Israeli airspace closed by October 31, 2026?

- [2026-02-28] Israel closed its airspace when the US and Israel attacked Iran. At least eight states, Israel included, shut their airspace. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/2/28/airspace-closed-airlines-halt-flights-as-us-israel-attack-iran-responds - [2026-04-08/09] After a US-Israel-Iran ceasefire, the Transport Ministry fully reopened the airspace and Ben Gurion from midnight. Foreign carriers returned gradually. https://www.timesofisrael.com/ben-gurion-airport-set-to-reopen-as-israel-eases-flight-restrictions-after-ceasefire/ - [2026-06-07/08] Iranian missile fire resumed. Ben Gurion stayed open, though some airlines cancelled flights and officials weighed passenger caps. A Times of Israel entry from that date says Israel closed its airspace to civilian flights during an attack on Iran, but I did not open the page to confirm the date. Ynet reported no decision to close and said officials were preparing for the possibility if fire expanded. https://www.ynetnews.com/article/r1ikfr711mx - [2026-07-21] The IDF and Israeli authorities finished talks on running Ben Gurion under missile fire. They described a capability to give precise takeoff and landing windows, which points to managing threats through restrictions rather than full closure. https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/defense-news/article-903143 - [2026-09-30] EASA kept an Israel Information Note valid to 16 Nov 2026. It advises operators to weigh the risk, not to avoid Israeli airspace. The same update put Jordan back to "avoid at all levels" after renewed Iranian missile and drone attacks in September. https://ops.group/blog/middle-east-airspace-current-operational-picture/ - [2026-10-06] OPSGROUP reports Israel is open but not back to normal. Missile and drone attacks have become less frequent but remain possible, including around Tel Aviv. Some foreign airlines have returned and others have not. https://ops.group/blog/middle-east-airspace-current-operational-picture/ - [2026-10 (undated)] Safeairspace lists the Tel Aviv FIR (LLLL) as open at Risk Level Two. It warns that missile and drone threats can cause short-notice restrictions. https://safeairspace.net/israel/ - [2026-10-07] British Airways is selling London Heathrow–Tel Aviv flights from 25 Oct, its first since February. That signals confidence, but a scheduled return does not rule out a closure. https://www.jpost.com/business-and-innovation/all-news/article-910946 - [2026-10-14] A Notamify snapshot of the Tel Aviv ACC shows only partial restrictions. These are route closures (L53) and limits on route N134 for 07:00–10:00 UTC on 14 Oct. The page's own age tag is 56 days, so the snapshot may be stale. These are partial measures, which the rules exclude as subset closures. https://notamify.com/middle-east - [2026-09 to 2026-10] Iranian missile attacks on Jordan in September and Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia into October (latest 5 Oct) show the regional conflict is still active. https://ops.group/blog/middle-east-airspace-current-operational-picture/ - [Date not confirmed] An "iranwarlive.com" tracker lists Israel as "RESTRICTED", sourced to the CAA "Partial". It is a low-quality aggregator and I did not open it. https://iranwarlive.com/airspace BOTTOM LINE: As of 2026-10-14 the Tel Aviv FIR is open, with only partial NOTAM restrictions and no general closure in force. The conflict is simmering, and Iranian and Houthi attacks are continuing in the region. A qualifying closure would need a new major escalation, such as large Iranian barrages or renewed US/Israeli strikes, before 31 Oct. NOT FOUND: Any news from the last 7 days (7–14 Oct) on Israel–Iran strikes or a planned Israeli closure. I also found no official CAA/IAA NOTAM text for October and no scheduled event that would force a closure. I could not confirm whether the early-June closure (Times of Israel entry) actually took effect as a general closure.

- [2026-10-14] Safe Airspace (OPSGROUP) lists LLLL/Tel Aviv FIR as open, risk level Two. It says missile and drone threats can cause short-notice restrictions, and some airlines have not returned. It records Israeli airspace closing and reopening several times between Feb and Jul 2026. https://safeairspace.net/israel/ - [2026-09-30] EASA information note, valid to 2026-11-16, advises caution only. Italy's NOTAM (to 29 Nov) is also caution only. Russia's NOTAM (to 16 Oct) bars Russian operators from departing for Israel 2200–0400 UTC. These are foreign advisories, not Israeli closures, and would not count under exclusion (ix). https://safeairspace.net/israel/ - [2026-02-28] Reference class, 2026: Israel closed its airspace to civilian flights when the US and Israel struck Iran. The Transport Ministry ordered it. https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/israel-closes-airspace-amid-attack-on-iran-all-civilian-flights-canceled/ - [2026-03-05 to 2026-04-09] Duration of that closure: a partial reopening for Israeli carriers' repatriation flights began 4–5 March. Closure notices were extended to 16 April. Full reopening followed the 8 April ceasefire. About six weeks of restriction in all. https://www.timesofisrael.com/ben-gurion-airport-set-to-reopen-as-israel-eases-flight-restrictions-after-ceasefire/ - [2026-06-08] Policy shift: after Iranian missile attacks in June, Israel deliberately kept airspace open. Calcalist describes an effort to break the earlier pattern, where launches were followed almost at once by a closure. Officials said launches at central Israel would not necessarily mean a prolonged closure. A Polymarket "by June" market had spiked to about 64% and then fell to about 2% into its deadline. https://www.calcalistech.com/ctechnews/article/hjrlkk4bgx and https://www.israelhayom.com/2026/06/07/will-ben-gurion-airport-close-amid-tensions-with-iran/ - [2026-07-xx] Times of Israel headline: Israel remains on the sidelines of a US-Iran fight. The Regev statement says a new decision would follow if rocket fire expands. Neither is a closure. https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/israels-airspace-remaining-open-flights-continuing-as-scheduled-regev-says/ - [2026-09-xx] Early September: Cryptonews reports aviation officials recommended closing Ben Gurion amid fresh Iranian launches, but authorities kept it open. Secondary source. https://cryptonews.com/news/israel-airspace-closure-odds-polymarket-signals/ - [2026-09-20] Sibling Polymarket market "Israel closes its airspace by...?" (opened 2026-05-04). Every deadline from May 8 through Aug 31 shows "No". Only the Sep 30 line shows "Yes". Pages from the weeks before reported the Sep 30 line at 74–96%. The page cites a US embassy alert about closures ahead of Yom Kippur. The reason for the Yes is not stated and may be the holiday closure, which this question's rules exclude. A trader comment argues the Yom Kippur closure should not count. https://polymarket.com/event/israel-closes-its-airspace-by - [2026-09-19] Sibling market "Israeli airspace closed between Oct. 15 and Oct. 31?" has its own page. Its context says airspace is open and diplomacy is reducing the near-term chance of escalation. Its rules count a closure already in effect on Oct 15. I did not report its price. https://polymarket.com/event/israeli-airspace-closed-between-octpt-15-and-octpt-31 - [2026-09-19] A "by December 31, 2026" sibling market also exists. https://polymarket.com/event/israel-closes-its-airspace-by - [2025-06-13 to 2025-06-24] Earlier reference event: airspace closed at the start of the 12-day Israel-Iran war and reopened after the ceasefire. https://www.timesofisrael.com/israel-reopens-skies-for-air-travel-returns-international-airport-to-full-operation/ - Base-rate count: full closures occurred in Jun 2025 and Feb–Apr 2026. Both began with Israeli or US strikes on Iran. Short-lived Iranian barrages (Jun 2026) and the Houthi/Hezbollah fire did not trigger a general closure. I found no reported closure from mid-April to mid-October 2026 other than the excluded holiday. So the window needs a fresh major escalation, most likely an Israel/US-Iran strike. BOTTOM LINE: Since Apr 2026 Israel has kept airspace open through several Iranian missile attacks, so only a new major war-start event looks likely to produce a qualifying closure. The window is short (about 17 days), and the question's rules exclude holiday closures and closures announced before issuance. The unresolved reason behind the Sep 30 sibling's Yes is a resolution-risk signal. NOT FOUND: Current-week (Oct 7–14) news on strikes, ceasefire status or any Israeli NOTAM. A fetched primary Israeli CAA/NOTAM text. Any verified closure in Oct 2026. The reason the Sep 30 sibling resolved Yes.

YES means: Israel (the Civil Aviation Authority or the Transport Ministry) orders a general closure of the Tel Aviv FIR (LLLL) to commercial flights, taking effect between Sep 15 and Oct 31, 2026. The closure must be new, unscheduled, and not a holiday or partial closure. - [2026-10-11] The Times of Israel live-blog headline says Netanyahu convened security officials amid concerns of Iran escalation. The same day's entries say Iran called the US reply to its Hormuz-reopening proposal "insufficient". The US was also enforcing a naval blockade on Iran and disabled a blockade-running cargo ship. Diplomacy looks stalled while pressure rises. I saw only the snippet, because the page was blocked when I tried to open it. https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog-october-11-2026/ - [2026-10-09] A Times of Israel live-blog headline item reads "US said preparing options to renew Iran war, including plan for 3 days of intense strikes". This is a report, not confirmed. It is the clearest path to YES, because both earlier full closures (Jun 2025, Feb 2026) opened with strikes on Iran. Only the snippet was visible. https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog-oct-9-2026/ - [2026-10-10] A GlobalSecurity war tracker (Day 225) says no strike on an Iranian nuclear site has been reported since Jul 7. It cites Iran's atomic energy chief on Oct 8 refusing to give up enrichment or its uranium stockpile, and dismissing renewed US threats against nuclear facilities. The nuclear dispute that preceded the earlier rounds is unresolved. The page was paywalled when I tried to open it, so this comes from the snippet. https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/iran-war-oprep.htm - [2026-10-06/11] The National Security Council warned of heightened Iranian and proxy attack risk around the Oct 7 anniversary. Israel's Knesset election is on Oct 27. Both the election and the anniversary fall inside the window. Both are potential triggers or pressure points for either side. https://www.timesofisrael.com/national-security-council-warns-iran-could-attack-israel-jews-on-oct-7-anniversary/ - [2026-10-11] Netanyahu condemned a "horrific" attack on Riyadh airport on Oct 11, per the live-blog headline list. This is a newer regional strike on an airport than the Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia through Oct 5 in the earlier reports. It suggests proxy or Iranian fire on aviation targets is still happening. https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog-october-11-2026/ - [2026-06-08] Open-airspace policy is a deliberate choice that officials could reverse. Calcalist describes it as a risk-management framework with continuous reassessment, and the decision covered only the Jun 7 attack on northern Israel. A strike on central Israel at scale, or damage to Ben Gurion, would remove that discretion. Iranian missiles hit the airport and damaged aircraft in March (Calcalist). https://www.calcalistech.com/ctechnews/article/hjrlkk4bgx - [2026-04-16] The wartime NOTAM was framed by the Israel Airports Authority as a "technical extension" that "can be updated, shortened, or extended at any time". That shows closure and reopening can be switched by NOTAM within hours, so the resolution trigger needs no long lead time. https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/restrictions-on-israeli-airspace-expected-to-stay-in-place-through-april-16-pending-developments/ - [2026-02-28] The precedent was a preemptive Israeli strike followed at once by a Regev order to the CAA director general to close airspace to civilian flights. The order took effect immediately, with 24 hours' notice promised before reopening. So a closure can happen the same morning as a strike, with no warning to the public. https://www.ynetnews.com/article/h1r1jfgtbg - [2026-10 (undated)] Safeairspace records Israeli airspace as having closed and reopened "several times" in Feb–Jul 2026. That is more than one episode, so a short closure after a flare-up has a precedent beyond the six-week war. The same page says missile and drone threats can cause short-notice restrictions. https://safeairspace.net/israel/ - [2026-09-19] The Polymarket "by" page says foreign carrier resumptions are slated for Oct–Nov under a "fragile truce". It also says EASA warnings and NOTAMs reflect persistent drone and ballistic risks. This supports a view that calm depends on a truce that could break. https://polymarket.com/event/israel-closes-its-airspace-by BOTTOM LINE: The strongest YES path is a US or Israeli resumption of strikes on Iran before Oct 31. Reports on Oct 9–11 of US options for 3 days of intense strikes, stalled Hormuz talks and the Oct 27 election point that way. That would almost certainly produce an immediate Transport Ministry closure order, as on Feb 28. No source I found shows a closure order or an imminent decision to close. NOT FOUND: I could not open the Times of Israel Oct 9 and Oct 11 pages or the GlobalSecurity tracker (blocked), so the bullets above rest on search snippets. I found no primary reporting that US strikes are scheduled, and no official Israeli NOTAM or order for October. I also found no Oct 12–14 reporting of Iranian launches at Israel.

YES means: the Tel Aviv FIR (LLLL) is generally closed to commercial flights by an Israeli authority order that takes effect between market creation (2026-09-15) and 2026-10-31, 11:59 PM ET. Holiday closures, closures announced before issuance, and partial or subset closures don't count. - [2026-10-14] The Safe Airspace/OPSGROUP page, fetched in full, shows no Israeli closure order. All current warnings come from outside Israel. The EASA note covers "exercise caution" only, and Italy's NOTAM is advisory. Russia's NOTAM (to 16 Oct) bars Russian operators from departing for Israel between 2200 and 0400 UTC. It applies by operator nationality, and a foreign authority issued it. Exclusions (vi) and (ix) both rule it out. https://safeairspace.net/israel/ - [2026-10-07] The Jerusalem Post, fetched, verified that British Airways flights Heathrow–Tel Aviv are on sale from 25 Oct. BA had said at the end of May that its Middle East suspension would run to at least 25 Oct. A major Western carrier (owned by a group whose largest shareholder is Qatari) is committing capacity to the last week of the window. https://www.jpost.com/business-and-innovation/all-news/article-910946 - [2026-10 (about 10 days before 14 Oct)] A Masa Israel guide (search snippet; the page returned 403 when fetched) says Ben Gurion is "open and running normally". It says Delta and United resumed in September, most European carriers are back, and Brussels, TAP and SAS return 24–26 Oct. It also says flydubai suspended its service after a 30 Sep incident on flight FZ1073. That is an airline-level action, which exclusion (vi) covers. https://www.masaisrael.org/airlines-flying-to-israel/ - [2026-06-07] On the Israel Hayom page, the assessment was that even fire at central Israel means only brief pauses during sirens, and the Regev entry says a new decision comes only if fire expands. Israel has a stated policy of using takeoff and landing pauses instead of closure. Pauses are ATM measures under exclusion (viii), and they are not NOTAM closures of the FIR. https://www.israelhayom.com/2026/06/07/will-ben-gurion-airport-close-amid-tensions-with-iran/ - [2026-07 to 2026-09] The Times of Israel (Regev) entry covers a rocket-fire episode with ballistic impacts at Arad and Dimona that wounded nearly 200 people. Even then the Transport Ministry declared the airspace open. The bar for a general closure has since been above anything seen since April. https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/israels-airspace-remaining-open-flights-continuing-as-scheduled-regev-says/ - [2026-09-16] The Polymarket sibling page for Oct 15–31 states the context. A truce framework and Qatari-mediated talks "reduced the immediate likelihood" of broad escalation. EASA and others advise caution, not prohibition. It gives a Sept 16 open date. This question's own rules exclude closures "planned or announced before Contract Issuance". Any sibling-style carry-over of a closure already in effect on Oct 15 would need such a closure to exist, and none does. https://polymarket.com/event/israeli-airspace-closed-between-octpt-15-and-octpt-31 - [2026-09-07] The Lines.com analysis of the Sept 30 sibling flagged a technicality. It said the contract needs a broad, region-wide closure, and that limited cancellations or airline exits do not qualify. Its description of the sibling as "74%" shows how fast sentiment swung. Spikes, such as the Sept 8 move from 9% to 75% and the June move to 64%, collapsed when no closure came, and the Sept 30 sibling's later Yes appears to rest on the Yom Kippur holiday. This market's exclusion (ii) removes that route. https://www.lines.com/israel-airspace-at-74-on-polymarket-what-the-market-sees - [2026-09 (about 24 days before 14 Oct)] A Polymarket staff note in the Aug 31 sibling's page says holiday closures count for that contract. This contract's rules say the opposite. The only scheduled-closure date in the window, if any, is excluded. The Oct 2026 holiday calendar offers no obvious further event (Yom Kippur was in September). https://polymarket.com/es/event/israel-closes-its-airspace-by/israel-closes-its-airspace-by-august-31-389 - [2026-09 (about 24 days before 14 Oct)] The Polymarket "by" event page showed the "Oct 15–31" sibling at 11% and the "by Dec 31" sibling at 22%, in an earlier snapshot. The 11-point gap in that snapshot shows that part of the longer-window mass sits outside the 17-day window. This is a dated reading of a sibling, not of this contract. https://polymarket.com/event/israel-closes-its-airspace-by - [2026-06-19] The Israel–Hezbollah ceasefire was renewed, but the Iran talks were called off the same day. Netanyahu's government said it was not bound by the US–Iran MOU. That fragility is the main YES route. Still, the trigger pattern in both prior full closures was a deliberate US or Israeli first strike, and it came with pre-positioning, such as US tankers parked at Ben Gurion before 28 Feb. Neither is reported now. https://www.nbcnews.com/world/iran/us-iran-talks-postponed-vance-cancels-trip-israel-strikes-lebanon-rcna350830 - [2026-02-28 to 2026-04-09] Past closure took effect at the moment of the first strike. Any new closure within 17 days would need a new war-start event. The Feb–Apr episode needed a stated breakdown of talks first, and the 2026 war's major pause since April 8 has held through the summer's flare-ups. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2026_Iranian_strikes_on_Israel BOTTOM LINE: Status quo is the open FIR, with a deliberate policy of pauses over closure, no Israeli closure order in force, and foreign carriers (BA, SAS, TAP, Brussels) returning 24–26 Oct. A YES needs a fresh strike on Iran or a major barrage within about 17 days, and Israeli officials have repeatedly declined to close the FIR even under missile fire since June. NOT FOUND: Any news from 7–14 Oct on strikes, or any official Israeli CAA/IAA NOTAM text for October. Any reported plan for a closure in the window. A fetched page (Masa Israel returned 403) for the "normal operations" claim. The reason the Sept 30 sibling resolved Yes.