Use the FTS current reading and historical Lebanon/comparable appeal funding trajectories to build a distribution of September coverage; the threshold sub-questions (>=20%, >=35%, >=50%) plus the requirement-revision risk are blended via weighted average into a central percentage estimate with appropriately wide uncertainty bands.
## Cross-Market Signals ### Polymarket - "Will the Fed decrease interest rates by 25 bps after the September 2026 meeting?" → Yes: 0.01, Volume: $7.9M - "Will there be no change in Fed interest rates after the September 2026 meeting?" → Yes: 0.67, Volume: $6.9M - "Will the Fed increase interest rates by 25 bps after the September 2026 meeting?" → Yes: 0.33, Volume: $6.5M - "Will the Fed increase interest rates by 50+ bps after the September 2026 meeting?" → Yes: 0.00, Volume: $4.6M - "Will the Fed decrease interest rates by 50+ bps after the September 2026 meeting?" → Yes: 0.01, Volume: $4.0M - "Will Shakhtar Donetsk win the 2026-27 UEFA Champions League Championship?" → Yes: 0.00, Volume: $4.4M - "US announces end of Iranian blockade by August 15, 2026?" → Yes: 0.04, Volume: $2.6M - "Clarity Act (H.R.3633) signed into law in 2026?" → Yes: 0.20, Volume: $7.0M - "Fed rate hike in 2026?" → Yes: 0.55, Volume: $7.3M - "Will Elon Musk post 120-139 tweets from August 7 to August 14, 2026?" → Yes: 0.00, Volume: $286.2K
1. [sq1 | web_search | STRONG cred 88 | UP | DATED] OCHA Flash Update citing FTS reported the 2026 Lebanon Flash Appeal at 42% funded ($270M of $639.9M) as of July 9, 2026. 2. [sq1 | web_search | STRONG cred 88 | UP | DATED] Funding progression in June 2026: 32.2% (June 11), 34.2% (June 18), 37% (June 29), i.e. roughly +1 to +2.5 percentage points per week. 3. [sq2 | web_search | STRONG cred 85 | UP | DATED] Appeal already exceeded 35% coverage by late June 2026 and reached 42% by July 9, well before the September 2 measurement date. 4. [sq3 | web_search | MODERATE cred 55 | NEUTRAL | DATED] Extrapolating the observed ~1.5 pp/week June–July pace from 42% on July 9 would reach roughly 50-55% by early September, though contribution pace typically decelerates after appeal-period end. 5. [sq4 | web_search | STRONG cred 90 | NEUTRAL | DATED] The appeal was already revised upward once, from $308.3M (March) to $639.9M (June 5) covering March–August 2026, halving the reported coverage percentage at the time. 6. [sq4 | web_search | MODERATE cred 70 | UP | RECENT] OCHA's Lebanon page accessed around August 2026 still lists $639.9 million as the current total requirement. 7. [sq4 | web_search | MODERATE cred 80 | NEUTRAL | DATED] The revised Flash Appeal covers March–August 2026, meaning the plan period ends just before the September 2 resolution date, creating a decision point for extension or a new appeal. 8. [sq1 | article_search | MODERATE cred 85 | NEUTRAL | RECENT] Ongoing Israeli operations, incursions and strikes in southern Lebanon continued through mid-2026 despite repeated ceasefires, sustaining displacement and humanitarian needs. 9. [sq4 | article_search | MODERATE cred 85 | NEUTRAL | RECENT] Israel, Lebanon and the US signed a framework agreement on June 26, 2026 described as a first step toward peace, with over 700,000 returns reported by July. 10. [sq1 | article_search | WEAK cred 60 | DOWN | DATED] US funding cuts and USAID dismantlement in 2026 have reportedly hampered humanitarian responses globally, constraining donor pools. 11. [sq2 | code_execution | WEAK cred 25 | NEUTRAL | VERY_RECENT] A Monte Carlo simulation with assumed parameters produced median coverage of 29% and P(>=35%)=0.35, P(>=50%)=0.11, notably below the observed July 42% reading. 12. [sq1 | web_search | WEAK cred 50 | NEUTRAL | VERY_RECENT] No direct scrape of the FTS plan 1568 summary page was obtained; all coverage figures are secondhand via OCHA situation reports. ## Cross-Market Signals ### Polymarket - "Will the Fed decrease interest rates by 25 bps after the September 2026 meeting?" → Yes: 0.01, Volume: $7.9M - "Will there be no change in Fed interest rates after the September 2026 meeting?" → Yes: 0.67, Volume: $6.9M - "Will the Fed increase interest rates by 25 bps after the September 2026 meeting?" → Yes: 0.33, Volume: $6.5M - "Will the Fed increase interest rates by 50+ bps after the September 2026 meeting?" → Yes: 0.00, Volume: $4.6M - "Will the Fed decrease interest rates by 50+ bps after the September 2026 meeting?" → Yes: 0.01, Volume: $4.0M - "Will Shakhtar Donetsk win the 2026-27 UEFA Champions League Championship?" → Yes: 0.00, Volume: $4.4M - "US announces end of Iranian blockade by August 15, 2026?" → Yes: 0.04, Volume: $2.6M - "Clarity Act (H.R.3633) signed into law in 2026?" → Yes: 0.20, Volume: $7.0M - "Fed rate hike in 2026?" → Yes: 0.55, Volume: $7.3M - "Will Elon Musk post 120-139 tweets from August 7 to August 14, 2026?" → Yes: 0.00, Volume: $286.2K Information gaps: - No direct FTS plan-1568 reading for August 2026 - No base rate for post-period-end funding accrual on flash appeals - Unknown whether a September–December 2026 appeal/revision is planned - No data on specific large pledges (Gulf, EU, ECHO) in July–August Key uncertainties: - Whether requirements are revised upward again before Sept 2 - Pace of contribution recording after the August plan end - Whether FTS retroactive reporting boosts totals significantly - Effect of ceasefire/framework deal on donor urgency
You are an elite superforecaster. Produce a probability distribution over the answer to this Metaculus numeric question.
## Question
What percentage of the total requirements of the 2026 Lebanon Flash Appeal will be funded on September 2, 2026?
## Description / Resolution Criteria
## Description
According to [Reliefweb](https://reliefweb.int/report/lebanon/lebanon-flash-update-45-escalation-hostilities-lebanon-20-july-2026): "Humanitarian and protection needs persist in Lebanon, as people experiencing prolonged displacement and those returning to conflict-affected areas continue to require urgent support. While the latest ceasefire announcement led to significant returns of over 700,000 people, ongoing security incidents in southern Lebanon continue to impede safe and sustainable returns, exacerbate protection risks, and disrupt service delivery and infrastructure rehabilitation. Reports of airstrikes, artillery shelling, demolitions and sonic grenades continued daily across South and Nabatieh governorates, including in Bint Jbeil, Marjayoun and Nabatieh districts in Nabatieh Governorate, and Tyre District in South Governorate."
`{"format": "bot_tournament_question", "info": {"hash_id": "ed3250409cce2a6e", "sheet_id": "162"}}`
## Resolution Criteria
This question resolves as the percentage of the "total requirements of plan" funded for the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) [Lebanon Flash Appeal 2026](https://fts.unocha.org/plans/1568/summary), as displayed when the page is checked by Metaculus on or after September 2, 2026.
## Range
The answer must be a number in [44.95, 64.05] (units: %).
## Sub-question decomposition (planner)
- (w=0.30) Will the FTS-reported funding coverage of the Lebanon Flash Appeal 2026 be at least 20% of total requirements when checked on/after September 2, 2026? — Establishes the low-end floor; most UN flash appeals in protracted crises reach at least 20% by early September (8+ mont
- (w=0.30) Will the FTS-reported funding coverage of the Lebanon Flash Appeal 2026 be at least 35% by September 2, 2026? — 35% is close to the modal outcome for Lebanon appeals (2024 Flash Appeal ended ~40-50%; 2025 appeals underfunded amid gl
- (w=0.25) Will the FTS-reported funding coverage of the Lebanon Flash Appeal 2026 be at least 50% by September 2, 2026? — Tests the upper tail — requires strong donor mobilization, which is less likely given US/European humanitarian budget cu
- (w=0.15) Will the appeal's total requirements be revised upward (or a new/expanded appeal launched) between now and September 2, 2026, mechanically depressing the funded percentage? — Renewed escalation typically triggers requirement revisions that raise the denominator and lower reported coverage even
## Synthesized evidence
1. [sq1 | web_search | STRONG cred 88 | UP | DATED] OCHA Flash Update citing FTS reported the 2026 Lebanon Flash Appeal at 42% funded ($270M of $639.9M) as of July 9, 2026.
2. [sq1 | web_search | STRONG cred 88 | UP | DATED] Funding progression in June 2026: 32.2% (June 11), 34.2% (June 18), 37% (June 29), i.e. roughly +1 to +2.5 percentage points per week.
3. [sq2 | web_search | STRONG cred 85 | UP | DATED] Appeal already exceeded 35% coverage by late June 2026 and reached 42% by July 9, well before the September 2 measurement date.
4. [sq3 | web_search | MODERATE cred 55 | NEUTRAL | DATED] Extrapolating the observed ~1.5 pp/week June–July pace from 42% on July 9 would reach roughly 50-55% by early September, though contribution pace typically decelerates after appeal-period end.
5. [sq4 | web_search | STRONG cred 90 | NEUTRAL | DATED] The appeal was already revised upward once, from $308.3M (March) to $639.9M (June 5) covering March–August 2026, halving the reported coverage percentage at the time.
6. [sq4 | web_search | MODERATE cred 70 | UP | RECENT] OCHA's Lebanon page accessed around August 2026 still lists $639.9 million as the current total requirement.
7. [sq4 | web_search | MODERATE cred 80 | NEUTRAL | DATED] The revised Flash Appeal covers March–August 2026, meaning the plan period ends just before the September 2 resolution date, creating a decision point for extension or a new appeal.
8. [sq1 | article_search | MODERATE cred 85 | NEUTRAL | RECENT] Ongoing Israeli operations, incursions and strikes in southern Lebanon continued through mid-2026 despite repeated ceasefires, sustaining displacement and humanitarian needs.
9. [sq4 | article_search | MODERATE cred 85 | NEUTRAL | RECENT] Israel, Lebanon and the US signed a framework agreement on June 26, 2026 described as a first step toward peace, with over 700,000 returns reported by July.
10. [sq1 | article_search | WEAK cred 60 | DOWN | DATED] US funding cuts and USAID dismantlement in 2026 have reportedly hampered humanitarian responses globally, constraining donor pools.
11. [sq2 | code_execution | WEAK cred 25 | NEUTRAL | VERY_RECENT] A Monte Carlo simulation with assumed parameters produced median coverage of 29% and P(>=35%)=0.35, P(>=50%)=0.11, notably below the observed July 42% reading.
12. [sq1 | web_search | WEAK cred 50 | NEUTRAL | VERY_RECENT] No direct scrape of the FTS plan 1568 summary page was obtained; all coverage figures are secondhand via OCHA situation reports.
## Cross-Market Signals
### Polymarket
- "Will the Fed decrease interest rates by 25 bps after the September 2026 meeting?" → Yes: 0.01, Volume: $7.9M
- "Will there be no change in Fed interest rates after the September 2026 meeting?" → Yes: 0.67, Volume: $6.9M
- "Will the Fed increase interest rates by 25 bps after the September 2026 meeting?" → Yes: 0.33, Volume: $6.5M
- "Will the Fed increase interest rates by 50+ bps after the September 2026 meeting?" → Yes: 0.00, Volume: $4.6M
- "Will the Fed decrease interest rates by 50+ bps after the September 2026 meeting?" → Yes: 0.01, Volume: $4.0M
- "Will Shakhtar Donetsk win the 2026-27 UEFA Champions League Championship?" → Yes: 0.00, Volume: $4.4M
- "US announces end of Iranian blockade by August 15, 2026?" → Yes: 0.04, Volume: $2.6M
- "Clarity Act (H.R.3633) signed into law in 2026?" → Yes: 0.20, Volume: $7.0M
- "Fed rate hike in 2026?" → Yes: 0.55, Volume: $7.3M
- "Will Elon Musk post 120-139 tweets from August 7 to August 14, 2026?" → Yes: 0.00, Volume: $286.2K
Information gaps:
- No direct FTS plan-1568 reading for August 2026
- No base rate for post-period-end funding accrual on flash appeals
- Unknown whether a September–December 2026 appeal/revision is planned
- No data on specific large pledges (Gulf, EU, ECHO) in July–August
Key uncertainties:
- Whether requirements are revised upward again before Sept 2
- Pace of contribution recording after the August plan end
- Whether FTS retroactive reporting boosts totals significantly
- Effect of ceasefire/framework deal on donor urgency
## Required pre-forecast walkthrough
Before giving percentiles, address these explicitly in your rationale:
(a) The time left until the question resolves.
(b) The outcome if NOTHING changes from today (the status quo value).
(c) The outcome if the CURRENT TREND continues.
(d) The expectations of experts / markets / base rates.
(e) A plausible scenario that produces a LOW outcome (near p10).
(f) A plausible scenario that produces a HIGH outcome (near p90).
## Calibration guidance
- **Be humble about tails.** Good forecasters set WIDE 90/10 intervals to account for unknown unknowns. Narrow tails get punished by the log score far more than slightly-biased medians.
- **Status quo anchoring.** The p50 should be close to the status quo value unless you have strong evidence of a trend.
- Don't pile mass at one value — if you're tempted, widen the spread by 20-50%.
- **Anchor on markets/experts.** If liquid market prices, analyst forecasts, or community percentiles appear in the evidence, center your distribution on them and widen — don't override a liquid market without specific evidence it lacks.
- **Relative-return / spread questions ("how much will X's return exceed Y's").** A near-zero median is usually right, but size the TAILS to the more VOLATILE leg, not to a generic 2-3pp spread. Two broad equity indices (e.g. Nasdaq-100 vs S&P 500) do stay within roughly ±2-3pp over a two-week window. But when one leg is a commodity (crude oil, gold) or a single high-beta stock (e.g. Nvidia), the two-week realized spread regularly reaches ±10pp or more — crude-vs-equity spreads have hit ±18pp. In those cases set p10/p90 to at least ±10pp (±15pp or wider for oil) while keeping the median near the status-quo spread; the 2-3pp intuition applies only to index-vs-index.
- **Heavy-tailed one-off magnitudes (opening-weekend box office, product-launch or debut numbers).** Pre-event tracking for these routinely misses by ±40% or more, and results land both far above and far below the consensus. Do NOT treat the displayed [min, max] range as the plausible range or clamp p10/p90 to its edges: the outcome can fall outside the range in either direction (recent opening weekends resolved ~7% above a displayed ceiling in one case and roughly half the displayed floor in another). Set p10/p90 wide enough that a 2x-or-0.5x surprise versus your central estimate still lands inside the interval, and when concrete current tracking disagrees with historical/franchise base rates, weight the tracking.
## Output
Return ONLY valid JSON, no markdown fences:
{
"rationale": "<address (a) through (f) above, then state your distribution — 6-10 sentences total>",
"p10": <number>,
"p25": <number>,
"p50": <number>,
"p75": <number>,
"p90": <number>
}
Percentiles MUST be in non-decreasing order (p10 <= p25 <= p50 <= p75 <= p90).
{
"forecast": {
"evidence_brief": "1. [sq1 | web_search | STRONG cred 88 | UP | DATED] OCHA Flash Update citing FTS reported the 2026 Lebanon Flash Appeal at 42% funded ($270M of $639.9M) as of July 9, 2026.\n2. [sq1 | web_search | STRONG cred 88 | UP | DATED] Funding progression in June 2026: 32.2% (June 11), 34.2% (June 18), 37% (June 29), i.e. roughly +1 to +2.5 percentage points per week.\n3. [sq2 | web_search | STRONG cred 85 | UP | DATED] Appeal already exceeded 35% coverage by late June 2026 and reached 42% by July 9, well before the September 2 measurement date.\n4. [sq3 | web_search | MODERATE cred 55 | NEUTRAL | DATED] Extrapolating the observed ~1.5 pp/week June\u2013July pace from 42% on July 9 would reach roughly 50-55% by early September, though contribution pace typically decelerates after appeal-period end.\n5. [sq4 | web_search | STRONG cred 90 | NEUTRAL | DATED] The appeal was already revised upward once, from $308.3M (March) to $639.9M (June 5) covering March\u2013August 2026, halving the reported coverage percentage at the time.\n6. [sq4 | web_search | MODERATE cred 70 | UP | RECENT] OCHA\u0027s Lebanon page accessed around August 2026 still lists $639.9 million as the current total requirement.\n7. [sq4 | web_search | MODERATE cred 80 | NEUTRAL | DATED] The revised Flash Appeal covers March\u2013August 2026, meaning the plan period ends just before the September 2 resolution date, creating a decision point for extension or a new appeal.\n8. [sq1 | article_search | MODERATE cred 85 | NEUTRAL | RECENT] Ongoing Israeli operations, incursions and strikes in southern Lebanon continued through mid-2026 despite repeated ceasefires, sustaining displacement and humanitarian needs.\n9. [sq4 | article_search | MODERATE cred 85 | NEUTRAL | RECENT] Israel, Lebanon and the US signed a framework agreement on June 26, 2026 described as a first step toward peace, with over 700,000 returns reported by July.\n10. [sq1 | article_search | WEAK cred 60 | DOWN | DATED] US funding cuts and USAID dismantlement in 2026 have reportedly hampered humanitarian responses globally, constraining donor pools.\n11. [sq2 | code_execution | WEAK cred 25 | NEUTRAL | VERY_RECENT] A Monte Carlo simulation with assumed parameters produced median coverage of 29% and P(\u003e=35%)=0.35, P(\u003e=50%)=0.11, notably below the observed July 42% reading.\n12. [sq1 | web_search | WEAK cred 50 | NEUTRAL | VERY_RECENT] No direct scrape of the FTS plan 1568 summary page was obtained; all coverage figures are secondhand via OCHA situation reports.\n\n## Cross-Market Signals\n\n### Polymarket\n- \"Will the Fed decrease interest rates by 25 bps after the September 2026 meeting?\" \u2192 Yes: 0.01, Volume: $7.9M\n- \"Will there be no change in Fed interest rates after the September 2026 meeting?\" \u2192 Yes: 0.67, Volume: $6.9M\n- \"Will the Fed increase interest rates by 25 bps after the September 2026 meeting?\" \u2192 Yes: 0.33, Volume: $6.5M\n- \"Will the Fed increase interest rates by 50+ bps after the September 2026 meeting?\" \u2192 Yes: 0.00, Volume: $4.6M\n- \"Will the Fed decrease interest rates by 50+ bps after the September 2026 meeting?\" \u2192 Yes: 0.01, Volume: $4.0M\n- \"Will Shakhtar Donetsk win the 2026-27 UEFA Champions League Championship?\" \u2192 Yes: 0.00, Volume: $4.4M\n- \"US announces end of Iranian blockade by August 15, 2026?\" \u2192 Yes: 0.04, Volume: $2.6M\n- \"Clarity Act (H.R.3633) signed into law in 2026?\" \u2192 Yes: 0.20, Volume: $7.0M\n- \"Fed rate hike in 2026?\" \u2192 Yes: 0.55, Volume: $7.3M\n- \"Will Elon Musk post 120-139 tweets from August 7 to August 14, 2026?\" \u2192 Yes: 0.00, Volume: $286.2K\n\nInformation gaps:\n - No direct FTS plan-1568 reading for August 2026\n - No base rate for post-period-end funding accrual on flash appeals\n - Unknown whether a September\u2013December 2026 appeal/revision is planned\n - No data on specific large pledges (Gulf, EU, ECHO) in July\u2013August\n\nKey uncertainties:\n - Whether requirements are revised upward again before Sept 2\n - Pace of contribution recording after the August plan end\n - Whether FTS retroactive reporting boosts totals significantly\n - Effect of ceasefire/framework deal on donor urgency",
"forecast_prompt": "You are an elite superforecaster. Produce a probability distribution over the answer to this Metaculus numeric question.\n\n## Question\nWhat percentage of the total requirements of the 2026 Lebanon Flash Appeal will be funded on September 2, 2026?\n\n## Description / Resolution Criteria\n## Description\nAccording to [Reliefweb](https://reliefweb.int/report/lebanon/lebanon-flash-update-45-escalation-hostilities-lebanon-20-july-2026): \"Humanitarian and protection needs persist in Lebanon, as people experiencing prolonged displacement and those returning to conflict-affected areas continue to require urgent support. While the latest ceasefire announcement led to significant returns of over 700,000 people, ongoing security incidents in southern Lebanon continue to impede safe and sustainable returns, exacerbate protection risks, and disrupt service delivery and infrastructure rehabilitation. Reports of airstrikes, artillery shelling, demolitions and sonic grenades continued daily across South and Nabatieh governorates, including in Bint Jbeil, Marjayoun and Nabatieh districts in Nabatieh Governorate, and Tyre District in South Governorate.\"\n\n`{\"format\": \"bot_tournament_question\", \"info\": {\"hash_id\": \"ed3250409cce2a6e\", \"sheet_id\": \"162\"}}`\n\n## Resolution Criteria\nThis question resolves as the percentage of the \"total requirements of plan\" funded for the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) [Lebanon Flash Appeal 2026](https://fts.unocha.org/plans/1568/summary), as displayed when the page is checked by Metaculus on or after September 2, 2026.\n\n## Range\nThe answer must be a number in [44.95, 64.05] (units: %).\n\n## Sub-question decomposition (planner)\n- (w=0.30) Will the FTS-reported funding coverage of the Lebanon Flash Appeal 2026 be at least 20% of total requirements when checked on/after September 2, 2026? \u2014 Establishes the low-end floor; most UN flash appeals in protracted crises reach at least 20% by early September (8+ mont\n- (w=0.30) Will the FTS-reported funding coverage of the Lebanon Flash Appeal 2026 be at least 35% by September 2, 2026? \u2014 35% is close to the modal outcome for Lebanon appeals (2024 Flash Appeal ended ~40-50%; 2025 appeals underfunded amid gl\n- (w=0.25) Will the FTS-reported funding coverage of the Lebanon Flash Appeal 2026 be at least 50% by September 2, 2026? \u2014 Tests the upper tail \u2014 requires strong donor mobilization, which is less likely given US/European humanitarian budget cu\n- (w=0.15) Will the appeal\u0027s total requirements be revised upward (or a new/expanded appeal launched) between now and September 2, 2026, mechanically depressing the funded percentage? \u2014 Renewed escalation typically triggers requirement revisions that raise the denominator and lower reported coverage even \n\n## Synthesized evidence\n1. [sq1 | web_search | STRONG cred 88 | UP | DATED] OCHA Flash Update citing FTS reported the 2026 Lebanon Flash Appeal at 42% funded ($270M of $639.9M) as of July 9, 2026.\n2. [sq1 | web_search | STRONG cred 88 | UP | DATED] Funding progression in June 2026: 32.2% (June 11), 34.2% (June 18), 37% (June 29), i.e. roughly +1 to +2.5 percentage points per week.\n3. [sq2 | web_search | STRONG cred 85 | UP | DATED] Appeal already exceeded 35% coverage by late June 2026 and reached 42% by July 9, well before the September 2 measurement date.\n4. [sq3 | web_search | MODERATE cred 55 | NEUTRAL | DATED] Extrapolating the observed ~1.5 pp/week June\u2013July pace from 42% on July 9 would reach roughly 50-55% by early September, though contribution pace typically decelerates after appeal-period end.\n5. [sq4 | web_search | STRONG cred 90 | NEUTRAL | DATED] The appeal was already revised upward once, from $308.3M (March) to $639.9M (June 5) covering March\u2013August 2026, halving the reported coverage percentage at the time.\n6. [sq4 | web_search | MODERATE cred 70 | UP | RECENT] OCHA\u0027s Lebanon page accessed around August 2026 still lists $639.9 million as the current total requirement.\n7. [sq4 | web_search | MODERATE cred 80 | NEUTRAL | DATED] The revised Flash Appeal covers March\u2013August 2026, meaning the plan period ends just before the September 2 resolution date, creating a decision point for extension or a new appeal.\n8. [sq1 | article_search | MODERATE cred 85 | NEUTRAL | RECENT] Ongoing Israeli operations, incursions and strikes in southern Lebanon continued through mid-2026 despite repeated ceasefires, sustaining displacement and humanitarian needs.\n9. [sq4 | article_search | MODERATE cred 85 | NEUTRAL | RECENT] Israel, Lebanon and the US signed a framework agreement on June 26, 2026 described as a first step toward peace, with over 700,000 returns reported by July.\n10. [sq1 | article_search | WEAK cred 60 | DOWN | DATED] US funding cuts and USAID dismantlement in 2026 have reportedly hampered humanitarian responses globally, constraining donor pools.\n11. [sq2 | code_execution | WEAK cred 25 | NEUTRAL | VERY_RECENT] A Monte Carlo simulation with assumed parameters produced median coverage of 29% and P(\u003e=35%)=0.35, P(\u003e=50%)=0.11, notably below the observed July 42% reading.\n12. [sq1 | web_search | WEAK cred 50 | NEUTRAL | VERY_RECENT] No direct scrape of the FTS plan 1568 summary page was obtained; all coverage figures are secondhand via OCHA situation reports.\n\n## Cross-Market Signals\n\n### Polymarket\n- \"Will the Fed decrease interest rates by 25 bps after the September 2026 meeting?\" \u2192 Yes: 0.01, Volume: $7.9M\n- \"Will there be no change in Fed interest rates after the September 2026 meeting?\" \u2192 Yes: 0.67, Volume: $6.9M\n- \"Will the Fed increase interest rates by 25 bps after the September 2026 meeting?\" \u2192 Yes: 0.33, Volume: $6.5M\n- \"Will the Fed increase interest rates by 50+ bps after the September 2026 meeting?\" \u2192 Yes: 0.00, Volume: $4.6M\n- \"Will the Fed decrease interest rates by 50+ bps after the September 2026 meeting?\" \u2192 Yes: 0.01, Volume: $4.0M\n- \"Will Shakhtar Donetsk win the 2026-27 UEFA Champions League Championship?\" \u2192 Yes: 0.00, Volume: $4.4M\n- \"US announces end of Iranian blockade by August 15, 2026?\" \u2192 Yes: 0.04, Volume: $2.6M\n- \"Clarity Act (H.R.3633) signed into law in 2026?\" \u2192 Yes: 0.20, Volume: $7.0M\n- \"Fed rate hike in 2026?\" \u2192 Yes: 0.55, Volume: $7.3M\n- \"Will Elon Musk post 120-139 tweets from August 7 to August 14, 2026?\" \u2192 Yes: 0.00, Volume: $286.2K\n\nInformation gaps:\n - No direct FTS plan-1568 reading for August 2026\n - No base rate for post-period-end funding accrual on flash appeals\n - Unknown whether a September\u2013December 2026 appeal/revision is planned\n - No data on specific large pledges (Gulf, EU, ECHO) in July\u2013August\n\nKey uncertainties:\n - Whether requirements are revised upward again before Sept 2\n - Pace of contribution recording after the August plan end\n - Whether FTS retroactive reporting boosts totals significantly\n - Effect of ceasefire/framework deal on donor urgency\n\n## Required pre-forecast walkthrough\n\nBefore giving percentiles, address these explicitly in your rationale:\n (a) The time left until the question resolves.\n (b) The outcome if NOTHING changes from today (the status quo value).\n (c) The outcome if the CURRENT TREND continues.\n (d) The expectations of experts / markets / base rates.\n (e) A plausible scenario that produces a LOW outcome (near p10).\n (f) A plausible scenario that produces a HIGH outcome (near p90).\n\n## Calibration guidance\n\n- **Be humble about tails.** Good forecasters set WIDE 90/10 intervals to account for unknown unknowns. Narrow tails get punished by the log score far more than slightly-biased medians.\n- **Status quo anchoring.** The p50 should be close to the status quo value unless you have strong evidence of a trend.\n- Don\u0027t pile mass at one value \u2014 if you\u0027re tempted, widen the spread by 20-50%.\n- **Anchor on markets/experts.** If liquid market prices, analyst forecasts, or community percentiles appear in the evidence, center your distribution on them and widen \u2014 don\u0027t override a liquid market without specific evidence it lacks.\n- **Relative-return / spread questions (\"how much will X\u0027s return exceed Y\u0027s\").** A near-zero median is usually right, but size the TAILS to the more VOLATILE leg, not to a generic 2-3pp spread. Two broad equity indices (e.g. Nasdaq-100 vs S\u0026P 500) do stay within roughly \u00b12-3pp over a two-week window. But when one leg is a commodity (crude oil, gold) or a single high-beta stock (e.g. Nvidia), the two-week realized spread regularly reaches \u00b110pp or more \u2014 crude-vs-equity spreads have hit \u00b118pp. In those cases set p10/p90 to at least \u00b110pp (\u00b115pp or wider for oil) while keeping the median near the status-quo spread; the 2-3pp intuition applies only to index-vs-index.\n- **Heavy-tailed one-off magnitudes (opening-weekend box office, product-launch or debut numbers).** Pre-event tracking for these routinely misses by \u00b140% or more, and results land both far above and far below the consensus. Do NOT treat the displayed [min, max] range as the plausible range or clamp p10/p90 to its edges: the outcome can fall outside the range in either direction (recent opening weekends resolved ~7% above a displayed ceiling in one case and roughly half the displayed floor in another). Set p10/p90 wide enough that a 2x-or-0.5x surprise versus your central estimate still lands inside the interval, and when concrete current tracking disagrees with historical/franchise base rates, weight the tracking.\n\n## Output\n\nReturn ONLY valid JSON, no markdown fences:\n\n{\n \"rationale\": \"\u003caddress (a) through (f) above, then state your distribution \u2014 6-10 sentences total\u003e\",\n \"p10\": \u003cnumber\u003e,\n \"p25\": \u003cnumber\u003e,\n \"p50\": \u003cnumber\u003e,\n \"p75\": \u003cnumber\u003e,\n \"p90\": \u003cnumber\u003e\n}\n\nPercentiles MUST be in non-decreasing order (p10 \u003c= p25 \u003c= p50 \u003c= p75 \u003c= p90).\n",
"models": [
"opus",
"secondary"
],
"p50": 51.849999999999994,
"percentiles": {
"0.1": 46.5,
"0.25": 49.1,
"0.5": 51.849999999999994,
"0.75": 55.150000000000006,
"0.9": 59.15
},
"rationale": "(a) The question resolves on/after September 2, 2026, roughly 7-8 weeks after the last solid data point (42% funded, $270M of $639.9M, on July 9, 2026). (b) Status quo \u2014 if nothing more were recorded on FTS \u2014 the value would be ~42%, which is below the answer range floor of 44.95, implying the question designer expects further accrual and that the true answer lies above 45%. (c) Extrapolating the observed June\u2013July pace of ~1\u20132.5 pp/week (32.2% June 11 \u2192 42% July 9, about 1.7 pp/week) over ~7.7 weeks gives ~53\u201355%, though contribution recording typically decelerates in the summer and after the plan period ends August 31; a decelerated 1.0\u20131.5 pp/week path lands at 50\u201354%. (d) No liquid market exists; the weak Monte Carlo (median 29%) is clearly stale/miscalibrated versus the observed 42% July reading and is discounted; base rates for Lebanon appeals (2024 flash appeal ~40\u201350% final) plus retroactive FTS posting support a low-to-mid-50s outcome. (e) LOW scenario (~p10): the ceasefire/framework deal reduces donor urgency, US/USAID cuts bite, and only a trickle of contributions is recorded post-July, or requirements are revised upward again for a September\u2013December extension, holding coverage near 46\u201348%. (f) HIGH scenario (~p90): a burst of Gulf/EU/ECHO end-of-period disbursements and retroactive FTS reporting of pledges pushes coverage to 58\u201362%, especially as agencies push to close the appeal before a new plan launches. I center just above the linear-with-mild-deceleration extrapolation, near 52%, with wide tails to cover both a denominator revision and a late funding surge, keeping the whole mass inside the permitted range."
},
"plan": {
"combination_logic": "weighted_average",
"domain": "geopolitics",
"n_sub_qs": 4,
"n_tools": 4,
"reasoning_approach": "Use the FTS current reading and historical Lebanon/comparable appeal funding trajectories to build a distribution of September coverage; the threshold sub-questions (\u003e=20%, \u003e=35%, \u003e=50%) plus the requirement-revision risk are blended via weighted average into a central percentage estimate with appropriately wide uncertainty bands.",
"sub_questions": [
{
"id": "sq1",
"question": "Will the FTS-reported funding coverage of the Lebanon Flash Appeal 2026 be at least 20% of total requirements when checked on/after September 2, 2026?",
"rationale": "Establishes the low-end floor; most UN flash appeals in protracted crises reach at least 20% by early September (8+ months into the year), so this anchors the lower bound of the distribution.",
"weight": 0.3
},
{
"id": "sq2",
"question": "Will the FTS-reported funding coverage of the Lebanon Flash Appeal 2026 be at least 35% by September 2, 2026?",
"rationale": "35% is close to the modal outcome for Lebanon appeals (2024 Flash Appeal ended ~40-50%; 2025 appeals underfunded amid global aid cuts); this discriminates the central mass of the distribution.",
"weight": 0.3
},
{
"id": "sq3",
"question": "Will the FTS-reported funding coverage of the Lebanon Flash Appeal 2026 be at least 50% by September 2, 2026?",
"rationale": "Tests the upper tail \u2014 requires strong donor mobilization, which is less likely given US/European humanitarian budget cuts in 2025-2026.",
"weight": 0.25
},
{
"id": "sq4",
"question": "Will the appeal\u0027s total requirements be revised upward (or a new/expanded appeal launched) between now and September 2, 2026, mechanically depressing the funded percentage?",
"rationale": "Renewed escalation typically triggers requirement revisions that raise the denominator and lower reported coverage even as absolute funding rises; this is a key downside driver.",
"weight": 0.15
}
],
"tool_requests": [
{
"parameters": {
"brief": "Find the current status of the OCHA FTS Lebanon Flash Appeal 2026 (plan 1568): total requirements in USD, funding received to date, and percentage covered. Also find the same coverage figures and month-by-month trajectory for the Lebanon Flash Appeal 2024 and 2025 (or Lebanon Humanitarian Response Plan) for comparison, and any news on donor pledges, conferences, or aid budget cuts affecting Lebanon in 2026.",
"max_searches": 5,
"question_title": "What percentage of the total requirements of the 2026 Lebanon Flash Appeal will be funded on September 2, 2026?"
},
"target_sub_questions": [
"sq1",
"sq2",
"sq3",
"sq4"
],
"tool_name": "claude_news"
},
{
"parameters": {
"queries": [
"fts.unocha.org Lebanon Flash Appeal 2026 funding percentage covered",
"Lebanon humanitarian appeal 2026 requirements funded million OCHA",
"Lebanon flash appeal 2026 revised requirements donors pledge"
]
},
"target_sub_questions": [
"sq1",
"sq2",
"sq3",
"sq4"
],
"tool_name": "web_search"
},
{
"parameters": {
"lookback_days": 120,
"queries": [
"Lebanon Flash Appeal 2026 funding shortfall humanitarian",
"OCHA Lebanon humanitarian response underfunded 2026",
"Lebanon ceasefire escalation displacement humanitarian appeal donors"
]
},
"target_sub_questions": [
"sq2",
"sq4"
],
"tool_name": "article_search"
},
{
"parameters": {
"code": "import numpy as np\n# Historical coverage of Lebanon/comparable OCHA appeals at ~2/3 through year, and year-end\n# Lebanon Flash Appeal 2024 (Oct-Dec) ~ high; Lebanon 2025 appeal ~ low-mid; regional appeals 2025 ~ 20-35%\nhist_sept_coverage = np.array([0.20,0.25,0.28,0.30,0.33,0.35,0.40,0.45,0.18,0.22])\nprint(\u0027mean\u0027, hist_sept_coverage.mean(), \u0027median\u0027, np.median(hist_sept_coverage), \u0027sd\u0027, hist_sept_coverage.std())\n# Monte Carlo: beta-shaped distribution around mean with downside from requirement revisions\nnp.random.seed(0)\nbase = np.random.beta(3.0, 6.0, 200000) # mean ~0.33\nrevision = np.random.rand(200000) \u003c 0.35\nsim = np.where(revision, base*np.random.uniform(0.65,0.9,200000), base)\nsim = np.clip(sim,0,1)*100\nfor q in [5,10,25,50,75,90,95]:\n print(q, round(np.percentile(sim,q),1))\nprint(\u0027P(\u003e=20%)\u0027, (sim\u003e=20).mean(), \u0027P(\u003e=35%)\u0027, (sim\u003e=35).mean(), \u0027P(\u003e=50%)\u0027, (sim\u003e=50).mean())",
"description": "Monte Carlo of plausible September coverage percentages for the Lebanon Flash Appeal 2026, incorporating a probability of upward requirement revision."
},
"target_sub_questions": [
"sq1",
"sq2",
"sq3"
],
"tool_name": "code_execution"
}
]
},
"question": {
"close_time": "2026-08-13T12:00:00Z",
"description": "## Description\nAccording to [Reliefweb](https://reliefweb.int/report/lebanon/lebanon-flash-update-45-escalation-hostilities-lebanon-20-july-2026): \"Humanitarian and protection needs persist in Lebanon, as people experiencing prolonged displacement and those returning to conflict-affected areas continue to require urgent support. While the latest ceasefire announcement led to significant returns of over 700,000 people, ongoing security incidents in southern Lebanon continue to impede safe and sustainable returns, exacerbate protection risks, and disrupt service delivery and infrastructure rehabilitation. Reports of airstrikes, artillery shelling, demolitions and sonic grenades continued daily across South and Nabatieh governorates, including in Bint Jbeil, Marjayoun and Nabatieh districts in Nabatieh Governorate, and Tyre District in South Governorate.\"\n\n`{\"format\": \"bot_tournament_question\", \"info\": {\"hash_id\": \"ed3250409cce2a6e\", \"sheet_id\": \"162\"}}`\n\n## Resolution Criteria\nThis question resolves as the percentage of the \"total requirements of plan\" funded for the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) [Lebanon Flash Appeal 2026](https://fts.unocha.org/plans/1568/summary), as displayed when the page is checked by Metaculus on or after September 2, 2026.",
"open_lower": true,
"open_upper": true,
"q_max": 64.05,
"q_min": 44.95,
"question_type": "numeric",
"title": "What percentage of the total requirements of the 2026 Lebanon Flash Appeal will be funded on September 2, 2026?",
"units": "%"
},
"research": {
"cross_market_brief": "## Cross-Market Signals\n\n### Polymarket\n- \"Will the Fed decrease interest rates by 25 bps after the September 2026 meeting?\" \u2192 Yes: 0.01, Volume: $7.9M\n- \"Will there be no change in Fed interest rates after the September 2026 meeting?\" \u2192 Yes: 0.67, Volume: $6.9M\n- \"Will the Fed increase interest rates by 25 bps after the September 2026 meeting?\" \u2192 Yes: 0.33, Volume: $6.5M\n- \"Will the Fed increase interest rates by 50+ bps after the September 2026 meeting?\" \u2192 Yes: 0.00, Volume: $4.6M\n- \"Will the Fed decrease interest rates by 50+ bps after the September 2026 meeting?\" \u2192 Yes: 0.01, Volume: $4.0M\n- \"Will Shakhtar Donetsk win the 2026-27 UEFA Champions League Championship?\" \u2192 Yes: 0.00, Volume: $4.4M\n- \"US announces end of Iranian blockade by August 15, 2026?\" \u2192 Yes: 0.04, Volume: $2.6M\n- \"Clarity Act (H.R.3633) signed into law in 2026?\" \u2192 Yes: 0.20, Volume: $7.0M\n- \"Fed rate hike in 2026?\" \u2192 Yes: 0.55, Volume: $7.3M\n- \"Will Elon Musk post 120-139 tweets from August 7 to August 14, 2026?\" \u2192 Yes: 0.00, Volume: $286.2K",
"errors": [],
"has_cross_market": true,
"n_errors": 0,
"n_tools": 4,
"tools": [
{
"elapsed_s": 36.77,
"error": null,
"success": true,
"summary": "13 citations",
"tool_name": "claude_news"
},
{
"elapsed_s": 35.99,
"error": null,
"success": true,
"summary": "20 results",
"tool_name": "web_search"
},
{
"elapsed_s": 2.73,
"error": null,
"success": true,
"summary": "18 articles",
"tool_name": "article_search"
},
{
"elapsed_s": 0.24,
"error": null,
"success": true,
"summary": "Monte Carlo of plausible September coverage percentages for ",
"tool_name": "code_execution"
}
]
},
"synthesis": {
"error": null,
"evidence": [
{
"claim": "OCHA Flash Update citing FTS reported the 2026 Lebanon Flash Appeal at 42% funded ($270M of $639.9M) as of July 9, 2026.",
"credibility": 88,
"direction": "UP",
"priced_in": true,
"recency": "DATED",
"source": "web_search",
"strength": "STRONG",
"sub_question_id": "sq1"
},
{
"claim": "Funding progression in June 2026: 32.2% (June 11), 34.2% (June 18), 37% (June 29), i.e. roughly +1 to +2.5 percentage points per week.",
"credibility": 88,
"direction": "UP",
"priced_in": true,
"recency": "DATED",
"source": "web_search",
"strength": "STRONG",
"sub_question_id": "sq1"
},
{
"claim": "Appeal already exceeded 35% coverage by late June 2026 and reached 42% by July 9, well before the September 2 measurement date.",
"credibility": 85,
"direction": "UP",
"priced_in": true,
"recency": "DATED",
"source": "web_search",
"strength": "STRONG",
"sub_question_id": "sq2"
},
{
"claim": "Extrapolating the observed ~1.5 pp/week June\u2013July pace from 42% on July 9 would reach roughly 50-55% by early September, though contribution pace typically decelerates after appeal-period end.",
"credibility": 55,
"direction": "NEUTRAL",
"priced_in": false,
"recency": "DATED",
"source": "web_search",
"strength": "MODERATE",
"sub_question_id": "sq3"
},
{
"claim": "The appeal was already revised upward once, from $308.3M (March) to $639.9M (June 5) covering March\u2013August 2026, halving the reported coverage percentage at the time.",
"credibility": 90,
"direction": "NEUTRAL",
"priced_in": true,
"recency": "DATED",
"source": "web_search",
"strength": "STRONG",
"sub_question_id": "sq4"
},
{
"claim": "OCHA\u0027s Lebanon page accessed around August 2026 still lists $639.9 million as the current total requirement.",
"credibility": 70,
"direction": "UP",
"priced_in": true,
"recency": "RECENT",
"source": "web_search",
"strength": "MODERATE",
"sub_question_id": "sq4"
},
{
"claim": "The revised Flash Appeal covers March\u2013August 2026, meaning the plan period ends just before the September 2 resolution date, creating a decision point for extension or a new appeal.",
"credibility": 80,
"direction": "NEUTRAL",
"priced_in": true,
"recency": "DATED",
"source": "web_search",
"strength": "MODERATE",
"sub_question_id": "sq4"
},
{
"claim": "Ongoing Israeli operations, incursions and strikes in southern Lebanon continued through mid-2026 despite repeated ceasefires, sustaining displacement and humanitarian needs.",
"credibility": 85,
"direction": "NEUTRAL",
"priced_in": true,
"recency": "RECENT",
"source": "article_search",
"strength": "MODERATE",
"sub_question_id": "sq1"
},
{
"claim": "Israel, Lebanon and the US signed a framework agreement on June 26, 2026 described as a first step toward peace, with over 700,000 returns reported by July.",
"credibility": 85,
"direction": "NEUTRAL",
"priced_in": true,
"recency": "RECENT",
"source": "article_search",
"strength": "MODERATE",
"sub_question_id": "sq4"
},
{
"claim": "US funding cuts and USAID dismantlement in 2026 have reportedly hampered humanitarian responses globally, constraining donor pools.",
"credibility": 60,
"direction": "DOWN",
"priced_in": true,
"recency": "DATED",
"source": "article_search",
"strength": "WEAK",
"sub_question_id": "sq1"
},
{
"claim": "A Monte Carlo simulation with assumed parameters produced median coverage of 29% and P(\u003e=35%)=0.35, P(\u003e=50%)=0.11, notably below the observed July 42% reading.",
"credibility": 25,
"direction": "NEUTRAL",
"priced_in": false,
"recency": "VERY_RECENT",
"source": "code_execution",
"strength": "WEAK",
"sub_question_id": "sq2"
},
{
"claim": "No direct scrape of the FTS plan 1568 summary page was obtained; all coverage figures are secondhand via OCHA situation reports.",
"credibility": 50,
"direction": "NEUTRAL",
"priced_in": false,
"recency": "VERY_RECENT",
"source": "web_search",
"strength": "WEAK",
"sub_question_id": "sq1"
}
],
"information_gaps": [
"No direct FTS plan-1568 reading for August 2026",
"No base rate for post-period-end funding accrual on flash appeals",
"Unknown whether a September\u2013December 2026 appeal/revision is planned",
"No data on specific large pledges (Gulf, EU, ECHO) in July\u2013August"
],
"key_uncertainties": [
"Whether requirements are revised upward again before Sept 2",
"Pace of contribution recording after the August plan end",
"Whether FTS retroactive reporting boosts totals significantly",
"Effect of ceasefire/framework deal on donor urgency"
],
"n_evidence": 12
},
"timings": {
"forecast": 38.94,
"plan": 26.86,
"research": 36.77,
"synthesis": 18.74
}
}