Scan: Will there be a year with zero wild polio cases before 2030?

date	predicted	market price	confidence
2026-08-19	6%	10%	64%
2026-08-10	10%	10%	50%
2026-08-03	7%	10%	50%

1. Planner Opus 5

Tools chosen: kalshi_direct claude_news gdelt_news wikipedia kalshi_related polymarket_related code_execution

Sub-questions (Fermi decomposition)

How many wild poliovirus type 1 (WPV1) cases were reported globally in 2024 and how many so far in 2025, by country (Pakistan, Afghanistan)?
What is GPEI's current official target date for interrupting wild poliovirus transmission, and how many times has that target been pushed back historically?
What does environmental surveillance (sewage sampling) in Pakistan/Afghanistan show about the breadth of WPV1 circulation in 2025 — is positivity rising or falling?
What operational obstacles (Taliban house-to-house campaign bans, vaccinator killings, funding cuts from USAID/US withdrawal from WHO) are affecting 2025-2026 campaigns?
Given that a 'zero year' requires zero cases across a full calendar year, and reporting lags, what is the earliest realistic first zero-case calendar year (2027? 2028? 2029?) and what annual decay rate would be needed?
What is the current Kalshi price on this market and is there any correlated market (Polymarket or other Kalshi health markets) priced differently?

Planner reasoning

This is a Kalshi question about wild poliovirus type 1 (WPV1) reaching zero reported cases in any calendar year 2024-2029; endemic transmission persists only in Pakistan and Afghanistan. The key empirical inputs are the annual WPV1 case counts for 2024 and 2025 (both clearly nonzero), the trend and environmental-surveillance positivity, and GPEI's stated interruption-of-transmission target dates. I anchor on the Kalshi price, then gather GPEI/WHO case data and news on eradication timelines, plus a base-rate/decay calculation.

2. Research

tool	status	time	items	summary
kalshi_direct	OK	0.2s	1	## This Market's Kalshi Data Before 2030 (KXPOLIOELIM-30) - Current price (probability): 4.00% - 7-day price change: -5.50% - 30-day price change: -6.30% - Average daily volume: 178 contracts - Price range: 3.00% - 12.70% - Data points: 89 days
claude_news	OK	31.0s	13	Based on research, here are the key findings: Case counts by year: - 2023: Afghanistan and Pakistan each reported six cases for all of 2023 — global total ~12 cases (https://www.cidrap.umn.edu/polio/afghanistan-pakistan-report-more-wild-poliovirus-cases) - 2024: Final total was 99 cas
gdelt_news	OK	87.9s	10	GDELT: 10 articles across 3 queries (lookback=120d). 'wild poliovirus Pakistan cases 2025': error HTTPSConnectionPool(host='api.gdeltproject.org', port=443): Read timed out. (read timeout=30) \| 'polio eradication Afghanistan vaccination campaign': 10 hits \| 'GPEI polio eradication target date delaye
wikipedia	OK	3.6s	3	Fetched 3 Wikipedia entries (0 missing pages).
kalshi_related	OK	3.5s	2	2 related markets / summaries. series KXPOLIOELIM: 0 markets (skipped 1 no-signal) \| keyword 'polio': ok \| keyword 'eradication': no matches \| keyword 'WHO health': ok
polymarket_related	OK	3.5s	0	Scanned 100 active Polymarket markets, kept 0 matches. keyword 'polio': 0 markets \| keyword 'eradication': 0 markets \| keyword 'disease': 0 markets
code_execution	OK	76.5s	0	## Modeling P(zero WPV1 year, 2025–2029) Historical anchor data & overdispersion diagnosis - WPV1 cases 2019–2024: 176, 140, 6, 30, 12, ~99 → mean ≈ 77, variance ≈ 5,146, CV ≈ 0.93 (highly overdispersed, not Poisson-like). - Method-of-moments negative-binomial fit to this series gives dispersio

3. Evidence Brief Sonnet 5, 7978 chars

# Current state As of mid-2026, wild poliovirus type 1 (WPV1) continues to circulate in Afghanistan and Pakistan; 2025 closed with ~40 cases (9 Afghanistan, 31 Pakistan) and 2026 already has confirmed new cases (Afghanistan reported 6 cases by June 2026, additional case in Uruzgan province Aug 2026), meaning 2025 and 2026 are both disqualified as "zero" years. Resolution requires any full calendar year 2024-2029 with zero reported WPV1 cases; only 2027-2029 remain mathematically possible. # Timeline of key events - 2023 — Afghanistan and Pakistan each report 6 cases; global total ~12 (confirmed, CIDRAP). - 2023-2024 — GPEI's original 2022-2026 plan target of ending transmission by 2023 missed (confirmed, CDC MMWR). - 2024-08 — WHO 39th IHR Emergency Committee: environmental positivity rises (Pakistan 186 positive samples vs 126 in 2023; Afghanistan 44 vs 62) (confirmed, WHO). - 2024 (full year) — 99 global WPV1 cases (74 Pakistan, ~25 Afghanistan) — highest in years (confirmed, WHO/outbreaknews). - 2024-09/10 — Taliban abruptly reimpose house-to-house vaccination restrictions nationwide, reversing 2021-era easing (confirmed, CDC MMWR, WHO 43rd IHR). - Early 2025 — GPEI narrows target to "interrupt transmission by end of 2025" (reported, polioeradication.org) — later missed. - 2025 (through Oct 22) — 38 cases reported globally, down from 62 in same period 2024 (confirmed, Health Policy Watch). - 2025 (full year) — 40 cases (9 Afghanistan, 31 Pakistan), down from 99 in 2024 — declining trend but nonzero (confirmed, WHO 44th IHR). - 2025-11 — WHO 43rd IHR statement revises target: interrupt/certify WPV1 eradication by 2027, cVDPV2 elimination by 2029 (confirmed). - 2026-03 — WHO 44th IHR statement further revises: interrupt endemic WPV1 transmission "in 2026," stop cVDPV2 by 2028 (confirmed but internally inconsistent with Nov 2025 statement — target language is unstable/shifting). - 2026-06 — Afghanistan records 2 new cases, 2026 total reaches 6 (confirmed, Khaama). - 2026-07/08 — Continued case detection and vaccination campaigns in Afghanistan (Uruzgan) and Pakistan (Islamabad/Rawalpindi); attacks on health workers reported complicating campaigns (reported, various). # Event Will there be at least one calendar year between 2024-2029 with zero globally reported wild poliovirus type 1 (WPV1) cases? # Outcomes to forecast - Yes - No # Kalshi market anchor **YES currently priced at 4.00%** (KXPOLIOELIM-30). Trend: -5.50% over 7 days, -6.30% over 30 days — market has been drifting down. 30-day/89-day range: 3.00%-12.70%. Average daily volume ~178 contracts (moderate liquidity). Market has consistently priced this as a long-shot and is trending further downward. # Sub-question answers 1. **2024/2025 case counts by country** — 2024: 99 global (74 Pakistan, ~25 Afghanistan). 2025: 40 global (31 Pakistan, 9 Afghanistan) — a ~60% YoY decline (WHO IHR statements). 2. **GPEI target date, revision history** — Original 2022-2026 plan targeted 2023; missed. Revised to "end of 2025" (early 2025); missed. Revised to 2027 for WPV1 interruption/certification (Nov 2025 WHO statement). Then revised again to "2026" in March 2026 statement — target has now shifted at least 3-4 times and statements are internally inconsistent, indicating no stable near-term target (multiple WHO IHR statements). 3. **Environmental surveillance trend** — 2024 saw environmental positivity spike in Pakistan (186 vs 126 samples) though Afghanistan declined slightly (44 vs 62); virus detected outside core areas and in low-transmission season, suggesting silent/broad circulation (WHO 39th IHR, Health Policy Watch). No 2025/2026 environmental data provided. 4. **Operational obstacles** — Taliban banned house-to-house campaigns nationwide since Oct 2024 (still in effect per Nov 2025 WHO statement), limiting full child coverage; attacks/killings of vaccinators reported in Pakistan (2026); funding gaps flagged by WHO despite a $500M Saudi pledge; no explicit USAID/WHO withdrawal detail found in research. 5. **Earliest realistic zero-case year** — 2024, 2025, 2026 are all disqualified (confirmed nonzero cases through Aug 2026). Only 2027-2029 remain possible. Given 40 cases in 2025 and already 6+ cases in Afghanistan alone by mid-2026, a ~2028-2029 zero year would require continued ~25-40%/yr decline with no rebound — plausible only under optimistic scenarios. 6. **Kalshi price / correlated markets** — KXPOLIOELIM-30 YES = 4.00%, declining. No matching Polymarket market found (0 matches for polio/eradication/disease). No other correlated Kalshin health market directly relevant. # Key facts (high-confidence, factual) 1. [WHO IHR] 2024: 99 WPV1 cases globally; 2025: 40 cases — declining but nonzero both years. 2. [Khaama/GDELT] 2026 already has confirmed new WPV1 cases (Afghanistan, incl. Aug 2026 Uruzgan case) — 2026 is disqualified. 3. [WHO IHR, CDC MMWR] Taliban house-to-house campaign ban since Oct 2024 remains a major access barrier. 4. [WHO statements] GPEI eradication target has slipped from 2023→2025→2027→2026 across successive statements, showing chronic over-optimism/inconsistency. 5. [code_execution model] Historical case counts are highly overdispersed (CV≈0.93), making simple trend extrapolation unreliable; modeled P(≥1 zero year 2025-2029) ≈10-20% central estimate, but 2025/2026 already ruled out, so remaining probability mass concentrates on 2027-2029 only. # Cross-market signals - Kalshi related: Only this market itself found under "polio" keyword; no arbitrage counterpart in KXPOLIOELIM series. - Polymarket: No matching markets (0/100 scanned matched polio/eradication/disease keywords). - Sportsbook implied: N/A (not applicable to this event type). # Analyst opinions and speculation - Claude_news synthesis: declining 2025 trend is real but case counts remain far above zero; repeated target slippage suggests achieving a zero year before 2030 is "uncertain but not implausible." - Code-execution model: overdispersion (lumpy transmission chains) matters more than mean decline rate; central estimate 10-20% for any zero year 2025-2029, but this predates confirmation that 2025 and 2026 both had nonzero cases, so true remaining probability (for 2027-2029) is lower than the model's blended estimate. # Directional lean per outcome - **Yes**: Supported by clear declining trend 2024→2025 (99→40) and narrowing geographic reservoirs; opposed by disqualification of 2024-2026, persistent Taliban access bans, vaccinator attacks, funding gaps, environmental circulation outside core areas, and 30+ years of chronic target slippage — only 3 years (2027-2029) remain viable and each would need a near-total elimination, historically unprecedented at this stage. - **No**: Supported by consistent nonzero cases every year on record, structural access/security barriers with no resolution timeline, and market pricing (4%, trending down); opposing evidence is limited to the recent case-count decline, which is encouraging but not close to zero. # Gaps / unknowns - No 2026 full-year case total yet (year in progress; already nonzero, so moot for 2026 but full magnitude unclear for trend assessment). - No updated 2025/2026 environmental surveillance positivity data. - No detail on USAID/WHO funding withdrawal impacts as asked in sub-question 4. - Reporting lag/certification standards (e.g., how "zero cases" would be verified/certified) not addressed in rules. # Calibration anchors - Kalshi current YES price: **4.00%** (declining, primary anchor). - Model-based estimate (pre-adjustment for confirmed 2025/2026 nonzero years): 10-20%, but should be revised down given 2025 and 2026 are now confirmed disqualified, leaving only 2027-2029 — consistent with market's low and falling price. - Precedent: GPEI has never achieved a global zero WPV1 year since eradication efforts began in 1988 (endemic transmission has persisted continuously), underscoring how rare this outcome would be historically.

4. Forecasters Opus 5 + GPT-5.6 Sol, in parallel

claude-opus-5

79% conf

Yes	4%
No	96%

2024 (99 cases), 2025 (40 cases) and 2026 (already 6+ Afghan cases by mid-year) are all confirmed nonzero, leaving only 2027-2029 as viable zero years. Achieving a full zero calendar year within three years would require near-total interruption despite the Taliban's nationwide house-to-house campaign ban since Oct 2024, vaccinator attacks in Pakistan, funding gaps, and environmental positivity indicating silent circulation. GPEI targets have slipped repeatedly (2023 -> 2025 -> 2027 -> 2026), and no zero WPV1 year has ever occurred since 1988. The encouraging 99->40 decline supports some chance, but even optimistic scenarios likely produce a handful of cases through 2027-2028 with certification lag. Kalshi prices YES at 4% and trending down; I sit essentially on that anchor.

gpt-5.6-sol

72% conf

Yes	4%
No	96%

The decline from 99 cases in 2024 to 40 in 2025 shows progress, but confirmed 2026 cases mean only 2027-2029 can produce a qualifying zero-case year. Repeatedly missed GPEI targets, broad environmental detection, restrictions on house-to-house vaccination, attacks on vaccinators, and funding gaps all point toward continued transmission. The pre-adjustment model's 10-20% estimate covered additional years that are now disqualified and therefore supports a substantially lower remaining probability. With no strong evidence that the 4.00% Kalshi YES price misses a major development, I retain that consensus anchor.

5. Devil's Advocate Sonnet 5

Both forecasts anchor almost exactly on the Kalshi 4% price without independently stress-testing whether the market itself might be underpricing tail scenarios (e.g., a sudden vaccination-access breakthrough in Afghanistan, a ceasefire/policy reversal on house-to-house bans, or a surprise Pakistan-only near-elimination) — the brief notes only ~178 daily volume, moderate liquidity, so the anchor may not reflect deep informed trading.

Neither forecast explicitly addresses the "certification/verification" ambiguity flagged in Gaps/Unknowns — if resolution requires only *reported* cases rather than certified interruption, a lucky reporting-lag year (e.g., cases occurring but not confirmed/reported within the calendar year due to lab backlog) could produce a technical "zero" year that doesn't reflect true epidemiological eradication; this could push probability slightly higher than pure epidemiological modeling suggests.

Both treat the 2027-2029 window fairly uniformly, but neither disaggregates by country: Pakistan (31 cases, larger population, ongoing security issues) vs Afghanistan (9 cases, smaller reservoir but the Taliban ban is a hard access constraint) — a scenario where Pakistan alone drives near-elimination while Afghanistan's ban persists indefinitely deserves more explicit reasoning than a single blended "near-total interruption" phrase.

The overdispersion point from the code-execution model (CV≈0.93, "lumpy transmission chains") is cited in the brief but not really incorporated by either forecaster — high variance actually cuts both ways: it slightly raises the chance of a freak low year but neither forecast discusses this asymmetry, they only use it to justify caution.

Both forecasts round to essentially identical probabilities (4.5% and 4.0%) with high stated confidence (0.79, 0.72), showing herd convergence on the anchor rather than independent triangulation — given three years of remaining uncertainty (2027-2029) and chronic target slippage, a wider divergence or explicit sensitivity range (e.g., 3%-8%) would better reflect genuine epistemic uncertainty rather than both converging to within 0.5pp of the current market price.

Neither forecast discusses the funding-gap/Saudi $500M pledge trajectory or potential new donor commitments through 2029 as a lever that could accelerate elimination — this is flagged as an operational obstacle in the brief but omitted from both rationales, missing a potential upside scenario for "Yes."

6. Aggregator Opus 5

5% (76% confidence)

Yes: 5% No: 95%

2024 (99 cases), 2025 (40) and 2026 (6+ Afghan cases by mid-year) are confirmed nonzero, so only 2027-2029 remain viable, each requiring a complete zero-reporting calendar year. Structural barriers (Taliban house-to-house ban since Oct 2024, vaccinator attacks in Pakistan, funding gaps, environmental positivity indicating silent circulation) plus 30+ years of chronic GPEI target slippage argue strongly for No, and the market at 4% is trending down. I nudge marginally above the anchor to reflect the critique's valid points: overdispersion means a freak low year is not negligible, the 99->40 decline is genuine, resolution on *reported* cases (with lab/reporting lag) is slightly easier than certified interruption, and thin liquidity (~178 contracts/day) means the price is not deeply informed. Those adjustments are small in magnitude, so I land at 5% Yes.

Pipeline Timing

Total pipeline time: 175.0s

Per-tool research timings shown in the Research section above.