
2. [sq3 | web_search | STRONG cred 78 | UP | VERY_RECENT] The most recent reported official rate (Aug 14, 2026) of 11.62 is already below the 12.0 threshold.
3. [sq2 | web_search | MODERATE cred 75 | DOWN | VERY_RECENT] The official fixing peaked around 12.13 (July 31 fixing) and has not been reported at or above 13.0 at any point since the float began.
4. [sq1 | web_search | STRONG cred 82 | UP | RECENT] The rate rose from 9.73 on June 29 to about 12.13 by the July 31 fixing, roughly 25% depreciation in the first month of the managed float.
5. [sq1 | code_execution | WEAK cred 35 | UP | VERY_RECENT] A Monte Carlo extrapolating the post-float drift (30-day log change 0.193) gives a median of ~13.1 for Aug 31, with P(>12.0)=0.75 and P(>13.0)=0.51.
6. [sq3 | code_execution | MODERATE cred 40 | NEUTRAL | VERY_RECENT] The Monte Carlo model anchors on 11.80 (July 29) and assumes persistent drift, ignoring the observed early-August appreciation to 11.62.
7. [sq5 | web_search | MODERATE cred 70 | NEUTRAL | DATED] The float was established by Ministerial Resolution 245 with daily fixing based on weighted-average bank client purchase transactions, i.e., an administratively set fixing.
8. [sq5 | web_search | WEAK cred 45 | NEUTRAL | VERY_RECENT] La Patria describes Bolivia as operating a dual system with an official BCB rate coexisting with a market-based Valor Referencial del Dólar (VRD).
9. [sq4 | article_search | WEAK cred 30 | NEUTRAL | VERY_RECENT] Article search over June–August 2026 returned no coverage of a Bolivia–IMF staff-level agreement or external financing package; only a prior report of a 'potential' IMF deal exists.
10. [sq4 | web_search | MODERATE cred 70 | NEUTRAL | RECENT] Reporting notes the IMF had long warned Bolivia's peg was unsustainable amid falling reserves, and Bolivian officials call an IMF agreement 'indispensable' to resolving the FX crisis.
11. [sq1 | article_search | STRONG cred 90 | NEUTRAL | DATED] President Rodrigo Paz declared a state of emergency on June 20, 2026 after ~50 days of blockades that halted the economy, with at least 14 deaths.
12. [sq1 | web_search | WEAK cred 40 | NEUTRAL | VERY_RECENT] Some search-result text misattributes the June 2026 peg exit to the Arce government rather than Paz, indicating source-quality errors in the retrieved summaries.
## Cross-Market Signals
### Polymarket
- "Will Elon Musk post 200-219 tweets from August 7 to August 14, 2026?" → Yes: 0.03, Volume: $365.8K
- "Will Elon Musk post 180-199 tweets from August 7 to August 14, 2026?" → Yes: 0.97, Volume: $350.8K
- "US announces end of Iranian blockade by August 15, 2026?" → Yes: 0.01, Volume: $2.9M
- "US announces end of Iranian blockade by August 22, 2026?" → Yes: 0.10, Volume: $367.1K
- "Will Elon Musk post 220-239 tweets from August 7 to August 14, 2026?" → Yes: 0.00, Volume: $270.9K
- "US announces end of Iranian blockade by August 31, 2026?" → Yes: 0.21, Volume: $1.4M
- "Putin out as President of Russia by August 31, 2026?" → Yes: 0.01, Volume: $642.0K
Information gaps:
- No daily BCB series for Aug 15–31, 2026 (question opened Aug 10; late-August prints unknown)
- No base rates for post-peg-exit FX paths in comparable EM devaluations (overshoot-then-retrace frequency)
- No data on BCB reserves, intervention volumes, or FX market turnover post-float
- No confirmation of IMF mission timing or staff-level agreement status
Key uncertainties:
- Whether the early-August appreciation to 11.62 reflects genuine stabilization or thin-market/administrative smoothing
- Whether an IMF/external financing announcement lands before Aug 31
- Political stability under Paz (protests, blockades) and its FX spillover
- Whether BCB shifts to discretionary fixing or a band, capping the rate
## Required pre-forecast walkthrough
Before giving percentiles, address these explicitly in your rationale:
(a) The time left until the question resolves.
(b) The outcome if NOTHING changes from today (the status quo value).
(c) The outcome if the CURRENT TREND continues.
(d) The expectations of experts / markets / base rates.
(e) A plausible scenario that produces a LOW outcome (near p10).
(f) A plausible scenario that produces a HIGH outcome (near p90).
## Calibration guidance
- **Be humble about tails.** Good forecasters set WIDE 90/10 intervals to account for unknown unknowns. Narrow tails get punished by the log score far more than slightly-biased medians.
- **Status quo anchoring.** The p50 should be close to the status quo value unless you have strong evidence of a trend.
- Don't pile mass at one value — if you're tempted, widen the spread by 20-50%.
- **Anchor on markets/experts.** If liquid market prices, analyst forecasts, or community percentiles appear in the evidence, center your distribution on them and widen — don't override a liquid market without specific evidence it lacks.
- **Relative-return / spread questions ("how much will X's return exceed Y's").** A near-zero median is usually right, but size the TAILS to the more VOLATILE leg, not to a generic 2-3pp spread. Two broad equity indices (e.g. Nasdaq-100 vs S&P 500) do stay within roughly ±2-3pp over a two-week window. But when one leg is a commodity (crude oil, gold) or a single high-beta stock (e.g. Nvidia), the two-week realized spread regularly reaches ±10pp or more — crude-vs-equity spreads have hit ±18pp. In those cases set p10/p90 to at least ±10pp (±15pp or wider for oil) while keeping the median near the status-quo spread; the 2-3pp intuition applies only to index-vs-index.
- **Heavy-tailed one-off magnitudes (opening-weekend box office, product-launch or debut numbers).** Pre-event tracking for these routinely misses by ±40% or more, and results land both far above and far below the consensus. Do NOT treat the displayed [min, max] range as the plausible range or clamp p10/p90 to its edges: the outcome can fall outside the range in either direction (recent opening weekends resolved ~7% above a displayed ceiling in one case and roughly half the displayed floor in another). Set p10/p90 wide enough that a 2x-or-0.5x surprise versus your central estimate still lands inside the interval, and when concrete current tracking disagrees with historical/franchise base rates, weight the tracking.
## Output
Return ONLY valid JSON, no markdown fences:
{
"rationale": "<address (a) through (f) above, then state your distribution — 6-10 sentences total>",
"p10": <number>,
"p25": <number>,
"p50": <number>,
"p75": <number>,
"p90": <number>
}
Percentiles MUST be in non-decreasing order (p10 <= p25 <= p50 <= p75 <= p90).
{
"forecast": {
"evidence_brief": "1. [sq1 | web_search | STRONG cred 80 | DOWN | VERY_RECENT] BCB official rate was 12.08 (applied Aug 3), 11.86 on Aug 9, and 11.62 on Aug 14 \u2014 a modest appreciation over early August.\n2. [sq3 | web_search | STRONG cred 78 | UP | VERY_RECENT] The most recent reported official rate (Aug 14, 2026) of 11.62 is already below the 12.0 threshold.\n3. [sq2 | web_search | MODERATE cred 75 | DOWN | VERY_RECENT] The official fixing peaked around 12.13 (July 31 fixing) and has not been reported at or above 13.0 at any point since the float began.\n4. [sq1 | web_search | STRONG cred 82 | UP | RECENT] The rate rose from 9.73 on June 29 to about 12.13 by the July 31 fixing, roughly 25% depreciation in the first month of the managed float.\n5. [sq1 | code_execution | WEAK cred 35 | UP | VERY_RECENT] A Monte Carlo extrapolating the post-float drift (30-day log change 0.193) gives a median of ~13.1 for Aug 31, with P(\u003e12.0)=0.75 and P(\u003e13.0)=0.51.\n6. [sq3 | code_execution | MODERATE cred 40 | NEUTRAL | VERY_RECENT] The Monte Carlo model anchors on 11.80 (July 29) and assumes persistent drift, ignoring the observed early-August appreciation to 11.62.\n7. [sq5 | web_search | MODERATE cred 70 | NEUTRAL | DATED] The float was established by Ministerial Resolution 245 with daily fixing based on weighted-average bank client purchase transactions, i.e., an administratively set fixing.\n8. [sq5 | web_search | WEAK cred 45 | NEUTRAL | VERY_RECENT] La Patria describes Bolivia as operating a dual system with an official BCB rate coexisting with a market-based Valor Referencial del D\u00f3lar (VRD).\n9. [sq4 | article_search | WEAK cred 30 | NEUTRAL | VERY_RECENT] Article search over June\u2013August 2026 returned no coverage of a Bolivia\u2013IMF staff-level agreement or external financing package; only a prior report of a \u0027potential\u0027 IMF deal exists.\n10. [sq4 | web_search | MODERATE cred 70 | NEUTRAL | RECENT] Reporting notes the IMF had long warned Bolivia\u0027s peg was unsustainable amid falling reserves, and Bolivian officials call an IMF agreement \u0027indispensable\u0027 to resolving the FX crisis.\n11. [sq1 | article_search | STRONG cred 90 | NEUTRAL | DATED] President Rodrigo Paz declared a state of emergency on June 20, 2026 after ~50 days of blockades that halted the economy, with at least 14 deaths.\n12. [sq1 | web_search | WEAK cred 40 | NEUTRAL | VERY_RECENT] Some search-result text misattributes the June 2026 peg exit to the Arce government rather than Paz, indicating source-quality errors in the retrieved summaries.\n\n## Cross-Market Signals\n\n### Polymarket\n- \"Will Elon Musk post 200-219 tweets from August 7 to August 14, 2026?\" \u2192 Yes: 0.03, Volume: $365.8K\n- \"Will Elon Musk post 180-199 tweets from August 7 to August 14, 2026?\" \u2192 Yes: 0.97, Volume: $350.8K\n- \"US announces end of Iranian blockade by August 15, 2026?\" \u2192 Yes: 0.01, Volume: $2.9M\n- \"US announces end of Iranian blockade by August 22, 2026?\" \u2192 Yes: 0.10, Volume: $367.1K\n- \"Will Elon Musk post 220-239 tweets from August 7 to August 14, 2026?\" \u2192 Yes: 0.00, Volume: $270.9K\n- \"US announces end of Iranian blockade by August 31, 2026?\" \u2192 Yes: 0.21, Volume: $1.4M\n- \"Putin out as President of Russia by August 31, 2026?\" \u2192 Yes: 0.01, Volume: $642.0K\n\nInformation gaps:\n - No daily BCB series for Aug 15\u201331, 2026 (question opened Aug 10; late-August prints unknown)\n - No base rates for post-peg-exit FX paths in comparable EM devaluations (overshoot-then-retrace frequency)\n - No data on BCB reserves, intervention volumes, or FX market turnover post-float\n - No confirmation of IMF mission timing or staff-level agreement status\n\nKey uncertainties:\n - Whether the early-August appreciation to 11.62 reflects genuine stabilization or thin-market/administrative smoothing\n - Whether an IMF/external financing announcement lands before Aug 31\n - Political stability under Paz (protests, blockades) and its FX spillover\n - Whether BCB shifts to discretionary fixing or a band, capping the rate",
"forecast_prompt": "You are an elite superforecaster. Produce a probability distribution over the answer to this Metaculus numeric question.\n\n## Question\nWhat will be the Boliviano-USD exchange rate on August 31, 2026?\n\n## Description / Resolution Criteria\n## Description\nFrom 2011 to 2026, the Bolivian boliviano was pegged to the US dollar, maintaining a fixed exchange rate of roughly 6.9 bolivianos per dollar.\n\nAlthough the currency avoided major issues for most of this period, during 2023, the government could no longer defend the rate, and a secondary rate emerged alongside surging inflation. Following the [2025 election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2025_Bolivian_general_election) of Rodrigo Paz, the government substantially restructured the budget, facing [large-scale protests](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2026_Bolivian_protests) in response, but avoided immediate changes to the peg system.\n\nOn June 26, 2026, the Government of Bolivia [announced the end](https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/bolivia-ends-15-year-dollar-peg-attempt-restore-economic-stability-2026-06-27/) of the fixed exchange rate, and established a flexible exchange rate. Initially set at 9.73 on June 29, each day\u0027s exchange rate is set based upon actual currency transactions, creating what is known as a managed float.\n\nAs of July 29, 2026, the rate has further depreciated to 11.80, as the country continues to face severe liquidity issues, and looks towards a [potential IMF deal](https://www.riotimesonline.com/bolivia-imf-agreement-indispensable-fx-crisis-2026/).\n\n`{\"format\": \"metac_reveal_and_close_in_period\", \"info\": {\"post_id\": 44963, \"question_id\": 45106}}`\n\n## Resolution Criteria\nThis question will resolve as the official Boliviano-US Dollar reference exchange rate on August 31, 2026, as reported by the [Central Bank of Bolivia](https://www.bcb.gob.bo/?q=cotizaciones_tc).\n\n## Fine Print\nThis question\u0027s information (resolution criteria, fine print, background info, etc) is synced with an [original identical question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/44963) which opened on 2026-08-10 17:00:00. This question will resolve based on the resolution criteria and fine print of the linked original question. However, if this question would resolve differently than the original question, then this question will be annulled. Additionally, if the original question\u0027s resolution could have been known before this question opened, then this question will be annulled.\n\n## Range\nThe answer must be a number in [7, 20] (units: Bs/USD).\n\n## Sub-question decomposition (planner)\n- (w=0.30) Will the BCB official reference rate on August 31, 2026 be higher (more bolivianos per USD) than the rate prevailing in mid-August 2026 (i.e., continued depreciation rather than stabilization/appreciation)? \u2014 Establishes the directional drift of the managed float since the June 26 peg exit, which anchors the central estimate.\n- (w=0.25) Will the official rate on August 31, 2026 be at or above 13.0 bolivianos per USD? \u2014 Tests the upside/depreciation tail \u2014 a continuation of the ~2 bolivianos/month slide seen from 9.73 (June 29) to 11.80 (\n- (w=0.20) Will the official rate on August 31, 2026 be below 12.0 bolivianos per USD? \u2014 Tests the stabilization/appreciation scenario, e.g., if an IMF program, external financing, or BCB intervention firms th\n- (w=0.15) Will Bolivia reach a staff-level or formal financing agreement with the IMF (or announce a major external financing package) before August 31, 2026? \u2014 An IMF/external financing deal is the single most likely catalyst for arresting depreciation; absence implies continued \n- (w=0.10) Will the government/BCB alter the exchange rate regime again (e.g., reimpose a peg/band, step devaluation, or discretionary fixing that breaks from market-based fixing) before August 31, 2026? \u2014 A regime change or administrative fixing would create a discontinuity, making simple extrapolation of the float invalid \n\n## Synthesized evidence\n1. [sq1 | web_search | STRONG cred 80 | DOWN | VERY_RECENT] BCB official rate was 12.08 (applied Aug 3), 11.86 on Aug 9, and 11.62 on Aug 14 \u2014 a modest appreciation over early August.\n2. [sq3 | web_search | STRONG cred 78 | UP | VERY_RECENT] The most recent reported official rate (Aug 14, 2026) of 11.62 is already below the 12.0 threshold.\n3. [sq2 | web_search | MODERATE cred 75 | DOWN | VERY_RECENT] The official fixing peaked around 12.13 (July 31 fixing) and has not been reported at or above 13.0 at any point since the float began.\n4. [sq1 | web_search | STRONG cred 82 | UP | RECENT] The rate rose from 9.73 on June 29 to about 12.13 by the July 31 fixing, roughly 25% depreciation in the first month of the managed float.\n5. [sq1 | code_execution | WEAK cred 35 | UP | VERY_RECENT] A Monte Carlo extrapolating the post-float drift (30-day log change 0.193) gives a median of ~13.1 for Aug 31, with P(\u003e12.0)=0.75 and P(\u003e13.0)=0.51.\n6. [sq3 | code_execution | MODERATE cred 40 | NEUTRAL | VERY_RECENT] The Monte Carlo model anchors on 11.80 (July 29) and assumes persistent drift, ignoring the observed early-August appreciation to 11.62.\n7. [sq5 | web_search | MODERATE cred 70 | NEUTRAL | DATED] The float was established by Ministerial Resolution 245 with daily fixing based on weighted-average bank client purchase transactions, i.e., an administratively set fixing.\n8. [sq5 | web_search | WEAK cred 45 | NEUTRAL | VERY_RECENT] La Patria describes Bolivia as operating a dual system with an official BCB rate coexisting with a market-based Valor Referencial del D\u00f3lar (VRD).\n9. [sq4 | article_search | WEAK cred 30 | NEUTRAL | VERY_RECENT] Article search over June\u2013August 2026 returned no coverage of a Bolivia\u2013IMF staff-level agreement or external financing package; only a prior report of a \u0027potential\u0027 IMF deal exists.\n10. [sq4 | web_search | MODERATE cred 70 | NEUTRAL | RECENT] Reporting notes the IMF had long warned Bolivia\u0027s peg was unsustainable amid falling reserves, and Bolivian officials call an IMF agreement \u0027indispensable\u0027 to resolving the FX crisis.\n11. [sq1 | article_search | STRONG cred 90 | NEUTRAL | DATED] President Rodrigo Paz declared a state of emergency on June 20, 2026 after ~50 days of blockades that halted the economy, with at least 14 deaths.\n12. [sq1 | web_search | WEAK cred 40 | NEUTRAL | VERY_RECENT] Some search-result text misattributes the June 2026 peg exit to the Arce government rather than Paz, indicating source-quality errors in the retrieved summaries.\n\n## Cross-Market Signals\n\n### Polymarket\n- \"Will Elon Musk post 200-219 tweets from August 7 to August 14, 2026?\" \u2192 Yes: 0.03, Volume: $365.8K\n- \"Will Elon Musk post 180-199 tweets from August 7 to August 14, 2026?\" \u2192 Yes: 0.97, Volume: $350.8K\n- \"US announces end of Iranian blockade by August 15, 2026?\" \u2192 Yes: 0.01, Volume: $2.9M\n- \"US announces end of Iranian blockade by August 22, 2026?\" \u2192 Yes: 0.10, Volume: $367.1K\n- \"Will Elon Musk post 220-239 tweets from August 7 to August 14, 2026?\" \u2192 Yes: 0.00, Volume: $270.9K\n- \"US announces end of Iranian blockade by August 31, 2026?\" \u2192 Yes: 0.21, Volume: $1.4M\n- \"Putin out as President of Russia by August 31, 2026?\" \u2192 Yes: 0.01, Volume: $642.0K\n\nInformation gaps:\n - No daily BCB series for Aug 15\u201331, 2026 (question opened Aug 10; late-August prints unknown)\n - No base rates for post-peg-exit FX paths in comparable EM devaluations (overshoot-then-retrace frequency)\n - No data on BCB reserves, intervention volumes, or FX market turnover post-float\n - No confirmation of IMF mission timing or staff-level agreement status\n\nKey uncertainties:\n - Whether the early-August appreciation to 11.62 reflects genuine stabilization or thin-market/administrative smoothing\n - Whether an IMF/external financing announcement lands before Aug 31\n - Political stability under Paz (protests, blockades) and its FX spillover\n - Whether BCB shifts to discretionary fixing or a band, capping the rate\n\n## Required pre-forecast walkthrough\n\nBefore giving percentiles, address these explicitly in your rationale:\n (a) The time left until the question resolves.\n (b) The outcome if NOTHING changes from today (the status quo value).\n (c) The outcome if the CURRENT TREND continues.\n (d) The expectations of experts / markets / base rates.\n (e) A plausible scenario that produces a LOW outcome (near p10).\n (f) A plausible scenario that produces a HIGH outcome (near p90).\n\n## Calibration guidance\n\n- **Be humble about tails.** Good forecasters set WIDE 90/10 intervals to account for unknown unknowns. Narrow tails get punished by the log score far more than slightly-biased medians.\n- **Status quo anchoring.** The p50 should be close to the status quo value unless you have strong evidence of a trend.\n- Don\u0027t pile mass at one value \u2014 if you\u0027re tempted, widen the spread by 20-50%.\n- **Anchor on markets/experts.** If liquid market prices, analyst forecasts, or community percentiles appear in the evidence, center your distribution on them and widen \u2014 don\u0027t override a liquid market without specific evidence it lacks.\n- **Relative-return / spread questions (\"how much will X\u0027s return exceed Y\u0027s\").** A near-zero median is usually right, but size the TAILS to the more VOLATILE leg, not to a generic 2-3pp spread. Two broad equity indices (e.g. Nasdaq-100 vs S\u0026P 500) do stay within roughly \u00b12-3pp over a two-week window. But when one leg is a commodity (crude oil, gold) or a single high-beta stock (e.g. Nvidia), the two-week realized spread regularly reaches \u00b110pp or more \u2014 crude-vs-equity spreads have hit \u00b118pp. In those cases set p10/p90 to at least \u00b110pp (\u00b115pp or wider for oil) while keeping the median near the status-quo spread; the 2-3pp intuition applies only to index-vs-index.\n- **Heavy-tailed one-off magnitudes (opening-weekend box office, product-launch or debut numbers).** Pre-event tracking for these routinely misses by \u00b140% or more, and results land both far above and far below the consensus. Do NOT treat the displayed [min, max] range as the plausible range or clamp p10/p90 to its edges: the outcome can fall outside the range in either direction (recent opening weekends resolved ~7% above a displayed ceiling in one case and roughly half the displayed floor in another). Set p10/p90 wide enough that a 2x-or-0.5x surprise versus your central estimate still lands inside the interval, and when concrete current tracking disagrees with historical/franchise base rates, weight the tracking.\n\n## Output\n\nReturn ONLY valid JSON, no markdown fences:\n\n{\n \"rationale\": \"\u003caddress (a) through (f) above, then state your distribution \u2014 6-10 sentences total\u003e\",\n \"p10\": \u003cnumber\u003e,\n \"p25\": \u003cnumber\u003e,\n \"p50\": \u003cnumber\u003e,\n \"p75\": \u003cnumber\u003e,\n \"p90\": \u003cnumber\u003e\n}\n\nPercentiles MUST be in non-decreasing order (p10 \u003c= p25 \u003c= p50 \u003c= p75 \u003c= p90).\n",
"models": [
"opus",
"secondary"
],
"p50": 11.65,
"percentiles": {
"0.1": 10.475000000000001,
"0.25": 11.125,
"0.5": 11.65,
"0.75": 12.375,
"0.9": 13.55
},
"rationale": "(a) The last observed official BCB fixing is 11.62 on Aug 14, 2026, leaving ~17 days to the Aug 31 resolution date. (b) Status quo: if nothing changes, the rate resolves around 11.6. (c) Current trend is mild appreciation (12.08 on Aug 3 \u2192 11.86 Aug 9 \u2192 11.62 Aug 14, roughly -0.04/day); naive extrapolation gives ~10.9-11.1, though such retracements typically flatten rather than persist linearly. (d) A Monte Carlo anchored on the earlier post-float drift (9.73 \u2192 12.13 in a month) implies ~13.1 median, but it ignores the observed August retracement and overweights the initial overshoot phase; the more recent prints and the administratively smoothed daily fixing argue for a median near, or just below, current levels. Base rates for EM post-peg-exit paths show an initial overshoot often partially retracing once a market-clearing rate is found, and Bolivia\u0027s fixing is a weighted average of bank client transactions, which tends to move gradually. (e) Low scenario (~p10): an IMF staff-level agreement or a sizable external financing/deposit package lands in late August, boosting confidence and FX supply, plus seasonal/administrative smoothing pushes the fixing toward 10.0-10.5. (f) High scenario (~p90): renewed blockades/political unrest, no IMF deal, continued reserve drain and dollar scarcity restart the June-July slide, taking the fixing back above 13 toward 13.5-14. Net: I center slightly below the Aug 14 print to reflect the modest appreciating trend, but keep a fat right tail because the fundamentals (very low reserves, unresolved IMF talks, fiscal stress) skew risks toward depreciation and thin-market fixings can jump. Distribution: median 11.5 with a right-skewed spread."
},
"plan": {
"combination_logic": "weighted_average",
"domain": "economics",
"n_sub_qs": 5,
"n_tools": 4,
"reasoning_approach": "Anchor on the latest observed BCB official daily rate and the realized depreciation trend since the June 26 peg exit, then use the Monte Carlo threshold probabilities (sq1\u2013sq3) as the core distribution, shifting the median down if an IMF/financing deal materializes (sq4) and widening the tails if a regime change is likely (sq5). The weighted blend of directional and threshold sub-questions is used to calibrate the central estimate and the width of the numeric distribution.",
"sub_questions": [
{
"id": "sq1",
"question": "Will the BCB official reference rate on August 31, 2026 be higher (more bolivianos per USD) than the rate prevailing in mid-August 2026 (i.e., continued depreciation rather than stabilization/appreciation)?",
"rationale": "Establishes the directional drift of the managed float since the June 26 peg exit, which anchors the central estimate.",
"weight": 0.3
},
{
"id": "sq2",
"question": "Will the official rate on August 31, 2026 be at or above 13.0 bolivianos per USD?",
"rationale": "Tests the upside/depreciation tail \u2014 a continuation of the ~2 bolivianos/month slide seen from 9.73 (June 29) to 11.80 (July 29) would push past 13.",
"weight": 0.25
},
{
"id": "sq3",
"question": "Will the official rate on August 31, 2026 be below 12.0 bolivianos per USD?",
"rationale": "Tests the stabilization/appreciation scenario, e.g., if an IMF program, external financing, or BCB intervention firms the boliviano back toward or below the late-July level.",
"weight": 0.2
},
{
"id": "sq4",
"question": "Will Bolivia reach a staff-level or formal financing agreement with the IMF (or announce a major external financing package) before August 31, 2026?",
"rationale": "An IMF/external financing deal is the single most likely catalyst for arresting depreciation; absence implies continued FX scarcity and slide.",
"weight": 0.15
},
{
"id": "sq5",
"question": "Will the government/BCB alter the exchange rate regime again (e.g., reimpose a peg/band, step devaluation, or discretionary fixing that breaks from market-based fixing) before August 31, 2026?",
"rationale": "A regime change or administrative fixing would create a discontinuity, making simple extrapolation of the float invalid in either direction.",
"weight": 0.1
}
],
"tool_requests": [
{
"parameters": {
"queries": [
"tipo de cambio oficial Banco Central de Bolivia boliviano d\u00f3lar agosto 2026",
"Bolivia boliviano exchange rate August 2026 depreciation managed float",
"BCB cotizaci\u00f3n oficial d\u00f3lar hoy bolivianos"
]
},
"target_sub_questions": [
"sq1",
"sq2",
"sq3"
],
"tool_name": "web_search"
},
{
"parameters": {
"brief": "Find the most recent daily official BCB reference exchange rate (bolivianos per USD) for August 2026, the day-by-day path since the June 26, 2026 peg exit (9.73 on June 29, 11.80 on July 29), any BCB or finance ministry statements on intervention, FX auctions, reserves, remittance/parallel market rates, and the status of IMF negotiations or other external financing.",
"max_searches": 4,
"question_title": "What will be the Boliviano-USD exchange rate on August 31, 2026?"
},
"target_sub_questions": [
"sq1",
"sq2",
"sq3",
"sq4",
"sq5"
],
"tool_name": "claude_news"
},
{
"parameters": {
"lookback_days": 75,
"queries": [
"Bolivia IMF agreement Rodrigo Paz financing program",
"Bolivia central bank exchange rate intervention reserves dollars",
"boliviano devaluation parallel market rate crisis"
]
},
"target_sub_questions": [
"sq4",
"sq5"
],
"tool_name": "article_search"
},
{
"parameters": {
"code": "import numpy as np\n# Observed path since peg exit\nobs = {\u00272026-06-29\u0027: 9.73, \u00272026-07-29\u0027: 11.80}\n# Monthly log depreciation observed\nr = np.log(11.80/9.73) # over ~30 days\nprint(\u002730-day log change:\u0027, r, \u0027annualized:\u0027, r*12)\n# Project to Aug 31 (~33 days after Jul 29) under scenarios\nimport math\nfor damp in [0.0,0.25,0.5,0.75,1.0,1.25]:\n print(damp, round(11.80*math.exp(r*(33/30)*damp),2))\n# Monte Carlo: drift damped, high vol, with regime-break jumps\nnp.random.seed(0)\nN=200000\ndays=33\n# drift per day sampled: damping factor uncertain\ndamp = np.random.uniform(-0.2,1.1,N)\nmu = r/30*damp\nsig = np.random.uniform(0.004,0.020,N) # daily vol of new float\npaths = 11.80*np.exp(mu*days + sig*np.sqrt(days)*np.random.randn(N))\n# jump component: 12% chance of administrative regime break, mixed sign\njump_mask = np.random.rand(N)\u003c0.12\njump = np.where(np.random.rand(N)\u003c0.6, np.random.uniform(0.03,0.30,N), -np.random.uniform(0.03,0.20,N))\npaths = paths*np.where(jump_mask, np.exp(jump), 1.0)\nqs=[2.5,10,25,50,75,90,97.5]\nprint(\u0027quantiles\u0027, np.round(np.percentile(paths,qs),2))\nfor t in [11.0,11.8,12.0,12.5,13.0,14.0,15.0]:\n print(\u0027P(\u003e%.1f)=\u0027%t, round(float((paths\u003et).mean()),3))\n",
"description": "Extrapolate the post-peg-exit depreciation path and run a Monte Carlo over drift damping, volatility, and regime-break jumps to get a predictive distribution and threshold probabilities for Aug 31, 2026."
},
"target_sub_questions": [
"sq1",
"sq2",
"sq3"
],
"tool_name": "code_execution"
}
]
},
"question": {
"close_time": "2026-08-14T17:00:00Z",
"description": "## Description\nFrom 2011 to 2026, the Bolivian boliviano was pegged to the US dollar, maintaining a fixed exchange rate of roughly 6.9 bolivianos per dollar.\n\nAlthough the currency avoided major issues for most of this period, during 2023, the government could no longer defend the rate, and a secondary rate emerged alongside surging inflation. Following the [2025 election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2025_Bolivian_general_election) of Rodrigo Paz, the government substantially restructured the budget, facing [large-scale protests](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2026_Bolivian_protests) in response, but avoided immediate changes to the peg system.\n\nOn June 26, 2026, the Government of Bolivia [announced the end](https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/bolivia-ends-15-year-dollar-peg-attempt-restore-economic-stability-2026-06-27/) of the fixed exchange rate, and established a flexible exchange rate. Initially set at 9.73 on June 29, each day\u0027s exchange rate is set based upon actual currency transactions, creating what is known as a managed float.\n\nAs of July 29, 2026, the rate has further depreciated to 11.80, as the country continues to face severe liquidity issues, and looks towards a [potential IMF deal](https://www.riotimesonline.com/bolivia-imf-agreement-indispensable-fx-crisis-2026/).\n\n`{\"format\": \"metac_reveal_and_close_in_period\", \"info\": {\"post_id\": 44963, \"question_id\": 45106}}`\n\n## Resolution Criteria\nThis question will resolve as the official Boliviano-US Dollar reference exchange rate on August 31, 2026, as reported by the [Central Bank of Bolivia](https://www.bcb.gob.bo/?q=cotizaciones_tc).\n\n## Fine Print\nThis question\u0027s information (resolution criteria, fine print, background info, etc) is synced with an [original identical question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/44963) which opened on 2026-08-10 17:00:00. This question will resolve based on the resolution criteria and fine print of the linked original question. However, if this question would resolve differently than the original question, then this question will be annulled. Additionally, if the original question\u0027s resolution could have been known before this question opened, then this question will be annulled.",
"open_lower": true,
"open_upper": true,
"q_max": 20,
"q_min": 7,
"question_type": "numeric",
"title": "What will be the Boliviano-USD exchange rate on August 31, 2026?",
"units": "Bs/USD"
},
"research": {
"cross_market_brief": "## Cross-Market Signals\n\n### Polymarket\n- \"Will Elon Musk post 200-219 tweets from August 7 to August 14, 2026?\" \u2192 Yes: 0.03, Volume: $365.8K\n- \"Will Elon Musk post 180-199 tweets from August 7 to August 14, 2026?\" \u2192 Yes: 0.97, Volume: $350.8K\n- \"US announces end of Iranian blockade by August 15, 2026?\" \u2192 Yes: 0.01, Volume: $2.9M\n- \"US announces end of Iranian blockade by August 22, 2026?\" \u2192 Yes: 0.10, Volume: $367.1K\n- \"Will Elon Musk post 220-239 tweets from August 7 to August 14, 2026?\" \u2192 Yes: 0.00, Volume: $270.9K\n- \"US announces end of Iranian blockade by August 31, 2026?\" \u2192 Yes: 0.21, Volume: $1.4M\n- \"Putin out as President of Russia by August 31, 2026?\" \u2192 Yes: 0.01, Volume: $642.0K",
"errors": [],
"has_cross_market": true,
"n_errors": 0,
"n_tools": 4,
"tools": [
{
"elapsed_s": 36.71,
"error": null,
"success": true,
"summary": "20 results",
"tool_name": "web_search"
},
{
"elapsed_s": 35.16,
"error": null,
"success": true,
"summary": "10 citations",
"tool_name": "claude_news"
},
{
"elapsed_s": 0.59,
"error": null,
"success": true,
"summary": "25 articles",
"tool_name": "article_search"
},
{
"elapsed_s": 0.22,
"error": null,
"success": true,
"summary": "Extrapolate the post-peg-exit depreciation path and run a Mo",
"tool_name": "code_execution"
}
]
},
"synthesis": {
"error": null,
"evidence": [
{
"claim": "BCB official rate was 12.08 (applied Aug 3), 11.86 on Aug 9, and 11.62 on Aug 14 \u2014 a modest appreciation over early August.",
"credibility": 80,
"direction": "DOWN",
"priced_in": false,
"recency": "VERY_RECENT",
"source": "web_search",
"strength": "STRONG",
"sub_question_id": "sq1"
},
{
"claim": "The most recent reported official rate (Aug 14, 2026) of 11.62 is already below the 12.0 threshold.",
"credibility": 78,
"direction": "UP",
"priced_in": false,
"recency": "VERY_RECENT",
"source": "web_search",
"strength": "STRONG",
"sub_question_id": "sq3"
},
{
"claim": "The official fixing peaked around 12.13 (July 31 fixing) and has not been reported at or above 13.0 at any point since the float began.",
"credibility": 75,
"direction": "DOWN",
"priced_in": false,
"recency": "VERY_RECENT",
"source": "web_search",
"strength": "MODERATE",
"sub_question_id": "sq2"
},
{
"claim": "The rate rose from 9.73 on June 29 to about 12.13 by the July 31 fixing, roughly 25% depreciation in the first month of the managed float.",
"credibility": 82,
"direction": "UP",
"priced_in": true,
"recency": "RECENT",
"source": "web_search",
"strength": "STRONG",
"sub_question_id": "sq1"
},
{
"claim": "A Monte Carlo extrapolating the post-float drift (30-day log change 0.193) gives a median of ~13.1 for Aug 31, with P(\u003e12.0)=0.75 and P(\u003e13.0)=0.51.",
"credibility": 35,
"direction": "UP",
"priced_in": false,
"recency": "VERY_RECENT",
"source": "code_execution",
"strength": "WEAK",
"sub_question_id": "sq1"
},
{
"claim": "The Monte Carlo model anchors on 11.80 (July 29) and assumes persistent drift, ignoring the observed early-August appreciation to 11.62.",
"credibility": 40,
"direction": "NEUTRAL",
"priced_in": false,
"recency": "VERY_RECENT",
"source": "code_execution",
"strength": "MODERATE",
"sub_question_id": "sq3"
},
{
"claim": "The float was established by Ministerial Resolution 245 with daily fixing based on weighted-average bank client purchase transactions, i.e., an administratively set fixing.",
"credibility": 70,
"direction": "NEUTRAL",
"priced_in": true,
"recency": "DATED",
"source": "web_search",
"strength": "MODERATE",
"sub_question_id": "sq5"
},
{
"claim": "La Patria describes Bolivia as operating a dual system with an official BCB rate coexisting with a market-based Valor Referencial del D\u00f3lar (VRD).",
"credibility": 45,
"direction": "NEUTRAL",
"priced_in": false,
"recency": "VERY_RECENT",
"source": "web_search",
"strength": "WEAK",
"sub_question_id": "sq5"
},
{
"claim": "Article search over June\u2013August 2026 returned no coverage of a Bolivia\u2013IMF staff-level agreement or external financing package; only a prior report of a \u0027potential\u0027 IMF deal exists.",
"credibility": 30,
"direction": "NEUTRAL",
"priced_in": false,
"recency": "VERY_RECENT",
"source": "article_search",
"strength": "WEAK",
"sub_question_id": "sq4"
},
{
"claim": "Reporting notes the IMF had long warned Bolivia\u0027s peg was unsustainable amid falling reserves, and Bolivian officials call an IMF agreement \u0027indispensable\u0027 to resolving the FX crisis.",
"credibility": 70,
"direction": "NEUTRAL",
"priced_in": true,
"recency": "RECENT",
"source": "web_search",
"strength": "MODERATE",
"sub_question_id": "sq4"
},
{
"claim": "President Rodrigo Paz declared a state of emergency on June 20, 2026 after ~50 days of blockades that halted the economy, with at least 14 deaths.",
"credibility": 90,
"direction": "NEUTRAL",
"priced_in": true,
"recency": "DATED",
"source": "article_search",
"strength": "STRONG",
"sub_question_id": "sq1"
},
{
"claim": "Some search-result text misattributes the June 2026 peg exit to the Arce government rather than Paz, indicating source-quality errors in the retrieved summaries.",
"credibility": 40,
"direction": "NEUTRAL",
"priced_in": false,
"recency": "VERY_RECENT",
"source": "web_search",
"strength": "WEAK",
"sub_question_id": "sq1"
}
],
"information_gaps": [
"No daily BCB series for Aug 15\u201331, 2026 (question opened Aug 10; late-August prints unknown)",
"No base rates for post-peg-exit FX paths in comparable EM devaluations (overshoot-then-retrace frequency)",
"No data on BCB reserves, intervention volumes, or FX market turnover post-float",
"No confirmation of IMF mission timing or staff-level agreement status"
],
"key_uncertainties": [
"Whether the early-August appreciation to 11.62 reflects genuine stabilization or thin-market/administrative smoothing",
"Whether an IMF/external financing announcement lands before Aug 31",
"Political stability under Paz (protests, blockades) and its FX spillover",
"Whether BCB shifts to discretionary fixing or a band, capping the rate"
],
"n_evidence": 12
},
"timings": {
"forecast": 30.78,
"plan": 29.87,
"research": 36.71,
"synthesis": 27.8
}
}