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Will transit calls in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait be cut by half or more on August 31, 2026 compared to July 2026?

post 44808 · question 44955 · binary · summer-futureeval-2026 · 2026-08-01T12:04:37.734081 · View on Metaculus →
35.7%
Submitted p(YES)
13.0%
Holistic gut estimate
weighted_average
Fermi logic
geopolitics
Domain

Plan 27.38s

Weight the scenario-based sub-questions (blockade persistence, reachability of the ≤20 threshold, historical analogue magnitude, and the persistent-traffic floor) into a blended probability, anchored by the Monte Carlo estimate of the 7-day MA distribution on Aug 31 relative to the 40 baseline.

Sub-questions (4)

sq1
Will the Houthi/Iranian blockade escalation still be operationally active (attacks or credible enforcement against shipping in the Red Sea) through late August 2026, without a ceasefire or de-escalation agreement?
A sustained, enforced blockade is the necessary driver of a >50% collapse in transits; de-escalation would allow traffic to recover.
w=0.35
sq2
Will the 7-day moving average of Bab el-Mandeb transit calls fall to 20 or below at any point between July 24 and August 31, 2026?
Tests whether the required magnitude of decline (roughly half of the ~40 baseline) is even reachable given observed trajectory; touching the threshold is a precondition for being at/below it on Aug 31.
w=0.30
sq3
Do historical Red Sea crisis episodes (e.g., Dec 2023–2024 Houthi campaign) show transit call declines of 50%+ within a ~6-week window from a pre-crisis baseline?
Base rate anchor: in 2024 transits fell ~60-70% over months, but the decline was gradual; also, current baseline of 40 is already post-decline, so further halving is a steeper ask.
w=0.20
sq4
Will sanctioned/Iranian and regional-only traffic (which continues transiting despite the blockade) keep the daily transit count above 20 even under a full commercial pullback?
Portwatch counts all vessels including small regional/Iranian traffic; a floor of persistent transits could prevent the 7-day MA from dropping to ≤20 even in severe scenarios.
w=0.15

Tool requests (5)

claude_news sq1, sq2, sq4 {"brief": "Find the latest data and reporting (July-August 2026) on Bab el-Mandeb / Red Sea shipping transit volumes after the Houthi naval blockade declaration of July 20, 2026. Specifically: current IMF PortWatch 7-day moving average of transit calls at Bab el-Mandeb, Clarksons/Lloyd\u0027s List/Windward estimates of daily transits, whether attacks on ships are continuing, whether any ceasefire or de-escalation between the US/Israel/Iran/Houthis has occurred, and how much commercial tonnage has rerouted via Cape of Good Hope.", "max_searches": 5, "question_title": "Will transit calls in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait be cut by half or more on August 31, 2026 compared to July 2026?"}
article_search sq1, sq2 {"lookback_days": 45, "queries": ["Bab el-Mandeb transits Red Sea shipping volumes decline", "Houthi blockade Saudi Arabia Red Sea tankers rerouting Cape of Good Hope", "Red Sea ceasefire Iran Houthi de-escalation shipping resumes"]}
web_search sq2, sq4 {"queries": ["IMF PortWatch Bab el-Mandeb transit calls 7-day moving average August 2026", "Red Sea daily transits August 2026 Houthi blockade shipping data"]}
code_execution sq2, sq3, sq4 {"code": "import numpy as np\n# Baseline: 7dMA = 40 on July 19 2026. Threshold: \u003c=20 on Aug 31 2026 (43 days later).\n# 2023-24 analogue: Bab el-Mandeb transits fell from ~70-75/day (Nov 2023) to ~30-35/day by Feb 2024 (~55% over ~10 weeks).\n# Model log-decline with uncertainty conditional on scenarios.\nnp.random.seed(0)\nN=200000\n# Scenario probabilities (to be updated by research)\np_sustained=0.55 # blockade actively enforced through Aug\np_partial=0.30\np_deescal=0.15\nu=np.random.rand(N)\nres=np.zeros(N)\nfor i,(mask,mu,sd,floor_mu) in enumerate([\n (u\u003cp_sustained, -0.55, 0.35, 14), # sustained: mean ~42% further decline\n ((u\u003e=p_sustained)\u0026(u\u003cp_sustained+p_partial), -0.20, 0.25, 18),\n (u\u003e=p_sustained+p_partial, 0.05, 0.20, 22)]):\n n=mask.sum()\n val=40*np.exp(np.random.normal(mu,sd,n))\n floor=np.random.normal(floor_mu,4,n).clip(5,None) # persistent regional/Iranian traffic floor\n res[mask]=np.maximum(val,floor*0.9)\nprint(\u0027P(7dMA \u003c= 20 on Aug 31):\u0027, (res\u003c=20).mean())\nprint(\u0027median\u0027, np.median(res), \u0027q10\u0027, np.percentile(res,10), \u0027q90\u0027, np.percentile(res,90))\n# sensitivity: what if floor is lower\nfor fl in [8,12,16,20]:\n val=40*np.exp(np.random.normal(-0.55,0.35,N))\n print(\u0027sustained-only P\u003c=20 with floor\u0027,fl,\u0027:\u0027,(np.maximum(val,fl)\u003c=20).mean())\n", "description": "Monte Carlo of Bab el-Mandeb 7-day MA transit calls on Aug 31 2026 given scenario weights and a persistent-traffic floor, to estimate P(\u003c=20)."}
wikipedia_lookup sq3 {"queries": ["Red Sea crisis", "Houthi attacks on shipping", "Bab-el-Mandeb"]}

Research 33.79s · 5 tool(s) · 0 error(s)

claude_news ok 17 citations 33.79s
article_search ok 25 articles 2.59s
web_search ok 0 results 30.84s
code_execution ok Monte Carlo of Bab el-Mandeb 7-day MA transit calls on Aug 3 0.4s
wikipedia_lookup ok 3 pages 1.47s
Cross-market signals 
## Cross-Market Signals

### Polymarket
- "Will Elon Musk post 90-114 tweets from July 30 to August 1, 2026?" → Yes: 0.17, Volume: $123.1K
- "Will Elon Musk post 115-139 tweets from July 30 to August 1, 2026?" → Yes: 0.01, Volume: $121.2K
- "Will Donald Trump publicly insult Vladimir Putin by July 31, 2026?" → Yes: 0.00, Volume: $1.1M
- "Bab el-Mandeb Strait effectively closed by August 31?" → Yes: 0.09, Volume: $1.1M
- "Will Donald Trump publicly insult Emmanuel Macron by July 31, 2026?" → Yes: 0.23, Volume: $94.5K
- "Will China invade Taiwan by September 30, 2026?" → Yes: 0.01, Volume: $1.8M
- "Will the Fed increase interest rates by 25 bps after the September 2026 meeting?" → Yes: 0.59, Volume: $2.3M
- "Will the Fed decrease interest rates by 25 bps after the September 2026 meeting?" → Yes: 0.02, Volume: $2.7M
- "Will the Democratic Party control the Senate after the 2026 Midterm elections?" → Yes: 0.43, Volume: $2.1M
- "Will Ultra Prime win the LPL 2026 season?" → Yes: 0.00, Volume: $247.4K

Evidence Synthesis 32.49s · 12 items

Direction mix: UP 5 DOWN 5 NEUTRAL 2
sq1 article_search STRONG cred 92 UP DATED
Houthis declared a naval blockade of Bab el-Mandeb on July 20, 2026, in retaliation for Saudi strikes on Sanaa airport.
sq1 article_search STRONG cred 90 UP DATED
JMIC (US Navy-led) warned July 21 that Houthis had completed preparations, deploying missiles and drones near Bab el-Mandeb, to attack shipping.
sq1 article_search STRONG cred 90 UP DATED
Houthis fired on two Saudi oil tankers in the Red Sea the week of July 20; Saudi coalition struck Houthi targets in Yemen on July 25.
sq1 article_search MODERATE cred 85 DOWN DATED
The EU naval mission advisory was scoped narrowly, urging only vessels 'linked to Israeli, U.S. or Saudi interests' to avoid the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden.
sq1 article_search MODERATE cred 80 DOWN DATED
On July 26 the Trump administration signaled a pause in strikes on Iran to allow negotiations to progress, with Pakistan mediating a possible ceasefire revival.
sq1 article_search MODERATE cred 85 DOWN DATED
A prior US-Iran war episode ended with a Trump-Pezeshkian MOU on June 17, 2026 reopening the Strait of Hormuz, showing rapid de-escalation is possible in this conflict.
sq2 article_search STRONG cred 95 NEUTRAL DATED
IMF Portwatch 7-day moving average of Bab el-Mandeb transit calls was 40 on July 19, 2026, the pre-blockade baseline; ≤20 requires a 50% drop.
sq2 article_search MODERATE cred 75 DOWN DATED
Windward recorded 26 inbound and 17 outbound Bab el-Mandeb crossings on July 20 (~43 total), showing no collapse in the first days after the blockade declaration.
sq2 article_search WEAK cred 70 UP DATED
MarineTraffic reported on July 21 that two oil tankers rerouted after departing Saudi Arabia, described as the first operational response to Red Sea risk.
sq4 article_search MODERATE cred 75 DOWN DATED
Windward observed the Red Sea market 'splitting in two,' with commercial tonnage pulling back while sanctioned Iranian traffic pushed into Bab el-Mandeb.
sq3 article_search WEAK cred 40 NEUTRAL DATED
No data on the 2023-24 Houthi campaign's Portwatch transit-call trajectory was surfaced by the research tools.
sq1 article_search MODERATE cred 82 UP DATED
Conflict is multi-front — Iran attacking tankers near Hormuz, Houthis in the Red Sea, Ukraine hitting shadow-fleet vessels — per CNBC July 24 commodity analysts.

Information gaps

Key uncertainties

Forecast 87.57s · opus, secondary

Sub-question estimates

sq1
0.600
sq2
0.200
sq3
0.780
sq4
0.280

Rationale

(a) The question opened July 24, 2026 and resolves on the Aug 31, 2026 Portwatch 7-day moving average — roughly five to six weeks of runway. (b) Status quo: the July 19 baseline was 40 calls/day and Windward's own count on July 20 (~43 crossings) showed no immediate collapse, with commercial tonnage pulling back but sanctioned Iranian/regional traffic surging in; the 40 baseline is already a heavily depressed, risk-tolerant residual after the 2023-24 exodus (~70-80 pre-crisis), so the marginal remaining vessels are precisely those least deterred by threats. (c) NO scenario (most likely): Houthi enforcement stays scoped to Saudi/Israeli/US-linked vessels (as the EU advisory implies), US-Iran talks and Pakistani mediation keep a lid on escalation, and the MA drifts to ~25-35 rather than ≤20 — a meaningful but sub-50% cut. (d) YES scenario: indiscriminate attacks on non-aligned tankers or a mined/kinetically contested chokepoint triggers a genuine insurance/underwriter withdrawal, war-risk premiums spike, and even the risk-tolerant residual plus regional traffic drops below 20 by late August. Historically, a 50%+ decline within ~6 weeks did occur in Dec 2023-Jan 2024, so the magnitude is achievable in principle, but from a much higher baseline with much more elastic traffic. The liquid Polymarket contract on 'Bab el-Mandeb effectively closed by Aug 31' at 9% is a strong anchor; a 50% cut is easier than effective closure, so I sit modestly above it. Note: sq4 is scored in the YES-aligned direction (probability the persistent Iranian/regional floor does NOT keep the count above 20).

What would change my mind

Above 70%: Portwatch readings in early-to-mid August showing the 7-day MA already at ~22-25 with continued indiscriminate attacks on non-aligned vessels and major carriers/underwriters formally suspending Red Sea transits. Below 30% (further): a US-Iran/Saudi-Houthi ceasefire announcement or Portwatch holding above 30 through mid-August.
Evidence brief shown to forecaster 
1. [sq1 | article_search | STRONG cred 92 | UP | DATED] Houthis declared a naval blockade of Bab el-Mandeb on July 20, 2026, in retaliation for Saudi strikes on Sanaa airport.
2. [sq1 | article_search | STRONG cred 90 | UP | DATED] JMIC (US Navy-led) warned July 21 that Houthis had completed preparations, deploying missiles and drones near Bab el-Mandeb, to attack shipping.
3. [sq1 | article_search | STRONG cred 90 | UP | DATED] Houthis fired on two Saudi oil tankers in the Red Sea the week of July 20; Saudi coalition struck Houthi targets in Yemen on July 25.
4. [sq1 | article_search | MODERATE cred 85 | DOWN | DATED] The EU naval mission advisory was scoped narrowly, urging only vessels 'linked to Israeli, U.S. or Saudi interests' to avoid the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden.
5. [sq1 | article_search | MODERATE cred 80 | DOWN | DATED] On July 26 the Trump administration signaled a pause in strikes on Iran to allow negotiations to progress, with Pakistan mediating a possible ceasefire revival.
6. [sq1 | article_search | MODERATE cred 85 | DOWN | DATED] A prior US-Iran war episode ended with a Trump-Pezeshkian MOU on June 17, 2026 reopening the Strait of Hormuz, showing rapid de-escalation is possible in this conflict.
7. [sq2 | article_search | STRONG cred 95 | NEUTRAL | DATED] IMF Portwatch 7-day moving average of Bab el-Mandeb transit calls was 40 on July 19, 2026, the pre-blockade baseline; ≤20 requires a 50% drop.
8. [sq2 | article_search | MODERATE cred 75 | DOWN | DATED] Windward recorded 26 inbound and 17 outbound Bab el-Mandeb crossings on July 20 (~43 total), showing no collapse in the first days after the blockade declaration.
9. [sq2 | article_search | WEAK cred 70 | UP | DATED] MarineTraffic reported on July 21 that two oil tankers rerouted after departing Saudi Arabia, described as the first operational response to Red Sea risk.
10. [sq4 | article_search | MODERATE cred 75 | DOWN | DATED] Windward observed the Red Sea market 'splitting in two,' with commercial tonnage pulling back while sanctioned Iranian traffic pushed into Bab el-Mandeb.
11. [sq3 | article_search | WEAK cred 40 | NEUTRAL | DATED] No data on the 2023-24 Houthi campaign's Portwatch transit-call trajectory was surfaced by the research tools.
12. [sq1 | article_search | MODERATE cred 82 | UP | DATED] Conflict is multi-front — Iran attacking tankers near Hormuz, Houthis in the Red Sea, Ukraine hitting shadow-fleet vessels — per CNBC July 24 commodity analysts.

## Cross-Market Signals

### Polymarket
- "Will Elon Musk post 90-114 tweets from July 30 to August 1, 2026?" → Yes: 0.17, Volume: $123.1K
- "Will Elon Musk post 115-139 tweets from July 30 to August 1, 2026?" → Yes: 0.01, Volume: $121.2K
- "Will Donald Trump publicly insult Vladimir Putin by July 31, 2026?" → Yes: 0.00, Volume: $1.1M
- "Bab el-Mandeb Strait effectively closed by August 31?" → Yes: 0.09, Volume: $1.1M
- "Will Donald Trump publicly insult Emmanuel Macron by July 31, 2026?" → Yes: 0.23, Volume: $94.5K
- "Will China invade Taiwan by September 30, 2026?" → Yes: 0.01, Volume: $1.8M
- "Will the Fed increase interest rates by 25 bps after the September 2026 meeting?" → Yes: 0.59, Volume: $2.3M
- "Will the Fed decrease interest rates by 25 bps after the September 2026 meeting?" → Yes: 0.02, Volume: $2.7M
- "Will the Democratic Party control the Senate after the 2026 Midterm elections?" → Yes: 0.43, Volume: $2.1M
- "Will Ultra Prime win the LPL 2026 season?" → Yes: 0.00, Volume: $247.4K

Information gaps:
  - No actual Portwatch transit-call readings after July 24, 2026
  - Missing base rate: magnitude/speed of Bab el-Mandeb declines in Dec 2023–Feb 2024 Houthi campaign
  - No breakdown of persistent regional/Iranian traffic floor at Bab el-Mandeb
  - No August 2026 news on ceasefire status or continued Houthi attacks

Key uncertainties:
  - Whether US-Iran talks yield a ceasefire that de-escalates Houthi actions
  - Whether Houthi enforcement broadens beyond Saudi/Israeli/US-linked vessels
  - Size of the irreducible transit floor (Iranian, Yemeni, regional short-sea traffic)
  - Whether the Dec 2023 baseline (~70-80 calls) versus 2026 baseline (40) changes drop dynamics
Raw forecast prompt 
You are an elite superforecaster using Tetlock-style Fermi decomposition. Estimate each sub-question INDEPENDENTLY, then provide a holistic estimate. The pipeline will mathematically recombine the sub-question estimates — your job is to give the most accurate per-component probabilities.

## Question
Will transit calls in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait be cut by half or more on August 31, 2026 compared to July 2026?

## Description / Resolution Criteria
## Description
About 7% of the world's oil supply [transited](https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2026/07/houthis-declare-red-sea-blockade-saudi-arabia-oil-markets-brace-impact) the Bab el-Mandeb Strait in June 2026. According to [Windward](https://windward.ai/blog/houthi-blockade-announcement-the-red-sea-split-in-two/) on July 22, 2026: 

> The Houthis declared [a naval blockade against Saudi Arabia on July 20](https://www.npr.org/2026/07/21/nx-s1-5901846/us-iran-updates), escalating threats across the Red Sea corridor while Iranian forces struck three tankers in the Strait of Hormuz within 48 hours.

> That ambiguity is doing real work. Within a day, Windward tracked the market splitting into two opposite flows: commercial tonnage pulling back from Bab al-Mandeb, and sanctioned Iranian traffic pushing into it.

<img height="660" width="1024" alt="Bab al-Mandeb crossings into vs. out of the Red Sea since 8 June, with 26 inbound against 17 outbound on 20 July. Source: Windward Maritime AI™ Platform" src="https://windward.ai/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/img-bab-el-mandeb-crossings-1024x660.png" />(Image courtesy of Windward)

[](https://twitter.com/share?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwindward.ai%2Fblog%2Fhouthi-blockade-announcement-the-red-sea-split-in-two%2F\&text=Two+Days+After+the+Houthi+Blockade+Announcement%2C+the+Red+Sea+Split+in+Two)[](https://www.linkedin.com/cws/share?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwindward.ai%2Fblog%2Fhouthi-blockade-announcement-the-red-sea-split-in-two%2F)[](http://www.facebook.com/share.php?u=https%3A%2F%2Fwindward.ai%2Fblog%2Fhouthi-blockade-announcement-the-red-sea-split-in-two%2F)

As of July 19, 2026, the 7-day moving average of transit calls at the Bab el-Mandeb Strait according to the [resolution source](https://portwatch.imf.org/pages/6b1814d64903461b98144a6cc25eb79c) was 40.

`{"format": "metac_reveal_and_close_in_period", "info": {"post_id": 44792, "question_id": 44939}}`

## Resolution Criteria
This question resolves as **Yes** if, for August 31, 2026, the 7-day moving average of transit calls is less than or equal to 20 according to IMF Portwatch's [Bab el-Mandeb Strait](https://portwatch.imf.org/pages/6b1814d64903461b98144a6cc25eb79c) tracker.

## Fine Print
This question's information (resolution criteria, fine print, background info, etc) is synced with an [original identical question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/44792) which opened on 2026-07-24 15:00:00. This question will resolve based on the resolution criteria and fine print of the linked original question. However, if this question would resolve differently than the original question, then this question will be annulled. Additionally, if the original question's resolution could have been known before this question opened, then this question will be annulled.

## Sub-question decomposition
- (w=0.35) Will the Houthi/Iranian blockade escalation still be operationally active (attacks or credible enforcement against shipping in the Red Sea) through late August 2026, without a ceasefire or de-escalation agreement?  — A sustained, enforced blockade is the necessary driver of a >50% collapse in transits; de-escalation would allow traffic
- (w=0.30) Will the 7-day moving average of Bab el-Mandeb transit calls fall to 20 or below at any point between July 24 and August 31, 2026?  — Tests whether the required magnitude of decline (roughly half of the ~40 baseline) is even reachable given observed traj
- (w=0.20) Do historical Red Sea crisis episodes (e.g., Dec 2023–2024 Houthi campaign) show transit call declines of 50%+ within a ~6-week window from a pre-crisis baseline?  — Base rate anchor: in 2024 transits fell ~60-70% over months, but the decline was gradual; also, current baseline of 40 i
- (w=0.15) Will sanctioned/Iranian and regional-only traffic (which continues transiting despite the blockade) keep the daily transit count above 20 even under a full commercial pullback?  — Portwatch counts all vessels including small regional/Iranian traffic; a floor of persistent transits could prevent the 

Combination rule: **weighted_average**

## Synthesized evidence
1. [sq1 | article_search | STRONG cred 92 | UP | DATED] Houthis declared a naval blockade of Bab el-Mandeb on July 20, 2026, in retaliation for Saudi strikes on Sanaa airport.
2. [sq1 | article_search | STRONG cred 90 | UP | DATED] JMIC (US Navy-led) warned July 21 that Houthis had completed preparations, deploying missiles and drones near Bab el-Mandeb, to attack shipping.
3. [sq1 | article_search | STRONG cred 90 | UP | DATED] Houthis fired on two Saudi oil tankers in the Red Sea the week of July 20; Saudi coalition struck Houthi targets in Yemen on July 25.
4. [sq1 | article_search | MODERATE cred 85 | DOWN | DATED] The EU naval mission advisory was scoped narrowly, urging only vessels 'linked to Israeli, U.S. or Saudi interests' to avoid the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden.
5. [sq1 | article_search | MODERATE cred 80 | DOWN | DATED] On July 26 the Trump administration signaled a pause in strikes on Iran to allow negotiations to progress, with Pakistan mediating a possible ceasefire revival.
6. [sq1 | article_search | MODERATE cred 85 | DOWN | DATED] A prior US-Iran war episode ended with a Trump-Pezeshkian MOU on June 17, 2026 reopening the Strait of Hormuz, showing rapid de-escalation is possible in this conflict.
7. [sq2 | article_search | STRONG cred 95 | NEUTRAL | DATED] IMF Portwatch 7-day moving average of Bab el-Mandeb transit calls was 40 on July 19, 2026, the pre-blockade baseline; ≤20 requires a 50% drop.
8. [sq2 | article_search | MODERATE cred 75 | DOWN | DATED] Windward recorded 26 inbound and 17 outbound Bab el-Mandeb crossings on July 20 (~43 total), showing no collapse in the first days after the blockade declaration.
9. [sq2 | article_search | WEAK cred 70 | UP | DATED] MarineTraffic reported on July 21 that two oil tankers rerouted after departing Saudi Arabia, described as the first operational response to Red Sea risk.
10. [sq4 | article_search | MODERATE cred 75 | DOWN | DATED] Windward observed the Red Sea market 'splitting in two,' with commercial tonnage pulling back while sanctioned Iranian traffic pushed into Bab el-Mandeb.
11. [sq3 | article_search | WEAK cred 40 | NEUTRAL | DATED] No data on the 2023-24 Houthi campaign's Portwatch transit-call trajectory was surfaced by the research tools.
12. [sq1 | article_search | MODERATE cred 82 | UP | DATED] Conflict is multi-front — Iran attacking tankers near Hormuz, Houthis in the Red Sea, Ukraine hitting shadow-fleet vessels — per CNBC July 24 commodity analysts.

## Cross-Market Signals

### Polymarket
- "Will Elon Musk post 90-114 tweets from July 30 to August 1, 2026?" → Yes: 0.17, Volume: $123.1K
- "Will Elon Musk post 115-139 tweets from July 30 to August 1, 2026?" → Yes: 0.01, Volume: $121.2K
- "Will Donald Trump publicly insult Vladimir Putin by July 31, 2026?" → Yes: 0.00, Volume: $1.1M
- "Bab el-Mandeb Strait effectively closed by August 31?" → Yes: 0.09, Volume: $1.1M
- "Will Donald Trump publicly insult Emmanuel Macron by July 31, 2026?" → Yes: 0.23, Volume: $94.5K
- "Will China invade Taiwan by September 30, 2026?" → Yes: 0.01, Volume: $1.8M
- "Will the Fed increase interest rates by 25 bps after the September 2026 meeting?" → Yes: 0.59, Volume: $2.3M
- "Will the Fed decrease interest rates by 25 bps after the September 2026 meeting?" → Yes: 0.02, Volume: $2.7M
- "Will the Democratic Party control the Senate after the 2026 Midterm elections?" → Yes: 0.43, Volume: $2.1M
- "Will Ultra Prime win the LPL 2026 season?" → Yes: 0.00, Volume: $247.4K

Information gaps:
  - No actual Portwatch transit-call readings after July 24, 2026
  - Missing base rate: magnitude/speed of Bab el-Mandeb declines in Dec 2023–Feb 2024 Houthi campaign
  - No breakdown of persistent regional/Iranian traffic floor at Bab el-Mandeb
  - No August 2026 news on ceasefire status or continued Houthi attacks

Key uncertainties:
  - Whether US-Iran talks yield a ceasefire that de-escalates Houthi actions
  - Whether Houthi enforcement broadens beyond Saudi/Israeli/US-linked vessels
  - Size of the irreducible transit floor (Iranian, Yemeni, regional short-sea traffic)
  - Whether the Dec 2023 baseline (~70-80 calls) versus 2026 baseline (40) changes drop dynamics

## Required pre-forecast walkthrough

Before giving probabilities, walk through these explicitly:
  (a) The time left until the question resolves.
  (b) The status quo outcome — what happens if nothing changes from today.
  (c) A brief scenario that results in NO.
  (d) A brief scenario that results in YES.

## Calibration guidance

- **Estimate each sub-question in isolation.** Do not let your answer to one sub-question anchor your answer to another. This is the core of Fermi decomposition — independence forces more careful reasoning per factor.
- **Anchor on the status quo.** Require strong specific evidence to move far from it.
- 0.05 / 0.95 require strong, multi-source evidence. Avoid >0.97 or <0.03 unless the outcome is already settled or near-tautological — overconfident misses are punished heavily by the log score.
- **Anchor on prediction markets.** If liquid market prices (Polymarket / Kalshi) or a community forecast appear in the evidence, treat them as a strong, well-calibrated prior. Your final estimate should rarely sit more than ~15 percentage points from a liquid market on the SAME question — move further only with specific evidence the market lacks.
- **Treat research as fallible, not ground truth.** A single-source or "very recent" claim — especially one the evidence flags as unverified, possibly AI-generated, or low-credibility — must not drive you to near-certainty. When a load-bearing fact is unverified, keep at least 10-15% on the chance it is wrong.
- **Also provide a holistic estimate** — your overall gut feeling about the main question, BEFORE you see the mathematical combination. This serves as a sanity check: if the Fermi result and holistic estimate diverge wildly, something is wrong.

## Output

Return ONLY valid JSON, no markdown fences:

{
  "rationale": "<address (a) (b) (c) (d) above — 5-8 sentences total>",
  "sub_question_estimates": {
    "sq1": <float in [0.01, 0.99]>,
    "sq2": <float in [0.01, 0.99]>,
    "sq3": <float in [0.01, 0.99]>,
    "sq4": <float in [0.01, 0.99]>
  },
  "holistic_p_yes": <float in [0.01, 0.99] — your overall estimate ignoring the decomposition>,
  "what_would_change_my_mind": "<1-2 sentences: what new info would push you above 70% or below 30%>"
}

Raw Trace JSON

Show full JSON 
{
  "forecast": {
    "combination_logic": "weighted_average",
    "evidence_brief": "1. [sq1 | article_search | STRONG cred 92 | UP | DATED] Houthis declared a naval blockade of Bab el-Mandeb on July 20, 2026, in retaliation for Saudi strikes on Sanaa airport.\n2. [sq1 | article_search | STRONG cred 90 | UP | DATED] JMIC (US Navy-led) warned July 21 that Houthis had completed preparations, deploying missiles and drones near Bab el-Mandeb, to attack shipping.\n3. [sq1 | article_search | STRONG cred 90 | UP | DATED] Houthis fired on two Saudi oil tankers in the Red Sea the week of July 20; Saudi coalition struck Houthi targets in Yemen on July 25.\n4. [sq1 | article_search | MODERATE cred 85 | DOWN | DATED] The EU naval mission advisory was scoped narrowly, urging only vessels \u0027linked to Israeli, U.S. or Saudi interests\u0027 to avoid the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden.\n5. [sq1 | article_search | MODERATE cred 80 | DOWN | DATED] On July 26 the Trump administration signaled a pause in strikes on Iran to allow negotiations to progress, with Pakistan mediating a possible ceasefire revival.\n6. [sq1 | article_search | MODERATE cred 85 | DOWN | DATED] A prior US-Iran war episode ended with a Trump-Pezeshkian MOU on June 17, 2026 reopening the Strait of Hormuz, showing rapid de-escalation is possible in this conflict.\n7. [sq2 | article_search | STRONG cred 95 | NEUTRAL | DATED] IMF Portwatch 7-day moving average of Bab el-Mandeb transit calls was 40 on July 19, 2026, the pre-blockade baseline; \u226420 requires a 50% drop.\n8. [sq2 | article_search | MODERATE cred 75 | DOWN | DATED] Windward recorded 26 inbound and 17 outbound Bab el-Mandeb crossings on July 20 (~43 total), showing no collapse in the first days after the blockade declaration.\n9. [sq2 | article_search | WEAK cred 70 | UP | DATED] MarineTraffic reported on July 21 that two oil tankers rerouted after departing Saudi Arabia, described as the first operational response to Red Sea risk.\n10. [sq4 | article_search | MODERATE cred 75 | DOWN | DATED] Windward observed the Red Sea market \u0027splitting in two,\u0027 with commercial tonnage pulling back while sanctioned Iranian traffic pushed into Bab el-Mandeb.\n11. [sq3 | article_search | WEAK cred 40 | NEUTRAL | DATED] No data on the 2023-24 Houthi campaign\u0027s Portwatch transit-call trajectory was surfaced by the research tools.\n12. [sq1 | article_search | MODERATE cred 82 | UP | DATED] Conflict is multi-front \u2014 Iran attacking tankers near Hormuz, Houthis in the Red Sea, Ukraine hitting shadow-fleet vessels \u2014 per CNBC July 24 commodity analysts.\n\n## Cross-Market Signals\n\n### Polymarket\n- \"Will Elon Musk post 90-114 tweets from July 30 to August 1, 2026?\" \u2192 Yes: 0.17, Volume: $123.1K\n- \"Will Elon Musk post 115-139 tweets from July 30 to August 1, 2026?\" \u2192 Yes: 0.01, Volume: $121.2K\n- \"Will Donald Trump publicly insult Vladimir Putin by July 31, 2026?\" \u2192 Yes: 0.00, Volume: $1.1M\n- \"Bab el-Mandeb Strait effectively closed by August 31?\" \u2192 Yes: 0.09, Volume: $1.1M\n- \"Will Donald Trump publicly insult Emmanuel Macron by July 31, 2026?\" \u2192 Yes: 0.23, Volume: $94.5K\n- \"Will China invade Taiwan by September 30, 2026?\" \u2192 Yes: 0.01, Volume: $1.8M\n- \"Will the Fed increase interest rates by 25 bps after the September 2026 meeting?\" \u2192 Yes: 0.59, Volume: $2.3M\n- \"Will the Fed decrease interest rates by 25 bps after the September 2026 meeting?\" \u2192 Yes: 0.02, Volume: $2.7M\n- \"Will the Democratic Party control the Senate after the 2026 Midterm elections?\" \u2192 Yes: 0.43, Volume: $2.1M\n- \"Will Ultra Prime win the LPL 2026 season?\" \u2192 Yes: 0.00, Volume: $247.4K\n\nInformation gaps:\n  - No actual Portwatch transit-call readings after July 24, 2026\n  - Missing base rate: magnitude/speed of Bab el-Mandeb declines in Dec 2023\u2013Feb 2024 Houthi campaign\n  - No breakdown of persistent regional/Iranian traffic floor at Bab el-Mandeb\n  - No August 2026 news on ceasefire status or continued Houthi attacks\n\nKey uncertainties:\n  - Whether US-Iran talks yield a ceasefire that de-escalates Houthi actions\n  - Whether Houthi enforcement broadens beyond Saudi/Israeli/US-linked vessels\n  - Size of the irreducible transit floor (Iranian, Yemeni, regional short-sea traffic)\n  - Whether the Dec 2023 baseline (~70-80 calls) versus 2026 baseline (40) changes drop dynamics",
    "forecast_prompt": "You are an elite superforecaster using Tetlock-style Fermi decomposition. Estimate each sub-question INDEPENDENTLY, then provide a holistic estimate. The pipeline will mathematically recombine the sub-question estimates \u2014 your job is to give the most accurate per-component probabilities.\n\n## Question\nWill transit calls in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait be cut by half or more on August 31, 2026 compared to July 2026?\n\n## Description / Resolution Criteria\n## Description\nAbout 7% of the world\u0027s oil supply [transited](https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2026/07/houthis-declare-red-sea-blockade-saudi-arabia-oil-markets-brace-impact) the Bab el-Mandeb Strait in June 2026. According to [Windward](https://windward.ai/blog/houthi-blockade-announcement-the-red-sea-split-in-two/) on July 22, 2026:\u0026#x20;\n\n\u003e The Houthis declared [a naval blockade against Saudi Arabia on July 20](https://www.npr.org/2026/07/21/nx-s1-5901846/us-iran-updates), escalating threats across the Red Sea corridor while Iranian forces struck three tankers in the Strait of Hormuz within 48 hours.\n\n\u003e That ambiguity is doing real work. Within a day, Windward tracked the market splitting into two opposite flows: commercial tonnage pulling back from Bab al-Mandeb, and sanctioned Iranian traffic pushing into it.\n\n\u003cimg height=\"660\" width=\"1024\" alt=\"Bab al-Mandeb crossings into vs. out of the Red Sea since 8 June, with 26 inbound against 17 outbound on 20 July. Source: Windward Maritime AI\u2122 Platform\" src=\"https://windward.ai/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/img-bab-el-mandeb-crossings-1024x660.png\" /\u003e(Image courtesy of Windward)\n\n[](https://twitter.com/share?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwindward.ai%2Fblog%2Fhouthi-blockade-announcement-the-red-sea-split-in-two%2F\\\u0026text=Two+Days+After+the+Houthi+Blockade+Announcement%2C+the+Red+Sea+Split+in+Two)[](https://www.linkedin.com/cws/share?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwindward.ai%2Fblog%2Fhouthi-blockade-announcement-the-red-sea-split-in-two%2F)[](http://www.facebook.com/share.php?u=https%3A%2F%2Fwindward.ai%2Fblog%2Fhouthi-blockade-announcement-the-red-sea-split-in-two%2F)\n\nAs of July 19, 2026, the 7-day moving average of transit calls at the Bab el-Mandeb Strait according to the [resolution source](https://portwatch.imf.org/pages/6b1814d64903461b98144a6cc25eb79c) was 40.\n\n`{\"format\": \"metac_reveal_and_close_in_period\", \"info\": {\"post_id\": 44792, \"question_id\": 44939}}`\n\n## Resolution Criteria\nThis question resolves as **Yes** if, for August 31, 2026, the 7-day moving average of transit calls is less than or equal to 20 according to IMF Portwatch\u0027s [Bab el-Mandeb Strait](https://portwatch.imf.org/pages/6b1814d64903461b98144a6cc25eb79c) tracker.\n\n## Fine Print\nThis question\u0027s information (resolution criteria, fine print, background info, etc) is synced with an [original identical question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/44792) which opened on 2026-07-24 15:00:00. This question will resolve based on the resolution criteria and fine print of the linked original question. However, if this question would resolve differently than the original question, then this question will be annulled. Additionally, if the original question\u0027s resolution could have been known before this question opened, then this question will be annulled.\n\n## Sub-question decomposition\n- (w=0.35) Will the Houthi/Iranian blockade escalation still be operationally active (attacks or credible enforcement against shipping in the Red Sea) through late August 2026, without a ceasefire or de-escalation agreement?  \u2014 A sustained, enforced blockade is the necessary driver of a \u003e50% collapse in transits; de-escalation would allow traffic\n- (w=0.30) Will the 7-day moving average of Bab el-Mandeb transit calls fall to 20 or below at any point between July 24 and August 31, 2026?  \u2014 Tests whether the required magnitude of decline (roughly half of the ~40 baseline) is even reachable given observed traj\n- (w=0.20) Do historical Red Sea crisis episodes (e.g., Dec 2023\u20132024 Houthi campaign) show transit call declines of 50%+ within a ~6-week window from a pre-crisis baseline?  \u2014 Base rate anchor: in 2024 transits fell ~60-70% over months, but the decline was gradual; also, current baseline of 40 i\n- (w=0.15) Will sanctioned/Iranian and regional-only traffic (which continues transiting despite the blockade) keep the daily transit count above 20 even under a full commercial pullback?  \u2014 Portwatch counts all vessels including small regional/Iranian traffic; a floor of persistent transits could prevent the \n\nCombination rule: **weighted_average**\n\n## Synthesized evidence\n1. [sq1 | article_search | STRONG cred 92 | UP | DATED] Houthis declared a naval blockade of Bab el-Mandeb on July 20, 2026, in retaliation for Saudi strikes on Sanaa airport.\n2. [sq1 | article_search | STRONG cred 90 | UP | DATED] JMIC (US Navy-led) warned July 21 that Houthis had completed preparations, deploying missiles and drones near Bab el-Mandeb, to attack shipping.\n3. [sq1 | article_search | STRONG cred 90 | UP | DATED] Houthis fired on two Saudi oil tankers in the Red Sea the week of July 20; Saudi coalition struck Houthi targets in Yemen on July 25.\n4. [sq1 | article_search | MODERATE cred 85 | DOWN | DATED] The EU naval mission advisory was scoped narrowly, urging only vessels \u0027linked to Israeli, U.S. or Saudi interests\u0027 to avoid the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden.\n5. [sq1 | article_search | MODERATE cred 80 | DOWN | DATED] On July 26 the Trump administration signaled a pause in strikes on Iran to allow negotiations to progress, with Pakistan mediating a possible ceasefire revival.\n6. [sq1 | article_search | MODERATE cred 85 | DOWN | DATED] A prior US-Iran war episode ended with a Trump-Pezeshkian MOU on June 17, 2026 reopening the Strait of Hormuz, showing rapid de-escalation is possible in this conflict.\n7. [sq2 | article_search | STRONG cred 95 | NEUTRAL | DATED] IMF Portwatch 7-day moving average of Bab el-Mandeb transit calls was 40 on July 19, 2026, the pre-blockade baseline; \u226420 requires a 50% drop.\n8. [sq2 | article_search | MODERATE cred 75 | DOWN | DATED] Windward recorded 26 inbound and 17 outbound Bab el-Mandeb crossings on July 20 (~43 total), showing no collapse in the first days after the blockade declaration.\n9. [sq2 | article_search | WEAK cred 70 | UP | DATED] MarineTraffic reported on July 21 that two oil tankers rerouted after departing Saudi Arabia, described as the first operational response to Red Sea risk.\n10. [sq4 | article_search | MODERATE cred 75 | DOWN | DATED] Windward observed the Red Sea market \u0027splitting in two,\u0027 with commercial tonnage pulling back while sanctioned Iranian traffic pushed into Bab el-Mandeb.\n11. [sq3 | article_search | WEAK cred 40 | NEUTRAL | DATED] No data on the 2023-24 Houthi campaign\u0027s Portwatch transit-call trajectory was surfaced by the research tools.\n12. [sq1 | article_search | MODERATE cred 82 | UP | DATED] Conflict is multi-front \u2014 Iran attacking tankers near Hormuz, Houthis in the Red Sea, Ukraine hitting shadow-fleet vessels \u2014 per CNBC July 24 commodity analysts.\n\n## Cross-Market Signals\n\n### Polymarket\n- \"Will Elon Musk post 90-114 tweets from July 30 to August 1, 2026?\" \u2192 Yes: 0.17, Volume: $123.1K\n- \"Will Elon Musk post 115-139 tweets from July 30 to August 1, 2026?\" \u2192 Yes: 0.01, Volume: $121.2K\n- \"Will Donald Trump publicly insult Vladimir Putin by July 31, 2026?\" \u2192 Yes: 0.00, Volume: $1.1M\n- \"Bab el-Mandeb Strait effectively closed by August 31?\" \u2192 Yes: 0.09, Volume: $1.1M\n- \"Will Donald Trump publicly insult Emmanuel Macron by July 31, 2026?\" \u2192 Yes: 0.23, Volume: $94.5K\n- \"Will China invade Taiwan by September 30, 2026?\" \u2192 Yes: 0.01, Volume: $1.8M\n- \"Will the Fed increase interest rates by 25 bps after the September 2026 meeting?\" \u2192 Yes: 0.59, Volume: $2.3M\n- \"Will the Fed decrease interest rates by 25 bps after the September 2026 meeting?\" \u2192 Yes: 0.02, Volume: $2.7M\n- \"Will the Democratic Party control the Senate after the 2026 Midterm elections?\" \u2192 Yes: 0.43, Volume: $2.1M\n- \"Will Ultra Prime win the LPL 2026 season?\" \u2192 Yes: 0.00, Volume: $247.4K\n\nInformation gaps:\n  - No actual Portwatch transit-call readings after July 24, 2026\n  - Missing base rate: magnitude/speed of Bab el-Mandeb declines in Dec 2023\u2013Feb 2024 Houthi campaign\n  - No breakdown of persistent regional/Iranian traffic floor at Bab el-Mandeb\n  - No August 2026 news on ceasefire status or continued Houthi attacks\n\nKey uncertainties:\n  - Whether US-Iran talks yield a ceasefire that de-escalates Houthi actions\n  - Whether Houthi enforcement broadens beyond Saudi/Israeli/US-linked vessels\n  - Size of the irreducible transit floor (Iranian, Yemeni, regional short-sea traffic)\n  - Whether the Dec 2023 baseline (~70-80 calls) versus 2026 baseline (40) changes drop dynamics\n\n## Required pre-forecast walkthrough\n\nBefore giving probabilities, walk through these explicitly:\n  (a) The time left until the question resolves.\n  (b) The status quo outcome \u2014 what happens if nothing changes from today.\n  (c) A brief scenario that results in NO.\n  (d) A brief scenario that results in YES.\n\n## Calibration guidance\n\n- **Estimate each sub-question in isolation.** Do not let your answer to one sub-question anchor your answer to another. This is the core of Fermi decomposition \u2014 independence forces more careful reasoning per factor.\n- **Anchor on the status quo.** Require strong specific evidence to move far from it.\n- 0.05 / 0.95 require strong, multi-source evidence. Avoid \u003e0.97 or \u003c0.03 unless the outcome is already settled or near-tautological \u2014 overconfident misses are punished heavily by the log score.\n- **Anchor on prediction markets.** If liquid market prices (Polymarket / Kalshi) or a community forecast appear in the evidence, treat them as a strong, well-calibrated prior. Your final estimate should rarely sit more than ~15 percentage points from a liquid market on the SAME question \u2014 move further only with specific evidence the market lacks.\n- **Treat research as fallible, not ground truth.** A single-source or \"very recent\" claim \u2014 especially one the evidence flags as unverified, possibly AI-generated, or low-credibility \u2014 must not drive you to near-certainty. When a load-bearing fact is unverified, keep at least 10-15% on the chance it is wrong.\n- **Also provide a holistic estimate** \u2014 your overall gut feeling about the main question, BEFORE you see the mathematical combination. This serves as a sanity check: if the Fermi result and holistic estimate diverge wildly, something is wrong.\n\n## Output\n\nReturn ONLY valid JSON, no markdown fences:\n\n{\n  \"rationale\": \"\u003caddress (a) (b) (c) (d) above \u2014 5-8 sentences total\u003e\",\n  \"sub_question_estimates\": {\n    \"sq1\": \u003cfloat in [0.01, 0.99]\u003e,\n    \"sq2\": \u003cfloat in [0.01, 0.99]\u003e,\n    \"sq3\": \u003cfloat in [0.01, 0.99]\u003e,\n    \"sq4\": \u003cfloat in [0.01, 0.99]\u003e\n  },\n  \"holistic_p_yes\": \u003cfloat in [0.01, 0.99] \u2014 your overall estimate ignoring the decomposition\u003e,\n  \"what_would_change_my_mind\": \"\u003c1-2 sentences: what new info would push you above 70% or below 30%\u003e\"\n}\n",
    "holistic_p_yes": 0.13,
    "models": [
      "opus",
      "secondary"
    ],
    "p_yes": 0.357,
    "rationale": "(a) The question opened July 24, 2026 and resolves on the Aug 31, 2026 Portwatch 7-day moving average \u2014 roughly five to six weeks of runway. (b) Status quo: the July 19 baseline was 40 calls/day and Windward\u0027s own count on July 20 (~43 crossings) showed no immediate collapse, with commercial tonnage pulling back but sanctioned Iranian/regional traffic surging in; the 40 baseline is already a heavily depressed, risk-tolerant residual after the 2023-24 exodus (~70-80 pre-crisis), so the marginal remaining vessels are precisely those least deterred by threats. (c) NO scenario (most likely): Houthi enforcement stays scoped to Saudi/Israeli/US-linked vessels (as the EU advisory implies), US-Iran talks and Pakistani mediation keep a lid on escalation, and the MA drifts to ~25-35 rather than \u226420 \u2014 a meaningful but sub-50% cut. (d) YES scenario: indiscriminate attacks on non-aligned tankers or a mined/kinetically contested chokepoint triggers a genuine insurance/underwriter withdrawal, war-risk premiums spike, and even the risk-tolerant residual plus regional traffic drops below 20 by late August. Historically, a 50%+ decline within ~6 weeks did occur in Dec 2023-Jan 2024, so the magnitude is achievable in principle, but from a much higher baseline with much more elastic traffic. The liquid Polymarket contract on \u0027Bab el-Mandeb effectively closed by Aug 31\u0027 at 9% is a strong anchor; a 50% cut is easier than effective closure, so I sit modestly above it. Note: sq4 is scored in the YES-aligned direction (probability the persistent Iranian/regional floor does NOT keep the count above 20).",
    "sub_question_estimates": {
      "sq1": 0.6,
      "sq2": 0.2,
      "sq3": 0.78,
      "sq4": 0.28
    },
    "what_would_change_my_mind": "Above 70%: Portwatch readings in early-to-mid August showing the 7-day MA already at ~22-25 with continued indiscriminate attacks on non-aligned vessels and major carriers/underwriters formally suspending Red Sea transits. Below 30% (further): a US-Iran/Saudi-Houthi ceasefire announcement or Portwatch holding above 30 through mid-August."
  },
  "plan": {
    "combination_logic": "weighted_average",
    "domain": "geopolitics",
    "n_sub_qs": 4,
    "n_tools": 5,
    "reasoning_approach": "Weight the scenario-based sub-questions (blockade persistence, reachability of the \u226420 threshold, historical analogue magnitude, and the persistent-traffic floor) into a blended probability, anchored by the Monte Carlo estimate of the 7-day MA distribution on Aug 31 relative to the 40 baseline.",
    "sub_questions": [
      {
        "id": "sq1",
        "question": "Will the Houthi/Iranian blockade escalation still be operationally active (attacks or credible enforcement against shipping in the Red Sea) through late August 2026, without a ceasefire or de-escalation agreement?",
        "rationale": "A sustained, enforced blockade is the necessary driver of a \u003e50% collapse in transits; de-escalation would allow traffic to recover.",
        "weight": 0.35
      },
      {
        "id": "sq2",
        "question": "Will the 7-day moving average of Bab el-Mandeb transit calls fall to 20 or below at any point between July 24 and August 31, 2026?",
        "rationale": "Tests whether the required magnitude of decline (roughly half of the ~40 baseline) is even reachable given observed trajectory; touching the threshold is a precondition for being at/below it on Aug 31.",
        "weight": 0.3
      },
      {
        "id": "sq3",
        "question": "Do historical Red Sea crisis episodes (e.g., Dec 2023\u20132024 Houthi campaign) show transit call declines of 50%+ within a ~6-week window from a pre-crisis baseline?",
        "rationale": "Base rate anchor: in 2024 transits fell ~60-70% over months, but the decline was gradual; also, current baseline of 40 is already post-decline, so further halving is a steeper ask.",
        "weight": 0.2
      },
      {
        "id": "sq4",
        "question": "Will sanctioned/Iranian and regional-only traffic (which continues transiting despite the blockade) keep the daily transit count above 20 even under a full commercial pullback?",
        "rationale": "Portwatch counts all vessels including small regional/Iranian traffic; a floor of persistent transits could prevent the 7-day MA from dropping to \u226420 even in severe scenarios.",
        "weight": 0.15
      }
    ],
    "tool_requests": [
      {
        "parameters": {
          "brief": "Find the latest data and reporting (July-August 2026) on Bab el-Mandeb / Red Sea shipping transit volumes after the Houthi naval blockade declaration of July 20, 2026. Specifically: current IMF PortWatch 7-day moving average of transit calls at Bab el-Mandeb, Clarksons/Lloyd\u0027s List/Windward estimates of daily transits, whether attacks on ships are continuing, whether any ceasefire or de-escalation between the US/Israel/Iran/Houthis has occurred, and how much commercial tonnage has rerouted via Cape of Good Hope.",
          "max_searches": 5,
          "question_title": "Will transit calls in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait be cut by half or more on August 31, 2026 compared to July 2026?"
        },
        "target_sub_questions": [
          "sq1",
          "sq2",
          "sq4"
        ],
        "tool_name": "claude_news"
      },
      {
        "parameters": {
          "lookback_days": 45,
          "queries": [
            "Bab el-Mandeb transits Red Sea shipping volumes decline",
            "Houthi blockade Saudi Arabia Red Sea tankers rerouting Cape of Good Hope",
            "Red Sea ceasefire Iran Houthi de-escalation shipping resumes"
          ]
        },
        "target_sub_questions": [
          "sq1",
          "sq2"
        ],
        "tool_name": "article_search"
      },
      {
        "parameters": {
          "queries": [
            "IMF PortWatch Bab el-Mandeb transit calls 7-day moving average August 2026",
            "Red Sea daily transits August 2026 Houthi blockade shipping data"
          ]
        },
        "target_sub_questions": [
          "sq2",
          "sq4"
        ],
        "tool_name": "web_search"
      },
      {
        "parameters": {
          "code": "import numpy as np\n# Baseline: 7dMA = 40 on July 19 2026. Threshold: \u003c=20 on Aug 31 2026 (43 days later).\n# 2023-24 analogue: Bab el-Mandeb transits fell from ~70-75/day (Nov 2023) to ~30-35/day by Feb 2024 (~55% over ~10 weeks).\n# Model log-decline with uncertainty conditional on scenarios.\nnp.random.seed(0)\nN=200000\n# Scenario probabilities (to be updated by research)\np_sustained=0.55  # blockade actively enforced through Aug\np_partial=0.30\np_deescal=0.15\nu=np.random.rand(N)\nres=np.zeros(N)\nfor i,(mask,mu,sd,floor_mu) in enumerate([\n    (u\u003cp_sustained, -0.55, 0.35, 14),          # sustained: mean ~42% further decline\n    ((u\u003e=p_sustained)\u0026(u\u003cp_sustained+p_partial), -0.20, 0.25, 18),\n    (u\u003e=p_sustained+p_partial, 0.05, 0.20, 22)]):\n    n=mask.sum()\n    val=40*np.exp(np.random.normal(mu,sd,n))\n    floor=np.random.normal(floor_mu,4,n).clip(5,None)  # persistent regional/Iranian traffic floor\n    res[mask]=np.maximum(val,floor*0.9)\nprint(\u0027P(7dMA \u003c= 20 on Aug 31):\u0027, (res\u003c=20).mean())\nprint(\u0027median\u0027, np.median(res), \u0027q10\u0027, np.percentile(res,10), \u0027q90\u0027, np.percentile(res,90))\n# sensitivity: what if floor is lower\nfor fl in [8,12,16,20]:\n    val=40*np.exp(np.random.normal(-0.55,0.35,N))\n    print(\u0027sustained-only P\u003c=20 with floor\u0027,fl,\u0027:\u0027,(np.maximum(val,fl)\u003c=20).mean())\n",
          "description": "Monte Carlo of Bab el-Mandeb 7-day MA transit calls on Aug 31 2026 given scenario weights and a persistent-traffic floor, to estimate P(\u003c=20)."
        },
        "target_sub_questions": [
          "sq2",
          "sq3",
          "sq4"
        ],
        "tool_name": "code_execution"
      },
      {
        "parameters": {
          "queries": [
            "Red Sea crisis",
            "Houthi attacks on shipping",
            "Bab-el-Mandeb"
          ]
        },
        "target_sub_questions": [
          "sq3"
        ],
        "tool_name": "wikipedia_lookup"
      }
    ]
  },
  "question": {
    "close_time": "2026-08-01T15:00:00Z",
    "description": "## Description\nAbout 7% of the world\u0027s oil supply [transited](https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2026/07/houthis-declare-red-sea-blockade-saudi-arabia-oil-markets-brace-impact) the Bab el-Mandeb Strait in June 2026. According to [Windward](https://windward.ai/blog/houthi-blockade-announcement-the-red-sea-split-in-two/) on July 22, 2026:\u0026#x20;\n\n\u003e The Houthis declared [a naval blockade against Saudi Arabia on July 20](https://www.npr.org/2026/07/21/nx-s1-5901846/us-iran-updates), escalating threats across the Red Sea corridor while Iranian forces struck three tankers in the Strait of Hormuz within 48 hours.\n\n\u003e That ambiguity is doing real work. Within a day, Windward tracked the market splitting into two opposite flows: commercial tonnage pulling back from Bab al-Mandeb, and sanctioned Iranian traffic pushing into it.\n\n\u003cimg height=\"660\" width=\"1024\" alt=\"Bab al-Mandeb crossings into vs. out of the Red Sea since 8 June, with 26 inbound against 17 outbound on 20 July. Source: Windward Maritime AI\u2122 Platform\" src=\"https://windward.ai/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/img-bab-el-mandeb-crossings-1024x660.png\" /\u003e(Image courtesy of Windward)\n\n[](https://twitter.com/share?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwindward.ai%2Fblog%2Fhouthi-blockade-announcement-the-red-sea-split-in-two%2F\\\u0026text=Two+Days+After+the+Houthi+Blockade+Announcement%2C+the+Red+Sea+Split+in+Two)[](https://www.linkedin.com/cws/share?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwindward.ai%2Fblog%2Fhouthi-blockade-announcement-the-red-sea-split-in-two%2F)[](http://www.facebook.com/share.php?u=https%3A%2F%2Fwindward.ai%2Fblog%2Fhouthi-blockade-announcement-the-red-sea-split-in-two%2F)\n\nAs of July 19, 2026, the 7-day moving average of transit calls at the Bab el-Mandeb Strait according to the [resolution source](https://portwatch.imf.org/pages/6b1814d64903461b98144a6cc25eb79c) was 40.\n\n`{\"format\": \"metac_reveal_and_close_in_period\", \"info\": {\"post_id\": 44792, \"question_id\": 44939}}`\n\n## Resolution Criteria\nThis question resolves as **Yes** if, for August 31, 2026, the 7-day moving average of transit calls is less than or equal to 20 according to IMF Portwatch\u0027s [Bab el-Mandeb Strait](https://portwatch.imf.org/pages/6b1814d64903461b98144a6cc25eb79c) tracker.\n\n## Fine Print\nThis question\u0027s information (resolution criteria, fine print, background info, etc) is synced with an [original identical question](https://www.metaculus.com/questions/44792) which opened on 2026-07-24 15:00:00. This question will resolve based on the resolution criteria and fine print of the linked original question. However, if this question would resolve differently than the original question, then this question will be annulled. Additionally, if the original question\u0027s resolution could have been known before this question opened, then this question will be annulled.",
    "question_type": "binary",
    "title": "Will transit calls in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait be cut by half or more on August 31, 2026 compared to July 2026?"
  },
  "research": {
    "cross_market_brief": "## Cross-Market Signals\n\n### Polymarket\n- \"Will Elon Musk post 90-114 tweets from July 30 to August 1, 2026?\" \u2192 Yes: 0.17, Volume: $123.1K\n- \"Will Elon Musk post 115-139 tweets from July 30 to August 1, 2026?\" \u2192 Yes: 0.01, Volume: $121.2K\n- \"Will Donald Trump publicly insult Vladimir Putin by July 31, 2026?\" \u2192 Yes: 0.00, Volume: $1.1M\n- \"Bab el-Mandeb Strait effectively closed by August 31?\" \u2192 Yes: 0.09, Volume: $1.1M\n- \"Will Donald Trump publicly insult Emmanuel Macron by July 31, 2026?\" \u2192 Yes: 0.23, Volume: $94.5K\n- \"Will China invade Taiwan by September 30, 2026?\" \u2192 Yes: 0.01, Volume: $1.8M\n- \"Will the Fed increase interest rates by 25 bps after the September 2026 meeting?\" \u2192 Yes: 0.59, Volume: $2.3M\n- \"Will the Fed decrease interest rates by 25 bps after the September 2026 meeting?\" \u2192 Yes: 0.02, Volume: $2.7M\n- \"Will the Democratic Party control the Senate after the 2026 Midterm elections?\" \u2192 Yes: 0.43, Volume: $2.1M\n- \"Will Ultra Prime win the LPL 2026 season?\" \u2192 Yes: 0.00, Volume: $247.4K",
    "errors": [],
    "has_cross_market": true,
    "n_errors": 0,
    "n_tools": 5,
    "tools": [
      {
        "elapsed_s": 33.79,
        "error": null,
        "success": true,
        "summary": "17 citations",
        "tool_name": "claude_news"
      },
      {
        "elapsed_s": 2.59,
        "error": null,
        "success": true,
        "summary": "25 articles",
        "tool_name": "article_search"
      },
      {
        "elapsed_s": 30.84,
        "error": null,
        "success": true,
        "summary": "0 results",
        "tool_name": "web_search"
      },
      {
        "elapsed_s": 0.4,
        "error": null,
        "success": true,
        "summary": "Monte Carlo of Bab el-Mandeb 7-day MA transit calls on Aug 3",
        "tool_name": "code_execution"
      },
      {
        "elapsed_s": 1.47,
        "error": null,
        "success": true,
        "summary": "3 pages",
        "tool_name": "wikipedia_lookup"
      }
    ]
  },
  "synthesis": {
    "evidence": [
      {
        "claim": "Houthis declared a naval blockade of Bab el-Mandeb on July 20, 2026, in retaliation for Saudi strikes on Sanaa airport.",
        "credibility": 92,
        "direction": "UP",
        "priced_in": true,
        "recency": "DATED",
        "source": "article_search",
        "strength": "STRONG",
        "sub_question_id": "sq1"
      },
      {
        "claim": "JMIC (US Navy-led) warned July 21 that Houthis had completed preparations, deploying missiles and drones near Bab el-Mandeb, to attack shipping.",
        "credibility": 90,
        "direction": "UP",
        "priced_in": true,
        "recency": "DATED",
        "source": "article_search",
        "strength": "STRONG",
        "sub_question_id": "sq1"
      },
      {
        "claim": "Houthis fired on two Saudi oil tankers in the Red Sea the week of July 20; Saudi coalition struck Houthi targets in Yemen on July 25.",
        "credibility": 90,
        "direction": "UP",
        "priced_in": true,
        "recency": "DATED",
        "source": "article_search",
        "strength": "STRONG",
        "sub_question_id": "sq1"
      },
      {
        "claim": "The EU naval mission advisory was scoped narrowly, urging only vessels \u0027linked to Israeli, U.S. or Saudi interests\u0027 to avoid the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden.",
        "credibility": 85,
        "direction": "DOWN",
        "priced_in": true,
        "recency": "DATED",
        "source": "article_search",
        "strength": "MODERATE",
        "sub_question_id": "sq1"
      },
      {
        "claim": "On July 26 the Trump administration signaled a pause in strikes on Iran to allow negotiations to progress, with Pakistan mediating a possible ceasefire revival.",
        "credibility": 80,
        "direction": "DOWN",
        "priced_in": false,
        "recency": "DATED",
        "source": "article_search",
        "strength": "MODERATE",
        "sub_question_id": "sq1"
      },
      {
        "claim": "A prior US-Iran war episode ended with a Trump-Pezeshkian MOU on June 17, 2026 reopening the Strait of Hormuz, showing rapid de-escalation is possible in this conflict.",
        "credibility": 85,
        "direction": "DOWN",
        "priced_in": true,
        "recency": "DATED",
        "source": "article_search",
        "strength": "MODERATE",
        "sub_question_id": "sq1"
      },
      {
        "claim": "IMF Portwatch 7-day moving average of Bab el-Mandeb transit calls was 40 on July 19, 2026, the pre-blockade baseline; \u226420 requires a 50% drop.",
        "credibility": 95,
        "direction": "NEUTRAL",
        "priced_in": true,
        "recency": "DATED",
        "source": "article_search",
        "strength": "STRONG",
        "sub_question_id": "sq2"
      },
      {
        "claim": "Windward recorded 26 inbound and 17 outbound Bab el-Mandeb crossings on July 20 (~43 total), showing no collapse in the first days after the blockade declaration.",
        "credibility": 75,
        "direction": "DOWN",
        "priced_in": true,
        "recency": "DATED",
        "source": "article_search",
        "strength": "MODERATE",
        "sub_question_id": "sq2"
      },
      {
        "claim": "MarineTraffic reported on July 21 that two oil tankers rerouted after departing Saudi Arabia, described as the first operational response to Red Sea risk.",
        "credibility": 70,
        "direction": "UP",
        "priced_in": true,
        "recency": "DATED",
        "source": "article_search",
        "strength": "WEAK",
        "sub_question_id": "sq2"
      },
      {
        "claim": "Windward observed the Red Sea market \u0027splitting in two,\u0027 with commercial tonnage pulling back while sanctioned Iranian traffic pushed into Bab el-Mandeb.",
        "credibility": 75,
        "direction": "DOWN",
        "priced_in": true,
        "recency": "DATED",
        "source": "article_search",
        "strength": "MODERATE",
        "sub_question_id": "sq4"
      },
      {
        "claim": "No data on the 2023-24 Houthi campaign\u0027s Portwatch transit-call trajectory was surfaced by the research tools.",
        "credibility": 40,
        "direction": "NEUTRAL",
        "priced_in": true,
        "recency": "DATED",
        "source": "article_search",
        "strength": "WEAK",
        "sub_question_id": "sq3"
      },
      {
        "claim": "Conflict is multi-front \u2014 Iran attacking tankers near Hormuz, Houthis in the Red Sea, Ukraine hitting shadow-fleet vessels \u2014 per CNBC July 24 commodity analysts.",
        "credibility": 82,
        "direction": "UP",
        "priced_in": true,
        "recency": "DATED",
        "source": "article_search",
        "strength": "MODERATE",
        "sub_question_id": "sq1"
      }
    ],
    "information_gaps": [
      "No actual Portwatch transit-call readings after July 24, 2026",
      "Missing base rate: magnitude/speed of Bab el-Mandeb declines in Dec 2023\u2013Feb 2024 Houthi campaign",
      "No breakdown of persistent regional/Iranian traffic floor at Bab el-Mandeb",
      "No August 2026 news on ceasefire status or continued Houthi attacks"
    ],
    "key_uncertainties": [
      "Whether US-Iran talks yield a ceasefire that de-escalates Houthi actions",
      "Whether Houthi enforcement broadens beyond Saudi/Israeli/US-linked vessels",
      "Size of the irreducible transit floor (Iranian, Yemeni, regional short-sea traffic)",
      "Whether the Dec 2023 baseline (~70-80 calls) versus 2026 baseline (40) changes drop dynamics"
    ],
    "n_evidence": 12
  },
  "timings": {
    "forecast": 87.57,
    "plan": 27.38,
    "research": 33.79,
    "synthesis": 32.49
  }
}